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Sovereignty Crises
George Edmondson and Klaus Mladek
We are fortunate to find ourselves living in interesting times: times not sim-
ply of change or transition but of universal crisis.1 History is full of crises, of 
course. Yet compared to its predecessors, today’s crisis feels more permanent 
and enveloping because it lacks the one certainty they shared: that it will, for 
better or worse, have an end. When the term crisis acquired its contemporary 
meaning (as a time of social upheaval and epochal transformation) in the late 
eighteenth century, “the only unknown quantity” was “when and how” the 
crisis in question would be resolved, and by what means.2 Today, our ubiqui-
tous crisis consciousness appears to have cast such assurance in doubt. Alain 
Badiou can usually be counted on to defend robust revolutionary solutions, 
yet even he contends that the promise of a remedy— an alternative political 
vision, a new praxis, or a compelling symbolic fiction— “is in a state of total 
crisis.”3 (Which is exactly why the search for such a fiction remains an urgent 
political project, as we argue here.) Meanwhile, as if confirming Arendt’s 
observation that there is “no longer any ‘uncivilized’ spot on earth” and that 
“we have really started to live in One World,” the symptoms of crisis have 
spread boundlessly to become, in a manner very different from what Carl 
Schmitt envisioned, the new nomos of the earth.4 How far does crisis extend? 
Far enough that even the traditional concept of krísis, with its spatiotemporal 
limits and inherent faith in resolution, has itself been thrown into a crisis 
powerful enough to affect the category of the political as such: its ordering 
function, its concept of historical and organizing space, even, as the surging 
critical interest in bio- and zoopolitics attests, Aristotle’s definition of the 
human as the only political animal. More than two millennia on, the very 
origins of the political are so thoroughly in crisis that the margins of the 
apolis, stalked by the beast and the god, have once again come into view.
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To its credit, contemporary political theory has succumbed to neither 
resignation nor quietism in the face of crisis. On the contrary, a generation 
of scholars is right now mulling over an array of new political thoughts 
and forms of life— the outgrowth of a renewed inquiry into the origin and 
genealogy of political ideas and practices that might yet prove capable of 
reorienting our future, even in spite of their troubled histories.5 Yet despite 
this enormous effort, nothing major seems to have changed in the global 
political order. The Western democracies have not been swept by a revolu-
tionary tidal wave, while the riots and revolutions of the non- Western world 
are local and easily contained. Nor do we find many reasons for optimism. 
In a time of political stalemate and unfettered global capitalism— a time 
when even the smallest advances in legislation seem impossible and complicit 
parliamentary systems are dominated by often indistinguishable parties that 
join together to mouth the vacuous abstractions of an outmoded political 
vocabulary— there may be many new words and ideas, but there is little ma-
terial change. Instead, a crisis mode, crouched and paralyzing, affects nearly 
every field in nearly every segment of life.
That is where the essays gathered together here come in. There was once 
a time, let us recall, when the sphere of crisis was “conceptually fused” with 
that of critique.6 Etymologically, both terms derive from the Greek word 
κρίσις, or krísis, meaning to differentiate, to judge, to select, to decide, to sep-
arate; both capture the sense that a situation is at a crucial turning point— 
that a critical diagnosis needs to be made, a judgment rendered, and a course 
of action charted. What we now think of as the sharp distinction between 
crisis as objective event and critique as subjective engagement— between cri-
sis as the concept of an occurrence and critique as an ad hoc practice, part 
intellectual, part moral, part material- interventionist— doesn’t appear until 
the eighteenth century, when it emerges as a corollary to the development of 
our modern concepts of history and the subject. But in fact the two concepts 
had begun to separate long before then, with the result that, over time, krísis 
came to denote little more than administrative and legal judgments made in 
the interests of governmental crisis management: a decisionist consciousness 
focused on delimiting a more encompassing crisis.
This incremental fusion of crisis with the practical dimension of govern-
ing would not go unchallenged, however. In the eighteenth century there 
begins to grow a sense, imperceptible even to some of the radical thinkers 
who advance it, that the only practice capable of counteracting the drift 
toward managerial krísis, with its merely restorative forms of critique, was 
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the neglected philological- philosophical form of critique, now given a new 
force by the epoch’s transformative- revolutionary crisis. Rooted in the philo-
logical art of judging texts practiced by the criticus or grammaticus, this sub-
jective dimension of crisis had long stayed in the shadows, a victim of its 
own potentiality. For even when not overtly political, both philology and 
philosophy assured the perpetual recurrence of crisis, in the sense that one 
form of crisis, critical judgment, held the potential to throw another form 
of crisis, the decision making called for by governing, into a third form of 
crisis, the turmoil brought about by potentially infinite division. Where the 
medical, theological, and legal forms of critique sought to rejuvenate an 
order in crisis by reforming it, improving it, and consolidating it, this other 
mode of self- encountering— or, better, enfolding— critique fell back upon 
itself in the furor of its own power: a critique forever in crisis. The practice 
of critique, to round it off to a formula, made it possible to arrest decisionist 
krísis through the divisive act of piling up crises.
To the extent that they share anything at all, the essays assembled here 
extend that practice of enfolding critique by violently forcing critique back 
into crisis, restoring both terms to their common etymology precisely by 
continuing the paradoxical tradition, begun in the eighteenth century, of 
dividing critique from crisis just enough to allow critique to put all forms 
of krísis, including its own, into permanent crisis. Simply stated, the essays 
in this collection model the different ways that critique might reinject crisis, 
understood as a time of tumult and upheaval brought about by a potentially 
infinite partitioning, into krísis, understood as a species of determinate de-
cision and judgment. For only so violent a gesture is enough to separate— to 
put into crisis— the conjunction between the juridical dimension of crisis, 
with its tendency to couch lawmaking violence as managerial decision mak-
ing, and the theological dimension, with its faith that all time is a crisis 
heading toward a resolution, a Last Judgment. In this regard the essays are 
especially timely, insofar as they remind us that the current time of transition 
in which we live is not an eschaton, not some sort of providential revelation. 
To believe as much would be to fall back into judgment time, as if today 
were only an interval in linear time, an interregnum. Our present moment 
is something else entirely. More than a simple transition from one mode of 
governing to another, ours is a time of nonsimultaneity. To actualize crisis 
is thus to extract our time— not the end of time toward which we march, 
but the time of the end, our intensely historical time, charged with an addi-
tional time that is genuine crisis time: a time out of joint, a noncoincidence 
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with representations of time. All time— historical, salvific, evolutionary— is 
tinged with a more fundamental form of crisis, one that expresses how thor-
oughly humankind is out of sync with the horizon of a last judgment and 
world- historical chronos. And it is our crisis judgment, achieved through our 
political constructions, that conjures that additional crisis- time. As Hamlet 
says to Horatio, “It will be short. The interim’s mine” (act 5, scene 2, line 
78). Interim time partitions the time of crisis maintained by the allegiance 
between the juridical and the political.7
To carry out the work of that partitioning, our contributors turn to a 
variety of conceptual wedges: the impolitical; the impersonal; the category 
of flesh; the worst; an overturning of the idea of origin; a critique of an-
cient nomos; a pluralized subject; a theatrical dispersion of sovereignty; the 
rebirth of a different history. Countering the impulse to reduce politics to 
modes of management and activism, Sovereignty in Ruins insists on the ne-
cessity of a theoretical political act prior to what have traditionally been re-
garded as the practical ends of politics: a voiding in the midst of both nomos 
and politics in order to alter the very coordinates and vocabularies through 
which political action might take place.
The volume is divided into three parts, beginning with our own long 
essay, “Natural History: Toward a Politics of Crisis.” Legible both as a free- 
standing meditation and as a considered response to the questions opened 
up by its ten companion chapters, this first essay constellates a group of 
thinkers—Kant, Marx, Foucault, Adorno, Kafka, and Paolo Virno— in or-
der to theorize the central role that natural history plays, both as master 
category and driving force, in the development of a politics of crisis. For us, 
natural history is more than, or not only, the mutually negating dialectic it 
was for Adorno. Natural history indicates the movements of a physionomos 
detectable, for example, in the eternal perishing of groundlessness, in Kant’s 
indestructible and unforgettable will to revolution, in the ungovernable 
form- of- life enacted by Foucault’s “critical ontology of ourselves,” in the laws 
of fermentation that, according to Marx, govern even the capitalist and his 
products, and in the enigmatic comings and goings of the creature Odradek 
and the fanatical accountings of the bureaucrat- god Poseidon.
The volume’s second part, “Italian Affirmations,” opens with an English 
translation of a short book from 2010 by the Italian historian of political 
thought Carlo Galli, Left and Right: Why They Still Make Sense. In his force-
ful intervention into contemporary politics, Galli explains that the designa-
tions left and right must be preserved, as they are names for different rela-
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tions to the political origin. Whereas Noberto Bobbio’s 1994 book Left and 
Right: Signification of a Political Distinction locates the source of the left- right 
indistinction in the crisis of parliamentary democracy after the collapse of 
communism, Galli detects a much deeper crisis. Drawing on Schmitt’s ge-
nealogy of modern politics, Galli argues that the real source of the left- right 
distinction is the incomplete and accidental manner in which modern poli-
tics inherits the very premodern political forms it presumes to overturn and 
reject. Yet even though contemporary politics might remain bound up with 
an ambiguous political heritage, it nonetheless inhabits institutional archi-
tectures and political terminologies that point to a new chain of active sub-
jectivities and conflictual political spaces outside state politics, ones in which 
the traditional distinctions begin to get crowded out by emerging questions 
of ecology, biopolitical potentialities, and new rebellious collectives.
Pitched somewhere between essay and conversation, the section’s next 
piece, “Politics in the Present,” records an exchange in which the voice of the 
Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito merges with that of his interlocutor, 
Roberto Ciccarelli, to create a “third person.” The two figures, at once di-
verging and blending, present a succinct yet comprehensive account of many 
of the concepts, such as biopolitics, the impersonal, and the impolitical, that 
have begun to pervade our political terminology and that inform many of 
the essays assembled here. The result is more than just a précis of Esposito’s 
work to date, however (although it is that). It is also an experiment in a com-
mon search for, and presentation of, the crisis in our theological, philosophi-
cal, and juridical tradition that will activate the philosophy of immanence 
and affirmative biopolitics lying dormant there, patiently awaiting its vin-
dication in contemporary thought. At a time when political theory seeks an 
alternative to the juridical concept of the person that for too long sustained 
a practice of subordination and exclusion, it is no accident that Esposito’s 
works should be increasingly studied in the Anglophone academy and his 
philosophy of immunity and life more widely received.
In his wide- ranging essay “Cujusdam nigri & scabiosi Brasiliani: Rancière 
and Derrida,” Alberto Moreiras first addresses a blind spot in Hardt and 
Negri’s concept of the multitude and in Marx’s view of history and class 
struggle: the almost inextricable knot between war and production that un-
derlies the question of revolution as well as much of contemporary leftist 
politics. Are revolutionary movements still part of what Foucault identified 
as the modern “ontology of war,” making them a result of antagonisms in-
herent in the development of productive forces in the biopolitical economy 
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of capitalism, or can we detect in them the silhouettes of an alternative po-
litical theory that could end politics as war— and as production and self- 
production? According to Moreiras, Rancière’s critique of Derrida’s democ-
racy to come, that it advocates a messianic ethics at the expense of political 
practice and democratic eruption, overlooks (like much of post- Althusserian 
or neocommunist polemics against Derrida) the degree to which a politics of 
deconstruction has already destroyed pious visions of history and progress. 
Moreiras’s essay arrives at a defense of Derrida’s democratic politics and his 
ethics of hospitality, with its insistence on the perilous conflicts and poten-
tials that arise with the entrance of the visitor, the friend, or the stranger.
Rounding off the section, Rei Terada’s “Pasolini’s Acceptance” confronts 
us with an almost unbearable thought: that politics as such, let alone leftist 
political activism and revolutionary transformation, is so thoroughly futile 
and such a farce that a certain posture of acceptance is all that is left to 
us. Analyzing Pasolini’s film Salò alongside his essay “Repudiation” allows 
Terada to track the bewildering intensity of the demand made, and the in-
cendiary effect created, when a deeply political thinker and artist begins to 
think the unthinkable and accept the unacceptable: that politics has irrevo-
cably ceased to exist and what remains is nothing but the convergence of 
freedom and slavery, autonomy and control. Terada shows that Pasolini’s 
complete repudiation of the nullity of Italian politics, the vacuity of its po-
litical parties, and the disappearance of the people in homogenized capitalist 
society is neither one more postpolitical reflection on the end of politics nor 
another search for alternative or impolitical areas of political struggle. In 
Terada’s account, Pasolini’s adaptation to the given constitutes a new rela-
tion to the damaged world, one carried out through a strangely provocative 
power of hostility toward the status quo. Pasolini’s cinematic cruelty, like his 
unsparingly critical essay, offers Terada a point of departure for a thought of 
the worst that dwells outside politics after its utter catastrophe.
“The Endgames of Sovereignty,” the volume’s third part, revolves around 
certain lacunae in political philosophy that continue to obsess political thought 
even as they offer alternatives to its current configuration. Adam Sitze’s “Re-
opening the Plato Question” goes right to the heart of the matter by revisit-
ing political philosophy itself, that unprecedented genre of thought inaugu-
rated by Plato’s Laws under the auspices of that most imperial of institutions, 
the colony. Sitze’s essay focuses on the conceptual aftershocks stemming 
from book 3 of Laws, where Clinias reveals to his interlocutors that he has 
been commissioned to settle a new colony. As Sitze shows, the philosophi-
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cal activity of inventing a new political order— as if such a thing could be 
instituted entirely from scratch, as if philosophical lawgiving and wisdom 
could forgo the memory of past civil strife and the already existing arrange-
ment of oikos— will silently shape the course of exploration in the Laws and 
in much of colonialist thought after Plato. Philosophical nomos suddenly 
acquires a paradigmatic and, if the accusations Badiou levels at the law giving 
apparatuses of late Plato are correct, disastrous name in the emerging dis-
course of political philosophy, a name born from the immunitarian logic 
of colonial thinking: to solve the war within the home by constructing the 
space of a home away from home. The essay focuses on two readings of the 
Laws, Strauss’s and Badiou’s, that appear to be pitted against one another 
but that are in fact, as Sitze shows, mutually implicated in a tradition where 
the relation between law and philosophy is understood as a nonrelation, “an 
unbridgeable distance between philosophy’s open question (‘what is?’) and 
law’s definitive declaration (‘what is’).”
Eric L. Santner’s “The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the 
Endgames of Sovereignty” identifies one possible name for the crisis described 
in this introduction: flesh. Expanding upon Kantorowicz’s study of political 
theology by tracing the dispersal of sovereignty in postmedieval Europe 
from the body of the king to the flesh of the people, Santner shows how the 
flesh that was once contained by sovereign krísis now floods the modern 
scene, overwhelming and deranging it. This, Santner concludes, constitutes 
the basic dilemma of our present moment: having rid ourselves of sover-
eignty’s representational regime, we can no longer figure out what to do 
with the flesh bequeathed to us by the demise of krísis, leaving us with a 
crisis (an “investiture crisis,” as Santner puts it) that the so- called sciences of 
immanence are no longer capable of managing.
Judith Butler’s essay, “Arendt: Thinking Cohabitation and the Dispersion 
of Sovereignty,” takes up Arendt’s account of the Eichmann trial in order to 
derive, out of the text’s rhetorical and theatrical dimensions, an imperative 
regarding the rights of cohabitation. In a dramatic turn of her court report, 
Arendt invents a scene in which she assumes the role of a judge to directly 
confront Eichmann in the second person with her own explanation for why 
he deserves to die. Arendt accuses Eichmann of having abrogated a funda-
mental principle of human rights that, to this day, no sovereign state has 
been able to articulate: no one has the right to choose with whom to cohabit 
the earth. Butler reads this right in terms of the right, grounded neither in 
natural nor in positive law, that Arendt elaborates in The Origins of  Totalitar-
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ianism: the “right to have rights.” Arendt asserts this distinctly social right 
on the presupposition of a plural subject able to put pressure, through its in-
herent performative power, on the status of the sovereign exception. Could 
we even go so far as to rethink the performative more fundamentally, as a 
dispersion of sovereignty? The cohabitation on earth, and the internal com-
pany we keep, are for Butler the two forms of socializing plurality through 
which Arendt promotes a form of federalist democracy able to guide us be-
yond the sovereign exception as it is conceived in Schmitt and Agamben.
Andrew Norris begins “Beyond the State of Exception” with a critique 
of the tendency, common to Schmitt and Agamben (and their followers), to 
reduce the phenomenon of sovereignty to a largely unhistorical structural 
category. Opposing itself to the recent critical trend toward understanding 
sovereignty as the inevitable logical effect of conceptual conflict, Norris’s 
essay advocates for a Hegelian analysis of the concrete universals and actual 
institutions that generate the moment of sovereign decision. Norris’s reading 
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right not only explicates the universalizing ethical 
life of a modern society; it goes further by arguing that only a discussion of 
subjectivity, irony, and evil allows us to deduce the monarch’s exceptional 
executive powers from Hegel’s thought. Hegel deserves credit, Norris ar-
gues, for being the first to fully grasp the political potential of Socrates’s 
destructive irony for our times. In a manner very different from the abstract 
self- determination of romantic irony, Socrates asserts his daemonic subjec-
tivity as a substantive universality in excess of the ethical life of the Greek 
polis and as a true political art capable of radicalizing the truth of a Sophist 
project still pressing today: how to create discursive communities and other 
commons in an atheistic spiritual universe wherein man is the measure. By 
shifting back and forth between ancient Greece, nineteenth- century Prussia, 
and contemporary American politics, Norris’s study mobilizes Socrates and 
Hegel as legal, political, and ethical resources for a dialectical alternative to 
the decisionist and logical concept of sovereignty.
Cary Wolfe’s essay, “Humans and (Other) Animals in a Biopolitical Frame,” 
works dialectically to put into crisis the central terms of postsovereignty: 
subject, life, living, norm, value, equivalence. Sifting through the work of Fou-
cault, Esposito, Derrida, Levi Bryant, and Martin Hägglund in search of a 
nonexclusionary, nonimmunitarian who (neither human nor nonhuman) to 
whom things might matter, Wolfe ends by making a case for a paradoxically 
responsible decisionism, a decisionism that endlessly limits itself by closing 
off any recourse to a perspective outside the frame of biopolitics. By doing 
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away with immunity and its reciprocal trappings, Wolfe suggests, we could 
arrive at an affirmative, and thus far more radical, vision of biopolitics and 
community, one predicated not on a strict economy of equilibrium but on an 
uneconomical apportionment of valuation, perspective, and responsibility.
Finally, Carsten Strathausen offers us, in “Thing- Politics and Science,” 
one possible way of practicing a politics of crisis. Ranging widely (the essay 
touches upon epistemology, the continuing importance of the university as 
a privileged site of critical engagement, the limitations of Deleuzean sin-
gularity, the siren song of vitalism, and the challenges that science poses to 
the so- called new materialism), Strathausen makes good his point that con-
cepts, too, are objects— and not just objects but objects in relation, objects 
in conflict. That point is essential, Strathausen argues, for counteracting the 
incoherence generated, in the first place, by thing- politics’ overemphasis on 
the “cooperative potential of concepts” and, in the second, by its reduction 
of humans to things. Not only are humans irreducible to things, Strathausen 
concludes; we remain, as we were for the scientific materialism of the (old) 
Marxism, the agents of history— that is, the agents of crisis.
One premise of this collection is that a crisis has seized the inherited 
terms of politics, terms like sovereignty, state, liberty, party system, territory, and 
national community, to name but a few. That should not be taken to mean, 
however, that we endorse the view that we live in an age only of confusion, 
accelerated frenzy, and dread.8 Our belief is that we live in an age of confu-
sion, accelerated frenzy, and dread that is at the same time an age of delight. 
Admittedly, it is easy to be awed and dumbstruck by one’s own feeling of 
impotence. But dread, submitting as it does to the confusion supposedly en-
gendered by mobility and flux, only perpetuates the contemporary assump-
tion of an existential struggle for scarce resources and places.9 Meanwhile, 
thought incessantly moves, not only to think something new, but to think 
“the same things differently.”10 Thought itself— and what should a critic do 
but think and write?— is an agent of crisis, bringing with it both the small 
shifts and large ruptures that have begun to manifest (or, in some cases, re-
assert) themselves today, whether in the form of riots, as Badiou holds, or in 
more taciturn modes of withdrawal.11 Crisis ought not to be misconstrued 
as an opportunity for innovation or as the ecstatic vision of an eschatological 
transition time. Nor should crisis be reduced to an essentially capitalist and 
bourgeois idea, an obstacle we must traverse in order to realize “the auton-
omy of biopolitical production” proper to the multitude.12 To fully assume 
the consequences of crisis— to wield its positive modes of destruction— will 
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require more than viewing it merely as a setback in progressive development 
or as a symptom of the impending collapse of so- called disaster capitalism. 
The “logic of crisis,” as Paolo Virno has argued, both emerges from and 
affects the crisis of the underlying grammar that sustains the ineluctable 
background of our customary political thought and life.13 That descriptive 
logic of crisis, designed to explore how moments of crisis dissolve the other-
wise unexamined ties between what are habitually seen as facts of life and 
the grammar of norms, can help prepare the thinking of an affirmative mode 
of crisis, or what could be called a politics of crisis. In such a politics, crisis 
would be understood not simply as a perilous situation to be overcome but 
as the unleashing of a commonizing energy to be used. This understanding 
might then allow us to think the contemporary manifestation of the politi-
cal with reference to the internal, implicit crisis from which it continues to 
emerge and whose changing grammar the essays collected in this volume 
set out, in the interest of enacting the politics of crisis inherent in critique, 
to explicate.
For just as Nietzsche feared that “we are not getting rid of God because 
we still believe in grammar,” we cannot rid our politics of figures of dom-
ination and sovereignty if we continue to believe in a grammar that has 
sustained our obsession with them.14 A situation of crisis irrevocably returns 
us to the fundamental questions and terms themselves: to their grammatical 
organization, the instances of their enunciation, the origins and scenes in 
which they emerge, the responses and judgments they compel. In short, cri-
sis returns us to critique.15 The very form of crisis demands the patient labor 
of a critique bereft of routine answers, recipes, robust affects, and actions— 
 a critique, in short, mindful of the origin and genealogy it shares with 
crisis. There are precedents for this: Badiou reminding us of the force of 
declaration and appearance, Deleuze and Esposito challenging us to invent 
political terms worthy of the event, Agamben emphasizing the “poetic mo-
ment” in the terminology of every political thought. If Agamben is right 
that behind the “irrevocable exodus from any sovereignty” lies an accord 
between a power of speech or Marx’s “general intellect” and political life— if 
indeed there can be found a “form- of- life” that does not sever physis and bios 
from nomos and logos16— then it is to be hoped that such acts of naming and 
thinking will force new practices and living contexts to emerge (and vice 
versa) until we reach the moment when a form of life converges with experi-
ence and the power of thought. Collectively making up a political poetry of 
thought, these thought acts hold the potential to move us beyond the false 
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alternative between thought and action toward something truly novel: an 
active theoretical practice in which the power of speech and the expressive-
ness of the living and the dead join forces to seize the surrounding contexts 
devised to immunize against them.
At any rate, they bring us to the impetus for this collection. Critique 
and the sovereign function share a long and intimate history together, one 
born from their common root in crisis. The sovereign function has emerged 
repeatedly from crisis in order to quell crisis, including the crisis of the sov-
ereign’s own precarious nature as mortal creature. When Bodin and Hobbes 
ushered the modern sovereign onto the political stage in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, it was as a political crisis manager in times of civil war. 
But that rootedness in crisis also meant that the sovereign became answer-
able to critique, which is itself intimately linked to the diagnosis and man-
agement of crisis. Given their shared history, it is entirely fitting that critique 
and the sovereign function in its various guises (as state of exception, empire, 
the master’s discourse, and so on) should also share a profound irony. Both 
have come to be regarded as, at best, vanishing forces and, at worst, obstacles 
still to be overcome; and yet both have been revived, even reanimated, by 
the efforts made to banish them once and for all.17 The nature of this ironic 
resuscitation has added another twist to Foucault’s famous pronouncement 
that “in political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of 
the king.”18 Strictly speaking, Foucault meant by this that we continue to 
live under the sway of the repressive hypothesis and the idea of negative 
liberties, and a generation of theorists took up that line of interpretation by 
eschewing the sovereign and turning their critical attentions instead to the 
analysis of biopolitical or governmental power and disciplinary regimes. It 
is no longer enough to say, however, that our clamoring for liberty is itself 
an implicit recognition of the king’s caput. For the fact remains that the 
dread and pleasure once associated with the sovereign have not just been 
transferred to governmentality; they have also been perfected there. Our 
continuous attempts to conjure ever more sinister and productive forma-
tions of power— the disciplinary, the biopolitical, the teletechnic, the tech-
noscientific, the economic societies, or what Deleuze calls the “societies of 
control”— what are these if not an unmistakable index for how much we 
mourn the corpse of the traditional form of politics? It is as though we were 
in need of an even more dreadful and refined power, one that would finally 
remedy the insufficiencies of a crisis- ridden sovereign and fill the gap of his 
vacated throne (a frightening vision indeed if thought to its radical end: the 
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throne itself missing from the place of lack) so that we might reconfirm our 
pleasure narrative of tragic struggle, failure, and overcoming. It is as though 
we wanted nothing more than to believe that we can still resist, subvert, 
strike blows, or invent counter- dispositifs as a form of crossed obedience or 
loyal disobedience to a superior force.
So let us propose another way of interpreting our failure to cut off the 
head of the king: rather than assuming that we have moved into a post- 
Westphalian age ushered in by the demise of the sovereign, let us recognize, 
as much of contemporary Italian philosophy has done, that the king, em-
pire, and sovereign powers are all alive and well even in and as crisis— that 
politics remains sovereign so long as we remain enthralled by a repetition 
compulsion compelling us to redeem crisis. From its inception, politics has 
assumed different permutations of the sovereign function, from the point of 
command above the social field to widely dispersed apparatus, from premod-
ern sovereignty to contemporary governmentality.19 If it is not so easy, then, 
to throw off the sovereign function, it is precisely because the sovereign, like 
political economy, is infinitely protean; each one can quickly assume the 
guise of the other. There is a sovereignty effect at work in the economy, just 
as there is an administrative organization and providential, eschatological 
direction— an oikonomia— inherent in the sovereign function. To interrogate 
the one does not then mean evading the other. On the contrary, we are 
tempted to view the dispositif of sovereignty itself as a sovereign apparatus, 
one might even say the apparatus of apparatuses (the exceptional appara-
tus and the apparatus of exception)— that is, as the first, primordial, and 
generalized form of what Foucault circumscribed with the term dispositif.20 
Foucault is ordinarily hailed as the chief thinker of the transitions of power 
formations, the visionary critic of networks of social micropractices. Yet he 
early on detected the ways in which sovereignty has the capacity to morph, 
to adapt itself to any new political economy by appropriating emerging dia-
grams (the disciplinary, the biopolitical, political economy in general) and 
overcoding them once again with its concrete strategic demands and mech-
anisms. Not only is “the problem of sovereignty . . . more acute than ever,” 
according to Foucault. The problem of sovereignty is “never posed with 
greater force” than once its premodern forms begin to wane: once it needs 
fresh general principles to function alongside the idea of the social contract 
and the general will, once it needs more room to maneuver within and above 
the “art of government.”21
The enormous staying power of sovereignty is due, then, not simply to 
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the fact that it has proved impossible to root out. It is due to the fact that sov-
ereignty is continuously returning.22 Sovereignty might well be regarded, in 
fact, as the figure of return, the creature of our repetition compulsion: “The 
king is dead, long live the king! The king is dead, long live the king!”23 Sov-
ereignty, invented as a secularized successor to divine representation, to its 
oikonomia and providence, at once compensates for the breakdown of those 
same medieval categories and also perpetuates them, through a tropological 
exportation, in modern contexts.24 As sovereignty’s seriality— that long liv-
ing in continuous dying— suggests, however, there remains one more reason 
why we have yet to cut off the head of the king: because it is more consoling 
to maintain the illusion that we can leave behind an interrogation of sov-
ereignty effects than to confront the possibility that the sovereign function 
might be constitutively ruined— that it might have always existed in a state 
of continuous perishing. The attraction of postsovereignty is that it means 
not having to face up to the ruination, the perpetual downfall, of the sover-
eign function. Following the example of Dario Gentili’s anthology La crisi 
del politico, which assembles the most interesting contributions published 
between 1981 and 1986 in the journal Il Centauro, one aim of this collection is 
to reinvigorate the nexus of crisis and critique by inserting strife, continuous 
perishing, and a revolutionary reordering into the different permutations 
assumed by the sovereign function. This might take the form of intervening 
in the current moment of transition, when the stars seem to have aligned 
around a new manifestation of empire and sovereignty— of exposing that 
transition to the crisis out of which it emerged and that it is called upon to 
manage and heal. The goal here would be to deploy genuine crisis in order 
to thwart any smooth passage toward a new configuration of the triangle 
of governmentality, sovereignty, and discipline that, in Foucault’s analysis, 
constitutes contemporary political economy. But the critic might also return 
to other moments of transition within sovereignty in order to disrupt them 
after the fact, thereby drawing out the permanence of crisis and the force 
of negation. Now, though, that permanence and force would constitute a 
politics of crisis and not simply a descriptive logic of crisis. The thought acts 
that make up Sovereignty in Ruins are intended, in part, to help facilitate that 
transition from descriptive logic to forceful politics, from an understanding 
of crisis to its affirmation.
Our interest in permanent crisis was inspired in part by Lacan’s reaction 
to the events of May 1968. In a self- interview included in Seminar XVII: The 
Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan breaks down his students’ revolutionary 
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outburst to a basic fallacy: any revolutionary aspiration rooted in or insti-
gated by experience cannot break free from experience and is therefore des-
tined to end in a master— that is to say, in an embodiment, a practitioner and 
beneficiary, of experience. If your aspirations are directed toward a master, 
Lacan warns, you will get one.25 Ordinarily, this moment in Seminar XVII 
is invoked to emphasize the passage from S1 to S2, the master’s discourse to 
the university discourse. But it might more accurately be read as a critique, 
not simply of activism or the university, but of the superficial way in which 
they are pitted against one another, as if they were not already mutually 
implicated. What matters in the passage is not the transition from S1 to S2; 
what matters is the transformation of the form of knowledge manifested in 
the university— the university you don’t leave when you hit the street in pro-
test. If it is structures that walk the streets, not people, then the aim must be 
to revolutionize those structures. Activists get so agitated by the enjoyment 
exhibited by S1/S2 that they in turn risk exhibiting the form of enjoyment, the 
form of a, necessary for their own way of suturing the master with knowl-
edge. They risk becoming a spectacle of enjoyment, when what they need to 
be doing is making an exodus from the scene. In this, Lacan agrees with Fou-
cault and Derrida (and Agamben, for that matter) that the traditional view 
of revolution, with its grand narratives and its particular modes of seizing 
power, must be dismantled in order to remain faithful to the idea of the revo-
lution. What is needed is a revolution, be it philosophical, political, or poetic, 
of the revolution. What is needed, in short, is something along the lines of 
what Marx calls, against the drunken spectacle of the bourgeois revolution, 
the proletarian revolution: something critical, repetitious, self- encountering, 
accumulative until it reaches the point of no return: a true crisis.26
How is such an idea of revolution to be accomplished? It cannot be di-
rected at the sovereign, the target of traditional revolution. But neither can it 
have as its aim the fantasy of a mastery without the master, a fantasy rooted 
in the belief that all we have to do to cut off the head of the king is abandon 
a dream of freedom and turn our critical attentions to the interrogation of 
disciplinary practices, governmental bureaucracies, and biopolitical disposi-
tifs. Foucault makes a compelling case that “to govern means . . . to govern 
things” and that “the things . . . with which government is to be concerned 
are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with 
those things” that surround and define them: wealth and resources, customs 
and habits, accidents and misfortunes.27 If sovereignty is the administration 
of territory, government is the disposing of such things. But even a cursory 
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glance at the woodcut of Hobbes’s leviathan or a consideration of Foucault’s 
own claim that the sovereign makes die will suggest that sovereignty, too, 
is not only a disposing and organizing of things, including people; it is 
a particular relation of forces and is itself inscribed into the microphysical 
diagram of things. Sovereignty is the habitation of those things of which 
government disposes. What governmentality and sovereignty share, then, 
is a rootedness in a realm of things. That such a realm is thought to require 
any form of disposing at all should alert us, however, to the way it threatens 
to stray from the codes and norms of an imposed economy. Sovereignty and 
governmentality are both engrossed in the life of things; but since the lives 
of those things are given over to an energy of passing, an energy of crisis, 
then it follows that both governmentality and sovereignty, each of which is 
dependent on the destiny of things, are in turn given over to the force that 
drives the passing of things (to the point that even prior forms of govern-
mentality and sovereignty become things). Theorists of governmentality tell 
us to forget sovereignty. Theorists of sovereignty counter that government 
and sovereignty have always been fused. Our aim is to work through both 
of those categories in order to touch upon the realm of ungovernable things 
that persists in each. As we see it, the challenge for the critic is to push 
beyond twinned fantasies— the fantasy, on the one hand, of an efficacious 
sovereign who paradoxically ensures our freedom to critique him and, on 
the other, the fantasy that there could ever be mastery without a master— 
and instead restore to the position of sovereign function a ruined, eternally 
perishing sovereign, an impossible master. Critique must ground the sover-
eign in a particular form of crisis, one rooted in that continuous perishing of 
social formations and things through which otherwise imperceptible forces 
in history assert themselves. Those unseen forces— political, yet positively 
nonexistent in either time or space; neither a simple negating of politics nor 
a positive affirmation of it but a canceled trace within the political; taciturn 
and sedimentary, reverberating in politics without being fully acknowledged 
or articulated— go by various names in this collection: apoikos, flesh, the in-
frapolitical, the impolitical. Following Marx and the Frankfurt School, we 
choose to call the historical form of those transient forces natural history. For 
it is natural history that, as we shall go on to argue in our own contribution 
to Sovereignty in Ruins, dissolves not only the link cementing the political 
subject to S1 and S2 but also the link cementing sovereignty to the economy. 
Marx, contemplating the creative destruction practiced by the bourgeoi-
sie, marveled at how “all that is solid melts into air.”28 Natural history does 
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something similar, but in a different element. The solid bond between the 
juridical and economic rationalities held in place by the sovereign, natural 
history grinds into dust.
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 1 In the last paragraph of his “Postface” to the second edition of Capital, Marx 
alludes to just such a “universal” or “general crisis,” a crisis measurable by the 
“universality of its field of action and the intensity of its impact.” Marx, Capital, 
vol. 1, 103.
 2 Koselleck, Critique and Crisis, 127: “The eventual solution is uncertain, but the 
end of the crisis, a change in the existing situation— threatening, feared and 
eagerly anticipated— is not. The question of the historical future is inherent in 
the crisis.”
 3 Badiou, Philosophy for Militants, 43.
 4 Arendt, The Origins of  Totalitarianism, 297.
 5 Meta- , para- , imp- , infra- , bio- , ecopolitics, and so on.
 6 Koselleck, “Crisis,” 359.
 7 Our thinking here is indebted to Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains, 
esp. 62 – 69.
xThinkers of biopolitics such as Nikolas Rose, Bruce Braun, Paolo Virno, and An-
tonio Negri proceed from the common assumption that the workings of a dark, 
fearful biopolitical capitalism necessarily generate its obverse, an affirmative po-
tential in which the mobility and flux of molecular life are the direct expression 
of an enormous productive power inherent in capitalism and are also capable of 
overthrowing it. The limitation of such a premise, as we see it, is that it cannot 
do much more than recognize dread, albeit with the added hope that within 
that dread there lies the potential for recombination— that dread is “radically 
open, full of surprises and unexpected forms.” Taking the world as it is, these 
thinkers try to turn it further, in the direction of something like communist 
capitalism. Dread, they seem to believe, can be turned to our advantage in the 
production of a biopolitical commons. Unfortunately, this full extension of the 
affective register does not fundamentality sever its connection to the produc-
tivity paradigm. The similarity between biocapitalism and an affirmative bio-
politics remains too great; rather than working through the distinctions, these 
thinkers make those distinctions indistinguishable. See, for example, Braun’s 
“Biopolitics and the Molecularization of Life,” esp. 17 – 18, in which the author 
tries to work through the fear and dread that biocapitalist rhetoric exploits but 
that can also be used to articulate “the virtuality of molecu lar life” (18).
 9 See Adorno’s formula #34, “Johnny- Head- in- Air,” in Minima Moralia: “The 
almost insoluble task is to let neither the power of others, nor your own power-
lessness, stupefy us” (57).
 10 Foucault, “For an Ethic of Discomfort,” 444.
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Natural History:
Toward a Politics of Crisis
George Edmondson and Klaus Mladek
Virno
Beneath our built environment of cultural habits and rules, behind our “or-
ganization of work and solid communicative habits,” between the furrows 
of every form of life, there persists a substratum of human uncertainty and 
groundlessness that constitutes a natural- historical invariant— or so Paolo 
Virno would have us believe.1 As Virno sees it, we humans are disoriented 
animals, so thoroughly lacking an instinctual blueprint to guide us, even at 
moments of maximum danger, that we are always generalists, always adapt-
able, never constrained by a preordained set of rules.2 Our instability and our 
language faculty, our anthropogenetic flexibility and mobility, our “dearth 
of specialized instincts,” our permanent crisis: these qualities mean that we 
can adapt to any environment.3 But they also condemn us to a Manichean 
existence in which, on the one hand, our flexibility and adaptability make us 
ideally suited to the demands of the contemporary capitalist labor process 
while, on the other hand, our natural historical invariance— or, to be more 
precise, our invariant and dangerous groundlessness— constitutes an inde-
structible opening that makes us capable of insubordination.4
Virno is clearly onto something important with his explication of the 
link between crisis, which he defines as “an emergency situation” wherein 
“a certain pseudo- environmental setup is subjected to violent transformative 
traction” and “the potentiality . . . of the human animal takes on the typical 
visibility of an empirical state of affairs,” and natural history, which he de-
fines as the inventory of “the multiple socio- political” representations (i.e., 
diagrams) of  “the biological invariant that characterizes the existence of the 
human animal” as a “potential animal” in time.5 We admit, in fact, that our 
position varies from his only by a matter of slight degrees. All the same, we 
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find that his concept of  “natural- historical diagrams,” by which he means 
“the socio- political states of affairs which display, in changing and rival forms, 
some salient features of anthropogenesis,” remains uncomfortably close to 
the harsh excesses of  “biolinguistic capitalism” precisely because, like Negri 
and Hardt’s “biopolitical productivity,” it meets capitalism on essentially the 
same terrain: the same anthropocentric machine that separates political and 
linguistic human life from nonhuman and dumb apolitical life; the same fas-
cination with original forms of productivity, innovation, and change arising 
from the dangers of an unruly state of nature; the same concept of an in-
contestable “metahistory” so basic as to determine the common behavior of 
humankind.6 Rather than further historicizing and politicizing natural his-
tory, Virno, in a distinctly Heideggerian manner, tends instead to ontologize 
natural necessities and, in that way, risks repeating the classical gesture of po-
litical thought: to separate an objective, indisputable sphere— nature— from 
the subjective interventions of thought and praxis. That can only mean reduc-
ing the critical ferment inherent in natural historical crisis to an organizing 
principle for future political life, which for Virno means only those “institu-
tions of the multitude” that rely exclusively on the human form.7
In Marx and the Frankfurt School, by contrast, natural historical crisis 
is permanent and pervasive, and it follows a specific dynamic of thought 
totality and dialectical decline in any given historical situation. Accordingly, 
it exposes even the assumption of capitalism’s unfathomable complexity, the 
ungraspable character of its mobility and flux— in short, the ideology of per-
manent change that is said to be our fate— to the dynamics of transience. 
(One might even go so far as to say, in fact, that the permanent succession of 
crises on which capitalist circulation thrives is arrayed against precisely this 
insight into a more all- enveloping crisis.) For Marx, a real dialectics contains 
“the recognition of [the] negation” of every state, “its inevitable destruc-
tion; because it regards every historically developed form as being in a fluid 
state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and be-
cause it does not let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence 
critical and revolutionary.”8 A real dialectics is “critical and revolutionary” 
(always complementary terms for Marx) because it is not merely a dialec-
tics of concept and logic but a dialectics of natural history that extracts the 
transient kernel and momentary existence from any “historically developed 
form.” Not surprisingly, this critical and revolutionary dialectical procedure 
draws out all the resistances and anxieties of the bourgeois order. In He-
gel, nature had merely behaved unreasonably, refusing to play along in the 
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dialectical playbook except as negation and as an antithesis to be sublated. 
Natural historical dialectics in Marx expresses real relations determined in 
particular historical situations wherein the inherent laws of nature oper-
ate as fundamental principles in the real.9 For Marx— and, following him, 
Adorno and Benjamin— the natural historical stratum identified by Virno 
is never sub, never an “invariant human nature” that suddenly erupts from 
underneath established cultural encrustations in times of crisis.10 In Marx’s 
idea of natural history, what Virno calls “species- specific prerogatives” are 
themselves profoundly historical and constructable, inseparable from the 
sphere of world history in which they are enmeshed.11 Other than invariant, 
always part of a specific historical constellation with its own mode of ex-
pression and laws of transition, natural history persists as an indestructible 
layer in the midst of any cultural formation— there as infinite perishing and 
transience— even when that formation is thriving (because natural history 
elicits an immunitarian response that is coexistent with what is perceived as 
crisis). The persistent truth content of things, their still- living obstinacy, is 
not an authentic being; nor is it a constitutively dislocated and unsheltered 
“Being” in the Heideggerian vein. This is where Virno goes astray: drawing 
heavily on Heidegger’s terminology, he gives natural history the status of 
a more authentic and generic layer in human life, an “as such” that, as in 
Heidegger, tends to become our irrevocable historical destiny. Naturalizing 
natural history, Virno removes it from analytical scrutiny, from the practice 
of intervention and presentation, and thereby repeats the concealment of the 
very natural historical layer that he advocates as the engine of revolutionary 
politics in times of crisis.12 The result is that politics then gets cordoned off, 
as exclusively human history, from nonhuman forms of life, including things 
and animals, their techne, or the life of machines. To draw political philos-
ophy out of its self- satisfied contemplation, political analysis must, as Marx 
and the Frankfurt School well knew, close off any recourse to metahistorical 
invariants grounded in the generic nature of man. Politics must instead be 
cognizant of the fact that truths, far from being permanently available for 
reflection, are to be seized in concrete, pressing situations and from fleeting, 
exigent objects— be they inorganic matter, ideas, or living beings— that can 
get irrevocably lost. Hence a natural history that manifests itself, both in 
health and in crisis, as an energy of passing away, an indestructible that is 
not an invariant groundlessness of humans alone but the continuous perish-
ing, the total and infinite passing away, that encompasses concrete political 
formations, including all nonhuman and thingly life.
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Natural history is thus to be understood not only as a perishing that 
befalls even the nothingness and groundlessness of the human but as a per-
ishing that is itself a new ontology, realized in the task of critical interven-
tion, of ourselves and of the present.13 What this means, in the first place, is 
that there can be no stratagem of governance predicated on the separation 
between a wild thinking underneath and the social calcifications above. 
Subversion and containment, health and disease: these supposed dichot-
omies are in fact complicit, with wild, anarchic thinking and the pastoral 
power of law and order sharing the same topology, one figured in terms 
of regeneration, of a cyclical understanding of perishing and rejuvenation, 
like the ups and downs of markets. By contrast, natural history manifests, 
in specific historical sites, a perishing even of the system of a rhythmic, pre-
dictable, regular perishing. To understand natural history is to understand 
that there persists an incompatible order— transient, unstable, deeply his-
torical, decaying, and therefore dialectical— which folds over and doubles a 
capitalist order that, like the sovereign, exploits crisis as its engine and foil. 
It is to understand, moreover, that the vision of the critic must be attuned 
to the difference between a mythological knowledge that props up the gov-
ernment/sovereign executive order and the scrutinizing, ruinous knowledge 
that, in its capacity to disarticulate this first order, allows critical knowledge 
to distinguish between the crises that give rise to police interventions and 
the crisis that is constitutive of critical ruination. In short, the critic must 
prompt a self- encounter of critique and crisis with the ambiguous genealogy 
they share.
Foucault/Kant
Perhaps the prime example of such critical prompting can be found in Fou-
cault’s sympathetic engagement with Kant. For Foucault, Kant’s critique of 
reason constitutes an especially bold move because it manages to exceed the 
bounds of the Enlightenment— manages to become transhistorically imper-
ative, universalizing, even revolutionary— by being a double of itself that, 
degenerative and self- ruining, dismantles not only the idea of governing cri-
sis but the art of governing as such. When the late- period Foucault returns 
repeatedly to the question of critique, it is to apply the pivotal concern of the 
Enlightenment, “the relationships between power, truth and the subject,” 
“to any moment in history” by staging a confrontation between the two 
arts that, according to Foucault, give rise to modern critique: the art of gov-
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erning and the art of being “not quite so governed,” “not like that,” “not for 
that, not by them,” or— Foucault flirts with anarchic defiance— “we do not 
want to be governed at all.”14 The art of critique begins with this primary 
decision, which is a critical decision in the original meaning of the term: one 
that reorients history around a new cause that never fails to be an efficacious 
power in the real. It expresses an individual and collective will, detectable 
throughout history, to revolt against government— and against modern 
governmentality, where the subject is piloted through life with the help of 
precise medical, legal, and theological techniques of self- governance, in par-
ticular. The incandescent traces of this will cut diagonally across history and 
return to modernity as primal scenes of critical dissent and insubordination. 
These include, for example, the strategy, common to Saint Paul and Kant, 
of disobeying the order as though one obeyed it or, as happens with many 
of Kafka’s protagonists, disobeying it by being excruciatingly obedient. Or 
they appear in the past scenes of upheaval that Foucault invokes— the trial 
of Socrates and the revolts of mysticism and reformation against the pastoral 
powers of the church— scenes whose historical diagrams become legible only 
belatedly, once we encounter the question of Enlightenment reason.
It is one question in particular, however— Kant’s question, “What is 
Enlightenment?”— that openly declares a bold, courageous exit from the 
discursive field, from the trappings of a “self- incurred immaturity” that in-
dolently relies on the guidance of such self- proclaimed guardians as books, 
doctors, and priests. As an art of subtraction and separation from the dis-
cursive scene, Kant’s manifesto for Enlightenment critique marks for Fou-
cault the advent of a completely new self- conscious political attitude toward 
one’s own contemporary reality. Kant’s critical operation asserts itself as a 
principled, recalcitrant gestus, an act born of a philosophical ethos that both 
partakes in and parts with the master discourses of his own time— the art of 
governing and Enlightenment reason— by interrogating and finally reversing 
the conditions of their acceptance. It does so, moreover, by making critical 
use of the very faculty of reason, otherwise destined to validate the systems 
of knowledge (legal, medical, theological) that undergird mechanisms of 
coercion: deploying reason’s inherent critical powers against its own power 
effects, endlessly applying its own universalizing truth procedures against 
it. Kant’s reason critiques, and then critiques reason, in a self- limiting auto- 
dissolution, curtailing the force of knowledge it generates and, in so doing, 
delimiting knowledge’s hold upon the subject. The end of critique is to make 
it impossible for us to accept naturalized forms of knowledge.
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But critique as transformative truth procedure does more than just derail 
natures and legitimacies; it instills crisis in the core of those traditional legal, 
medical, and political forms of critique that seek to liberate us or merely re-
form our sociopolitical institutions. Such forms of critique remain, in their 
goal of liberation and reformation, profoundly wedded to the logic of the 
sovereign, who welcomes our critical care, impatience, and indignation. The 
conjoined tasks of liberation and reformation come at the steep price of re-
suscitating a sovereign just as he is about to expire. Foucault’s patient form 
of critique, by contrast, advocates a critique that confers upon itself an in-
subordinate, intransigent right beyond juridical rights “to question truth on 
its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth.”15 In this 
respect, critique— critique as an ungovernable right without legal rights— 
resonates with the twin concepts, Pauline on the one side and Kantian on 
the other, that neither what is covered by the law nor what is deemed to be 
outside the law is up to the self- appointed task of critique. Only a critique 
that folds back on itself, perpetually demarcating the limits of its power, 
expanding and contracting its reach, accelerating and stopping short, truly 
understands its revolutionary power as something more than reformational. 
It grasps its capacity to coin new terms, terms worthy of the event, and 
enduringly loosens the hold of the sovereign by tethering him to his crisis.
In this spirit, Foucault proposes to name his own historical- philosophical 
project of critique a “procedure of eventalization,” the key strategy in the art 
of not being governed. Submitting pyramidal figures and principles of sov-
ereignty (final authority, unitary origin, necessity) to an archaeological and 
genealogical examination designed to dissolve the links between elements of 
knowledge and procedures of coercion that induce governable behavior and 
discourse, the eventalizing operation injects crisis into the natural, necessary 
appearance of such established links so that their singular elements might 
be reconfigured for the construction of events.16 Exposing a scientific or in-
stitutional system to its “essential fragility,” following its “breaking points” 
until the full display of its arbitrary nature and violence makes it more and 
more difficult to accept, eventalization reverses the destination of knowl-
edge and power as a prop for the art of governing by making the effects of 
power contained within a strategic field available for the presentation and 
creation of pure singularities and positivities.17 Thus Foucault’s rhetorical 
question: “How can the indivisibility of knowledge and power . . . induce 
both singularities, fixed according to their conditions of acceptability, and 
a field of possibles, of openings, indecisions, reversals, and possible dislo-
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cations which make them fragile, temporary, and which turn these effects 
into events, nothing more, nothing less than events?”18 Eventalization is the 
archaeological and genealogical procedure of making crisis return in govern-
mental orders, the aim being to ensure the power of reversibility and there-
fore of transformability as such. Accordingly, it forgoes historical veracity 
and necessity for the sake of transmitting expressive truths and singularizing 
events. Foucault’s passion for the event, beginning “with this decision not to 
be governed,” entails bringing about nothing, understood as the perishing 
of those seemingly irreversible powers that derive from masters, deep- rooted 
foundations, legitimizing laws, and unitary causes. The radical will not to 
be governed at all finds its counterpart in the will to relegate such sovereign 
figures to “disappearance” or, barring that, in the capacity at least to identify 
“by what and from what [such] disappearance is possible.”19
This convergence of care of the self, virtue, and critique is the closest Fou-
cault gets to an affirmative biopolitics; for not to be governed this way (or 
not at all) now concerns, as in the term self- governance, equally one’s singular 
life and one’s investment in a political form of life. To engage in critique 
means, according to Foucault, “to make available for the work that we can 
do on ourselves the largest possible share of what is presented to us as inac-
cessible.”20 To which we would add: what Foucault claims is “presented to 
us as inaccessible,” occulted by any given regime of intelligibility, is what is 
in fact unforgettable, and thus indestructible, in history and our lives today. 
To recognize as much is to recognize that history is not tied to the bound-
aries of world history but instead touches, in affect and in thought, upon 
the critical powers that return to us from disavowed strands in our history 
and prehistory, or what we are attempting to name with the term natural 
history. “Understood in these terms, criticism (and radical criticism) is utterly 
indispensable for any transformation,” according to Foucault, since it is now 
“a matter of making conflict more visible.”21 To make original modes of civil 
strife, or what the ancients called stasis, appear is to insert, by way of critique, 
crisis into politics and into the fantasy of the market economy— the realm 
of homo œkonomicus— in its deceptive guise as the new common. Foucault 
was the first to emphasize that modern governmental technology in general 
obeys the rationality of the workings of economy, loosely defined as the rule 
of equivalence and the processes of production and exchange that encompass 
both the economical and the juridical. Modern civil society is born from 
“a juridical structure (economie juridique) of a governmentality pegged to 
an economy understood as a process of production and exchange (economie 
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economique).”22 In other words, the dichotomy between sovereignty and gov-
ernmentality is a false one. Agamben is right to extrapolate from Foucault’s 
insight and turn oikonomia into an umbrella term, strangely permanent and 
operative in multiple contexts throughout history: the internal operations of 
the Trinity, divine providence, law, theological apparatuses, the governance 
of individuals, the sovereign exception, and so on. This allows Agamben to 
come to the surprising conclusion, given his previous work, that “the central 
mystery of politics is not sovereignty but government” or, better, “econ-
omy and its government.”23 The two terms are now interchangeable. World 
history, or the alternative term, universal history— essentially the parade of 
great men, empires, executive powers, and masters in our tradition— has 
thus been viewed exclusively as the ongoing refinement of governmental 
machines formed and supported by different permutations of oikonomia, a 
term that reaches back to the despotic management of a household (oikos). 
Indeed, Agamben has raised the question of whether the sovereign is not 
merely a fantastic supermanager with the power and legitimacy to suture to-
gether two otherwise incommensurable rationalities, the “political- juridical” 
and the “economic- governmental.”24 To push this further, we would suggest 
that an unacknowledged oikonomia knots together governmentality and 
sovereignty in a mutually reinforcing circle. In light of this, the twofold 
task of critique becomes much clearer. It is to disarticulate, by articulat-
ing the crisis in each, not only the links between the political- juridical and 
the economic- governmental rationalities but the permanence of oikonomia 
as such.
Foucault’s essays on Kant are where we discover the critical mode by 
which that disarticulating articulation can be achieved and by which some-
thing ungovernable in history and in ourselves can be created aside from 
the economic paradigm. According to Foucault, Kant accomplishes this 
disarticulation through two related historical interrogations: “What is 
Aufklärung?,” Kant’s epochal question from 1784, and his follow- up ques-
tion from 1798, raised in the wake of the French Revolution, “What to do 
with the will for revolution?”25 Crucially, however, Kant does not treat these 
historical occurrences in historical or historiographical terms. He treats 
them as unforgettable, indestructible, transformative events that forever 
define, as affect (courage or enthusiasm) or prophetic sign, how we relate 
to and act within our present and how we actualize an origin, here and for 
a future politics. In order for an event to become real and active, in order 
to dissolve the economic- governmental- sovereign alliance, one must isolate 
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that event in history and give it the value of an affect and a passionate sign. 
In this way, Kant ties the task of critique inexorably to the idea of revolution. 
In “The Contest of Faculties,” for example, the constitutive strife among 
the theological, medical, and juridical branches of the universitas (again: the 
priest, the doctor, and the lawyer) barely veils its roots in a critique and 
crisis that culminates in the indestructible will to revolution. And when 
Kant discusses how history could be a priori, he in fact raises the possibility 
that crisis, understood as the exposure of apparently consequential events to 
historical transience, might coexist with an indestructible and unforgettable 
predisposition in human nature. The revolution thus becomes the transcen-
dental condition for modern politics and for thinking through the fragility 
of history. Kant himself may speak of the prophet; but in doing so, he can 
also be heard to evoke the critic as a revolutionary, “the one who occasions 
and produces the events he predicts.”26 The prophetic critic predicts, by his 
actions in the present, the events that will take place in the future, since 
those events will result from his present actions. This confers an order to 
the crisis he puts in motion. Not only should the critic be aware of the un-
intended and unwitting ramifications of his declarative and diagnostic inter-
vention, he must be, since what a prophetic critic does is to put a state into 
crisis by introducing something untenable and unbearable within it. What 
makes the act revolutionary and at the same time a question of crisis is that 
it introduces a memory of revolutionary will into whatever attenuated form 
the revolution might take after the fact, a memory that makes hope possible 
precisely because it introduces the inevitability of failure into the makeup 
of any political formation. The unredeemable becomes the precondition of 
the unforgettable. If the hopes of the actual political revolution of a people 
remain unfulfilled, they perpetuate themselves all the more powerfully and 
comprehensively, beyond the specific location and time of a revolution, in 
the aspiration and nature of universal humankind.
Thus the enduring existence of revolution as what Kant calls a “histori-
cal sign” in its rememorative, demonstrative, and prognostic temporal vec-
tors gathers a given polity around a permanent cause of traumatic crisis and 
disjointedness— a permanent unrest— since all subsequent orders are then 
grounded in that instance of dissolution. Revolution introduces a politi-
cizing tendency that takes every order out of itself, given that revolution is 
itself proof that there exists “a tendency within the human race as a whole.”27 
This tendency introduces into the traditional concept of what Kant calls the 
natural history of man a moral history that confers upon the natural laws 
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of the planetary orders a revolutionary truth content for universal human 
history. In this, Kant effectively reprograms the empirical laws of nature 
so that, suffused with a moral law of revolution tied to the permanence of 
crisis in human institutions, those laws attain a heightened political status 
that licenses us to envision a new mode of thinking about nature and his-
tory. Traditionally, politics needed nature to justify historical continuities; 
in Kant’s critique, nature begins to work as the agent of profound historical 
and political breaks. Kant’s critical and at times poetic procedure exhausts 
the full weight of the overdetermination with which the term nature is at 
once blessed and plagued (laws of nature, natural laws, the nature of man, 
the nature of the noumenal world, i.e., what Kant calls the “kingdom of 
nature,” the state of nature, natural history, etc.). It is as if Kant’s confusing 
deployment of the term nature were meant to name a crisis and revolution in 
nature itself, and so render all expressions of nature immediately historical 
and political. More to the point, his deployment of the term wrests control 
of revolution away from world history and resituates it in natural history. In 
“The Contest of Faculties,” Kant refers (albeit with caution) to Blumenbach’s 
concept of a Naturrevolution occurring before the advent of humans on the 
stage of history, while in “Perpetual Peace” he writes of a “complete revolu-
tion . . . brought about by nature alone.”28 Although Kant is always careful 
to interlace this idea of a revolution of and in nature with human history and 
the nature of man, with what in human history and human nature “can never 
be forgotten,” he nonetheless embraces the idea of natural, objective laws of 
motion in our unconscious history. Not only, then, does the phenomenon 
of revolution emerge as an irresistible natural historical event; it can now be 
understood as at once the irrevocable cause and promise in “the prophetic 
history of mankind.”29 And precisely because this nature proceeds behind 
the backs of acting humans, eluding our conscious grasp, the subject is pri-
mordially invested in natural historical time and must respond to what is 
unthinkable in it by subjectifying its revolutionary truth- content.
In this way, Kant invents a new grammar of revolutionary critique— 
“an aptitude and power” with new causes, signs, and affects guiding hu-
manity throughout history— that introduces (or inserts) a permanent cri-
sis mode into our concept of world history, commonly understood as the 
“path to progress.”30 This grammar, however, is now deeply historical, in 
that it moves through an essentially revolutionary form of time and space; 
and because of that movement it is forever diagrammatic, never resolving 
into a self- contained form and order. Fortified with this new grammar, the 
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philosopher- critic now grants himself the right to activate a revolutionary 
will and proceeds, like an advocate, with proofs and public judgment to 
constitute a new nomos for a people and for nature. Kant’s revolutionary is 
no anarchic firebrand. He is a disciplined organizer for a natural history that 
is now full of signs and internal laws capable of drawing humans out of their 
accustomed oikonomia. It is not enough for the revolution to have a “per-
manent virtuality,” as Foucault puts it.31 The revolution must be seen as the 
fundamental real effective in nature and history: in me, in the polis around 
me, and in the starry sky above me. After that, judging the true meaning of 
historical events becomes a matter of assuming the proper standpoint. As 
Kant insists in “The Contest of Faculties,” the Copernican Revolution en-
ables us to view both ourselves and human history from an entirely different 
perspective, one from which other, more expansive and enduring laws of 
movement— the nomoi of a revolutionary, albeit highly fragile, nature— come 
to light. Deprived of their central viewpoint, humans now see their objects 
and themselves as if they were spectators: spectators permanently revolv-
ing within a greater spatiotemporal reference system of astronomical forces 
whose underlying movements, propensities, and laws they must decipher in 
order to decipher their own. Insight into man’s nature comes from the out-
side of man, from a blind spot that diverts his attention away from the active 
part he purportedly plays in the grand dramas of history. No longer strut-
ting and fretting, we find ourselves standing on a very different stage, one 
where historical objects and dramatic scenes are newly constructed around 
transformative events, where unfamiliar players demand the articulation of 
a completely new historiography and politics.
By identifying an unforgettable revolutionary “predisposition in human 
nature,” Kant effectively posits a quasi- natural evental force that is stronger, 
albeit less perceptible, than any earth- shattering accomplishments gener-
ated in the course of world history.32 To find a new certainty in a natural 
predisposition or sympathy for the revolution must remain strangely para-
doxical. Revolution is in some sense impossible and uncertain, filling both 
its actors and its spectators not only with enthusiasm but also with the dis-
tress, anxiety, and disorientation that every fundamental crisis generates. 
In this case, however, certainty is guaranteed by a prophecy that can be 
envisioned vividly and yet remains completely untenable to any given or-
der. The unforgettable and indestructible resides precisely in a cause that 
is continuously dissolving, being itself highly tenuous and forever on the 
brink of dissolution. In “The Contest of Faculties,” Kant tarries with this 
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permanent fragility of the revolution, which, like the moral law that in our 
daily lives is dismissed, watered down, compromised, evaded, and glossed 
over, is both indestructible and completely impossible. It can be infinitely 
destroyed and yet, for precisely that reason, remains indestructible. Like the 
revolution itself, the frailty of revolution is, by virtue of that very frailty and 
“in view of the frailty of human nature,” to be taken as a prophetic “sign of 
history.”33 Crucially, however, this insight into an essential frailty eludes the 
monarchs, priests, and doctors who make it their business to heal crisis and 
promote narratives of improvement (to the point, Kant wryly notes, that a 
patient could not help but confess how much he is “dying of sheer recovery!”).34 
It thus falls to the Kants of this world to warn the masters of crisis that their 
antidotes, by mistaking critical frailty for a misery that is in need of their care 
and intervention, are in fact unprincipled and anarchic.
For Foucault, then, Kant’s double critique of reason, always turning back 
upon itself in a gesture of autodissolution, introduces a model of genuinely 
revolutionary critical practice. And not only that: Kant’s own isolation of 
the fragile revolution as a prophetic sign— a singular, affectively charged 
event— models how the critical modes of passion and prophecy can trans-
form present reality by naming, and thus introducing, the unforgettable and 
indestructible will to revolution that manifests the moral history at work in 
man’s natural history. Revolution in this sense makes no reference to tran-
scendence or telos. Instead, it is driven by a critique that, itself being inti-
mately tied to crisis, is in turn rooted in an unforgettable— and, in that sense, 
moral— prehistory. The singularity of an event such as the revolution derives 
from the fact that each one is a perishing, fragile instance of a prehistoric 
will. Thus critique, homing in on a symptomatic, critical point, intensified 
by its incisive, restricted concentration on a singular occurrence, aims to 
bring about an order of singulars. Heterogeneous, incommensurable to one 
another, such singularities dwell in an ever- expanding constellation of con-
crete, historically determined struggles, actualized for the present and made 
compossible by the critic in a manner akin to Kant’s enthusiastic spectator 
of the French Revolution, who mobilizes his own situated standpoint from 
outside participatory action for a prognostic reversal of history.
The Foucault that emerges here is a different Foucault from the well- 
known prophet of bio- thanatopolitics, the Foucault whose conception of 
biopolitics has emerged as a new S1/S2 in which “life” looms so ominously 
as to once again elude critique. This is a Foucault who enlists Enlightenment 
critique in the search for a historical- philosophical analysis reminiscent of the 
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dialectical truth procedure with which Benjamin and Adorno actualize dis-
tant pasts in the present (and vice versa) by constructing disturbing new ori-
gins and a priori objects of history. “Actually, in this historical- philosophical 
practice,” as Foucault himself puts it, “one has to make one’s own history, 
fabricate history as if through fiction.”35 Like Deleuze, who proposes giving 
Bergson’s notion of fabulation a political meaning, and Derrida, who coins 
the term affabulation to define the strategies that render a political logic and 
knowledge meaningful by putting a fable to work in politics, Foucault sheds 
light on the commonality between political theory and poetic practice, on 
the fictions that politics and art share. What Foucault has in mind, how-
ever, is the invention of politically efficacious fictions that are in accordance 
with the art of not being governed. Every relation of forces, every complex 
network of powers and truths must traverse through a fiction in order to 
become effective as a historically determined real. Within every fictional 
artifice resides an unarticulated strength of fiction, just as any given nexus 
of power- knowledge contains a strength of power and knowledge whose 
energy can be redeployed for the construction of events. At this instance, 
the critical procedure of eventalization and the poetic practice of fabricating 
“history as if through fiction” converge. Both examine and dissolve the in-
timate and necessary relays between structures of knowledge and the mech-
anisms of coercion; both dismantle the intimate links joining real historical 
objects to established representations designed to mask or legitimize the 
violence of elementary power struggles and to dissipate or neutralize the effi-
cacy of ungovernable singularities. Most important, such fictioning critique 
creates events; for “one ‘fictions’ history on the basis of a political reality 
that makes it true, one ‘fictions’ a politics not yet in existence on the basis 
of a historical truth.”36 Foucault himself fictions the very power of fiction, 
using the reality effects of fictions to exhibit the complex poetic, scenic, and 
diagrammatic— and also material, factual, and microphysical— procedures 
that make historical truths real and acceptable.37 Foucault’s fictions thus tend 
to widen the same gap between imaginary semblances and real struggles that 
dominant discourses attempt to both represent and conceal. In this sense, 
Foucault’s fictions are counterfictions, diagrams that employ the power of 
fiction to intrude into fictions of naturalized, legitimized power. They also 
are counterscenes that rearrange concrete systems of power- knowledge by 
infusing them with crisis and the gestus of critique. A fiction of this sort— the 
diagram of a power struggle, the scene of a moment of crisis, the particular 
attitude of critique— intervenes in historical moments at the point of their 
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greatest symptomatic tension. And in so doing, it confronts a specific po-
litical reality with the history of the will, with a real that derives its force 
from the art of making lives ungovernable. Conjoining historical scenes with 
the rigor of thought, Foucault’s exemplary scenes begin to think, while, 
conversely, thoughts themselves become scenic or a central part of a scenic 
arrangement. One must only paraphrase Foucault’s paraphrase of Kant to 
crystallize this critical operation into a single imperative: “One must isolate 
an event in history that will take on the value of a scene.”38
Foucault himself models just such a scene— models, we should say, the crit-
ical practice of fictional actualization, eventalization, and compossibility — 
 in his reading of the fateful collision, circa 1800, between psychiatric power 
and the sovereign recounted in Pinel’s case history of George III’s treatment 
at the hands of a certain Dr. Willis (in essence a reordering of an ordering of 
events). Foucault characterizes the scene of George III’s madness not simply 
as a deposition but as a “total inversion of sovereignty”: not the triumph 
of psychiatric power over the sovereign but the profanation of both forms 
of transcendent sovereignty, sovereign power and governmentality.39 Before 
turning to the scene itself, Foucault reminds his audience of the classical 
iconography associated with sovereign power, a tableau organized around 
oppositions and the asymmetrical submission of subjects beneath the king, 
who towers over all with his ermine, scepter, and globe. It is exactly those in-
signia that psychiatric power sets out to rearrange. Confined now to a padded 
cell, cut off from his relations, the mad king falls upon himself and into the 
hands of the two brutish, “magnificent,” “Herculean” pages who were once 
members of his household, but who have now assumed the wordless task of 
subduing him.40 George III’s world has turned to shit, and not just meta-
phorically. Before he would have ordered the suppression of the filth and ex-
crement thrown at his carriage by the poorest of the poor. Now he is reduced 
to using his own ordure as a weapon of last resort, daubing it on the old 
doctor who comes to visit him. At the moment when “the crisis intervenes”— 
intervenes not only into the midst of sovereign splendor but into the critical 
act of decision itself, throwing established ways of judging and deciding into 
crisis— what had been the stratified and oppositional structure of the royal 
scene gives way to a new scene, one in which a host of miniature tyrants 
(doctors, helpers, and bureaucrats) enter the stage at the very site of royal 
decomposition, filling the vacuum left by the demise of the royal function 
and converting the symbols of royal power into meaningless, dumb matter.41
But it is not until Willis, the doctor who has appointed himself both 
natural history 35
director and protagonist of this new scene, enters into the midst of the 
ceremonial of sovereign power— not until the microphysics of psychiatric 
power have overwhelmed the political field with their elemental mode of 
operation— that we begin to detect the microphysical underside that was 
always at work within the premodern sovereign diagram. For embedded 
within this primal scene of a total inversion of sovereignty and of the advent 
of psychiatric microphysical power is the truth content of another scene, one 
that erases any distinction between a microphysics of dejected, excremental 
things of crisis and humans as they are rearranged by variable power rela-
tions. It is true, of course, that George III would recover from his madness 
enough to reassume the throne. But from the moment he enters his cell, he 
is irrevocably the subject of microphysical power— one actant in a wider mi-
crophysical diagram of power, no better or worse than his brutish pages or 
the poorest of the poor, who once threw filth at his carriage. This does not 
mean, however, that Willis is suddenly in charge. One gets the sense at first 
that Foucault, in staging the scene as he does, has set up the doctor as the 
modern crisis manager par excellence and psychiatric power as the emblem 
for the managerial, policing approach to crisis per se. The doctor, in seizing 
hold of the course of crisis, and thus making abnormal life a new political 
object, believes that he has the power to foster life where the sovereign used 
to take it. But the richer, more active manifestations of microphysical life that 
his analysis and crisis management have brought to light, a life embodied in 
the imposing pages and the other tenacious, masterless things that crowd 
the royal cell, exceed the control of the doctor as silent crisis manager to an 
even greater degree than they did the asymmetrical form inscribed in the 
ostentatious insignia of sovereign power. Crisis, in fact, more than exceeds 
the doctor’s control, for the crisis that he has induced, manipulated, and 
healed returns to him as the inverted truth of his own discourse. Forced 
to confront the melancholic, the paranoiac, or the psychotic on their own 
turf, the doctor has little choice but to devise a fiction of cure that is “exactly 
patterned on the delirium itself, homogeneous with the erroneous idea” pro-
duced by the patients he treats. Yet that can only mean that the stratagems 
of his truth are from the outset entangled in the same delirious forces, in 
the same real and fictional causes of madness, that he at once authenticates 
and works to suppress.42 Like all crisis managers, doctors of psychiatry are 
mimetic geniuses who closely model the verifying strategies and truth pro-
cedures of their dispositif on the capillary diagram of forces at play in the 
crisis of a disease. But precisely in that way, they unwittingly incorporate 
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the incomplete, delirious logic of those forces, the uncontrollable rhythms 
of their return. After all, to eagerly bring about an event within a delirium 
only in order to then forcefully discipline individuals on the grounds of 
this fictional event is also a way of taking something on, of contracting the 
powers of deviant life the doctor meant to regulate. Foucault is too subtle 
a thinker to settle for a simple dichotomy between transgression and con-
tainment or undifferentiated abyss and rigid systematicity. On the contrary, 
his masterless, tenacious things, like his isolated scenes, would murmur the 
two correlating psychiatric declarations drummed into every mad patient— 
“You are not king” and “Your body is not made of glass”— to both sovereign 
powers, king and doctor. For the very fact that no one is ever a king, not even 
the king himself, is exactly what releases indestructible tenacious powers, 
powers that can be stifled neither by the power of kings nor, conversely, by 
the sense of one’s own powerlessness.
So much for the doctor. What of his counterpart in crisis, the critic? The 
doctor’s form of treating crisis must, in more ways than one, elicit the scru-
tiny of the critic, whose task it is to return crisis to its critical core by once 
again fictionalizing the “labyrinth of fictional verification” fabricated by the 
doctor in his pursuit of the cure.43 Following the lead of Foucault, then, the 
critic is to act as a counterdoctor, reverting psychiatric domination (in all its 
forms) back to microphysical powers and forces. Pinel’s small tyrants— the 
pages who apply brute psychiatric force to quell the obstinacy of unacceptable 
crisis things and crisis bodies, the doctors who submit the sovereign’s fragile, 
transient body to a regimented framework of psychiatric discipline meant to 
tie sovereignty to the economy of a proper, reasonable government— have 
one chief objective: to knot together the two different rationalities of sover-
eignty and government, politics and economy, power and knowledge, the 
juridical and the disciplinary as though they were indivisible, mutually le-
gitimizing, reasonable only in their union. The archaeological- microphysical 
critic, by contrast, recounts and then reverses this institutionalized fusion, 
embodied in sovereign government or governmental executive power, back 
to its heterogeneous, microphysical scene of ruination.
But the other, divisive scene that Foucault stages within the psychiatric 
scene does something else as well: it disarticulates, critically, the fiction that 
there exists an inevitable, epochal struggle among sovereignty, disciplinary 
power, and governmentality. Intimately bonded, this triumvirate in fact 
shares a common will— to perfect the art of governing— and the same root: 
a common oikonomia of mastering a crisis as a despot manages his house-
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hold. Against the anomic principle that dwells in the midst of the triangular 
disciplinary- governmental- sovereign oikonomia (the despotic administra-
tion of a household not being bound by a system of rules), the critic thinks 
an “ungovernable,” as Agamben writes, “something that could never assume 
the form of an oikonomia.” 44 Thus the task of the critic: to create ungovern-
abilities that remain heteronomous to the disciplinary, governmental, and 
sovereign permutations of oikonomia even as they insist upon their own 
inherent nomical organization.
Yet one might push this further still and say that Foucault’s “critical on-
tology of ourselves,” the historical- philosophical form- of- life that critique 
at once denotes and embodies, itself constitutes just such an ungovernable 
life, a life that articulates a self- legislating nomos incommensurable with 
oikonomia.45 What would this life of critique consist of? How would it do 
justice not only to the “ourselves” of a new critical ontology but to the no-
mos of things? From the time that Pindar’s sovereign law (nomos basileus), 
conjured to justify violence “with the strongest hand,” joined forces with 
the Sophists’ fantasy of a “right of the strongest,” political philosophy has 
stumbled over the egregious conflation of might with right, of violence (bia) 
with justice (dike), that constitutes the inner workings of both sovereignty 
and government.46 One way that politics has tried to counteract that con-
flation of might with right is by drawing sovereignty itself within the ambit 
of the law. But while the generality of the law purports to have forever con-
strained the whimsical nature of sovereign rule, effectively ending the crisis 
behind that rule, critique reminds us that the authorized recourse to legal 
force might be a continuation of Pindar’s nomos basileus by other means. 
Political philosophy, meanwhile, has itself long been suspected of aspiring 
to the role of master or of creating a system of knowledge that is in ser-
vice to the master. But at the same time— and here we see its intimate con-
nection to critique— political philosophy has never ceased to dream about 
a noncoercive nomos and an immemorial physis able to elude the grasp of 
sovereignty and government while being highly active in them. Consider 
the idea of chora (space) in the Timaeus, Plato’s dramatized theorizing of 
cosmogony and natural history. Plato’s reflections, “as in a dream,” on the 
unsettled and yet indestructible chora seem to be driven by a single- minded 
pursuit of a third, bastard nature capable of breaking open the dichotomy 
between a changeless sphere of commanding, lawful being (a “source” and 
a “father,” 50d) and an anomic nature of becoming and semblance appre-
hended by changeable opinion (doxa).47 Here and elsewhere in his political 
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philosophy Plato, very much like Kant, tends to multiply the terms nature 
(physis) and law (nomos) in order to avoid the false alternative between a 
sovereign nomos that becomes one with nature, as in Pindar’s poem, and 
the Sophistic notion of an anomic, brute nature anterior to nomos. For this 
notion of a lawless nature only serves to justify the violence of the strongest 
and, in Hobbes, the intervention of the sovereign into the state of nature. 
Meanwhile, Plato’s chora, this nearly incomprehensible space, formless and 
yet capable of receiving and giving form, compels us to think a nomic kind 
of nature suspended between the hypernomic order of unchanging forms 
and the anomic sphere of visible nature. A “choratic” physionomos would 
make appear a singular life— its specific materiality, its metabolic processes, 
the rhythms of its appearance, its peculiar ways of being and perishing— 
that is inseparable from its form. It is as the Athenian remarks in Plato’s 
Laws: such physionomos would replace and displace Pindar’s “decree of 
nature . . . that the stronger should rule and the weaker should obey” (690c). 
The Platonic pursuit of physionomos effectively derails the operative fantasy 
of the Sophists that a physis can be severed from its nomos— that underneath 
law and logos roam the unfettered forces of a wild state of nature in need of 
despotic rule.
It is this tradition, in which thought devises a cohesive physionomos able 
to retain a disposition toward justice and the event for each singular being, 
that informs both Kant’s critique and Foucault’s microphysical diagram of 
ungovernable forces. Foucault’s procedure of eventalization is not only an 
integral part of the art of not being governed; it is also, as in Plato and Kant, 
a novel form of self- governance (or of not governing oneself at all) among 
masterless, transient things and common powers unwilling to play their part 
in the economy of sovereignty and government. The task of the critic is then 
to shed light on the uneconomical fold in the living— to tease out a different 
economy of powers, an economy at once heteronomous to the governmental 
economy but dwelling as a disintegrating kernel in its midst. It is our re-
course to the power of crisis and critique that opens the horizon for a differ-
ent politics. Sovereignty and government may both be preoccupied with ap-
prehending things and lives, yet they are apprehended in turn by what they 
cannot avow in themselves: the growing power of their perishing, which is 
at once a downfall and an elevation. What sutures the juridical rationality 
to the governmental economic rationality and the theological- political para-
digm to the economic- providential paradigm is not, as Agamben holds, the 
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fiction of sovereignty. It is the ordering and disposing of lives and things, 
either as fostering life or as making die, within a circumscribed territory 
meant to hem in the relatively autonomous physionomos of things and lives.
Marx
In the figure of the psychiatrist, Foucault was able to identify a particular 
type of conjurer, a sorcerer of providential economic governance. But it was 
Marx who gave that figure his proper name: the capitalist. And it was Marx 
who put his finger on an effective critical practice in response. Marx’s ma-
terialist critic intervenes at the precise juncture where the capitalist conjoins 
mystery to economy in the form of nature and in the processes of naturaliza-
tion. Where Foucault’s critic unleashes microphysical powers in the midst of 
microphysical institutions, the Marxist materialist critic intensifies a double 
already at work within the “naturalized” capitalist economy. This Marx-
ian counterpart to Foucault’s diagrammatic microphysical force goes by the 
name of natural history. Natural history is the critical fold of a physiocratic 
economic nature.
Hegel, to give the man his due, had at least found it tragic that history 
necessitated the subjugation of first nature in our constitution of second 
nature. He could recognize how ironic it was: the fact that we had no choice 
but to overcome the very nature whose laws we nonetheless assimilated in 
our development of the ethical/historical world. Yet beyond that he had dis-
missed nature and natural history as nothing more than an unreasonable 
antithesis, a roadblock of thought. Nature had therefore remained for him 
the disavowed outside of history. Marx, for the first time, thinks nature 
as the outside inside man: his history, his inorganic body, his techne, his 
machines, his unconscious life activity. In the Economic and Philosophical 
Manu scripts of 1844, this concept of nature remains largely anthropocentric 
and even anthropomorphic: that which drives the life activity of human 
beings. It is not until Capital that natural history becomes even more ex-
ternalized and outside, even more alien and nonhuman, than it had been 
for Hegel. But now, in a crucial overturning of Hegel, this radical nonhu-
man outside at work in natural history is understood to constitute the truth 
content of world history, determining the unconscious evolution of history 
and “of the economic formation of society, [which] is viewed as a process of 
natural history.” 48 Human actors are not individuals, but “personifications 
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of economic categories, the bearers of particular class- relations and inter-
ests,” and an individual can therefore not be made “responsible for relations 
whose creature he remains, socially speaking” (92). Contrary to the naive 
anthropology behind traditional world history, Marx presents things, reali-
ties, materials, animals, machines, and men within relations of production, 
within differential structures that define and distribute places and functions. 
At every turn, Marx inscribes things, human actors, raw materials, objects, 
and instruments of production into relations and structures of a natural 
historical diagram.
In Capital’s brief chapter on the production of absolute surplus, for exam-
ple, Marx exemplifies his dialectics of nature and the metabolism carried out 
by humans as itself a natural power. His point is not so much that the given-
ness of earth history— of nature independent of human beings— has become 
indistinguishable from our transformation of nature and, through that pro-
cess, of our own nature. His point is that nothing exists apart from the 
continuous transformation and perishing at work in the dialectic of natural 
history. In Hegel’s master- slave dialectic, the liberation or self- consciousness 
of the slave stems from his transformation of the world of things. All the 
same, the master and the slave remain lead actors in an exclusively human 
drama where the overthrow of the existing order assumes an almost heroic 
cast. In Marx’s natural- historical dialectics, that same master and slave are 
reduced to props on a side stage: given over to a natural- historical return, a 
natural- historical rotation or revolution, in which nature furnishes the ma-
terials through which ideas, and governing ideas in particular, are built up. 
It is like Marx’s image of the architect who, in a supposed departure from 
the bee, “builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax” (284). 
That image may seem like an affirmation of humankind’s radical difference 
from nature— of the putative gulf between the “worst architect” and the 
“best of bees”— but it remains embedded in a larger drama of man’s loss of 
mastery (284). Here man does more, but also less, than transform nature; 
he also realizes himself in nature, traverses nature, to such an extent that he 
subordinates his will, however indirectly, to that which he has transformed. 
The more the laborer becomes impersonal, the more he gives himself over 
to the traversal of natural history and its laws, the more capable he becomes 
of realizing life as metabolized with and through a nature that has also pro-
duced his own actions and organs. Marx may want to insist that “an im-
mense interval of time separates the state of things in a which a man brings 
his labour- power to market for sale as a commodity from the situation when 
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human labour had not yet cast off its first instinctive form.” “We are not 
dealing here,” he writes, “with those first instinctive forms of labour which 
remain on the animal level” (283). But by extending his critical, political 
history into time immemorial, collapsing epochs until prehistorical states 
are found to be still pulsating in our organs and modes of production, Marx 
himself draws even modern labor processes into another history altogether, 
one in which humankind’s metabolism with the earth continues to guaran-
tee our capacity for genuine, revolutionary transformation.
For what truly interests Marx is not the historical development of labor 
as such. What interests him is the idea of a symptom- like return detectable 
in the moment that man becomes an object in the same process by which he 
subjectivizes nature and by which nature itself becomes a subject. But if nat-
ural history operates through a dialectics of return, what is it that returns? 
Marx is unequivocal: what returns is a “complex of things,” things charac-
terized by their transformative agency, their transience, and their torment, 
which continues to pulsate in the processes of production (285 – 86). What 
returns, to put the matter another way, are the relics of past means of labor 
in which we can discern the outlines of lost forms of social organization. 
One only has to shift perspective from the product of labor to the process 
extinguished in it and that “form of unrest” reveals the traces of torment 
left behind by past lives and labor (287). In a crowded universe of things, 
perished forms of life reappear. Past labor is only ever evident or objectified 
in decaying things. Like symptoms, which only manifest themselves at the 
point where psychical operations fail, this “form of unrest” becomes our 
matter of concern when it manifests itself in products falling into disrepair. 
We only ever become aware of the past labor objectified in a commodity — 
 that is, we only ever become aware of the form of unrest extinguished in a 
product— when that commodity breaks down and reveals its inherent dys-
functionality and inoperativity. “Past labor,” as Marx calls it, having once 
produced these now idle objects, returns to conjure the revitalizing sparks 
inherent in living labor. Living labor may thus be understood as seizing 
the dead corpus that makes up the humus of accumulated dead labor and 
decaying things. And by the same token, the process of decay— a process 
that encompasses things, machines, forms of life— insofar as it is a meta-
bolic process full of its own force, calls living labor to it and, in so doing, 
calls living labor to itself. Such decaying and passing things “are therefore 
not only results of labour, but also its essential conditions” (287). Generated 
by the labor process, entered into it, they also cause that process to realize 
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its revitalizing force and to carry out its redemptive work. The destructive 
power of natural processes— a power to which machines fall prey, that rots 
wood and rusts iron, that turns unwoven yarn into cotton wasted— is itself 
the engine for living labor. It is decay that confers life on living labor (289). 
The contact point between living labor and such things, at the deepest root 
of their uneconomical deadness, makes it possible that things might not 
only become real use- values but also effective ones. The dialectics are thus, 
that while dead objects give rise to living labor, seizing it and reanimating it, 
living labor in turn must revitalize dead objects by consuming them further. 
In that sense, living labor furthers and instills the force of transience already 
at work in perishing things and idle machines.
In this respect, Marx is a critical thinker who takes literally the labor of 
the term Stoffwechsel, metabolism. This term translates as “change of stuff ” 
or “change of materials”; and it is to such continuous change that the ac-
tive theoretical practice of the materialist dialectic is attuned. Such an active 
theoretical practice says not only that every production of theory is also a 
practice, defying the opposition between pure theory and applied practice; 
it says that every production of theory is also an injection, into political 
economy, of differentials such as metabolism. This goes beyond the mere 
historicization of political economy. The critical historian of metabolism 
ties ends to new beginnings and, in the process, becomes a montage artist 
who amalgamates different states, temporalities, and collectives. But Marx 
does not stop there. He reinserts those conjoined states, recomposed things, 
and collectives into the very digestive apparatus of consumption that once 
dissolved their original, innate ties, his aim being to produce a different type 
of consummation: a consuming that, in the form of a devouring (verzehren) 
of the “living means” (Lebensmittel) in the process of (critical) labor, cre-
ates a novel product “distinct from the consumer” (290). Marx metabolizes 
those objects to such a degree that he composes a new body, prosthetic and 
monstrous, made up of relics, including economies that have fallen out of 
history and dropped from view: a prehistory that disappears even from the 
natural sciences. “Nature becomes one of the organs of [man’s] activity,” 
writes Marx, “which he annexes to his own bodily organs, adding stature to 
himself in spite of the Bible.” He then continues:
As soon as the labour process has undergone the slightest development, it 
requires specially prepared instruments. Thus we find stone implements 
and weapons in the oldest caves. In the earliest period of human history, 
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domesticated animals, i.e. animals that have undergone modification by 
means of labour, that have been bred specially, play the chief part as in-
struments of labour along with stones, wood, bones and shells, which 
have also had work done to them. . . . Relics of bygone instruments of 
labour possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct eco-
nomic formations of society as do fossil bones for the determination of 
extinct species of animals. It is not what is made but how, and by what 
instruments of labour, that distinguishes different economic epochs. . . . 
Among the instruments of labour, those of a mechanical kind, which, 
taken as a whole, we may call the bones and muscles of production, offer 
much more decisive evidence of the character of a given social epoch of 
production than those which, like pipes, tubs, baskets, jars etc., serve only 
to hold the materials for labor, and may be given the general denotation 
of the vascular system of production. (285 – 86)
Marx, we see, quite dramatically reuses objects whose lack becomes obsti-
nate, including machines that drop out of circulation and lose their use- 
value, in order to display how thoroughly objects must traverse a process 
of near complete extinction and consumption before their true power, the 
power to call living labor into action, can be unleashed. Once past labor 
loses its sense, its mediating purpose, along with the objects and forms of 
life activity that sustained it, only then can it return to us; only then can the 
objects of labor encounter themselves apart from the drudgery of a specific 
usefulness or the life context that once animated them.
And more: it is only through the power of decay that the critical histo-
rian can fully assume the mandate of reanimating things that were once 
extinguished. The power of such passing awakens the critical activity of 
the historian who, in the midst of persistent crisis, distills and hastens the 
downfall of objects and forms of life so that they can then be reabsorbed and 
recycled for a process of revolutionary germination. Labor rests on the un-
rest of objects that are released from the productivity of past labor. Mindful 
of his own critical activity, an activity that is, after all, part of the natural 
historical dialectics, Marx’s natural historian incessantly returns to objects 
that return, no matter how deadened they are, in order to consume them 
and mediate them further in the process of living labor activity. As the la-
borer and the materialist allegorician continue to wear away, to mortify, the 
material elements of objects and products of past labor, they in fact realize 
the truth content of those things: the efficacy of their downfall and return, 
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“the destructive power of natural processes” (289). Living labor is a mighty 
power because it is a deadening process. In its midst dwell forms of unrest: 
the ruins of past labor and once useful things. Together, idle objects and 
the “trace[s] of past labor” manifest the power of a most efficacious destruc-
tion and return, particularly and paradoxically when they are consumed or 
when they fail, decay, and become the dead matter for a different, common 
use. Perceiving as much, Marx emphatically conjoins the redemptive core 
of living labor with what he posits as a commonality beyond all traditional 
forms and manifestations of the common: “the universal condition for the 
metabolic interaction between man and nature” (290).
It is thus a peculiar natural- historical dialectic that drives the passage 
from an economy of domination ruled over alternatively by the slave driver, 
the anxious capitalist, the stone- wielding savage, and the managerial Cin-
cinnatus— ultimately a world- historical economy— to Marx’s metabolic no-
mos.49 We don’t use nomos lightly here. “True history,” the history of living 
labor, is by no means anarchistic or undifferentiated simply because it cannot 
be said to abide by the natural law of the physiocrats: the natural law that 
predetermines the economy of nature (oeconomia natura) and so sustains the 
political economy characterized by the ordered rise and fall of managers and 
masters. Marx, at the height of his critical fervor, no longer describes the 
nomos basileus of physical laws that support the political world. Rather, he 
encircles the physis of a nomos radically different from a political economy 
that is simply a social rationalization of the providential œconomia at the root 
of modern liberalism and government.
Marx’s own, implicit metaphor for this natural- historical physionomos is 
that of the laws of fermentation by which the capitalist and all his products 
unwittingly abide (292). Fermentation, apart from becoming the matter for 
any specific user, let alone master, is a process of controlled rot or natural- 
historical decay that is at once a form of petrified unrest and a politicized 
apprehension of metabolic germination: that which is apparently most dead, 
utterly extinguished, most actively works through the living. “By the pur-
chase of labor- power, the capitalist incorporates labor, as a living agent of 
fermentation, into the lifeless constituents of the product, which also belong 
to him. . . . The labor process is a process between things the capitalist has 
purchased, things which belong to him. Thus the product of this process 
belongs to him just as much as the wine which is the product of the process 
of fermentation going on in his cellar” (292). What Marx grasps here is that, 
on the molecular level, seemingly nonliving agents such as yeast and bacte-
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ria produce convivial luxuries through the energy generated by the process 
of dissolution that happens when things, nature, and human labor come 
into contact. Marx thus concludes the section on the natural history of the 
labor process with a thought image about a form of life and a life activity 
that is firmly in touch with the advances in microbiology and fermenta-
tion technology of the 1850s. The discovery of the power of bacteria and 
microorganic life in the work of Pasteur, Swann, and others— life activity 
below the threshold of recognized agents, or what Pasteur calls “life with-
out air”— germinates, like the concentrated medium of high- yielding, fast- 
growing microorganisms itself, in Marx’s critical analysis. Indeed, such mi-
croorganisms act as the unrecognized engine of Marx’s materialist dialectics, 
wherein something idle and inoperative turns out to be the most fecund, 
where what had been dismissed as “unorganized ferments” according to the 
physiocratic diagram reveals itself, through a slight rearrangement of those 
diagrammatic coordinates, to be highly organized, even politically potent. 
Suddenly the inorganic, or that which was thought to be dead, manifests 
itself as filled with dialectical unrest: a possible model for communal living 
and the actual overthrow of the physiocratic economy at the heart of the 
capitalist economy. The distributed networks of, and the quorum sensing 
among, micro biological forms of life not only cannot be owned or possessed 
(however much they might be subjected to the seal of copyright and patent 
law); their silently persistent physionomos is incessantly bubbling up within 
the products and commodities that the capitalist claims as his own. And 
indeed they are his own, but not just in the way that he believes or that 
Marx implies. They belong to him in a way that he cannot own up to, for he 
cannot get rid of all that life, or even recoil from it, simply by transmuting 
its excessive activity into surplus value, for he has literally incorporated its 
surplus life. Standing at the present end of a long history, the capitalist, the 
only human figure that Marx allows into the concluding paragraphs of this 
section, is the heir and proprietor of a vast cellar filled not only with the 
elements, both living and dead, of production but with the relics of past 
labor activity, superseded economic formations, and the accumulated unrest 
of things. In the deepest chambers of those cellars (which are themselves 
natural- historical, built in the caves of prehistoric peoples), there is a life that 
persists without air. And that life continues to boil in barrels filled not with 
wine alone but with the accumulated unrest of its making and consumption: 
a common good of conviviality, luxurious excess, and sociability. This stuff 
that, according to Marx’s contemporary Nietzsche, flows through Dionysian 
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tragedy and through the sacraments of Christian communion, has now been 
privatized and turned into profit. Out of the cellars of the capitalist flows a 
stream of commodities meant not to intoxicate us but to narcotize us, cap-
ture us in the stupefying aura of world- historical gravity and progress. But 
fermentation continues. It is the task of the materialist historian to venture 
into the darkest recesses of those cellars and put her hand to the labor that 
is already under way there, that is always under way there— that is under 
way in the countless barrels belonging to the capitalist— in the process of 
fermentation.
Marx thus describes the capitalist as a latecomer who, having traversed 
through a thingly technical history, is subjected to a metabolism of which he 
is an integral part and by which he will finally be consumed. This is how Marx 
understands crisis: not as a detrimental process demanding management and 
resolution but as in itself redemptive. It is as though Marx works through 
and then beyond that which, etymologically, crisis concerns: the symptomatic 
analysis and resuscitation of a diseased body or— why not?— body politic. 
Marx’s critic is not concerned with bodies. Contrary to the capitalist, whose 
sole care is for the effective administration and distribution of bodies— 
 bodies to consume and to be consumed in the process of labor, bodies to 
be used up or cast aside, inexhaustible bodies, elite bodies to be disciplined 
and perfected— the critic is obsessed with the incorporation of alien elements 
and histories as they gut corporations, turning the organs of their operation 
inside out. What preoccupies him are the technical prostheses that expand the 
habituated corporeal confines, the power of exfoliating cadavers, the energy 
of decaying things and forms of life: all the things that a privileging of the 
body encourages us to dismiss as pathogenic or parasitical. In short, Marx’s 
critic turns traditional political- economical criticism inside out because he 
eviscerates the thinking that takes place in and through bodies. The Marxian 
critic is a nonimmunological thinker. Like the capitalist, that quintessential 
figure of the undead— adding nothing to the metabolic interaction between 
labor and nature but instead vampirically sucking out the life activity of 
labor— the materialist critic manipulates and measures organic undead mat-
ter, including the capitalist himself, but with this crucial difference: unlike 
that of the capitalist, the critic’s symptomatic reading functions not by seizing 
upon the recombinatory potential of undead materials but by dissolving even 
the treasure of the symptom that can be turned into a surplus. In a nutshell, 
he makes that which belongs to the capitalist befall the capitalist, and to such 
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a commonizing extent that the capitalist becomes yet another agent— yet an-
other critical agent— of physionomos.
Let us finally understand what Marx is up to here. Marx describes, and 
in so doing effects, the infinite expansion of the objects of labor and the 
means and materials of production until “the distinction between princi-
ple subject and accessory vanishes,” alongside the “original composition” 
of all substances and products (288). That means that Marx systematically 
dehierarchizes the metaphysical taxonomies of substance and accidents that 
continue to reverberate in the capitalist distinction between the finished 
product, which interests the capitalist only insofar as it is a commodity, and 
the raw materials, means of production, and labor processes that went into 
it. Whereas the capitalist turns all means, things, and processes into sub-
stances, the critic liquefies those substances, transforming them into acci-
dentals by reentering them into natural- historical circulation. Being a mate-
rialist natural historian means transferring the transient and transformative 
force of things, regardless of the position, be it raw materials, products, or 
means of labor, that they happen to take in a given labor constellation, to 
the world of political economy. In this way, the classical natural order of 
the physiocrats, with its hierarchies and distributions, its overall properness, 
is dissolved and rendered uneconomical. So profoundly natural historical 
is Marx’s structuralist and functionalist thought that this uneconomy can 
be best described as a physionomos in which semimanufactured things— 
cotton, thread, and yarn— are “submitted to whole series of different pro-
cesses, changing their shape, their specific function by the position [they] oc-
cup[y], as [their] position changes” in a given moment, losing and attaining 
characteristics, becoming imperfect, failing, dying, until they achieve their 
complete extinction, at which point they release their destructive powers 
and also call out living labor (289). Marx thus invents a completely new, 
ever- expanding universe of infinite means and things: a physionomical logic 
in which everything is unsettled by the unrest extinguished in it. In the 
process, he reveals himself to be not only a profoundly structuralist thinker, 
a thinker for whom structures and constellations, and not subjects and peo-
ple, determine the political arena. He reveals himself to be a universalizing 
revolutionary thinker of minute things— bacteria, stones, dye, rust— as they 
come into contact with the grandest accomplishments of mankind— canals 
and so on— both past and present.
48 george edmondson and klaus mladek 
Kafka
Far from being extinguished, Marx’s idea of natural history would continue 
to return— and, in returning, call living labor to itself— long after Marx 
himself was dead and buried. Arguably the most fruitful of those returns 
can be found in the correspondence between Benjamin and Adorno, whose 
exchange on the commodity draws attention to the enigmatic comings and 
goings of one particular denizen of the natural historical realm, Kafka’s crea-
ture Odradek. For both Benjamin and Adorno, Odradek lends a face to the 
natural historical dimension of the commodity. But for Adorno especially, 
Odradek embodies nothing less than the promise for a future politics, a 
politics defined by the end of the oikos and the advent of postcommodified 
life. Does Odradek “not anticipate precisely the overcoming of the creaturely 
state of guilt,” asks Adorno,
and is not this concern— truly a case of Heidegger put right side up— the 
secret key, indeed the most indubitable promise of hope, precisely through 
the overcoming of the house itself? Certainly, as the other face of the 
world of things, Odradek is a sign of distortion— but precisely as such he 
is also a motif of transcendence, namely of the ultimate limit and of the 
reconciliation of the organic and the inorganic, or of the overcoming of 
death: Odradek “lives on.” Expressed in another way, it is only to a life 
that is perverted in thingly form that an escape from the overall context 
of nature is promised. . . . No, Odradek is indeed so dialectical that it can 
also properly be said of him that “almost nothing has made everything 
well again.”50
How is it that Adorno can arrive, from out of distortion, the dregs of the 
commodity, and the crisis of the patriarchal form of life, at the “promise of 
hope”? What Adorno perceives here is that crisis, first and foremost, exposes 
the precariousness of the world of things and their names. When a social 
form of life that had contained the thingly world through an order of nam-
ing founders: that is when we apprehend the thingly world in all its obsti-
nacy. At such moments, the critic must recognize himself, in Benjamin’s for-
mulation, as a physiognomist of the world of things and their names in crisis: 
as the one who knows how to read crisis into the constellation of things. At 
such moments, it is the task of the critic to act as an agent of natural history, 
seizing upon crisis lest crisis be seized upon as the pretext for its resolution.
The beginning of Kafka’s text epitomizes this operation of critique.51 
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What starts off as an etymological critique of Odradek the name soon be-
comes an ontological critique of Odradek the being, until finally critique 
expands to become a generalized crisis of knowledge and language: the 
fruitless investigation of a creature without discernible origin that no ex-
isting language can claim as its own. Not only then is Odradek a name for 
crisis; it speaks the very crisis of naming and being. The etymological cri-
tique introduced by the mere existence of Odradek intensifies the crisis of an 
existing form of life, a crisis that only becomes palpable through a program 
of interminable study and irresolvable concern. The neologism Odradek 
intimates the formation of a logic yet to come and a critique that pledges 
fidelity to that logic. This critique yet to come drains krísis from crisis by 
divesting a modern understanding of crisis of its etymology. For once we 
divest crisis of its etymological roots— once we drain krísis from crisis— we 
simultaneously deprive ourselves of the resolution and overcoming associ-
ated with crisis. What remains is then a form of critique that, like Odradek’s 
name and existence, will live on beyond the house, inflicting crisis upon the 
nomos of the oikos in perpetuity. This is not to imply that either the house 
or its father will themselves exist in perpetuity or that the aim of critique is 
to bring down the house. Odradek cannot be given a political purpose or 
get enlisted in a political project that would provide him with a permanent 
abode. That would be to misunderstand the ongoing, still unfolding, not 
altogether dreadful delight at work in the Odradekian form of crisis.
If the new, all- consuming object of epistemological and political critique 
goes by the name of Odradek, its new, deranged temporality first announces 
itself with sometimes, as in “sometimes he is not to be seen for months . . . 
but then he invariably comes back to our house again. Sometimes when one 
comes out of one’s room” (176). The intervals between Odradek’s returns 
are as unpredictable as where he will appear— the attic, the staircase, the 
corridor, the hallway— for Odradek is “exceptionally mobile and refuses to 
be caught” (176). What happens to a subject— the father of the family, in 
this case— when his affective attachment (in the mood of worry) to the out-
side world, the world of objects, comes via an elusive, mobile object whose 
location and time remain uncertain? At the very least, it means that what 
Heidegger calls the “Age of the World Picture,” wherein a subject makes 
the representation of an object dependent on how he places himself firmly 
in the scene— that is, the way humans position themselves “to beings as the 
objective”— has come to an end.52 With the arrival of furtive and nomadic 
objects like Odradek, we are no longer at home in the age of the world pic-
50 george edmondson and klaus mladek 
ture, where a stable subject- object opposition licenses man to subjectivize 
himself through the world of objects, while objects themselves are subjected 
to the fixed positioning and measurements of man. Now dwelling in a world 
populated by whimsical, ill- disciplined, and vaguely impish Odradeks, the 
father and his world picture are unsettled by the obstinacy of things that 
withdraw from us, only to return on their own time and in their own man-
ner. The moment when Odradek derails the oikos is the moment when the 
ennobling care (Sorge) that had defined oikonomia, the care for things and 
bodies, turns into an all- consuming concern and worry (Sorge).
If the appearance of Odradek should worry anyone, then, it is the father 
of the family; but even he, as Judith Butler observes, finds it “almost pain-
ful” that Odradek will outlive him.53 How are we to read that almost? The 
father of the family, as Marx, Freud, Lacan, and Foucault (for starters) well 
knew, stands at the gateway to modern economic and political thought. The 
Roman paterfamilias, with his right over the life and death of his children 
and his right to enjoy the usufruct of the products of their labor, is the arche-
type for the modern sovereign, capitalist, manager, and master. As Foucault 
notes, the family, although sovereign in origin and grounded in the patria 
potestas of Roman law, constitutes the cell of the disciplinary archipelago.54 
“In Rome,” writes Foucault, quoting Montesquieu, “after fathers were no 
longer permitted to put their children to death, the magistrates inflicted 
the punishment that the father would have prescribed.”55 Juridical and dis-
ciplinary power radiates outward from the family bond to the government 
and the state. It is not only that the Roman magistrates are the first figures 
to occupy the threshold between sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical 
regimes; it is that the doctrine of the parens patriae establishes, once and 
for all, the obligation of the state to care for the legally incompetent and 
the infirm— a doctrine built on the paternal and familial model. But if the 
father acts as the fulcrum for three diagrams of governmental power— the 
juridical, the disciplinarian, and the biopolitical— it is because he embodies 
the origin of our primordial investment in the social and political spheres. 
The paterfamilias of Rome amasses legal and moral obligations, establishes 
a regime of permanent relations and loyalty, and consolidates, among his 
sons and heirs, a regime of contractual and personal indebtedness to him, 
in the process creating a guilt history tied to the past and to a future gene-
alogy. In the family structure, as Foucault reads it, the flat, isotopic politics 
of contiguity associated with discipline joins the hierarchical, asymmetrical 
politics of verticality associated with the sovereign. The care and welfare of 
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the parens patriae characteristic of modern societies simply adds the biopo-
litical dimension to the “double role,” at once sovereign and disciplinary, 
already performed by the family man.56 But if the care and welfare of the 
father of the family primarily concerns the production of docile and efficient 
offspring, he also, in the end, becomes responsible for those who fall out-
side of the home: “the uneducable, undisciplinable, unusable and unwanted 
human waste” produced by and yet anathema to biopolitics.57 The father, in 
other words, becomes the caretaker of Odradek, while his home becomes 
the repository in which the homo œconomicus meets the creatura physionomicus.
And so the father of the family finds it “almost painful” that Odradek will 
outlive him. Because if, on the one hand, the father harbors the secret worry 
that his reign will replicate itself without him, on the other hand he betrays 
the not- so- secret hope that nothing of his reign will be reproduced at all— 
that a completely new progeny will emerge, one with no connection to his 
genealogy. Just as the superego ambivalently wishes that the child would 
accede to its demands while forever failing to become like it, so the father of 
the family invites his children to eventually supersede his rule and become 
Odradek’s playmates. The mercilessly perpetual feast days that celebrate the 
cult of capitalism— a cult grounded, as Marx well knew, in the paternal oikos 
and the homo œconomicus in general— are transformed into playdates with 
Odradek.58 Once the state of the father (the literal sense of patrimonium) is 
dissolved, not only will his children be freed from a regime of worry and 
care, but the father too will be unburdened of the immunity that he is ex-
pected not only to dispense but to protect. For we flatter ourselves if we 
assume that the problem the father faces is that of protecting us; the problem 
he faces is that of protecting the immunitarian paradigm of protection. And 
it is a problem of which he would just as soon be relieved. So it is that while 
the father initially worries about protecting the rule of the paternal home, he 
ends up worrying that Odradek, in outliving him, will fail in his appointed 
task and not unmake the patrimony whose dissolution will absolve the father 
of his worry. If the father’s new concern is also the source of his hope, his 
new worry is that he will lose that hope.
The father has no choice, then, but to learn to live in the midst of the 
worst, encapsulated in Kafka’s text by the einstmals (once, erstwhile, one 
day) of Odradek’s perpetual reappearance. “Can it be,” the father asks him-
self, “that he [Odradek] might one day [einstmals] still be rolling down the 
stairs, with ends of thread trailing after him, before the feet of [our] children 
and children’s children?” (177). Einstmals denotes an event in the past that, 
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in Kafka’s peculiar handling of the term, stretches into the most distant 
future, thereby challenging the frame of origin and last judgment that de-
limits the perimeters of our patrilineal mode of history. With the arrival of 
Odradek, we find ourselves in the realm of the almost: a middle where all 
acts, either the ones that run precipitously forward to the telos of history 
or those that run nostalgically back to a pure origin, are spliced. But even 
in this acting and being in the middle, which is the act our time demands, 
the father of the family does not give up on a remnant of last judgment. 
For every present spent with Odradek or wondering about his absence is an 
opportunity for more than the mutually beneficial exchange that the father 
seems to have in mind when he first meets the living spool. Every such pres-
ent holds out the potential for a true last judgment of the present, one that 
paradoxically declares fidelity to the ruination of the father’s oikos and to 
the end of all paternal judgment. Odradek’s existence in the einstmals, in-
dexed by the impossibility of determining the precise date of his appearance, 
detemporalizes chronometric time so utterly that it derails an epoch and a 
logic of decisionism.
Read from the perspective of the capitalist cult, in fact, Odradek’s crooked 
calendar traverses generations and confuses cause and effect, before and af-
ter, in a manner akin to the metaleptic temporal reversal of the Trinitarian 
father- son incest that Marx detected in the capitalist production of surplus 
(256). Only in the debris of capitalist production, at once its cause and effect, 
will we encounter a new type of infinity, one that departs from the immor-
tal regime of fathers and sons rolling out quietly and solemnly before us. 
In a kind of infinite finitude— old, torn, knotted, and discontinuous— or 
infinite decompletion of the surplus value produced and enjoyed by the fa-
ther, we find the prospect of a newly anxious type of care. The very idea of 
Odradek being ground down by purpose so worries the father that his anx-
iety becomes a care; and that new care relocates him and his household to a 
dominion where the only master is the laughter, “like the rustling of fallen 
leaves,” at our creaturely stupefaction (177). Simply by relating to Odradek, 
the father of the family and his children so thoroughly contract the creature’s 
discontinuous temporal and indefinite ontological status that they can no 
longer establish the distinct moments, delimited by a determinate before and 
after, when the trauma of concern began and might end. Odradek’s einst-
mals, about which “it is not possible to state anything more definite . . . since 
Odradek is exceptionally mobile and refuses to be caught,” renders impos-
sible the retroactive constitution, in a second encounter, of the first time he 
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vexed, concerned, and traumatized the father. Not even the psychoanalytic 
narrative of subjectivity, in which we relate to the impudent impossibility 
of our existence by returning to the past trauma through which we become 
subjects, is available to the father; for his nightmare has yet to arrive and 
never will have arrived since it has not even begun and therefore cannot end. 
Odradek, who moves into and, by moving into, voids the very position of 
the master, turns the father into a creature- object unable to subjectivize him-
self and thus to become a Being. Yet in that conundrum, the father discerns 
the outlines of an immanent transcendence, reachable only by traversing the 
figure of Odradek and the natural- historical rhythm of his reappearance.
The father of the family is not alone in catching a glimpse of that tra-
versal, however. He has an important counterpart in another of Kafka’s 
sovereign- cum- managerial figures: Poseidon, from the parable of the same 
name.59 Poseidon, one might say, is a more developed, because more para-
lyzed, version of the father of the family. Poseidon has a crisis of naming of 
his own. Everyone seems to think that he is a god. Worse, everyone seems to 
think that he is a Homeric god. This is almost more than Poseidon can bear. 
Not only is he not an idle, indolent god out cruising the waves, as everyone 
seems to believe. On the contrary, “the administration of all the waters gave 
him endless work” (85). Cruising around the waves, trident in hand. As if 
he had time for such nonsense! The only opportunity he ever gets to act like 
the Homeric god people wrongly conceive him as being is when he goes up 
“now and then” to meet with Jupiter. (And when had his own brother, Zeus, 
become Jupiter, figure of the imperium? Had he been so immersed in the 
management of the seas that he had missed the passing of the old order? Was 
he the last holdout of a form of life that had already faded away? If so, why 
had no one informed him?) At such times, he gets to pass fleetingly through 
his realm, but the meetings with Jupiter are invariably petty and humiliat-
ing, and he ends up returning to his office in a rage. Hardly the all- powerful 
god of the oceans he is made out to be.
Instead, Poseidon dwells where the father of the family dwells: in the 
midst of the worst, the realm of the perpetual almost. As he himself well 
understands, Poseidon is neither a god nor a bureaucrat. Rather, he inserts 
the bureaucrat into the god and, in so doing, occupies an origin different— 
neither coming to be nor passing away, neither divine nor profane— from the 
one imposed upon him by Homeric myth. In that sense, Kafka’s parable can 
be understood as a restaging and, in turn, an exit from the anarchy at the 
heart of Olympian management. His trident now propped up in a corner of 
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his office, Poseidon’s image (as a god) and his nature (as a bureaucrat) cancel 
one another out, leaving him nowhere other than in a natural- historical mid-
dle. To judge by his complaints, one would think that Poseidon finds this 
situation intolerable. “In fact, he had already filed many petitions for— as he 
put it— more cheerful work” (85). But the few times he is given an opportu-
nity to be something other than he is— appointed to a new post, given new 
responsibilities— Poseidon panics, his divine breathing becoming troubled 
and his bronze chest beginning to tremble (85). The office of ocean manage-
ment could not function without him. That, at least, is what he tells him-
self. But underneath his conflicted emotions, underneath the complaints and 
frustrations, Poseidon understands that there is no other, or no better, place 
for him than in the mutually canceling middle. He panics because, were 
he to leave his present position, he would cease to be the natural- historical 
figure he is; and it is only insofar as he retains his natural- historical position, 
only insofar as he continues to occupy his origin, that he has any hope or 
chance at happiness.
Poseidon, then, could be said to occupy— occupy voluntarily- unconsciously, 
as it were— the place that the father of the family comes to occupy only when 
forced to do so by the arrival of Odradek. Odradek draws the father into a 
different calendar and a different constellation. But from time immemorial, 
Poseidon has been immersed in that same calendar, that same constellation, 
by virtue of his bureaucratic task administering the creaturely life found in 
the depths of the sea. Poseidon is not simply an accountant. He is stuck in 
a state of perpetual accounting, of forever taking inventory. Is that not the 
ideal position for the figure, now understood to be one and the same, of the 
sovereign- cum- governmental manager? As an activity, accounting negates 
both poles of the spectrum that runs (in place) from sovereignty to biopoli-
tics. The sovereign, to use Foucault’s elegant formulation, lets live and makes 
die, while biopolitics fosters life and lets die. But accounting, thorough ac-
counting, accounting performed to its fanatical extreme, follows neither of 
those patterns. It lets nothing die; and yet it makes nothing live. Account-
ing, moreover, cannot be said either to enliven or to deaden its practitioners. 
It simply repeats without end. It therefore removes the accountant from the 
realm of care (which still promises a kind of grandeur) and relocates him, 
along with the father of the family, to the realm of concern: a realm where he 
is utterly absorbed, rendered harmless and distracted, no longer interested in 
aspirational or managerial redemption— a realm where he sits “in the depths 
of the world- ocean, doing figures uninterruptedly” (87).
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As we have known since Derrida’s Archive Fever, however, there is at the 
same time no historical or critical world apart from the archive. Were the 
accounts and inventories of the archive to disappear, so too would the his-
torical and critical worlds. And given the precariousness of every archive, 
this means that the historical world is forever on the verge of apocalypse. 
Already, then, Poseidon looks ahead, in his very occupation, to the end of 
world history. In fact, “he was in the habit of saying that what he was wait-
ing for was the fall of the world” (87). But insofar as he takes perpetual 
inventory, insofar as he is caught in the endless repetitive task that has been 
his “from the beginning” (85), the end of the world is held in abeyance even 
as it continues to unfold. The archive continues, albeit without resolution 
(there being no resolution to the taking of inventory). In that way, Poseidon 
can look ahead to an end that is always on the verge of arriving, or that 
arrives perpetually in its imagined anticipation. On that last day, Poseidon 
will finally be able to “to make a quick little tour” around the oceans that 
he administers but has never properly seen (87). But before doing so, he will 
look through (Durchsicht) his accounts one last time. Then, in a moment of 
transparency (Durchblick), he will realize that, all along, his rows were empty 
but for the figures, the “destructive characters” as Benjamin might call them, 
that it had been his job to enter there. In that moment of looking through, 
he will grasp that, behind the clamor of the historical world, there was a nul-
lification even of the nothingness that stirs the drama of the world- historical 
stage: that the historical world was filled, not with itself, but with the figures 
of natural history that he had spent his time “doing uninterruptedly.” Then 
he will be released from the burden of guilt that sustains all managerial care. 
His hope in the worst will have been confirmed.
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Left and Right:
Why They Still Make Sense
Carlo Galli
Translated by Zakia Hanafi
The issue of left and right still warrants reflection. Although widely debated, 
the topic has yet to be exhausted: the distinction between left and right, 
displaced from its original political space, and even from the somehow classic 
opposition between capital and labor, still remains effective and meaningful.
The thesis of this work is that although there have been, and continue to 
be, many lefts and rights, two broad categories can be identified within this 
plurality that are general, useful, and meaningful. The goal, therefore, is to 
simplify through synthesis, not to classify through analysis. We aim to arrive 
at a radical level of understanding, but not through the politological clarity of 
ideal types— models constructed according to the needs of the researcher— 
or through the historical variety of concrete forms. Nor will we proceed 
through essences or ontologically stable ideal clusters (such as liberty and 
equality, risk and security, preservation and revolution), or even through 
transepochal, psychological, or anthropological attitudes. Left and right will 
be treated rather as different modes, separate but inseparable, opposing but 
complementary, for accessing the original energy of the modern, through 
which— in the history, institutions, political ideas, and common feeling of 
public opinion— modern Western politics is articulated. This means that left 
and right can be radically thought only through a genealogical procedure that 
goes back to the ground zero of modern political institutions. This thesis also 
includes the observation that the categories of left and right do not survive 
today because of the persistence of the modern political space, with which 
they came into existence, or because they represent a fundamental dichotomy 
of society, one that is far more divided and fragmented today. The reason 
these categories have survived is because through them is expressed a force 
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and a problem, namely, subjectivity— in the modes we will be describing— 
which may very well be something more than simply an echo of an original 
big bang, the fossil radiation that pervades the universe of politics. Rather, 
subjectivity is one of the contributions of the modern period to the historical 
continuity of Western civilization, as were the Greek areté or the Roman ius 
or Christianity. Of course, if the distinction between left and right is not 
yet vestigial, it can still become so: in the same way the legacy of the ancient 
can be evacuated, the West can also lose all the driving force of its institu-
tional ideals. This may well happen, although the major powers that have 
sprung from it— science, technology, the capitalist mode of production— have 
extended themselves (of course, in superficial and varying degrees) through-
out most of the world. At play in the categories of left and right are specific 
political, historical, and cultural institutions of the West— secular humanism 
and democracy to begin with— which, although implicated in them, are not 
coextensive with the planetary expansion of Western practical skills.
A caveat I would do well to include, then, is that the arguments presented 
in this work— stemming from an interest in deciphering the intellectual and 
political forms of the right that currently governs Italy, and which is leaving 
its mark on the country, although one of uncertain duration— are primarily 
relevant to Western democracies, where the question of left and right first 
arose. There is a further caveat to be issued: this is not just another piece on 
the incidental fates of the left or right, an analysis of their ills, advice (unso-
licited at that) on the issues to be addressed by their policies, and in answer 
to the question whether a moderate or aggressive, institutional or radical 
praxis is called for. There is no normative intent to this inquiry; if anything, 
normativity is the object of its reflection. In any case, there is no intention 
to hand out badges of authenticity to any true left or true right. The pur-
pose of this work is to recognize two cardinal modes in the past, and in the 
present as well (meaning, even in the rudimentary politics of today). Both 
are interpretations of original, unavoidable aspects of modernity, so that we 
cannot say that one is false politics and the other authentic politics. The in-
determinacy of politics, its constitutive contingency, makes this impossible.
An Obsolete Dichotomy?
The heuristic, theoretical, and practical obsolescence of the political dis-
tinction between left and right has been proclaimed since the 1980s, and 
with even greater intensity in the wake of globalization following the fall of 
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Soviet communism. While in the 1980s criticism of the distinction was sus-
pected of being essentially right wing, beginning in the 1990s it was viewed 
instead as a sign of epochal, structural crisis. In the age of electronics and 
the consumer society, immaterial labor, and the disappearance of traditional 
classes, the left- right opposition— an archaic legacy of contrasting ideolog-
ical arguments played out around the centrality of factory labor— was de-
clared to be a mere lexical holdover, blamed on the incapacity or laziness 
of the political and intellectual class (the same result comes from reversing 
the signs, in other words, if you express nostalgia for a world polarized by 
strong ideologies).1
In reality, the difference between left and right was determined in the 
nineteenth century in reference to factory production: it identified the dia-
lectic, at times a harsh one, between those who advocated a prudent slowing 
down of the inclusive dynamics hardwired into capitalism, and those who 
advocated their advanced, progressive acceleration (in terms of citizenship, 
equality, and access to health and education) until its final, eventual over-
turning or fulfillment. At the beginning of the twentieth century, trans-
formed into the opposition between the liberal logics of the individual and 
the democratic logics of mass societies— both of which, as Tocqueville saw, 
had been inherent to modernity— the categorical pairing nonetheless seemed 
inadequate and stifling to many, like an intellectual and political cage to be 
broken out of by taking a leap forward, so as to go beyond right and left.2 
The fascists who held this stance to the bitter end attracted a great deal of 
the most evolved intellectual adherents in Europe, who at least in the early 
years were deluded precisely by this position.3 In reality, fascism had actually 
constructed another right, more radical than the traditional conservative 
one, by constructing something new, the totalitarian regime; or, if you will, 
it had realized its plan to go beyond left and right. This was a new political 
experience, but one that negated the reasons for the very problem leading to 
its creation (and even if the truth of Western modernity were to be found in 
this negation, left and right nonetheless lose all meaning in it).
In any case, with the disastrous loss of the war, fascism delegitimized 
the right in Europe and legitimized the left in all its forms, both commu-
nist and (broadly speaking) social- democratic. These seemed to occupy the 
political space of the left after the Second World War, while the right was 
forced to present itself as the center (and in many ways to also converge 
on it). Similarly, forty- five years later, the defeat of real communism would 
mark not only the end of the extreme left but also the weakening of the 
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social- democratic left. More generally, the real democracies had indeed won 
a historic victory over real communism, weakening it, precisely thanks to 
their profound internal economic and political transformations. But they 
had come to triumph so full of insuperable contradictions that at the time of 
their victory, the whole conceptual apparatus of modern politics was almost 
unusable: the almost complete disappearance from mass democracy of the 
individual subject, the heart of modernity— made now into the object rather 
than the subject of new, pervasive powers— was fundamental to this process. 
The postmodern era of globalization thus witnessed the crisis of socialism 
as well as the crisis of conservativism, made extremist and populist after the 
disappearance of its adversary, while witnessing at the same time an internal 
critique of neoliberalism itself, which was unable to lend a stable form to 
society.4
In short, the end of modernity and the fluidity of the present were sup-
posed to lead to the recognition that both left and right had lost their pur-
pose just as much as they had lost the chain of subjectivities and means to 
fulfill them. The present and the future were also supposed to have demanded 
going beyond modern political alternatives, so as to position themselves un-
der the banner of the new: the new left and new right, if the same terminol-
ogy really had to be used. But, in reality, the new was, obviously, substan-
tially the same, and it differed only by subtle tonalities, by only (slightly) 
different interpretations of the same political divide. There was the unques-
tioned centrality of the capitalist mode of production, but of consumption 
instead of labor, of pluralist parliamentary democracy effectively emptied 
of its meaning, and of the middle classes, to whose cultural and social me-
diateness politics was supposed to adapt as a structural and strategic factor, 
becoming a politics of the center. The cultural and political news over the 
last twenty years has indeed been full of convergences to the center, of right 
and left being surpassed, and also of social democracy and environmental-
ism, proceeding along new third paths, despite all the differences in the 
various Western political worlds (but also the acceptance of capitalism by the 
Chinese communist regime, which is no small theoretical and interpretive 
challenge).
True, there were those who refused to embrace the changes, rejecting 
the dilution of their power, and who spoke, from the far left, about two 
rights: the real right and the one the new left was turning into.5 Conversely, 
from the opposite bank, the Italian and French New Right pursued a dif-
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ferent way of overcoming the traditional dichotomy: in metapolitical terms, 
meaning, radically categorical ones, rather than from a merely factual con-
vergence; although not devoid of historical and theoretical awareness, it 
nonetheless held little practical effectiveness (the new right that has emerged 
in Italian politics has nothing in common with the New Right). In any case, 
the mainstream interpreters were nevertheless oriented toward perceiving 
the blurring of the boundaries and of the contrapositions, and toward the 
resulting shift of politics into an elsewhere— in which, at best, issues that 
involved neither the left nor the right should have been able to take on shape 
and importance, such as environmental issues— challenged if anything by 
the relics of the old extremisms and, much more, by the emergence of new 
populist forces, the vehicle of new extremisms, whether ethnic, cultural, or 
religious in character.
All this is partly true, especially in the obvious perception of the changed 
geopolitical and also conceptual landscape, but in other important respects 
it is simply inaccurate. In fact, in the West, the political space continues to be 
polarized around the left and the right— just think, for example, of the his-
tory of the last fifteen years in Italy, Spain, Poland, France, and the United 
States. This contraposition is no longer fueled by the complex ideological 
constructs of the nineteenth century or even purely from the positioning 
of individuals in the industrial space, in the material sphere of relations of 
production. In any case, the global economic crisis is showing that there is 
an attempt in politics to regain a central role through a new capacity to regu-
late the economy, or in general by providing post- laissez- faire regulatory 
solutions that involve social politics as much as the symbolic and cultural 
realm. There is no doubt that in this new phase distinctions of left and right 
are meaningful, from the standpoint of the political forces and their way 
of presenting themselves as well as from that of the voters’ response: in the 
European Parliament elections held in June 2009, for example, voters were 
clearly successful in distinguishing between left and right, rewarding the 
first and punishing the second.
In short, left and right are categories that belong to the politics of the 
modern era but somehow they continue to make sense in the largely post-
modern politics of the global age, which means that something of the mod-
ern tradition is also at work in a context that is very different from the one 
in which they came into existence. This is exactly the problem that calls for 
an explanation.
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Formal Schemas and the Complexity of History
The left- right cleavage only makes sense starting from modernity; in other 
words, it cannot be used to characterize all the conflicts of power and knowl-
edge that have marked Western history, to explain the struggle between 
Caesar and Pompey, or the conflict between the Guelphs and Ghibellines. 
In terms of political history, this means that the opponents engaged in the 
struggle between church and state, and those who later faced each other 
down in the space of political economy, are lined up across its divide.
In the first case, the oppositional association between left and right de-
scribes the bourgeois, rationalist, and individualist fight against the author-
ities— as much against the pontiff as against the traditional monarch— on an 
intellectual path that runs from Hobbes and Locke to the Enlightenment, 
and from Rousseau to Kant. Politically, it has its high points in the revo-
lutions that affected both sides of the Atlantic, in France and the United 
States, during the late eighteenth century. The goal was to make politics the 
space in which human beings are self- governing, where power only responds 
to human reason and not to other, dogmatic pleas.
In the second case, this opposition describes the change of front, after 
which the bourgeois world would give itself the goal of preserving the work-
ings of capitalism, with its associated organization of the individualistic, 
representative- based public sphere— the rule of law— while the socialist world 
sought, using various strategies, to go beyond this economic and political 
organization. From this point of view, too, the new front that opened up with 
Babeuf already participated in the dynamics of the French Revolution and 
was destined to refine itself with the maturing of the Industrial Revolution 
and the emergence of Blanc, Blanqui, Proudhon, and Marx. A formal schema 
can be put together out of this showing the difference between left and right 
based on the parameters of value (difference or equality between people), 
politics (authority or liberation, hierarchy or autonomy, state or individual 
removed from bourgeois alienation), and time (preservation or progress).6 In 
reality, this diagrammatic approach requires far more nuances. The political 
traditions of left and right are contradictory and anything but unambiguous 
in their historical reality. In other words, they are not determined by any 
specific contents (but— this is my thesis— neither are they empty containers 
that get randomly filled up from one occasion to the next).
It has been observed that the matrixes of the many possible versions of the 
right appeared on the political scene between 1789 and 1848.7 First, the coun-
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terrevolutionary Catholics (Maistre, Bonald, the early Lamennais), the kind 
of right that supports the embedding of politics within an inaccessible foun-
dation which precedes it (tradition, religion, nature, or for the romantics, the 
nation, and history) and which must be preserved without being criticized 
by human reason lest the political order suffer a catastrophic collapse. This 
was a radical right, consistently anti- individualist and anticapitalist, which 
strictly speaking did not even seek to be right wing: what it wanted was to 
abolish the modern political space of left and right altogether (without suc-
cess, of course, actually ending up trapped in it).
With the July Revolution, this right was flanked by another one, that 
of the Orleanists, in some ways its opposite, which, along with François 
Guizot, took for granted that the revolution was definitively over and that 
social and political democracy was a problem to be brought under control. 
It represented individual initiative capable of creating wealth for individuals 
and for society, while also selecting the winners and the losers, the fit and 
the unfit, according to the objective laws of the market and success, guar-
anteed by the legal apparatus of the state. This was a conservative right. 
What followed as a development of and reaction to the revolutionary events 
of 1848 was the Bonapartism of Napoleon III, or the revolutionary right 
of political leadership from on high, of the plebiscitary head who, by his 
decision, reorganized the whole body politic of the nation by extralegal and 
extrainstitutional means. In this particular right, Karl Marx (in “The Eigh-
teenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”) saw a constant of bourgeois politics, 
namely, that the bourgeoisie, fearing the power of the proletariat, may give 
up its own liberal, parliamentary, and democratic political forms.
What we have here are different forms of the right: some are confronted 
with modernity from its outset, while others are formed within it; some are 
economic and others political; some are moderate and others extreme. But 
they are the germs of many subsequent versions of the right: ones that have 
been and are conservative, traditionalist, and reactionary, but also avant- 
garde, revolutionary, modernist, and futurist; authoritarian, totalitarian, but 
also anarchic; statist, but also laissez- faire; equally organismic and individ-
ualistic. The extreme variety of the different rights, both intellectual and 
political, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries— which were often allied 
with each other in different power relations, but which also fought bitterly 
against one another— shows that for them the political space was sometimes 
fixed, sometimes only slowly evolving, and sometimes even completely un-
stable, while at other times instead it was dynamic and dizzyingly in motion. 
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At times the political space was strictly unitary, nationalist, and imperialist, 
while at others it was broken up into small, xenophobic countries. Just to 
name a few, the right embraced such disparate figures as Maistre and Scru-
ton, Burke and Maurras, Marinetti and Lorenz, Evola and Schmitt, Stahl 
and Spann, Malinsky and Guénon, Jünger and Gentile, Céline and Sironi, 
Eliade and Bishop Lefebvre; and politicians as far apart as Solaro della Mar-
gherita and Hitler, Franco and Mosley, Mussolini and Churchill, Rattazzi 
and Degrelle.
The right has taken every possible position on the main problems and 
categorical notions of modern politics: the relationship between religion and 
politics has taken the form, at different times, of politics being founded in 
religion (the counterrevolutionaries), of the depoliticized internalization of 
religion (the liberal- conservatives), of the authoritarian instrumentalization 
of religion by politics, and of the political religions of totalitarianisms. The 
various right- wing attitudes toward the state are equally far apart, ranging 
from out- and- out worship (what was called statolatry) to suspicion at its in-
herent secularism, which had to be balanced by the authority of the church, 
from the respect for its laws which were viewed as bringing unity and order 
to the intolerance toward those that hindered or slowed down economic dy-
namism. Right- wing attitudes to the state have also included a decisionistic 
overthrowing of its institutional and legal logic (so that the state remains a 
structure of mere domination) and, finally, open rebellion against its uni-
tary and equalizing pretensions, in the name of territorial differences and 
regional roots, but also of heroic and exceptional subjectivities.
For the culture of the right, the individual was also sometimes a wolf 
to keep in check with harsh repressive laws, and sometimes a helpless sheep 
that had to be protected from the dangers of treacherous enemies; at other 
times, the individual was the lone hero who, entirely on his own strength, 
was capable of taking on his destiny. The swings on the part of the right 
when it comes to the economy are dramatic: at times, with a disdainful, 
aristocratic- warrior attitude, they have rejected the logics and ethos of cap-
ital, an opposition that can also take the form of a nationalistic rejection of 
the internationalism of capital, attributed to cosmopolitan classes or races 
(whence anti- Semitism, the socialism of idiots). At other times, they have 
given unquestioning support to the market as the new earthly Providence; 
and at other times again, they exercise a watchful and suspicious political 
governance (sometimes corporate) over its dynamics. With regard to the 
people, finally, the different rights have manifested their intrinsic plurality 
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by sometimes abhorring the people as an unclean revolutionary beast, and 
sometimes coaxing the masses like a docile herd of consumers; now idoliz-
ing them as the nation— the source of historical tradition or race, in biologi-
cal terms— that legitimates any politics of power; now presenting them with 
the fate of being ruled by wealthy or superior elites, or perhaps by charis-
matic leaders. Or yet again, they may hold up the people (this is right- wing 
populism) in contrast to the legal institutions and professional politicians, as 
the bearers of an essential legitimacy and spontaneous morality.
Between 1789 and 1848, the three basic forms of the left also appeared: the 
liberals who sparked the revolution, through the theoretical armory of ratio-
nalism and the Enlightenment, secularism, and individual rights; the radical 
democrats, with their egalitarian and moralistic republicanism (that of the 
Jacobins but also the Mazzinians); and the socialists in their various and 
often opposing groups: those that would be defined by Marx as utopians, 
Proudhon above all; the Marxists (destined to be internally divided between 
revolutionaries and reformists); and the anarchists.8 Statist and individualis-
tic, libertarian and authoritarian, even totalitarian, focused on spontaneity 
or discipline, pauperist or productivist; industrialist or ecologist, bellicose 
or pacificist, universalist and differentialist, utopian and scientific, from a 
historical standpoint, the left also seems to constitute a pluralistic universe. 
The world of the left is one of infinite variety and extraordinary polyvalency, 
one that on the historical and practical planes has had and continues to have 
more of a taste for separation than union, more drawn toward fratricidal 
war than collaboration. The conflicts between Marx and Bakunin, between 
Lenin and Luxemburg, between Stalin and Trotsky, between socialists and 
communists, are just a few of the exemplary peak, bloody moments in a 
political and ideological history marked by division.
Once again, a few conceptual indicators may help to illustrate how deeply 
divided the polymorphous universe of the lefts really is. On the question of 
subjectivity, the various lefts can be split into two large camps: those who 
consider the subject to have precedence over politics, and to be bestowed 
with an originary autonomy (individual rights); and the other, made up of 
those who view the subject as engendering itself in the process of historical 
struggle for emancipation (the collective subjectivity of the proletariat). The 
first position is liberal- democratic, while the second is the kind of dialectical 
thought that already at the time of Hegel (considered here not because he can 
be ascribed to the left but because he is the founder of a tradition of thought) 
united an enormous value assigned to subjectivity (the phenomenological 
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theory of the substance- subject that constructs itself through history) with a 
critique of the abstractness and superficiality of liberalism, thus opening the 
way to the critique of Marx and Marxisms toward liberal individualism (for 
not being humanistic enough, since it focuses on the image of the alienated 
man), with the prospect of developing a fully liberated subjectivity (through 
the collective subject of the proletarian class, and beyond in the multiform 
humanity of communism). The issue is clearly rights, which have an a priori 
status for the democratic left. In the dialectical tradition, on the contrary, 
human rights cannot escape being historicized (as bourgeois), being made 
dialectical (as contradictory), and finally sent back— no longer as rights but as 
the height of practical and concrete being— to the dimension of the realized 
communism. With all the consequences we are only too familiar with.
The state is viewed with equally strong ambivalence: some on the left 
interpret the state as an instrument of class oppression, to be fought with a 
nonalienated, collective force, such as the party. Others, instead of consider-
ing it a Leviathan to be struck down, see it as a means to bring a bit of justice 
into society. Even the universal dimension of the political space— which in 
theory unites all the left, from liberals to proponents of antiglobalization, 
passing through the various forms of socialism— has many powerful excep-
tions: there has often been a country, a nation, a state that has incorporated 
the idea, and whose mission it has been to propagate the idea throughout the 
world, the USSR, obviously, being the most extreme example.
In addition, just to make any diagrammatic approach even more imprac-
tical and every history even more confused, we must recall the many over-
lapping critiques from the left and right that have been directed against the 
concepts and institutions that form the political structure of capitalism, in 
the forms of both liberal democracy and social democracy. Although their 
intents and logics may have been different, the convergence has been re-
markable, leading to the common use of entire sets of arguments. The ease, 
for example, with which Lamennais passed from his counterrevolutionary 
phase to his democratic phase is thus explained by the persistence in him of 
a constant antibourgeois polemic. Although from opposite political sides 
and from very different cultural matrixes, we may also recall the assonance 
between the critiques of parliamentarism issuing from left and right: it is 
no coincidence that some antiparliamentarian motifs from the Frankfurt 
School were believed to be influenced by Carl Schmitt, with an antiliberal 
slant. Or the more or less successful syntheses (Conservative Revolution, na-
tional Bolshevism, to say nothing of National Socialism); or the convergence 
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of left and right, in the first half of the twentieth century, for the purpose of 
organizational solutions, like planning, to overcome the individualist- based 
capitalist economy.
Finally, the same political force (for example, liberalism) can play a right- 
wing or left- wing role from one time to the next according to historical 
contingencies. The same goes for concepts (for example, the nation) and 
thinkers (the most renowned example being Sorel). Conversely, seemingly 
deciding oppositions such as individualism and statism traverse and intersect 
with the right as much as they do the left. However, despite the inadequacy 
of formal schemas and the ambiguity of historical content, the left- right 
binary opposition seems to persist even on the contemporary political scene. 
What is needed, therefore, is a radical deciphering of the political categories 
of modernity, not to explain the concrete political choices of individuals or 
collective subjects or various political forces— largely contingent choices— 
but to understand how the categories of left and right came into existence 
and why they are so long- lived. Without resorting to essentialisms, to defini-
tions that apply to all periods, what we require is a genealogy of the concepts 
of right and left, performed using the tools and categories of a philosophy 
that is not limited to merely recognizing that the left- right cleavage makes 
sense in a modern political topology, but which goes back to the roots of a 
vast, contradictory phenomenology of lefts and rights.
The Origin of Modern Politics, and Its Consequences
The existence of the left- right binary opposition is an expression of the fact 
that modern politics is originarily indeterminate, meaning that its unity does 
not consist in exhibiting shared structures or foundations. Its unity consists 
rather in a problem that takes the form of a structural duality. The concep-
tual building blocks of thought that innervate modern politics, seeing as it 
had to give up on the traditional idea of Justice— the idea, that is, of an order 
of being that, if it were not for human sinfulness, directs even the politi-
cal order— consists in the centrality of the link between disorder as a given 
and order as a requirement. On the one hand, there is an ominous and un-
stable reality, the state of nature; and on the other, it is essential to construct 
a contrivance that gives shape and stability to politics. These are the two, 
inseparable sides in the modern way of regarding politics.
When interpellated down to its roots, the history of modern political 
ideas— in its mainstream form of political rationalism— can be interpreted 
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as a political cosmology, as a series of texts on the construction of order. The 
element of novelty does not only reside in the epochal compulsion to create 
order, but also in the fact that its actor, center, and star is the individual 
subject— rational, free, and equal.
In Hobbes, Locke, Pufendorf, Rousseau, and Kant— in spite of their dif-
ferences, at times becoming oppositions— the same conceptual structure, 
the same view of the world, can be found: there is a primary experience 
(either natural or historical) of disorder, scarcity, and aggression. But at the 
same time there is also a need for the individual subject to be freed from 
anxieties and shortcomings. As senseless as it may seem, reality has a seed 
in itself of rationality and equal human dignity that can be made to flourish 
within the political contrivance.
There is thus a rationalistic program encoded in the dna of the modern 
period. It can be interpreted in a triumphalistic or more skeptical key; seen 
as a glorification of humanity, or as a lowering of the ends traditionally as-
signed to politics (to achieve the summum bonum, replaced by the conatus 
sese conservandi), a program that can be said to be always belied, in the his-
torical and geographically reality, by the many forms of unequal citizenship 
or hierarchical inclusion or internal exclusion— the phenomenon of slavery, 
consubstantial with the birth of modernity, the formation of colonial em-
pires, and the racist construction of domination over indigenous people, the 
struggle of (and against) dissidents, rebels, the subordination of women— in 
which the modern political project of Europe was substantiated. And even 
in Europe (in the West), where modernity unfolded in all its fullness and 
power, the subject was in fact placed inside forms of a material universal— 
the capitalist economy— that created powerful forms of inclusion, but in 
contradictory and hierarchizing ways. All this could lead to the modern 
project being interpreted as a dispositif of domination rather than one of lib-
eration. In effect, what we want to emphasize is that among the effects of 
this apparatus— and indeed at the origin of the conceptual structure that 
characterizes the modern era— there is included, and there must necessarily 
be the possibility, indeed the necessity, for the right as much as for the left.
The most radical critics will say that precisely because they are modern 
neither one of them is a bearer of liberation; rather, they are both forms of 
domination. My intention here, however, is simply to show their common 
roots, their diversity, and their permanence: indeed, the horizon on which 
the modern is surpassed has so far appeared in spurious forms, in which left 
and right continue to exist.
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In any case, the originary modernity of the right and left, their difference 
and, at the same time, their sharing of the same origin, their being the two 
ways in which the modern necessarily manifests itself, has to do with the 
different radicalism with which they participate in one and the other of the 
two sides of the originary, structural duality of modern political discourse. 
A genealogical look at the origin of modern politics (of the modern way 
of conceiving the origin of politics)— rather than a reference to this or that 
specific event— is what allows us to establish the criterion of their difference. 
It is a criterion for recognizing political and ideological positions that were 
articulated during late modern and contemporary history, even without it 
being clearly present and made explicit in them or by them. It is a criterion, 
however, that does not seek to judge the intentions, whether overt or hid-
den, of the political proposals and forces, but which examines their deep 
logical, categorical, and reasoning structures.
That said, it is quite easy to see that the lefts, despite their historic variety, 
have proclaimed themselves the heirs of rationalism and the Enlightenment. 
They share the greatest attention to the side of the modern consisting in an 
intrinsic element that is normative but not directly ordering, namely, human 
nature in its seminal form. Because of the innate qualities that are inher-
ent to human nature— translated, according to the semantics and syntax of 
modern political discourse, into rights, a more politically spendable and less 
demanding term than essence— it is taken a priori as a value to be affirmed 
equally for all. The historical development of modernity toward democracy 
has led the goals of the lefts to consist in conceptions of politics aimed at 
actively ensuring the freedom of the flourishing of the subject— singular or 
collective (in freely chosen communities)— in equal dignity. A liberal of the 
left like John Stuart Mill, when writing his Autobiography, could magnify 
“the importance, to man and society of a large variety in types of character, 
and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable 
and conflicting directions.” Following the same logic, albeit with very dif-
ferent conceptual tools, the young Marx spoke of communism as the dimen-
sion that achieves the newly found correspondence between liberated man, 
society, and nature (“the naturalism of man and humanism of nature both 
brought to fulfillment”), and which enables work to be a “free manifestation 
of life, hence an enjoyment of life.”9 In short, the norm (which does not nec-
essarily imply normativism) here is the idea that it is good that the seeds of 
human rationality develop freely, in subjectivities characterized by equality 
of dignity and autonomy, while renouncing violence, discrimination, and 
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domination. Here, too, is the idea that Justice is not the order of being, but 
a project on the part of the subjectivities to emancipate themselves, through 
politics, from obstacles and constraints. This is a goal, anything but generic 
and obvious, that brings together liberal politics and radical politics, and 
which is anything but moderate, because it implies difficult choices in all 
circumstances. If it is true, as Rousseau expressed it, that man is born free 
but everywhere is in chains, then politics— which at this point reveals its 
modern character of being at once instrument and destiny— is assigned the 
task of concretely realizing humanity.
Therefore, it is thanks to politics that this normativity to be found in the 
natural world takes shape: human nature is not a given, but an impulse; it 
is not predetermined but is only a seed of immediacy, which makes the me-
diation of institutions essential. It should be emphasized that the left does 
not coincide with the hypothesis of the rationality of the real, but only of its 
rationalizability with regard to the subject, in terms of equal dignity. Hence 
the image of flourishing may be misleading: if taken literally, it implies spon-
taneity, a kind of unidirectional necessity, the same way that starting from a 
seed inevitably leads to a flower (and only to a flower) and to only one fruit. 
On the contrary, despite the appearance of essentialism and naturalism that 
pertains to modern rationalism, the truth of its image of humanity— a truth 
that was made manifest in twentieth- century thought (in Rawls as much as 
in Habermas, for example, albeit in different languages)— is indeterminate: 
rights are in reality a way to name that which is only truly essential; in other 
words, the free expression of a Self that has the right to be whoever he or she 
wants to be from one time to the next, or who is not an essence bound to 
actualize himself or herself according to obligatory schemas, or suitable con-
figurations. This desire of the subject to live according to that which, in each 
person’s interpretation, represents fulfillment is the deep logic of modernism 
viewed from the left: it is the impulse toward humanist democracy; it is the 
way we now talk about the pursuit of happiness. This logic contains in itself, 
by necessity, the equal dignity of the different wills and different projects, 
with the consequent exclusion of domination and violence (both incidental 
and structural: from the domination of class to the domination of gender).
In the world of the lefts, this ideal of free development can also be con-
ceived as divine in origin, like a command or grace or an exhortation of 
God to humankind. The important thing is that human nature must not be 
interpreted monistically, since it is indeed intrinsically plural and dedicated 
to the complete autonomy of the multiple subjectivities, or coercively: it 
left and right 77
is not legitimate institutions or agencies of meaning— parties, churches, or 
other— that provide a binding (and thus exclusionary) version of the flour-
ishing of the seeds of humanity, which argue in terms of true human nature, 
of individual disorder with respect to an objective and imperative order, 
legitimized by a transcendence that is not accessible to human reason and its 
critical capacity. The reason for civil and political existence and its legitima-
tion does not reside in anything that transcends individuals.
Normalization and discipline are, of course, well represented in the intel-
lectual world and historical practice of the lefts, as means to achieve the end: 
their special relationship with the dual origins of the modern can inspire, 
politically, government control aimed at spontaneity, coarctation aimed at 
liberation (as well as a rejection of any authoritarian means that contradicts 
the liberating end). The lefts are split on the question of the natural qual-
ities of man (and woman), on the obstacles that impede them, and on the 
means for emancipating them: but democrats, socialists, communists, an-
archists, libertarians, revolutionaries and reformists, and maximalists and 
gradualists, sectarians or national populists, the militants and the left- wing 
parties— even in the most bitter, fratricidal conflicts— have in common the 
idea that all human beings naturally have the right to a human destiny, one 
that comes through their inclusion in a rational and equal political space that 
is constructed free from violence and from any arbitrary rule, and whose 
purpose is the flourishing of multiple life programs, all of which have equal 
dignity. In this principle of equality lies the risk of abstract universalism that 
in actuality, but not necessarily, pertains to the left: the risk, that is, of losing 
the determinacy and concreteness of politics, of ignoring its constitutive 
contingency, or of overlooking the fact that to politics belongs not only the 
goal of humankind’s free flourishing, but also our grouping together into 
identity- making collectivities that mutually estrange each other and are po-
tentially hostile. This risk is closely akin to that of constructing a necessity 
effect, that is, to interpret one’s liberating purpose as if it were sustained by 
an intrinsic providentiality, guided by an immanent teleology, by a philoso-
phy of history to which any contingency can be sacrificed (including the lives 
of the men and women to be liberated).10 This is an argument unfailingly 
reintroduced by the right, in polemics with the perfectionism of the left 
and its perverse outcomes (according to Hirschman’s rhetoric). However, it 
must be said, the left is not necessarily biased or naive, and it may very well 
be aware of human limitations, of the very contingency of subjectivity and 
politics, of the fact, in short, that the objective spirit is not absolute and is 
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necessarily tinged with contradiction. The distinguishing trait is not that 
the expressive development of the subjects is perfectly achievable, in equal 
dignity, but the fact that this constitutes the primary objective of politics. 
The left can even accept that the subject is not the origin of modern politics; 
but in any case it cannot help but consider the subject, in its equal dignity, 
as the end in itself: if not what is, then what ought to be.
The right, for its part, cannot reject— even if it tries to at times— the space 
of the political game, the originary mode of interpretation of the real that 
constitutes modernity. But it entertains a different relationship with it. The 
right puts the natural seeds of universal subjective rationality in the back-
ground, and is defined primarily by the perception of the instability of the 
real, of its anomie, its incapacity to be ever completely ordered: a contin-
gency, a disorder that can take on the appearance of a threat but also of an 
opportunity, of a nihilism to be confronted, but also to be used to indefi-
nitely shape reality. The given that the right accepts as insurmountable is not 
a system of values but the ontological inconsistency of reality: one of the two 
originating sides of the modern.11
This perception explains many themes that are typical of the right, which 
does indeed often draw on forms of organismic thought, or appeal to a 
transcendent order, to an inexorable law that is inaccessible to the emanci-
patory action of humanity. These sorts of foundations, however— and this 
is the deciding factor— are not only threatening (because they are not in the 
measure of man), they are also threatened. The rocky, unyielding, substan-
tialistic foundationism of many of the intellectual expressions of the right— 
which would like to have politics firmly guaranteed by (and dependent on) 
God, nature, history, tradition, values, nation, race, destiny, the market— is 
always accompanied by the theme of permanent aggression against order, 
the true source from which the right really derives its political energy. Or-
der, therefore, is neither natural nor necessary; the primary experience is 
that nature is not anthropomorphic but rather unstable, and therefore order 
must be achieved, certainly, but not so much by means of a rational con-
trivance as through a relentless fight against anyone who threatens it. The 
acceptance of disorder— the fact that in nature there are no seeds of anthro-
pomorphic rationality as an original given— holds even where political order 
is a real dogma: it does not escape a radical thinker like Maistre that every 
dynastic legitimacy has a mystery at its origin, the illegitimate moment of 
its inception.
But acceptance of disorder is not only a defensive stance: disorder, evil, 
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is not just the problem; it can also be seen as the solution, as the main re-
source that politics has at its disposal. The right is not, in fact, synonymous 
with preservation or quietism. The continuous thread running through it, 
the more or less obsessive perception of the instability of the real, since it 
is devoid of even a seminal normative element in the measure of man, and 
therefore of its precarious prehuman randomness or of its necessary destiny 
beyond humanity (which is not the same as Machiavellian contingency, be-
cause Machiavelli is located in an early modernity that lies on the other side 
of, and looks beyond, the dualistic disorder/order device of the modern fully 
developed into rationalism), is the deep logic of a complex phenomenology. 
This leads the right to pursue the grim, authoritarian armor plating of polit-
ical order against its internal and external enemies; to openly accept the risk 
of instability with the individualism of the economic subject, which relies on 
the logics of the market (whose presumed objectivity, which in reality is ever 
changing, is also a model of an unstable foundation of politics), eventually to 
be mitigated by an order that cannot fail to carry within itself the memory of 
the natural reality of disorder and to seek, at most, to transform it into the 
hierarchy (compassionate or not, as the case may be) of the strong over the 
weak, the victors over the defeated, those who are successful over those who 
fail; or finally, to resort to nihilism, that radical model of instability by which 
the right affirms the inconsistency of the real, exhibiting itself in a tough, 
tragic, extralegal decisionism, but also in imaginative futuristic creativity, 
or in manipulative illusionism— and this, too, in its festive artificial irre-
sponsibility, is nothing but a sophisticated strategy for addressing an ever- 
present disorder, for preserving it in reality and sublimating it in fiction. It 
should be noted that the malleability of reality, its anomic being, is certainly 
modern: it is the result of the idea that reality has so little objectivity that it 
is at the disposal of the subject. But it is not a constructivist idea, because 
this term refers to a particular action on the real that takes place when the 
desire is to develop the seminal reasons of subjectivity, already present in 
nature, into a rational political contrivance. Whether they claim to arrive 
back at the most archaic origin or project themselves into the most visionary 
future, which they perceive as an opening to a destiny of power or as a tool 
for administering the existent and its natural logics; whether they make use 
of technology to consolidate the world or reject it because it manipulates 
the world too radically; whether they profess the most close- minded, solid 
values or practice the most unconventional nihilism; whether they manifest 
themselves in the conservative, middle- class pursuit of security or in the 
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fascist cult of death; whether they entrust themselves to the market or to the 
state, the individual or the corporation; whether they compare 1789 to 1914, 
merchants to heroes, or give themselves over to the most unbridled laissez- 
faire; in every case, right- wing policies are marked by the conviction, more 
or less explicitly declared and rationalized, that the goal of politics is not to 
realize the natural norm of humanity by artificial means. Compared to the 
flourishing of subjectivity in equal dignity, there is always a more important 
task to accomplish, a more stringent compatibility to be recognized, a more 
cogent context to be respected, a higher interest to be served, a more realistic 
goal to be pursued, a more exciting narrative to be staged, a deadly anomie 
to be averted, a contingency (or conversely, a law) that cannot be overcome.
Thus, when the right makes its theme order, substance, stability, weight, 
uniformity, and also when it proffers the entertainment of fictional drama 
or the audacity of the imagination, it always develops the unstable side of the 
real as its main leitmotif: the harsh underscoring of the need for nonhuman 
law makes sense because disorder is either undoubtedly a law of nature to 
be accepted, or it constantly threatens human law. The species of concrete-
ness of which the right is a bearer is to be understood not as ontological 
solidity, but as immediate acceptance of the disorder of the world and the 
contingency of politics: the transcendence it appeals to is another name for 
immanence, for the nonhumanity of reality, unilluminated by any seminal 
anthropocentric reason.12
In short, the dominant given, for the right, is the need for exception, 
namely, the intrinsic randomness and nothingness of reality: the recurrent 
polemic against the relativism that would become typical of the left conceals 
and reveals a deep connection to the relativity of the real, viewed as the pri-
mary given, and which is never completely surmountable. This is not the idea 
(of the left) that free subjectivity is threatened by the disorder of the context, 
but rather, the idea (of the right) that it is preferable (or at least inevitable) 
to submit to the context that transcends it: for example, abortion or divorce 
should be banned because society, to exist, requires the nonfreedom of its 
subjects; or, at most, abortion or divorce should be tolerated as a lesser evil, 
but never welcomed and claimed as rights. And conversely, when the left is 
pursuing change, the continuous struggle against injustice— the revolution, 
but also progressive reforms— what it has in mind is the intrinsic normativity 
of human nature: its movement, its continuous transcendence with respect 
to the given, in reality its telos (as the ultimate horizon of meaning) is peace, 
as stability, finally achieved through justice. The left is thus characterized by 
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transcendence, not in the strict sense, but rather as critique, as going beyond, 
as what ought to be; in other words, by the negation of the world as it is, and 
by the effort to create another, better world, which is already a possibility 
(although negated at the moment) immanent to the present.
So it is the politics of the left that is guided by the idea that security and 
stability are possible, even ultimately as the result of emancipatory policies 
that are far from peaceful and even highly dynamic and conflictual: po-
lemical policies for the political achievement of the natural seeds of human 
rationality. For the right, instead, despite the emphasis placed on order and 
tradition, disorder is politically paramount.13 At the most— but without fall-
ing into simplistic dualisms— on one side, there is hope for peace, while on 
the other, endless fear or conflict (also diluted in the form of competition); 
on one side, there is analogy (the possibility that the subject can inhabit a 
world in his or her own image), and on the other, anomaly (permanent dis-
connection from the world): on one side, subjectivity (understood as ideal), 
and on the other, objectivity (defined as the nothing that reality is at bot-
tom); on one side, there is the personal, and on the other, the impersonal 
(as an active denial of the centrality of the subject); on one side, culture (the 
regnum hominis) and on the other, nature (resistant to any anthropomorphic 
configuration).
The real is conceived to be extremely malleable by the left, but not entirely 
so; in other words, only as a possibility to emancipate and educate human-
kind: the left has in mind a political contrivance (a party, a state, a revolu-
tion) that, at least in theory, assists in allowing human nature to flourish, 
in restoring its autonomy, in dealienating it. In principle, for the left, not 
everything is possible, since— regardless of how problematically— there is a 
purpose in the world, a normative grain of reason (and dignity), or at least 
we can and should behave as if there were. Its restlessness has a peaceful end; 
its politics (with its hard edges) has a liberating end. When Bruno Bauer 
wrote that “nothing is impossible for man,” he meant it in an emancipatory 
sense: we can liberate ourselves from all chains.14
To the right, however, everything really is possible (and this is good, for 
the postmodern and futuristic right, and bad for the traditional right), be-
cause there is no universally and egalitarian human norm in nature, no mat-
ter how implicit, to be developed explicitly in the political order. Because the 
real is infinitely anomic, unstable, and therefore also, temporarily, mallea-
ble, for the right, groundlessness— disorder, conflict, indeterminacy, radical 
contingency— is the ultimate, untranscendable dimension of politics.
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Both left and right can develop these logics in a partial and limited fash-
ion, or with no limits: extreme coercion (pedagogical, the Soviet model; or 
hierarchical, racial domination) has been carried out as a result of both as 
well as the paranoid fight against the enemy, whether historical or natural (a 
conflict that the left also participated in, not only under totalitarianism but 
also under democracy, in the fight against communism no less, during the 
Cold War). Permissiveness, prohibition, control, spontaneity, and violence 
may be as much a part of the right as they are of the left, depending on the 
circumstances.
Two forms of thought, therefore, both modern, though very divergent 
(one based ultimately on the exception, the other on the norm), both open, 
but in different ways, to contingency (the multiple forms of human flour-
ishing, not reducible to a single figure, in one case; the radical senselessness 
of the world, on the other), and both tempted by the necessity effect (by the 
effect of the teleological development of history, or by the objective accep-
tance of nonhuman logics). Some clarification is needed on a few historical 
and intellectual experiences that seemingly diverge from the general outline 
we have sketched out thus far.
First, the position of liberalism needs to be defined. Its historical, philo-
sophical, modern, rationalistic origins (practically speaking, beginning with 
Locke) are the indispensable first step, which consists in making subjectivity 
and its rights the core of politics. Once this has been established, liberalism 
can mix itself up with thinking and practices both from the right— where 
individual freedom can be interpreted in aggressive, derogatory, or hier-
archical ways— or from the left, as long as the idea prevails that individual 
self- determination should be accompanied by the idea of the equal dignity 
of individuals, and of the political struggle to free them from the constraints 
that inhibit or prevent their flourishing. In any event, even in its right- wing 
formations, liberalism has comported itself nobly.
The sober realism of the historic Italian right, the Christian and national 
patriotism of de Gaulle, the English resistance to the Nazis under the leader-
ship of Churchill, were great human and intellectual experiences, but also 
transitional forms, the result of specific historical emergencies, of provisional 
political and economic equilibriums, in which the perception of public duty 
or extreme threat turned into a real legitimate hegemony of the right. Per-
sonages who can be ascribed to this category do exist: Cavour and Einaudi, 
to provide other examples, despite their different places in history, and the 
distance that separates the impelling role of Cavour in the construction of 
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the unitary state from the more defensive position of Einaudi with regard 
to what is wrong with fascism and to the naïveté that can be found in social-
ist and democratic projects. They stand on a sort of crest, in an intellectual 
and political balance, which makes them wonderful and precarious charac-
ters whose excellence and political effectiveness have something exceptional, 
random, and unrepeatable about them— making them anything but para-
digms, then.
The political thought of English constitutionalism and then of Scottish 
skepticism and Enlightenment, which is not historically attributable to the 
genealogy of the modern outlined here, is actually drawn into the logic of 
the left- right opposition. On the one hand, there is (for example, in Burke, 
Hayek, and Scruton) a sort of methodological individualism, but that always 
transcends the individual and his or her equality in dignity in the name of 
some logic superior to it (history, the market, tradition, success). On the 
other hand, there are cases of market governance by the state in terms of 
social justice (think of the laborism and, in some respects, the Democrats in 
the United States; the ideology of the American Republicans, though, even 
with all its individualism, does not accede to the equality of dignity or to 
the dynamics of liberation, and remains in various ways inscribed within the 
idea of always threatened orders that transcend the individual, such as the 
market or religious foundations of politics).
The anticonstructivist polemics that this right engages in against the left 
hits the mark, but only up to a point and with severe limitations. Taken se-
riously, the argument should not only apply to the left but also be extended 
to the historical and conceptual sphere that seeks the existence of a left and 
right, that is, at the very origins of the modern. For anticonstructivism to 
cease being ideological, it would have to become truly deconstructionist, in 
other words, shaped by traditions of thought— from Nietzsche to Heideg-
ger, and from Foucault to Derrida— that in themselves are neither left nor 
right, because they are capable of revealing the devices originating in mod-
ern political discourse from the outside, and of displacing them. A similar, 
radical goal of arriving at an understanding of the modern beyond its own 
principles, but in somewhat constructive terms and, in any event, opposed 
to this one, inasmuch as it was substance- subject oriented, was shared by 
Hegel, who indeed, as to the intrinsic quality of his thought, transcended 
left and right. This is shown by his antiliberal polemics but also by his at-
tacks against a reactionary Catholic like Haller and a Germanist like Savigny.
These deconstructionist authors certainly do go about annihilating (or 
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at least radically historicizing) the more or less naive beliefs of the left and 
right, attacking faith in the order to be opposed by disorder as much as 
they attack faith in the subject to be liberated. Yet, despite the fact that they 
locate themselves, from an intellectual point of view, outside and beyond 
the left and right, even these thinkers were fatally sucked back into these 
categories when it came to their individual positions, or the ideological twist 
their thinking assumed in their lives. While not wanting to do any wrong 
to Nietzsche and certainly recognizing his ultrahuman effort to be truly 
impolitic, that is, to remain outside the categories of modern politics, the 
susceptibility to take sides brought Heidegger’s life history— and some of 
his intellectual traits, transformed into ideology— back into the categories of 
left and right. Heidegger was certainly capable of positioning himself before 
the origins of modernity and of brilliantly interpreting it as the fulfillment 
of Western metaphysics. He was also, therefore, able to predict the fate of 
subjugation and technical destruction of the selfsame subject who sought via 
technique to make himself master of the world (which was reduced to an im-
age, to be sure, but not of man). But this superior philosophical vision also 
led him to overlook every mortal offense humanity has to undergo before 
recovering from the malady of metaphysics and radically changing its rela-
tionship with being (the Verwindung). His was a path of fierce intellectual 
lucidity and political and human blindness.
A kindred thinker, although not part of the same line of thought, and 
more easily ascribable to the right, is Carl Schmitt. His deconstructionism 
is powerful and invaluable in revealing the original dynamics of modern 
politics, its groundlessness (which he defines as “exception” or “political”). 
In this respect, his work is a great intellectual contribution, and can be wel-
comed by the left as well (which indeed it was in Italy in the 1970s), as (an-
tidialectical) awareness of the absolute contingency of subjectivity, that is 
to say, the fact that the subject and action, even those of the left, are deter-
mined rather than necessary. But Schmitt is right wing because the source of 
politics— the original aporia of the modern, by which a politics whose end 
is the subject cannot have the subject as its beginning, because the begin-
ning is indeterminacy— is interpreted positively, still on (and not beyond) 
the horizon of modern politics, as a politics of origin, or as a political proj-
ect that repeats indefinitely the undetermined origin of the modern, which 
absolutizes and perpetuates the constitutively nonrational traits of rational-
ism, and which therefore excludes the possibility of the subject as builder of 
the political order (which in any case is destined to always contain disorder 
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inside itself, to never free itself from the state of nature) from ever being 
an individual (if anything, it is the constituent power of the people, or the 
party). ln short, Schmitt not only criticizes liberalism and humanism in their 
naive forms, he also sweeps away any obstacle to extreme political cynicism, 
because he delivers himself over to a nihilism that negates the subject in its 
fulfillment, and even any politics that envisages the subject as an end in itself. 
For him, anything truly is possible (a relativism that he tried to curb with his 
frightening völkisch roots), precisely because politics is that originary indeter-
minate negative that makes useless any specific contradiction that revolves 
around a subjectivity, and which can be surpassed in further freedom.
For every two examples of deconstructionism that ended in the right 
(however accidental this characterization may be for Heidegger), we can cite 
many that finished in the left— Foucault and Derrida, of course, but also 
Deleuze and Rorty, and others (for example, a thinker on a path that runs 
distant from these but converges with them in a critique of modern subjec-
tivity still in its metaphysical, necessary form as well as in a reassessment of 
contingency is Adorno). While taking for granted the obsolescence of the 
concept of a subjectivity that is to be liberated, even discerning the trap of 
liberation (the discipline, coercion, the continued construction of dispositifs 
of truth), they acted on the political scene, as if the subject they themselves 
had deconstructed and desubstantialized (a figure in the sand erased by an 
ocean wave . . . ) enjoyed a sort of fantasy or larval survival, a residual in-
ternal force that is less powerful with respect to the tradition of progressive 
rationalism; as if, in short, in the name of decency and compassion, if not 
in the name of reason or natural rights, subjectivity still guided the po-
litical discourse, at least in dictating concrete options, contingent stances, 
against violence, cruelty, domination, discrimination, and racism. Decon-
structionist radicalism also ends up adopting stances that, if not close to 
liberal ones, are not contrary to them either. Even if it does not naively em-
brace the theories of rights and considers them one discourse among others, 
and no more true than the others, one cannot go against the impulse for 
the free flourishing of subjectivity. This shows that even if we can think, 
in theory, beyond left and right, praxis— which is obviously central to the 
world of politics— prevents it; and it is precisely the presence or absence of 
the political centrality of the subject and its equal dignity that makes the 
difference. This is the case regardless of the awareness of the epistemological 
crisis of subjectivity (which can be narrated through psychoanalysis as well, 
and the discovery of the original cleaved and desiring structure of the sub-
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ject), and regardless even of the historic setbacks of humanism. So strong is 
the field of attraction emanating from the modern opposition between left 
and right that even the Catholic Church— which obviously stands outside it, 
and which was in some respects its original polemical target— is involved in 
it, although only in historical contingency. It was led to modify its action 
and theory of the person, which are supposed to stand outside the left- right 
opposition, sometimes in one direction, and sometimes in another (from 
Pax Christi to Bishop Fisichella, to give just two examples that are familiar 
to Italians, or from the theologians of revolution to Lefebvre). Even if the 
faith and hope taught by Catholic doctrine transcend history, not even the 
church’s authority has escaped the dilemmas that lie on the modern horizon.
It remains for us to analyze how the genealogical criterion we have ad-
vanced here interacts with some important parameters in political theory 
and practice.
As far as the relationship between risk and security is concerned— two 
categories that in themselves, in the abstract, cannot be ascribed exclusively 
to either the left or the right, because there are so many highly contradictory 
examples of them— the categorical explanation provides the reasons for a 
chiasm, or intersection, that can be experienced in everyday politics as well. 
The right is in favor of security, in the police sense of public order, a sphere 
dominated by a perception of threat (especially focused these days on im-
migrants, viewed as a font of disorder, and whose presence has sparked the 
conflict between equal dignity and hierarchical inclusion, as the security 
package of July 2009 showed, resolved more in the direction of the latter). 
And yet the right supports risk in the economy (a number of aspects make 
risk inherent to capitalism, even if it does not take the form of a purely com-
petitive market, as shown by the crisis starting in 2008). The right is some-
times for risk in politics, too, when the ontological disorder is expressed in 
nihilistic, heroic terms (the fascist theme of beautiful death and the heroic 
theme of adventure and challenge). The left, on the other hand, is in favor 
of facing the risk of the new and different (immigrants) with an open mind, 
as an enriching human experience, while it is a tenacious champion of social 
security, of safety at work and in the workplace, because it views human 
dignity as at stake in this issue.
As for individualism, by no means does the left adopt it directly: the free 
flourishing of subjectivities (whether individuals or free associations) is not 
the same thing as spontaneous flourishing, since in situations of injustice 
and alienation the latter is actually a synonym for survival of the fittest or 
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passive adaptation to the context. Hayek, despite the claims he makes for 
himself, belongs to the right (in his lexicon, a conservative) although he is 
an individualist (in the past one might have said precisely because he is an 
individualist, since bourgeois individualism was considered right wing and 
collectivism was considered left wing). His almost total exclusion of the issue 
of justice on a human scale (which he discredited as taxis and juxtaposed to 
spontaneous order, to kosmos) from politics in reality compromises equal 
dignity, something that is always connected to free flourishing (also posi-
tioning a figure such as Jünger’s Anarch, no matter how impressive, outside 
the left). There is no need, in short, to theorize inequality in order to be right 
wing: it suffices to practice inequality— which need not be only social and 
economic but also political, in forms of open hierarchy or exclusionary sep-
arateness (under which the friend- enemy relation also falls)— and accept it 
as inevitable, irremediable, and insurmountable, and to make it the main 
premise of political order.
Thus, Norberto Bobbio’s idea of inequality as the discriminating factor 
between left and right is empirically true, and constitutes a fairly safe crite-
rion for judging between the two: except that it should be interpreted as the 
result of a more fundamental difference between left and right, one which 
lies in the relationship to the two sides at the origin of modern politics.15 
Apart from the fact that equality is an indeterminate concept that should 
be expressed more precisely as equal dignity, it is true that equality in the 
normative sense is excluded from the world of the rights. Their power is to 
be found more in variously combining the inherent instability and frag-
mentation of the real, accepted as natural and legitimate and temporarily 
stabilized, through legal ways (so that the order of the right is actually a per-
manent conflict, resolved only temporarily and randomly by politically re-
inforced social hierarchies or individual adventures). And it is also true that 
the pole star of leftist politics is not to be found in a unification that levels 
out social and political differences, but at least in their delegitimization— 
allied with promoting the value of existential and individual differences.
As far as the link between subjectivity and context is concerned, finally, it 
is clear that the left may well know that it is essential to the free flourishing 
of subjectivity (that is to say, that cosmopolitanism and nomadism are not 
the only practical option for subjectification): in other words, the left may 
well be aware of the determinacy and contingency of politics. But for the 
left, context is never an insurmountable given, nor is it a roothold, because 
the full expression of the subject— the free, differentiated flourishing of the 
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individual, in freely chosen collectivities— is a primary duty. Even in the best 
of cases, however, the right will view this flourishing as determined by (and 
subordinate to) context: this is what is imposed on the individual as value. 
And it is a value that is continually threatened, rather than being peacefully 
foundational, a context that is always potentially chaos: the rootedness of 
the individual is a duty; it serves to prevent the disorder that stems from 
rootlessness, the risk of anomie always present and imminent (in reality, it is 
immanent in the sense that disorder is the only true reality, which transcends 
the subject). The defective structure of being is responsible for this risk, 
but even subjectivity itself— a solution for the lefts— is in reality part of the 
problem of disorder, and certainly not central to the political order. So, ul-
timately, democracy without adjectives— in line with its modern essence— is 
the goal of forces variously oriented toward the left (which hardly means that 
all lefts are democratic in their actual practice); nor does this imply that all 
rights are antidemocratic, only that their democracy is always qualified as an 
expression of something else (which can be quite varied: market democracy, 
authoritarian democracy, national democracy, protected democracy, Chris-
tian democracy).
Based on these observations, because the notion of society is the concrete, 
real ground adopted as the field of investigation and struggle by the left, we 
can see that the theme of community (in its standard meaning) is basically 
foreign to the left, which projects it if anything into the future, as commu-
nism, or as a regulative ideal of its praxis, and that, in its democratic forms, 
the left prefers solidarity (a sort of synthesis between altruism and brother-
hood). Community is instead a leitmotif of the right, which situates it in the 
past or in the present— and can also provide it with a robust, natural onto-
logical consistency, but in one way or another, always sees it as threatened by 
something or someone. Similarly, for the left, the social bond is a dialectical 
and historical given (the context) that must be overcome and transformed 
into an act of free will: the social contract, solidarity, cultivated relationality. 
The common good does not transcend individuals, but is desired by each 
person as a condition for the flourishing of the all. For the right, instead, the 
social bond (the common good) is a given to be accepted as natural (God, 
the nation, race, market, history, civilization), and therefore it makes indi-
viduals passive, rendering them vulnerable to all sorts of manipulation and 
isolation, despite the emphasis that is placed on community.
Our genealogical criterion thus also identifies the underlying reason for 
the superficial but often well- founded observation that the right is the bearer 
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of a negative anthropology (namely, political thought in which the subject, 
in its condition of equal dignity, cannot be central) while the left carries with 
it a view of human beings that is at least potentially positive. It also explains 
the closely related fact that political realism is more suited to the right, since it 
assumes as its principle the nonanthropomorphic side of nature, its total con-
tingency, and from this develops a discourse on man in general, on the nec-
essary limitedness of human expectations (although a school of thought that 
traverses multiple ages, originating with Thucydides and Tacitus, passing 
through Machiavelli and Hobbes, and culminating in Schmitt, is nothing 
but an anachronistic optical illusion, constructed entirely within the cham-
ber of mirrors of modernity, to which the right inherently belongs).
The Global Age and the Italian Case
The global age is distinguished by numerous crises involving the norma-
tivity of the subject, its rights, the importance of work, and the state. The 
decline of the Fordist factory and the social- democratic compromise; the 
new importance of consumption (the linguistic turn in politics) and of its 
ensuingly weak, polymorphic, narcissistic, and malleable subjectivity; the 
collapse of communism, that hyperregulatory model: all these events inau-
gurated what in many respects is a postmodern era, the iron age of global 
war, in which the validity of the politically vital categorical distinctions of 
modernity— interior- exterior, public- private, norm- exception, peace- war — 
 has become highly problematic.
It is an epoch of blurred, uncertain political spaces in which different 
scales— local, national, postnational, regional, universal, and global— coexist 
and confront each other. It is a liquid, fluid, unstable, fragmented, insecure 
world traversed by conflicts, fears, and uncertainties. In this context, poli-
tics does not appear in the egalitarian contours originating in rationalism 
and the Enlightenment, accompanied by the inclusionary institutions of 
the welfare state; rather, it is structured according to multiple, continuously 
changing contrapositions and exclusions (de facto or in principle): the dif-
ference between friend and enemy, between the West and Islam, between 
civilization and terrorism, between citizens and migrants, between rich and 
poor, between educated and uneducated, and between whites, blacks, and 
colored people. In addition, the public space tends to appear random, as an 
assemblage of social powers founded on exception and anomaly. The tran-
sition from modernity to contemporaneity is the transition from growth to 
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risk, from progress to labyrinth; it is the crisis of the normative capacity of 
politics and law (centered on subjectivity), and the triumph of the unstable 
and ultrahuman normativity of technology and the economy.
In these crisis conditions affecting modern and late- modern neutraliza-
tions (the state, in the form of the welfare state), the political forces (public 
opinion) seem to position themselves with new intensity around the left- 
right cleavage. In this amorphous, anomic political space, the right was the 
first to recover its strength and avail itself of this momentous historical op-
portunity that stretched across a good part of Europe, the first since 1945 
(true, there had been Thatcher in the 1980s, but her considerable political 
weight was exercised mainly in the transatlantic English- speaking world). 
Entirely immune from nostalgia and wanting anything but to restore past 
world orders, the postmodern rights— all at work today to a greater or lesser 
degree depending on the various national political contexts: charismatic 
and technocratic, foundationistic and nihilistic, personalistic and racist (or 
biopolitical), nationalistic and localistic— act without prejudice from within 
the internal diversity and complexity of contemporary societies. They inter-
vene with policies pandering to corporate divisions and alarmist fears, to 
social resentments and cultural fragmentation, to closures and exclusions 
(or subordination) of the nonintegrated, and to xenophobias, both overt 
and concealed. Organizing temporary, hierarchical combinations of social 
differences; putting forward contradictory policies of freedom of the market 
(neoliberalism with its savage mobilizing powers) and freedom from the 
market (state neointerventionism, with its force of stabilization); bringing 
together fear of competition and fear of the enemy in hopes of winning the 
struggle for existence, or carving out a protected niche; engaging in egoistic 
individualism while cultivating collective identities in imagined communi-
ties, with folklore and volunteer patrols to create the illusion of being able to 
recover lost territories and social spaces; inventing a threatening other onto 
which all tensions are discharged, without offering any rational response to 
them: all this means that the image of society promoted by the right does 
not have a project of emancipation at its heart whose norm consists in the 
equal dignity of all citizens. For the rights, society should remain divided in 
its different interests and in the variegated drives that traverse it and break it 
apart; it must find precarious equilibriums based on hierarchy and exclusion 
(or better yet, based on unequal inclusion): a revolution to keep everything 
from changing, to ensure that differences remain.
This strategy— expressed with varying intensity— is possible thanks to 
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the fact that the right interprets reality as ontologically unstable and anomic. 
Unifying and stabilizing identity- making forms (the nation, religion, life, 
the local community) that are offered at the symbolic level are actually mo-
bilizing, polemical, and organized around conflict with an enemy, around 
the exorcism of a communist, Islamic, terrorist specter (although they are 
also rounded up by traditional agents of meaning, like the Catholic Church, 
who, by taking some of these propaganda issues seriously, are given the op-
portunity to intervene in politics, in society, and in individuals).
The Italian case is in some ways paradigmatic of the new opportunities 
and new forms available to the postmodern rights, and of their ability to 
shape the real, without being constructivist in the strict sense. The end of the 
double conventio ad excludendum created between 1943 and 1948 (the found-
ing moment of the Republic, initially antifascist and later anticommunist), 
which was slow to come about, has already led, for fifteen years now, after 
the destruction of the political system due to the action of the judiciary, to 
a government in which the regulatory element of the republican political 
subjectivity— expressed by the association between the parties of the Italian 
National Liberation Committee and the social- democratic state— was no 
longer the politically driving factor. In the by- now advanced consummation 
of the defining traits of modernity— in social anomie and in the obsolescence 
of the difference between public and private (a difference that in itself is 
neither left nor right, but which traverses both, just as the alternation of the 
primacy given at any time to one or the other is not the defining difference, 
since only the political purpose to which it is directed is a deciding factor)— 
today the right successfully (in elections, at least) implements a policy man-
aged according to the logics of exception and anomaly, taking the utmost 
malleability of the world as achieved and for granted. The world is broken 
down and put back together according to multiple possible combinations 
that enable the coexistence of symbolic unity and real fragmentation, passive 
populism and hierarchizing oligarchy, tradition and postmodernity, racism 
and rhetorics of solidarity, real flexibility and imaginary communitary root-
edness, tough political leadership and mass- media dissolution of reality. This 
complexio oppositorum is made possible, in intellectual terms, by the most 
profound adherence on the part of the rights to the instability of the real, 
to its radical contingency and, therefore, to the relations of power that ac-
tually occur in society. In truth, this is very close to a state of nature (the 
individualism of the right is egoistic and anomic; it is the private that seeks 
immediately to be public), while the political state understood as a rational 
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contrivance is reduced to pure power (not all that powerful in actuality), 
and almost dissolved in effect by the systematic bypassing of constitutional 
balances and the very principle of legality.
The immanence that characterizes the right resides equally in its adherence 
to the world as it really is, and in its compensatory illusion— continuously 
nurtured— of a dream of individual and group power, of fantasized com-
munity, of prosperity and happiness that could come true, if only a few 
obstacles were removed (the communists, terrorists, migrants, magistrates, 
corruption bashers, journalists, and many others). And Italians largely share 
the perception of the world as devoid of rules, other than those that sanction 
success no matter how pursued, the subordination of the less able, and the 
exclusion of those who are different. The very centrality of the security issue 
passes off as obvious what is in fact a hierarchical construction of society, 
by which the second- last to arrive find partial relief from their subordinate 
status by means of laws that sanction hardline policies against noncitizens, 
the last to arrive: what matters is that rather than equality guaranteed by the 
state, the political guideline now guarantees exception. At most, the idea 
may be acceded to that it is a good, uplifting thing to soften the hard law of 
inequality, when possible, with the balm of compassion (but as charity, not 
as rights). Sentimentality is the surrogate of humanism.
But if the success of the right in Italy is ensured by its ability to tap un-
scrupulously into state power beyond the horizon of stateness, if the form 
of Italian politics is an example of the revolutionary force of the right, one 
cannot fail to mention that its success is mainly due to its leader, Silvio Ber-
lusconi, a singular example of a charismatic storyline of biopower, minidra-
mas, performance, and television populism. Berlusconi’s political proposal is 
that his own person, his own body— transfigured by the virtual apotheosis 
of the mass media— creates the fusion of the one with the many, and of the 
many with the one, through love. This is a curious reversal of the Sun King’s 
motto “the state is me.” Indeed, Louis XIV defined himself as the personal 
beginning of the impersonal public machine, while Berlusconi makes his 
person and his private interests law, just as he renders his own body identical 
to the all. This is dramatic representation, not political representation, the 
fruit of an emotional contract lying somewhere between religious mysticism 
and theatricality: the mystical body of the head— which is simultaneously 
king and people— is the living and concrete figure of a multitude that sees 
itself in him, and which in loving him loves itself, boosted but not over-
whelmed by feelings of inferiority: the head is simultaneously everyone and 
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each individual; he is a common man, easy to understand, and someone we 
can identify with. Thus is established a radical separation between being cit-
izens and being members of the mystical body, and strong competition be-
tween dramatic representation and political representation (the parliament). 
The latter is destined to an increasingly marginal political role, because be-
ing a citizen is tedious and difficult, alienating and sometimes depressing; 
while being part of the mystical body is not as tiring, and it offers joy and 
happiness: the fusion- transfiguration of the one into the many and the many 
into the one is vital, optimistic, and expansive (not by chance, the militants 
of Berlusconi’s People of Freedom party have been defined missionaries of 
freedom, since they are expected to carry its image “into the lands of the 
unbelievers” [in partibus infidelium]). Moreover— and this is true hegemony, 
combined with real illusionism— the head succeeds in making people believe 
that defending his interests (and interests of those like him) is in the interest 
of working people, who reward him heavily in elections. Hence, Berlusconi 
is doing politics in the strongest sense precisely when he conveys the illusion 
of going beyond politics in the fullness of the life of the nation, thanks to a 
daily media plebiscite, thereby incorporating in himself the antipolitical, the 
prepolitical, and the (allegedly) postpolitical.
More than anything, this political presentation has a deresponsibilizing 
effect. Political transfiguration has the effect of making what is real coincide, 
in full immanence, with what is represented: the difference— which was the 
starting point of modern politics— between what is and what ought to be, 
between an actual situation and a project, between natural and artificial is 
abolished; what is real has been transfigured, but left essentially how it is. 
Rather than criticism, an effort of the imagination and optimism accom-
panied by individual initiative make problems surmountable; in the event 
they are not, the fault is to be attributed to scapegoats, to the forces of evil, 
who are opposed to the forces of good, and who love neither the head nor 
the people.
Of course, the ends of these policies are those of any right- wing revolu-
tion: to change everything so that everything remains as it is. Which today 
means a design, a rather effective one, to go beyond parliamentary democ-
racy toward an executive made strong and legitimized by the charisma and 
power of the head, so as to stop the project of democratic equality, and of 
emancipation, of the republican constitution, so that the current contradic-
tions of society are blocked, so that the increasing gap in power and wealth 
between the citizens is not bridged, and is not even noticed, suffocated and 
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transfigured as it is in the new fated community embodied in the body of 
the head: and since in a community there is no thinking in terms of rights, 
it is to his compassion that we are obliged if no one is left behind. In con-
crete terms: this revolution, in these forms, serves to safeguard the person 
and interests of the head, so that the economic crisis is not managed in the 
interest of progress and development, and so that its effects are endured by 
the people as happily (or distractedly) as possible.
From the practical, empirical point of view, the success of these politics 
structured like a Gefolgschaft who is unheroic, but winking in complicity— 
 in which the thaumaturge king encounters the satrap, and unleashes the fu-
turistic power of a populist fantasy that makes the people the political protag-
onist (but only in words, because in reality, they are increasingly passive)— 
is made possible by the almost total control of television broadcasting and 
most of the print media: the right has always been at ease making innovative 
use of technologies.
We are spared from having to say that the whole world is on the right 
now: Obama’s victory in 2008 in the United States, even though essentially 
determined by the economic crisis that American public opinion viewed as 
having been caused by the right- wing government, is proof to the contrary. 
Yet based on the Italian experience— unusual, to be sure, but significant— it 
is clear that the right is more at home in a postmodern world because it can 
energetically play with the modern perception of the profound instability 
of the real: this is the reason why, in effect, it is able to achieve political, 
social, and cultural hegemony. Its thinking, hastily put together in the 1980s 
through the criticism of modern philosophy, but much more through the 
minidramas of commercial television, intercepts common sense, manipu-
lates it, and, without transcending it, molds and validates it.
The left, on the contrary, is disoriented because every one of its statements 
is counterfactual, referring to the world not as it is, but as it should be, and 
at the same time lacking many of the theoretical and political tools necessary 
for its praxis. Only when it knows what it really wants from politics can it 
credibly seek to realize, in the circumstances of any given moment, the only 
goal it really can have: the creation of a form of politics guided by the intrin-
sic normativity of the flourishing, in equal dignity, of individuals and groups 
in their concrete differences. Its appeal to conscious subjectivity, to rights, 
and to what remains of the welfare state, to the public- governmental sphere, 
can sound behind the times and ineffectual: although in some contexts and 
in some circumstances it has seemed more realistic and reasonable than the 
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fantasies of the right, the 2009 European elections showed that the left does 
exist, that it is different from the right, but unlike the right it is having dif-
ficulty evolving adaptively to the new ecological environment and feeling at 
home and sufficiently flexible and protean in the new, profoundly anomic 
context of economic crisis. This slowness is confronted, moreover, by the 
quickness of the right (which, however, is highly unstable in its solutions).
The Present and the Future: Provisional Conclusion
The transition to the postmodern (or global) age has thus transformed the 
left and the right, causing both to lose their traditional identity and political 
forms. But even though they both derive their reason for being from the 
origins of modernity, this does not make them obsolete as political cate-
gories. And the past has not been surpassed, not because left and right are 
permanent acquisitions, but (only) because the modern structural duality 
of politics— suspended between natural anomie and norm implicit in its 
subjectivities— has indeed lost its subjects, forms, and horizons, but it has 
not been replaced by any solid ground, by any new justice, or by a functional 
equivalent that can act as a yardstick, as a measure, for new political catego-
ries, or even by a new polemical front line capable of creating a new horizon 
of political meaning. In short, while the original duality of the modern has 
persisted, the structures of its political and institutional architecture have 
not. Consequently, both pundits and public opinion can still tell from one 
instance to the next if a position and policy are from the right or left, if they 
privilege exception or context, or— on the contrary— the latest normativity 
to enable the subject to flourish. The world interpreted by politics oscillates 
today between the nothingness of the order of human things (or defending 
a continuously threatened order to the bitter end) and the perception of a 
seminal norm that, as a (remote) possibility, consists in subjectivities— if not 
in their rational essence, then at least in their capacity to suffer and their 
willingness to live and flourish. Thus, although the world has changed, al-
though the problems vary and solutions are lacking, if politics remains struc-
turally undetermined, if these remain the lenses through which we view 
politics, if subjectivity as an end in itself can still be the defining trait, at least 
in political discourse— then left and right continue to determine the political 
space and to oppose each other.
The agenda of the challenges to be tackled, the new political guidelines 
to be thought out, is staggering. We are confronted with new forms of rela-
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tionship between the universal and the particular, with the dialectic implicit 
in the connection between humanity and cultures as they present them-
selves within the political space of the state, which today is called upon to 
accommodate differences that are far more heterogeneous (although com-
municating and comprehensible) than the antithesis between capital and 
labor.16 We must deal with biotechnologies and their ambiguous biopolitical 
potential— just one of the multiple powers that enter into the naked flesh of 
living beings, molding it and shaping it to the point of subjugation— and 
new options for the possible expression and liberation of subjectivity. It is 
not a matter of fighting biopower because it distorts the supposed true es-
sence of human nature, but because it may violate the freedom and dignity 
of the real subject; but then, the prospect of humanity hybridized with tech-
nology is in itself neither new nor scary, provided this marriage takes place in 
the prospect of freedom and maximization of the expressiveness of subjectiv-
ity. The challenges also involve managing the refragmentation of the global 
economy and governing globalization, in a new world order in which the 
West is no longer the center, and in a plurality of large economic areas. De-
mocracy must be revitalized: by enabling it to address conflicts; by seeking, 
through the state, to work with the change in scale (apparently required by 
the denationalization of politics) that (at least in part) places politics beyond 
the state, in the direction of federation or empire; by interpreting the agents 
of fluidity and disintegration of international relations (from the power of 
corporations to migrations to terrorism) using realistic thinking and creative 
imagination; by deciding between growth and restraint; by overcoming the 
conflict between nomadic and sedentary peoples that seems to have hypno-
tized the popular European consciousness.
All the points of this agenda target the subject, capitalism, technique, bio-
politics, the environment, and cultures as strategic centers of real contra-
dictions generated at the global level, but which we perceive critically as 
inside— and as breaching— the local space of the state and the vestiges of its 
ordering capacity. And if the possible answers to our current challenges still 
involve the contraposition of anomaly versus norm, exception versus legality, 
domination versus autonomy, rumormongering or propagandizing versus 
responsibly speaking out, and inequality versus equality; if, in these new 
scenarios, the alternative continues to be framed in terms of whether civil 
and political life should be something normatively different from a jumble of 
unequal relations, or whether, on the contrary, it can only oscillate between 
chance and necessity; if it still makes sense to ask whether the last word 
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should be given to the capitalist economy, which presents itself as a series of 
bubbles and crises, as an independent entity that shapes itself and demands 
the sacrifice of people, forms, and orders in order to function, or to the cen-
trality and dignity of subjectivities, affirmed by politics; if the subject, no 
longer transcendental, of course, but no longer simply deconstructed by crit-
ical theorists or turned into an ideological larva, a purely sentimental entity 
or a consumer or a spectator— in its life, its reproduction, its way of loving, 
its illnesses, suffering, and death— is still the battlefield between threatening 
and threatened authority versus freedom, this means that left and right will 
have a life beyond the modern age, surviving into the global age.
It is by no means to be taken for granted that they will retain their current 
forms. There is nothing preventing the left— it would actually be desirable 
if it did— from expressing a humanism that is not naive: a transparent hope, 
entirely free from the coerciveness of all its old necessity effects, one that is 
also attentive, however, to real contradictions as they authentically come to 
exist in bodies and spaces. Similarly, there is nothing preventing the right 
from putting itself forward as the bearer of a grave seriousness, of a realism 
that is not cynical, of a nonhumanism that is not also antihuman, of a sense 
of contingency that is neither ruthless nor ephemeral. Both left and right, if 
capable of it, should relaunch the normativity of politics and law against the 
deviations of the economy and technology. The strategic task of the right 
will continue to consist in coming up with continually new solutions for 
order— all of which they believe to be foundational and transcendental, but 
which in reality are transient, conflictual, and anomalous— for problems 
and threats they know they cannot (and will not) solve at their roots. The 
left has the task of taking on the existence and value of individuals as they 
ought to be, and of firmly articulating the rights of the subjectivities, but 
not in an essentialistic, identity- making way; in other words, not to turn 
the individual into a weapon against the other, but rather to arrive at it in 
all its concreteness. And in general, not to just wait until the imaginative 
bubble of the right bursts, but to actively pursue a new hegemony, that is, 
to outline a new chain of active subjectivities and effective political means; 
and to offer a new vision of the world, a framework within which individual 
and collective energies can find their space, working toward an emancipa-
tion that may be conflictual, but not unequal. If it comes down to it, the 
left must dynamically incite the power of populism, respond to unanswered 
political questions by establishing a new subject people at the heart of the 
political, beyond state neutralization.17 What this means to the left, having 
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abandoned any pretense of necessity, is to discover a kairòs, an opportunity 
that legitimates another shared undertaking to be pursued, beyond the last 
creation of the left (or center- left), the welfare state; but, equally, to reinvent 
the institutional and intellectual tools that will allow us, without making 
a utopian leap out of it, to pass from the world as it is to the world as it 
ought to be. Struggle and contingency, mobility and escape, but also a new 
era for rights, freedoms, and responsibilities, of individuals and collectives, 
singular and plural: these are the many options that open the way from 
here to a praxis, with the natural divergences between moderate and radical 
lefts; and perhaps the clash between unstructured, rebellious subjectivity 
and institutions is the new name for the traditional dilemma of reform ver-
sus revolution.
If and when the original modern structure of politics, balanced between 
nature and contrivance, is consumed and inconceivable; if and when the 
ground of politics is radically changed, because subjectivity is no longer a 
category that holds strategic value for forming the political space, and its 
flourishing is no longer the key political question; if and when politics is 
organized around other conceptual axes (for example, polluters against en-
vironmentalists, and the ecological crisis is in itself capable of crowding out 
the left- right cleavage, and of creating a front that unites humanity against 
nature gone mad, or, more radically, unites man and nature, meaning, all 
nonhuman living beings, in a new alliance based on restraining growth), 
then left and right will no longer mean anything, which was how it was for 
almost the entire historical and political experience of the West. But until 
then, left and right will continue to say, in a feeble whisper or perhaps out 
loud, something modern about our postmodern political fortunes.
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chapter 3
Politics in the Present
Roberto Esposito
Translated by Margaret Adams  
Groesbeck and Adam Sitze
Explaining oneself in an interview, a dialogue, or a conversation is 
so difficult.1 The questions, like their answers, are faked. They’re 
constructed, only to be rewritten in new combinations that take off from 
the problems they’re supposed to confront and that, mysteriously, they 
cleverly manage to evade. What counts therefore is the problem. And the 
problem directly interrogates the present as well as the interlocutors who 
live in the present. As such, we’ve decided to renounce the binary form 
that privileges the exchange between two but excludes other eventual 
addressees, preferring instead what has been defined in philosophy as 
the art of constructing problems. We take as our point of departure the 
unwinding of the thread of Roberto Esposito’s thirty- year meditation 
on philosophy and on politics. But this starting point is more convention 
than dialogic standard. Whether undertaken alone, shared with one other 
or many others, this reflection is necessary but not entirely satisfying 
when what’s in play is a politics that has declined to the present. We must 
instead restore to this reflection the movement that carries us to the 
problem, a movement in which past and future become contemporary 
with respect to the position reality has assumed. Here we deal with 
a convention— one we’ve respected— that mirrors footnotes at the 
bottom of a page and, more generally, the literary form of an intellectual 
biography written in the first person. This convention itself is revealed 
to be useful as a genealogical lens focused on the present. This same 
form, after all, is born in the moment suspended between the actual 
questioning and the virtual present in which we live. The conventional 
schema of this essay is based on four categories: the impolitical, 
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immunitas/communitas, biopolitics, and the impersonal. This schema will 
develop itself in the style of free indirect discourse, which will not shut 
off the flow of the reflection by preexisting stylistic modalities. And if 
the flow were about to be curtailed, it would show up right away: free 
indirect discourse aims to restore thought from its start in the immanence 
between language and the problem it confronts, that it intends to express 
and that it wants to delimit and reintroduce. This style constitutes a 
heterogeneous approach to interrogation, a meditation precisely on 
the present, its development and its state of permanent imbalance, its 
continual variation, open to the outside. In literature, free indirect style 
has created an alliance among the writer, the protagonist, and the reader. 
In philosophy, this style intends to carry the multiplicity of the problem, 
the plurality of voices, into the logocentric heart of the thought. It’s as 
if you’re jumping up on a trampoline, hanging suspended up in the air, 
before you flip and plunge back down.
— R. E., R. C.
Impolitical
Reflection on the impolitical was born in a phase in which the crisis of politi-
cal action was one with a renewed vitality of thought on politics. Through-
out the West, the crisis of the political apparatus, the crisis of the social state, 
combined to transform the historical meaning of the concept of govern-
ment. I’d like to reflect on why, at the beginning of the 1980s, one political 
cycle that lasted for at least thirty years appeared to end, while another cycle 
of reflection on politics opened, one that still continues to this day. Between 
1981 and 1986, with various thinkers such as Biagio de Giovanni, Bruno 
Accarino, Remo Bodei, Massimo Cacciari, Umberto Curi, Giuseppe Duso, 
Giacomo Marramao, Roberto Racinaro, and Maurizio Zanardi, I took part 
in the publication of Centauro, a significant journal for so many reasons. In 
those years, in Italy, there emerged a consciousness of the radical crisis of one 
of the topoi of the political culture of the left and, more generally, of the mod-
ern conception of politics.2 By then the dialectic, based on contradiction and 
on its recomposition in a higher unity, that joined class to party, movement 
to state, was shattered. Against this background of this new consciousness 
emerged an irreducible distance that separated a new reality from subjects of 
politics who were inspired by modern categories of sovereignty, state, popu-
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lation, and nation. That new reality no longer enjoyed the transcendental 
guarantee of political order. The prerogative of an international equilibrium 
described by Carl Schmitt in The Nomos of the Earth as having been in place 
in Europe since the peace of Westphalia failed— and failed forever.
The intellectuals who took part in the experience of Centauro demon-
strated a keen awareness of this change. They interpreted it in terms of a 
crisis of modernity and positioned themselves at its very limit. On one hand, 
this formula echoed the emerging debate about the end of the great modern 
narratives about politics, history, and philosophy launched in 1979 by Jean- 
François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition. This debate, soon expanded 
to a dimension unforeseen by even its promoter, extended the so- called end 
of history and the unrepresentability of social conflict. A model of rational-
ity in interpretation of the modernization of politics and economics was no 
longer credible. On the other hand, the crisis of modernity radically placed 
in dispute modern politics’ capacity to represent a reality whose own exclu-
sively national consistency had been undermined and whose subjects had 
difficulty recognizing the unique and irreplaceable role of the sovereign. The 
sphere of the political could no longer be separated from the social, anthro-
pological, and ontological forms it had tried to dominate, transform— even 
create from nothing— during the long adventure of modernity. Drawing my 
inspiration from the pages of Machiavelli’s Prince, I proposed the concept- 
symbol of a centaur as the title of the journal, in order to take up once again 
this tragic coexistence of contraries. Politics could no longer trust itself to 
general subjects capable of mediating conflict, given that conflict was in-
scribed in politics’ very reason for being. To politics fell the unfortunate 
assignment of holding together force and order, Machiavelli’s fox and lion, 
life and forms. But so much indicated that this last attempt at recomposition 
would have to be the last.
The philosophical juncture at which this reflection occurred was char-
acterized by a koinè that permitted diverse groups of intellectuals to come 
together to shape a horizon of common research. Since then, it has no lon-
ger been possible to create a collective journal with a sense comparable to 
Centauro in Italy because there is no longer a stable relationship between life 
and political forms, between theory and practice, between philosophy and 
politics, no matter how relocated and instrumental the relationship may be. 
And because of this, the philosophical alternatives present in Centauro split 
apart and have offered up radically different perspectives in the course of 
the last twenty years. It is with this awareness that I would reread the texts 
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and opinions of those who, in various ways, anticipated the passage we were 
living through at the beginning of the 1980s. While the journal Mondoperaio 
advanced a fiery revisionist polemic against the Marxist tradition and Lucio 
Colletti had confirmed the crisis of Marxism (even Italian Marxism) with 
his Intervista politico- filosofica, space for a renewal of themes and authors was 
opened up in the postmarxist Intellighenzia. In Krisis there was the thought 
of Massimo Cacciari, who first formulated the concept of the impolitical, 
by means of which the categories of sovereignty, representation, party, 
and power were more and more depoliticized. This concept tore open the 
theological- political fold that had kept these categories pinched together up 
to that moment and incorporated a technical modality destined to render 
meaningless the representative assumptions about modern politics. In rela-
tion to this entropic fate of politics, the only possible discourse seemed to be 
expressed by an impolitical decision.3 For some time, in an attempt to find a 
dialectical solution capable of giving form to conflicts, authors like Massimo 
Marramao and Angelo Bolaffi had reflected on the “Weimar laboratory,” 
expanding on the debate in Germany of the 1920s between Carl Schmitt and 
the social- democratic jurists Kirchheimer, Neumann, Fraenkel, and Heller.4
It would be impossible to describe with just a few strokes the theoretical 
richness of Italian thought on this crisis.
I’ll confine myself to pointing out in schematic terms the alternatives in 
play in those years. The first was negative thought, variously interpreted 
by Cacciari and Tronti. It engaged crisis as an originary dimension of the 
political, from which the political, in turn, drew the ability to create new 
forms of order through the force of its own decision- making power. A sec-
ond interpretive line accepted the extinction of the subject to which negative 
thought still attributed representability, even though this representability 
was no longer based on work as traditional Marxism had held. In this way 
there emerged various and even diverging geopolitical trajectories: while one 
reassessed the authors of the so- called conservative revolution, Carl Schmitt, 
and then Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, the second— the one in 
which I mostly see myself today— docked on the French shore where Der-
rida, but above all Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, understood the crisis 
of the modern political subject as resistance to the pretension of imposing 
a sovereign form on the life of individuals. What these trajectories had in 
common then was the consciousness of the failure of the autonomy of poli-
tics and therefore the necessity of articulating a different response to the 
crisis. But where to start? And where did criticism find a place? We can say 
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that there were three different hypotheses in place, even though they were 
not entirely disconnected from one another. For some, like de Giovanni, the 
crisis still positioned us in the modern, even if in a problematic way. Others 
like Bodei and Marramao landed on its margin, in a sort of hypermodern 
drawing out of modernity.5 Finally for others— first for Cacciari and for me 
as well— that point cast us outside, to the impolitical reversal. In one area, 
even among thinkers who were far from the experience of Centauro, one 
discussion acquired real importance. It focused on the three principal au-
thors of early modernity: Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza. In this debate, 
hypotheses that were not only philosophical but also political came into 
play. On one side was Mario Tronti, who worked on the autonomy of the 
political— in a theoretical frame in which the reflection on Hobbes took 
precedence. On the other side stood Toni Negri, who insisted instead on 
the break between Hobbes and Spinoza, in light of the revolutionary rup-
ture with modern political theology.6 Last but not least, de Giovanni chose 
a line of problematization that held Hobbes and Spinoza together against 
Descartes. He wanted to differentiate, within the modern tradition, the Car-
tesian perspective centered on the conscious subject from another, espoused 
by Spinoza and Vico, that ties life to forms in a new hypothesis of restoring 
the vitality of politics.7
We can’t say that, in general, this debate was made up of political refer-
ents around which that varied philosophical koinè turned. Looking back, I 
consider it the most evident proof of the rupture of the bond between theory 
and practice, between reflection on politics and politics itself. In Italy this 
link had been embodied in an organic intellectual— that is, an intellectual 
specialist in the humanities or social sciences who interpreted his own role as 
a political leader, especially in the Communist Party. I am not surprised by 
the conclusion de Giovanni, who was editor of Centauro, drew later on.8 The 
Communist Party did not understand the meaning of questioning ourselves 
about the crisis of modernity. Leaders like Gerardo Chiaromonte, Alfred 
Reichlin, and Giorgio Napolitano stepped in to keep the Centauro group 
from allying itself with the group coordinated by Mario Tronti, who ed-
ited Laboratorio politico in those years. A whole season of Italian intellectual 
life drew to a close— and with it the idea that journals about philosophical- 
political culture constituted, in a certain sense, the laboratory in which cate-
gories were created that politics would put into practice. Those first years of 
the 1980s were culturally lively despite recurring signs of the end of a politi-
cal cycle. Then there started to assert itself a style of analysis stamped with 
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the extreme personalization of theoretical apparatus and with the sophisti-
cated, conceptual articulation that radically changed the rapport between 
philosophy and politics. Let me note that the years in which Centauro ended 
witnessed the birth of a new journal, Filosofia politica, founded by Nicola 
Matteucci, whose editorship I shared with Carlo Galli and Giuseppe Duso. 
Both of them were engaged in significant interpretation of modern political 
categories that constitute for me a site of continual confrontation. But here 
we deal with an academic journal— in the best sense of the word— no lon-
ger one that represents a tendency. Filosofia politica is entirely separate from 
politics in action.
The fact that the rapport between philosophy and politics has never been 
mended, not even within the paradigm of the “crisis of the political,” proves 
that one stage has given way to another. In Categorie dell’impolitico I intended 
to distance myself from this paradigm, on one hand converging with, and on 
the other detaching myself from Cacciari’s interpretation of the impolitical.9 
As I later understood, at that time, despite any precautions, I ran the risk of 
providing a somewhat gnostic— that is, constitutively negative— reading of 
the impolitical. Despite my having refused to talk about any other or differ-
ent view of the political— but rather about its limits and its reversal— the cate-
gory of the impolitical could be understood in an implicitly dualistic key. In 
reality the impolitical is the unforeseen margin, the silent heart, the empty 
point— certainly not a feasible alternative— of politics. It’s not a political 
philosophy precisely because it refuses to establish an instrumental relation 
between philosophy and politics; it’s not a political theology because it ex-
cludes any representation of good, any dialectical relationship between poli-
tics and good; and it isn’t even a political ideology because it deconstructs 
the traditional bipolarities, starting with the one between right and left. In a 
strict sense, the impolitical is nothing but the determination of the political, 
in that the impolitical is that which defines the limits of the political. It’s the 
political imagined departing from its confines— without which there’s noth-
ing but the conflict of power and interests. But insisting on the inevitability 
of conflict, that category wanted to sanction even failure, or the constitutive 
antinomy, of modern political philosophy that is always, no matter how, 
a thought about order. From the moment that political philosophy resists 
thinking about a conflict neither ordered nor representable, the impolitical 
is exactly what bursts forth from its representation as well as what by its very 
being annuls it. Political philosophy, understood as the foundation of mod-
ern political science, was born with this dramatically neutralizing meaning. 
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Machiavelli shows us the reason why Italian philosophy today seems to have 
a different fate from that of other European philosophies. Machiavelli alone 
maintains not only the impossibility of canceling out conflict but even its 
productivity. His problem lies in being able to imagine a conflict that heads 
neither toward civil war nor toward total incorporation within order. We 
can say that in modernity this theoretical possibility has never been realized 
historically. It has remained silent, imprisoned in the impolitical heart of 
politics, even though it has maintained within itself the unexpressed possi-
bility of nonneutralizable conflict.
The impolitical therefore falls within a genealogical work on the modern 
political episteme, which cannot be considered as a single block but rather as 
a set of tensions in which, at least theoretically, more than one possibility in 
relationship to actual history opens up. Essays in Centauro had already es-
tablished the modern as a horizon from which lines may diverge— or at least 
project— from that dominant one that runs from Hobbes to Hegel. In this 
sense, we must rethink cues and problems such as the antagonism between 
order and conflict in Machiavelli, the thought of immanence in Spinoza, 
the theme of plasticity of humankind in Pico, Giordano Bruno’s opening on 
the infinity of worlds, Vico’s idea of catastrophic cycles of history. From this 
point of view, my work on the impolitical has an element in common with 
my earlier reading of humanism.10 Within this frame, at their extremes, the 
categories of the impolitical and of conflict tend toward each other. We’re 
dealing with the same overall meaning viewed from different angles. Their 
symmetry, or contiguity, springs from a common laterality in relationship 
to the prevalent tradition of the modern based on the agreed- upon neutrali-
zation of conflict springing from the constitutive relationship between the 
individual and sovereign order.
Communitas/Immunitas
In relation to the impolitical, the diptych Communitas: Origine e destino 
della comunità and Immunitas: Protezione e negazione della vita is no longer 
projected against the backdrop of the crisis of modernity or the crisis of 
the political. Starting in the mid- 1990s, I turned to what Michel Foucault 
defined as the “ontology of the present.”11 I ascribe a special importance to 
this definition since it reverses the general significance of the interrogation 
of the crisis of modernity up to that moment. I’d given an interpretation of 
certain historical- conceptual meanings of that crisis. I’d singled out a field— 
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impolitical, conflict— that couldn’t reenter the modern semantic, either as a 
negative implication or as a presupposition of its concepts. The interrogation 
of the current moment, on the other hand, freely permits a genealogical 
gaze at not only the history of concepts but also all knowledge that cast the 
present in its current form— as this present appears to one who questions it 
and lives in it as well.12
This saggital gaze on the present allows assessment not only of its genea-
logical depth but also of the political and epistemic alternatives it contains. 
Within this frame the (nondialectical) relation between communitas and im-
munitas represents the first modality of a reflection that carried me from 
interrogating the impolitical to examining the biopolitical. The impolitical 
was an analytic of finitude declined in negative terms— in this sense, some-
thing not very far from a transcendental category of a Kantian type. When I 
wrote the introduction for the new edition of Categorie dell’impolitico in 1998, 
I already felt myself within the horizon of ontology. It was the beginning of 
a new laboratory that retained some elements of the impolitical perspective 
but pushed the analytic of finitude in the direction of an ontology of relation 
and change. Though rejecting every reference to values, every subjectivist 
presupposition, the impolitical still had an ethical imprint, attitude, tonality. 
The theorization of community, by contrast, has a clear ontological inclina-
tion. During this transition, I realized that the philosophy of the impolitical 
was perhaps the last pledge paid out to the idea of a crisis of modernity that 
tries to overcome itself, but, for this very reason, remains all the same. This 
feeling, this possible interpretation, left me at least partially dissatisfied. The 
impolitical was a reactive and dissenting category that remained entangled 
in the crisis of modernity. Still, the impolitical posed an important ques-
tion: what is the structural, constitutive reason for the defective being of 
modernity, of this impossibility of filling its initial void? At a certain point 
I started to answer that modernity may have immunized itself against this 
originary deficiency. To be exact, we can talk about modernity as a deter-
mined, historical- categorical apparatus, when a politics directly concentrat-
ing on the survival and reproduction of life was invented.
In the transition from an ethical interrogation to an ontological one, we 
see determined a repositioning of the historical- political reading of moder-
nity as well: modernity doesn’t simply start with the institution of a sover-
eign power, as Hobbes posited, one with the intention of neutralizing— or 
immunizing— a conflict identified with a state of civil war that precedes 
politics. Rather, that very modernity, understood as affirmation of sover-
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eignty, is the product of this conflict. The relation between community and 
immunity gives voice to this inversion of perspective. When individuals in 
a community submit to sovereign power because they realize they can no 
longer sustain the threats that community poses to itself, we can say that 
such a community has been immunized. Of course such immunization is 
hardly definitive because, given the equality of strengths and weaknesses, 
the conflict starts up again soon enough. This is the fundamental condition 
for instituting the sovereign pact— but also the principal cause of its desta-
bilization. This conflict is inscribed on the dark heart of the community: it 
reflects back to a gift— the munus— that continually passes from one person 
to another and belongs to no one permanently. The foundation of communi-
tas starts with the ontological debt that constitutes the originary defect, the 
lack of being, of those who are part of it. The members of the community 
are all equally at fault. They fail themselves— in the sense that they commit 
a crime— as all the foundational stories start their narratives with a murder, 
often between brothers. Under these conditions, the community identity of 
whoever receives the gift is destabilized and fractured from its origin. Now 
the sovereign immunizes the community from its own community excess, 
but he is also the principal actor in this excess.
Community and immunity therefore cannot be considered in two op-
posing and alternative semantic structures but rather in an ontology of co-
involvement and change. Immunization is always relative to community. 
Like everything else an individual takes part in, community is always im-
munized in various ways. This involvement between the two concepts isn’t 
a kind of dialectic, because it can’t be understood as a relation between two 
different poles. Therefore it never reaches a definitive synthesis. Immunity 
and community are the same thing seen from two opposing sides, as a dou-
ble possibility that is also— always— a double necessity. If community is at 
least partially immunized in all its historical forms, immunity also has a 
community side, or tangency. Autoimmunity— that is, the destructive force 
in the face of an organism that means to protect itself— is only one of the 
latent possibilities in immunitary practice. In fact, on a biological plane, the 
immunitary system does not have only a defensive or aggressive capacity. It 
is also that filter that permits organ transplants as well as birth itself through 
so- called immune tolerance. Just as one can infer from the sphere of biology 
the possibility that life, understood in its singularity, may not be exclusively 
a product of either defense or offense in relation to external agents, so one 
can also see that life may be the result of self- regulation established by the 
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immanent norms that govern its development. Still, it would be an error to 
fix on a symmetry that immediately associates the biological and political 
horizons in a single plane: politics can’t be reduced to the biological measure 
of life, for fear of its transformation into a thanatopolitical form. In the same 
way, life can’t be completely incorporated into politics to avoid falling into 
a form of totalitarianism. I would rather consider the coinvolvement of this 
process in their constitutive asymmetry, oriented toward the constitution 
of life— whether individual or common— that tries to escape from autoim-
munitary logic.
To question modernity genealogically beginning from the ties between 
community and immunity means, in the end, to bring to light that fun-
damental ambiguity or aporia, established as fundamental in the rapport 
between power and life, between biology and politics, that Foucault has 
described as “the acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a living 
being,” his claim “that the biological came under State control, that there 
was at least a certain tendency that leads to what might be termed State 
control of the biological.”13 As I showed in the last section of Immunitas 
and more completely in Bíos, Foucault never succeeds in integrating these 
two perspectives— you see it in the never well- defined rapport between sov-
ereignty and biopolitics. We’re in the center of the antinomy of modernity, 
which I had already identified— albeit in a different way— in my book on the 
impolitical. My thesis is that in Foucault exists an irresolvable contradiction, 
because Foucault tends to view the rapport between politics and life as one 
between two entities already constituted in themselves. He does not inter-
pret it instead as a relation of reciprocal immanence in which one is consti-
tutive of the other. When you think of biopolitics as a relation between two 
preconstituted entities, you end up overlaying one on the other relation in 
which one is necessarily the subject and the other subjugated. Here necessity 
dictates that one leads to a sort of thanatopolitics or in what we might define 
very nearly as totalitarianism. I think that looking through a genealogical 
lens, biopolitics may be considered older than the modern, dating back to a 
coincidence with the birth of the political understood in its valence marked 
by conflict. But biopolitics finds in the modern paradigm of immuniza-
tion a fundamental shift that gives it something more and different from 
Foucault’s formulation. Immunity is the power to conserve life. With this 
paradigm, there is finally a full articulation of the two elements. From this 
point of view, in modernity biopolitics experiences an intensification— and 
also a semantic mutation— that renders it radically different from ancient 
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biopolitics. In Greek sanitary politics and Roman agrarian politics, for ex-
ample, biopolitics has a partially community structure, turned toward the 
ties between polis and civitas. The modern epoch, by contrast, determines an 
immunitary impulse that first passes through Hobbes’s project of individual 
salvation but that, following a dramatically discontinuous course, reaches 
an obsessive syndrome of a thanatopolitical type. This stage provides that 
the life of one group seems protected by the violent elimination of another, 
as generally happens with racism or, in an infinitely more violent way, with 
Nazism. Here I don’t want to give the impression that thanatopolitics casts 
its shadow over the entire spectrum of modernity— as if it were possible 
to reconceive modernity in a nonhistoricizable ontology in which, from its 
very beginning, life gets caught up in the mesh of power and crushed. On 
the contrary, when I speak of the ontological shift from the perspective of 
the impolitical to that of the biopolitical, I do intend to historicize the po-
litical, juridical, and anthropological dispositif of the mutual entanglement 
of life and politics in the face of very precise historical conditions— even 
including ruptures between them. In the light of these ruptures, one can 
argue the differences between the concepts of life and politics in modernity 
and those of antiquity. But differences also exist within modernity itself, 
and so we can avoid characterizing all of biopolitics in necessarily negative 
or thanatopolitical terms. In fact, what interests me is to bring to light the 
dispositif of coinvolvement and reciprocal change between communitas and 
immunitas that is at the foundation of biopolitics. The ontology I’m talking 
about is a historical ontology, which Foucault defined as “the ontology of 
the present,” an ontology that doesn’t get considered in traditional terms of 
history of being. It’s cast instead in terms of history of the present— or, in 
other words, of genealogy.
Jacques Derrida’s interpretation of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, on New York is one example of the ontology of the present. This event 
created a crisis— really an explosion— of immunitary defenses of Western 
political systems. I share the presupposition of this analysis, even though 
indulging in it may draw out the equivocation of assuming inevitable im-
munization of a body in relation to autoimmunization, with which, under 
certain circumstances, this same body might experiment with destructive 
results. In the analysis of September 11, we run the risk of assigning features 
of autoimmunization to an entire political regime— in this case, democracy. 
In this way we would fall into an antinomy analogous to Foucault’s analy-
sis of biopolitics, when he superimposes politics on its possible— but never 
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discounted— thanatopolitical outcomes. In New York, and in London in 
2005, liberal democracies recognized a new, tremendous problem: the ter-
rorists aren’t aliens; they’re citizens educated in Western schools; they speak 
the same language; they share the same culture, carrying to its extreme the 
death drive that passes through the community in an excessive, self- sacrificial 
suicide. In turn, this autoimmunitary crisis of democracy has produced po-
litical decisions, such as the preventive war against terrorism and a series of 
exceptional juridical dispositifs that have partially deprived democratic laws 
of any national or international authority. Derrida has related this auto-
immune disorder of contemporary democracy to a fate that seems to impose 
suicide on democracy, keeping it from realizing its potential. But if democ-
racy has been autoimmunitary from its beginning, then it is impossible to 
discount any form that, from time to time, democracy may assume.
Now this shift from ontology to politics conflates a political and juridi-
cal dispositif with a thanatopolitical fate of democracy. This consolidation 
has been going on for centuries but has its own significance in the pres-
ent. Clearly, we can explain the actual autoimmunitary crisis by citing the 
weakening of national sovereignties and the spectral return of religion to 
the heart of political decisions. These decisions deny the life of some while 
protecting the life of others. But this doesn’t demonstrate that the process 
of autoimmunization always degenerates into an autoimmunitary, suicidal 
crisis. What counts, even more than analogies, are distinctions. For example, 
always following Foucault’s line of reasoning, we certainly can say that today 
we live in liberal biopolitical regimes that no longer fit into the frame of 
what’s traditionally understood to be democracy. That is, if we understand 
democracy as something like equality of subjects— or at least as a theory of 
subjectivity based on equality— then today we can no longer say that such 
a regime is real. Whether in a negative or positive sense, contemporary bio-
politics is centered more on difference than on equality— as always happens 
when we deal with live bodies and not abstract subjects of the law.
In a certain sense, this outcome had already been established— even 
though for other aims— by Carl Schmitt in his important essay about democ-
racy and parliamentarianism in the 1920s.14 Today we live in liberal regimes 
of various natures that have little to do with democracy— far removed, at 
least, from Rousseau’s original concept. Even before September 11, we could 
recognize that immunitary democracy no longer resembled that concept. 
Naturally I’m not thinking of a totally community regime as an alternative, 
if we imagine as the alternative the concept of communitas in its radical form 
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of global contamination; in that case it would necessarily be given over to 
self- destruction. But democracy cannot even be a totally immunized regime, 
because then the excess of security would lead to a total block and there-
fore implosion. If, on a conceptual plane, the two alternatives counter one 
another in their differential clarity, on a historical plane we’ve always had 
some form of commingling of the two. We can imagine a democracy with a 
low immunitary intensity that may offer absolute safety from the risk of the 
munus. And, in the reverse, we could have a democracy of low community 
intensity that may give protection from the risk of a suicidal autoimmu-
nization. Securitized— or liberal— democracy functions in just this way: it 
produces one liberty, destroying another; it protects one part of life, aban-
doning another to whatever fate. Foucault theorized all this, even though 
he didn’t succeed in pointing out the various paths to this short circuit that 
brings biopolitics back to its originary antinomy.
Biopolitics
To talk about biopolitics, I’ll start from its most complex apex, from what 
I’ve defined as affirmative biopolitics. And I’ll lay it out in relation to the 
problem of democracy. To understand the meaning of an expression like 
“affirmative biopolitics,” we must start out from an alternative paradigm 
that clarifies the philosophical matrix in which it ripened. The affirmative 
qualities of biopolitics can be understood only by departing from the diver-
gence experienced— not only in the sphere of political philosophy— between 
an interpretation of processes based on a transcendent approach and an-
other interpretation focusing on immanence. The transcendent— or even 
the transcendental— perspective always makes reference to an external and 
superior point of view vis- à- vis the constitution of subjectivity— whether 
it be of sovereign, state, or party. The division between government and 
governed remains irreducible in this view. On the other hand, there opens 
up the possibility of an immanent reading— one that does not accept the 
idea of a sovereign power that regulates life from the outside. This read-
ing is the only one that conceives the political according to a modality that 
does not consider philosophy a mere support of practice. Reconsidering the 
perspective of the impolitical today, I draw a double conclusion. The first is 
that philosophy can— and should— no longer have a metaphorical and in-
strumental rapport with politics. Second, today the space of political action 
falls outside its traditional confines— and lies precisely in the terrain that 
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has been defined impolitical in various ways. When at last we overcome the 
barrier that modernity has created between philosophy and politics, and 
thought recognizes itself radically immersed within a biopolitical horizon, 
then philosophical reflection acquires a weighty political significance that it 
did not have before.
I consider this double evaluation the ultimate landing site of my reflec-
tion started twenty years ago. At that time, I tended to give the impolitical 
a predominantly negative representation— as the reverse of modern politics. 
In the meantime, it became clearer and clearer that the negative of the im-
political had been filled with that object apparently alien to politics— life. 
The impolitical had been from the beginning a paradigm critical of power— 
never apologetic or legitimating. But that discourse, justifiably critical of 
what exists, assumed a potentially affirmative modality when it turned to in-
terrogate the importance assumed today by the dimension of biological life.
By now we’ve determined a relation of reciprocal immanence and coin-
volvement between politics and life that’s no longer subject to interpretation 
by the transcendental philosophy that runs, in various forms, from Kant to 
Heidegger; instead the line, even though sometimes discontinuous, in its 
own way, must join Spinoza to Nietzsche. This shift in the axis of catego-
ries responds to the clearly visible circumstance that all great questions that 
have opened up from the 1980s to today arose within the crisis of the state 
form— questions about sexual difference, immigration, new forms of war, 
terrorism, and biotechnologies. These questions demonstrate that politics no 
longer depends on the transcendence of an order governed from above or 
from outside; rather, they directly address every person’s life in its immanent 
measure. Now that state politics and its principal paradigm— sovereignty— 
have been placed in serious discussion, the immanence of life is the only 
dimension in which contemporary politics finds its most essential meaning.
We can understand in this sense Foucault’s assertion that politics is always 
a form of government in confrontation with life. It shouldn’t make us think 
exclusively about power’s decisions about life but also about a possible form 
of self- governing of individuals’ own lives. Certainly politics can do noth-
ing but stay within life— this is what immanence means.15 It isn’t possible to 
think of politics and life outside their rapport with one another. That great 
transformation I have been describing has been generated by the yielding 
of dialectic categories of mediation and recomposition that have structured 
politics since the dawn of modernity. Government, organization, and form 
are nothing but articulations of the plane of immanence, along which life 
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enters into rapport with politics. In this sense, philosophy itself becomes a 
form of the political, a practice. If the impolitical inaugurated a season in 
which philosophy took on itself the task of making politics, albeit in a nega-
tive sense, biopolitics affirms that there exists a politics of philosophy. To 
make politics of— or in— philosophy is exactly the contrary of vindicating 
the role of political philosophy.
When I proposed the definition of affirmative biopolitics in Bíos, I in-
tended to point out a possible way of overcoming Foucault’s antinomy be-
tween politics of life and thanatopolitics; I turned toward another horizon 
of thought at whose center was an idea of porous democracy, facing its exter-
nal limits. This would be a democracy with low immunitary intensity, whose 
forms might always be objects of innovation and self- control. I am thinking 
about institutional modalities that not only support but may actually be 
produced by politics of life rather than politics on life. With this formula I in-
tended to root Foucault’s conflict between biopower and biopolitics within 
life— that is, within that immanent horizon in which communitas and immu-
nitas are always intertwined. In the category of affirmative biopolitics this 
coinvolvement gets read from another angle: that of the relation between life 
and norm, individuality and community, institutions and liberty— paying 
strict attention to avoid considering these terms as opposing polarities but 
as elements that interact in the same immanent process with political forms.
When we speak of the affirmative qualities of biopolitics, we situate poli-
tics in a horizon of innovation and production— not different from what 
Machiavelli did in his own way. From this point of view, I maintain we 
may imagine an immunity— one labeled positive— that would, on one hand, 
deliver life from the mortal dangers that lie in wait for it and, on the other, 
push it in a direction different from destructive results toward which its own 
autoimmunitary tendencies— and temptation— drag it. It’s not a given that 
conflict, which is at the basis of every definition of politics, may be assimi-
lated into a generalized state of war, into a state of permanent exception, 
and may, on its own account, impede the realization of democracy. Conflict 
can also be productive of new possibilities and horizons for democracy. To 
theorize this possibility, we must enter into the logic of the conflict itself— in 
the sense that we must deconstruct the thanatopolitical dispositifs in action, 
pointing out their genealogical relations with the structure they derive from. 
But we cannot delude ourselves that a dialectic reversal from negative to 
positive immunity can resolve the problems. In the ontology of the present 
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I’m trying to think, the dimension of conflict is not canceled out; rather it’s 
transported to a productive, not self- destructive, ground.
In Communitas and Immunitas the discourse was still focused on an idea 
of community understood to depart from its constitutive deficiency. It was 
the final outcome of a deconstruction of modern concepts that tried to deter-
mine an outside of politics, representing this outside as a kind of line, or even 
an empty center, understood as individual— or even collective— nonbeing in 
the relation. With Bíos, by contrast, my objective was to demonstrate that 
this emptiness, this outside of politics, is not necessarily subject to the than-
atopolitical outcomes of immunization. It’s instead rich in affirmative pos-
sibilities; it’s rooted in life according to the immanent declension that first 
Nietzsche and then, in other ways, Foucault and Deleuze gave it. The back-
ground against which this last transition took place was the interrogation of 
thanatopolitics— especially the Nazi version, which was the most radically 
negative expression of immunization. My intention was to open up a series 
of passages into the historical dispositifs that had pushed biopolitics to such 
lethal results until I could think of bios as form of life in common, knowing 
that meant rethinking democracy itself in the end.
In Bíos I articulated this form of common life in terms of birth, individ-
uation, and constituent power. The category of birth should be understood 
not only as the origin of a living being but also as the capacity of life itself to 
continually start over from itself, producing new forms— whether in individ-
uals or in multiplicity. As first formulated by Georges Canguilhem and then 
by Gilbert Simondon, the theory of individuation can be tied to that theory 
of event that links Bergson to Deleuze in the sphere of thought on imma-
nence. The question of constituent power must ultimately be considered in 
light of the fact that today— in contrast to what happened in the epoch of 
modern politics— we’re not dealing with establishing states or peoples. To-
day what politics constitutes— being in its turn constituted out of it— is life, 
in the sense that life is what produces conflicts and institutions. Its field of 
action is political, economic, and technical individuation on an individual 
or collective level. From a strictly philosophical point of view, this idea of 
form of life in common breaks with the paradigm of historicality or destiny, 
established by Heidegger with the second part of Being and Time. I will limit 
the term destiny (Geschick) to Being and Time, even though in succeeding 
works, Geschick and Schicksal, destiny takes on a wider meaning. Heidegger 
designates destiny as “Dasein’s primordial historizing, which lies in authen-
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tic resoluteness.”16 This decision permits Dasein to historicize itself in the 
sense that it rejoins its destiny— death— and, in this way, it “hands itself down 
to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has 
chosen.”17 This complicated game of destination of being- toward- death and 
of repetition, or transmission of death in the moment when Dasein decides 
for its own existence, imposes a paradigm of presupposition according to 
which every opening to the future can exist as such only if it roots itself in a 
form of inheritance of the past. In this way, the future is made possible only 
by a hereditary transmission of what is contained in the origin— even if this 
transmission is subsequently thought about in the form of absence or with-
drawal. What stays unchanged is the political declension of this paradigm 
of the presupposition by which the paradigm is thought— whether it be in-
dividual destiny or common destiny of the German people. In this case, life 
takes the form of repetition of an origin that signals in advance the destiny of 
a community of people. So the glorious future of Germany is conditioned by 
an elaboration of an inheritance— originally descended from Greece— passed 
down from an immemorial past.
In contrast to this philosophical declension of life in common in whatever 
common destiny or community of people, I believe that affirmative biopol-
itics goes in exactly the opposite direction: one that breaks the historicizing 
chain whose premise dictates that the future is shaped by beginning from 
its originary supposition. Repetition does not realize a common destiny for 
a people but rather the singularity of everyone’s life. That implies that life 
in common must be thought of outside the modern presupposition of its 
origin, just as democracy must renounce the idea of bringing up to date a 
transcendental order. Placing the problem of order before democracy means 
reaffirming the Hobbesian canon according to which politics is only con-
ceivable from the starting point of security. So to pose the problem of origin 
to singularity of life means to reaffirm that what comes first— and remains 
the same forever— is the common destiny of a people with respect to who 
lives in the present and for the present. This reasoning has an immediate ef-
fect on politics: the overturning of the historical plane on which Heidegger 
constructed the immanence of life permits us to think about a democracy 
that’s not presupposed but rather opened up to continual innovation. There 
could be a democracy imagined on the basis of the affirmation of birth and 
not the repetition of death. Life is no longer what repeats the destiny of man, 
which is death, but instead what affirms the event of birth in its singularity. 
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Here stands the difference between affirmative biopolitics and thanatopoli-
tics: the latter is constructed around the obsessive requirement to safeguard 
life from the death to which it is promised. Thinking about politics starting 
from the idea of birth means not going back to origin; on the contrary, it 
establishes a dimension of event renewed from time to time, uprooted from 
every presupposed antecedent. In the same way, thinking about conflict 
and democracy together signifies freeing the dimension of conflict from the 
modern supposition about order. If anything, it’s order that is realized as the 
basis of the emergencies that crop up in life from time to time.
The reference to the element of birth and individuation— to life’s capac-
ity to be reborn and renewed— can’t be carried through to a new theory of 
human or subjective rights. Rather the perspective of affirmative biopolitics 
involves a deconstruction of the idea of a subject of law and even of law as 
such. The juridical dispositif is always a dispositif of parts— partial— so law 
is always in a certain sense private— and privative— even if we are dealing 
with what we call public law. It inevitably implies a dividing and excluding 
line between who has rights and who, instead, is deprived of them. We deal 
with an essentially separating dispositif. This is much more so with respect 
to individual rights. The theory of individuation, on the other hand, is not 
reconcilable with the concept of individual as predefined entity. Simondon, 
Canguilhem, and Deleuze have quarreled with the idea of an individual 
closed in himself and ontologically separated from others. That attitude 
opens a compelling interrogative of the category of individual rights as they 
are thought about in the liberal tradition. Luhmann defines these rights as 
the immunitary system of social systems. These rights must be rethought 
beginning with a philosophy of justice in whose center stands the idea of 
relation. This idea allows us to imagine the coinvolvement of birth, indi-
viduation, and constitutive power of life within the form of the common. 
The theory of individuation is what ultimately characterizes biopolitics in 
an affirmative light and places the political forms of democracy in relation 
to the living being, to the immunitary apparatus, and to the community. 
In other words, affirmative biopolitics turns to a form of life that places in 
tension— even in conflict— these diverse dimensions of individuation of life 
in its communal force. Here conflict is not synonymous with violence— but 
instead with the production of structural transformations.
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Impersonal
All I’ve discussed requires a radical rethinking of the political categories that 
we have at our disposal. Through this lens, another, analogous concept— 
sovereignty— should be subjected to the same critical inquiry to which I 
subjected the concept of person in Terza persona. And the same discourse 
should be applied to the category of representation. In short, to maintain 
that the entire political lexicon of modernity must be rethought is no for-
mula like any other. Instead it responds to an exigency hidden from the 
twentieth century up to now— which, from Schmitt to Heidegger on, has 
seen technology as the ultimate dimension of politics, as the very thing that 
has caught up modernity in a horizon of catastrophe. Unlike the philosophy 
of immanence, this philosophy does not understand that, beyond technol-
ogy, there is the exigency of life, which becomes the new central reference 
point that includes technology. Today, from a political point of view, there 
is no discussion of the distribution and balance of power— in other words, 
the idea of representation. The dialectic between liberty and authority is not 
even in play. What’s in play is the definition of what life is on an individual 
or collective plane. The same ruling groups who have organized the politics 
of what we call empire have understood this well. Even leaving out the of-
ten thanatopolitical modes with which these groups express this exigency, 
the principal question remains for them the survival of life and the security 
of the population. Today what strikes me as completely out of the game is 
continuing to press politics on the question of representation. All that is 
truly over.
On a not merely categorical plane, affirmative biopolitics necessarily passes 
through a deconstruction of biopolitical categories in action. In its most rad-
ical meaning, deconstruction is politics of philosophy, or philosophical prac-
tice, that serves to define the genealogy of the present. In this case, it passes 
through a reversal of thanatopolitical categories carried to their extreme by 
Nazism. In Bíos, this hypernegative referent served to give me a necessary 
point of contrast because Nazism, unlike liberal- democratic regimes, had 
thought through the rapport between life and politics. Fifty years after 
Nietzsche, Nazism had theorized that politics isn’t thinkable, and operable, 
outside of life. Today this element is being taken up again and overturned. 
In Bíos, affirmative biopolitics must be thought within the reversal of three 
major political paradigms of Nazism: the enclosure of life in the organic 
body is opposed by the postphenomenological— but also post- Christian— 
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concept of flesh; the reduction of life under the domination of a single tran-
scendent norm opposed by an immanent normativization of life that dates 
back to Spinoza; the anticipated suppression of birth by means of negative 
eugenics opposed by a politics of birth already foreshadowed in some ways 
by Hannah Arendt.
The discourse on the impersonal that, for now, brings to a close the jour-
ney of my reflection implicitly reenters this horizon. From its origin, nega-
tive biopolitics is founded on the separation between life and body. The 
notion of person expresses this separation to the degree that it distinguishes 
juridical subjectivity from the body, thus dividing within bios one privileged 
zone from the other, subjugated zone of life. The critique of the idea of per-
son that moves in the direction of the impersonal is one of the most power-
ful openings for discourse on affirmative biopolitics; it places in discussion 
the paradigmatic axis on which modern politics is founded, starting from its 
deepest classical roots. This does not mean that the impersonal may show in 
a normative way what affirmative biopolitics is. We’re dealing here with an 
open horizon. Moreover, if I were to provide a normative version of affirma-
tive biopolitics, I’d return to situating biopolitics in a transcendental dimen-
sion. That politics inscribes itself into a genealogy of immanence means that 
it can no longer be normative in the abstract. Immanence does in fact reveal 
itself from time to time— and always in a different way— departing from the 
situation in which it’s realized, never from norms that apply. For example, 
saying that the immunitary system isn’t always— and only— negative, even if 
it often ends up that way, means that we undo the presumed superimposi-
tion of biopolitics and thanatopolitics.
All this, anticipated in Immunitas, stands at the center of Bíos. In relation 
to them, Terza persona positions itself within the same problematic orbit. 
Terza persona manages a double step ahead, or to one side: on one hand, 
in relation to the question of subjectivity— or, better still, the processes of 
subjectivization— and, on the other hand, to the problem of historicity and, 
especially, to the antinomic relationship between continuity and disconti-
nuity. The first point has to do with seeing the performative concept of dis-
positif. The dispositif of person is neither a concept nor even a category; it’s a 
dispositif that produces real effects. The first of these is to hide its effects in 
the personalistic rhetoric that today is reaching its apex. Let’s be clear: my 
book does not contest the various discourses focusing on emancipation that 
have brought back the value, dignity, and individuality of the human person 
since the Second World War— and today more than ever. But it does contest 
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this semantic connection between person and man. In reality, I go back to 
the double genealogy of the term person— the Roman juridical model and the 
Christian of a theological brand. I’ve tried to prove that its dispositif unifies 
the subject furnished with personal quality and the living being in which 
it’s installed— but always within the form of their presupposed separation. 
And that the original performance— whether theological or juridical— of the 
dispositif of person lies exactly in the capacity to define the threshold of 
division and exclusion within bios between the fully human life— endowed 
with rational and moral signs of the person— and a life of bestial nature 
subjugated to it.
Despite their enormous historical, categorical, and semantic distance from 
one another, Roman and even modern law give, consciously or uncon-
sciously, meaning to the notion of person with this result of separation— a 
result that renders the practice of something like human rights unthinkable 
today because it is structurally aporetic. Moreover, the Christian concep-
tion of the Incarnation, Christianity’s most extraordinary legacy, implies 
the simultaneous presence in Christ of two natures— one divine, the other 
human. These two natures aren’t only structurally different but also fur-
nished with different value. Within each human being, the immortal soul 
and the mortal body subjected and subordinated to it are similarly different 
and given disparate value. If we return to the insoluble relation between 
subjectification and subjugation as theorized by Foucault during the 1970s, 
we recognize the exact role played by the dispositif of the person: it’s to 
create subjectivity— even juridical subjectivity— through a practice of sub-
jectification, or objectification, of one zone against the other within each 
living being, and therefore also between men capable of governing their own 
bodies, on the one hand, and, on the other, those considered incapable of 
doing so, and who thus are cast into the sphere of animals.
This double, intersecting process of subjectification and animalization 
is reconstructed through the contamination of various languages— from 
philosophy to anthropology to linguistics and finally, naturally, to law and 
politics. That calls into question the way in which the apparatus of the hu-
manities performs. These fields themselves can’t be understood as neutral 
disciplines. Rather, they’re sites for the production of a concept of humanity 
that’s tied to specific logics of power and, better still, biopower, along the 
naturally broken line that runs from the great biologist Bichat to contempo-
rary bioethics. Naturally, the construction of discourse runs not only on a 
diverse disciplinary course but also along a quite profound diachronic axis; it 
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imposes a fine- tuning of a so- called methodological character, relative to the 
question of continuity and discontinuity. My effort has been to superimpose 
them— placing them in tension with one another— within a single gaze capa-
ble of taking in each within the other. That implies a conception of history 
of a stratified type that may see within itself the simultaneous presence of 
different times. Without forgetting the “future past” Reinhardt Koselleck 
talks about, this reference turns above all to the genealogy of Nietzsche and 
to the archaeological method of Benjamin when, especially in The Arcades 
Project, he goes researching the originary fragments fixed in the heart of 
modernity.18 Naturally the antinomic connection singled out by Freud be-
tween familiar and foreign lies in this constellation of thought. It’s especially 
important in relation to the circumstance in which the past— especially a 
denied or repressed past— returns in the present with a phantasmic or spec-
tral force that carries us back to Foucault’s connection between bio- and 
thanatopolitics. It’s precisely in this anachronic and anachronistic way the 
archaic dispositif of the person returns to the center of contemporary expe-
rience with power to separate and exclude. Naturally, if we want to pick up 
on its exigency, we have to cast an oblique, sagittal gaze capable of singling 
out, from time to time, the nonhistorical, or hyperhistorical, elements that 
run through and unhinge history.
And so it is that I come to the latest part of my work, which is still be-
ing fully developed: in opposition to the categorical and hierarchical effect 
of the dispositif of the person, I’ve proposed a philosophy of the imper-
sonal, as much as it is possible to draw out the impersonal from the most 
advanced experiences of contemporary reflection (but of art as well). I’ve 
substantially created it along three paths, within three semantic horizons. 
These are themselves anything but internally homogeneous, but all refer 
in some way to that third person which Émile Benveniste already defines 
as the nonpersonal— exactly impersonal— of the person. The first leads off 
with the idea of justice. Already in his Outline of a Phenomenology of Right, 
Alexandre Kojève alludes to justice as the only sphere in which the third— 
understood as an exteriority that cuts off every personal interest— won’t be 
only the judge, but so will anyone else who casts a glance toward a post-
historical condition in which humankind will rediscover its original, animal 
dimension. But it’s Simone Weil who makes the impersonal a sacred point of 
view that, through radical deconstruction, recognizes the separating power 
of the person. It’s further testimony to the intrahistorical connection between 
the ancient and the contemporary, as well as to the violent resurgence of the 
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original in modern times, that Weil singles out, with absolute lucidity, Ro-
man juridical culture at the beginning of that excluding dispositif implicit 
in the personalistic declension of modern law. From this point of view, I 
find a thread of discourse that, starting from Categorie dell’impolitico, runs 
through the intersection of communitas and immunitas and arrives at my 
most recent texts: for her to support the primacy of justice over the law 
means not only to look at the modern political from its impolitical side; it 
also proposes a communial (communiale)— because neither immunitary nor 
immunizing— conception of the relation among men.
The second vector of meaning in the philosophy of the impersonal came 
to me from a series of authors— from Robert Musil on— who had practiced 
a neutral approach to writing, as it delves into that dialogic word which, 
in current speech, ties the first and second person in a rapport of interlo-
cution. In twentieth- century philosophy, Maurice Blanchot cast himself as 
witness to such a lateral passage that decentered the narrative voice, espous-
ing literary work continually in exile from itself. With Blanchot, we’re by 
now far from the mystical result of Weil’s experiment; we’re instead handed 
over to a movement of depersonalization that, before any consideration of 
community, looks at language in its constitutive relationship with silence— 
not only with the end of the identification of the subjects of action with 
themselves but also with the aphony of narrative voice covered over by the 
anonymous murmuring of events. In political interventions of the 1950s and 
1960s, Blanchot practiced within his work collective an anonymous form 
of protest in which all individuals’ voices were inextricably mixed with the 
voices of all others up to the point of losing all proper names. In political 
action, as in writing, what counts is the impersonality of an event shared by 
all but belonging to no one. This happens when “it rains” (piove) or “one 
dies” (si muore).
Above all, Blanchot thinks about the impersonal from the point of view 
of death, in a form that lies in some ways within the Heideggerian horizon. 
Foucault and Deleuze bring the impersonal back to the form of life. The 
reverse of “one dies,” thought from the perspective of whatever transcends 
us in whatever way, is “one lives” (si vive), the central— but also decentered— 
place from which we’d taken off. This is the ultimate and definitive deviation 
in relation from the thought of ontological difference still present in authors, 
like Derrida, who have still thought after Heidegger. We’ve already seen 
what may be the role of life within the conception of Foucault— even in life’s 
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rapport with politics. It’s simultaneously the site of the exercise of sovereign 
power— but also the site of ultimate resistance to it. It’s precisely where we 
may recognize the impersonal dimension as opposed to the juridical form, 
which, at the origin of the modern, Hobbes had tied to the sovereign person 
capable of representing all who transferred their own rights to him in ex-
change for his protection. How clearly, then, can we say to Deleuze that his 
essential service to philosophy may be exactly in the deconstruction of the 
category, or dispositif, of the person in every sphere— psychoanalytic, liter-
ary, political. His call to “become animal” constitutes the most intense way 
to cut the knot that inextricably ties the figure of the person to the practice 
of subordination and exclusion of those who place themselves, or get placed, 
outside its limits. In a theological, philosophical, and juridical tradition that 
has always thrust one part of humanity into the dimension of bestiality, the 
revindication of animal nature as the most intimate nature of every man 
shatters the interdiction that has always governed us. Such a vindication of 
the impersonal in, or of, the person may be the point at which the philoso-
phy of immanence becomes one with the shift from philosophy meditating 
on death to philosophy reflecting on life already under way with Spinoza and 
followed by Nietzsche. But how the impersonal may be able to see itself in a 
new form of biopolitical democracy— or of affirmative biopolitics— is a ques-
tion that concerns not only my future work but all contemporary thought.
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In Commonwealth, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt discuss two different 
forms of understanding antimodern forces. Both of them refer back to Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s analyses in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
For them, while it is obvious that freedom in society is inseparable from En-
lightenment thought, enlightened societies keep within themselves the germ 
of their regression toward despotic barbarism. Horkheimer and Adorno’s ex-
amples are Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin, which causes 
the authors of Commonwealth some moral consternation. According to the 
latter, there is a need to posit two opposite types of antimodern reaction: the 
despotic type, which aims to enslave the multitude, and the reaction of those 
who “do not stand in a specular, negative relation to modernity but rather 
adopt a diagonal stance, not simply opposing all that is modern and rational 
but inventing new rationalities and new forms of liberation.”1
The dialectical assimilation of antimodernity to the dark forces of regres-
sion ends up closing a vicious circle unable to understand “how the positive, 
productive monsters of antimodernity, the monsters of liberation, always 
exceed the domination of modernity and point toward an alternative.”2 The 
posited alternative, of course, is one with the communist or neocommunist 
revolution of the multitude that Hardt and Negri seek or, rather, confidently 
expect. It is simple: the problem of total or absolute democracy is a mere 
matter of letting the forces of total or absolute democracy triumph. Fore-
gone conclusion: it is enough to keep the other ones from triumphing. The 
other ones are those whose antimodern polemical orientation consists of 
liberating the sovereign from his obligation toward his subordinates, as Juan 
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Donoso Cortés or Carl Schmitt would have suggested, not to mention the 
Nazis, the Ku Klux Klan, the proposers of ethnic cleansing, or the American 
neoconservatives dreaming of world domination.3 There are two positive 
tasks, say Negri and Hardt: “The first is to pose a clear distinction between 
reactionary antimodern notions of power that seek to break the relationship 
by freeing the sovereign and liberatory antimodernities that challenge and 
subvert hierarchies by affirming the resistance and expanding the freedom of 
the subordinated. The second task, then, is to recognize how this resistance 
and freedom always exceed the relationship of domination and thus cannot 
be recuperated in any dialectic with modern power. These monsters possess 
the key to release new creative powers that move beyond the opposition 
between modernity and hierarchy.” 4
War or production? Is the revolutionary question today a matter of war, 
antimodern war, reactionary war, or war that seeks the liberation of the 
dominator, as could be the case were the revolution a populist revolution 
led by the hordes of the U.S. tea party or by the Islamic fundamentalists? 
Or is revolution simply the foreseeable result of a development of productive 
forces in the biopolitical economy, at the time of the total subsumption of 
life into capital? The question is not new. To read Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels’s “Communist Manifesto” is already to ask that question, where a lot 
more than a possible response to the conditions of constitution and over-
coming of modernity lies. That the “Communist Manifesto” may itself pre-
suppose a productionist or polemological primary orientation is important 
only to the extent one considers the previous question regarding an exit from 
capitalism important. But— do we know whether capitalism is primarily a 
question of production or a question of war?
In his seminar “Society Must Be Defended,” Michel Foucault says that 
the end of the politico- juridical dispositif of sovereignty theory marks the 
beginning of modernity in the transition toward a historical conception 
that privileges an ontology of war. It is not easy to determine how far Fou-
cault wanted to go— things are rather tentative in those seminars that he 
was not thinking of publishing directly. Foucault analyzes the notion of 
war in modernity against sovereignty theory, and we know that he finds in 
the responses to the political situation of seventeenth- century Britain, not 
just the most remarkable and exhaustive formulation of sovereignty theory 
(in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan), but also the practical beginnings of an 
ontologico- political alternative based on war as the real engine of political 
existence. This ontologico- political development, Foucault thinks, will be-
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come central for the constitution of modernity, that is, of the second moder-
nity, the modernity whose conventional beginning dates back to the second 
half of the eighteenth century. Although Foucault makes no explicit refer-
ence to the “Communist Manifesto,” it is obvious that its initial sentence 
(after the famous exordium about ghosts and Europe), that is, “The history 
of all society up to now is the history of class struggles,” marks the semi-
nar.5 The sentence resounds through it, and it is a sentence that cannot be 
made compatible with sovereignty theory. It is the sentence that would make 
the 1848 Marx- Engels text one of the central texts of political modernity. The 
“Manifesto” has a performative dimension insofar as it does what it says, that 
is, as it participates in the struggle it announces, and in that sense it is within 
the region of experience that Marx’s 1845 eleventh thesis “On Feuerbach” 
opens up: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different 
ways; the point is to change it.”6
All history is the history of class struggle: “Freeman and slave, patrician 
and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in short, oppres-
sor and oppressed stood in continual conflict with one another, conduct-
ing an unbroken, now hidden, now open struggle, a struggle that finished 
each time with a revolutionary transformation of society as a whole, or with 
the common ruin of the contending classes.”7 There has always been war. 
Sometimes the real situation is hidden, and there is an appearance of peace; 
sometimes the situation is open, and what is apparent is war. But open or 
hidden war, not peace, defines the state of things, and that is so not now or 
yesterday but through history. Or at least through history “up to now,” as 
Marx and Engels say.
If war is, in modernity, the name of being, then politics is effectively a 
continuation of war, in the Foucauldian phrase that inverts von Clausewitz, 
and the end of politics is either to win the war or to keep on winning it, 
that is, to hold on to the benefits of victory. That means above all to keep 
the situation of domination of the enemy open as a situation of domination. 
When one says, “the history of all hitherto existing society up to now is 
the history of class struggles” from a militant position such as that of the 
“Manifesto,” one would seem to seek the place of victory, to occupy the po-
sition of the victor. But Marx and Engels never say that the proletariat must 
permanently assume a position as the oppressing class— that the proletariat 
must aim to keep a situation of endless domination open. “Let us win the 
war” means “let us make the enemy lose it.” To have the enemy lose means 
that the enemy will be made to pay the consequences of having lost. Or not? 
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Can Marx and Engels be saying that the proletariat as the universal class, as 
the class whose historical function is to rush and accomplish the end of class 
division, must win the last of the wars, that is, the war whose real result will 
be the very end of war, and the end of the paradigm of war? “Up to now” 
we have only had war, my friends, but if we win this war, then we will be in 
a position to promise that there will be no further wars. My friends, there 
will be no enemies anymore. Or at least there will be no internal enemies, 
until the time when we take victory in the war to its properly universal and 
interplanetary stage.
But the promise of the end of war by the winner of the war is always ev-
erywhere the announcement of the eternity of victory, hence inevitably the 
announcement of the eternity of war. The obligation— a war obligation, or 
better, an obligation of defeat, the price of defeat— to consider the eternal 
enemy an eternal friend is a heavy one. Perhaps there is no worse slavery: it 
is the inquisitorial obligation par excellence. What is at stake here? Can we 
rescue real meaning from this apparent contradiction? In Foucault’s terms, 
to insist that the winner must be a winner forever, must become the uncon-
ditional sovereign and lord of all discourse, would seem to be a relapse into 
sovereignty theory. But Negri and Hardt call that a false problem, to the very 
extent that biopolitical economy will win, not through war, rather through 
the unconditional liberation of life from the chains of an inoperative and in-
efficient capitalism, from the ruins of capital. Class struggle will always have 
been a mirage, or rather: if there was struggle, it ended when one of the parts 
defeated itself, so now we only have to welcome the orphaned and exhausted 
soldiers that are surrendering. The resolution of war will not have been bel-
lic. Could it be understood as an exception to war? Strange tropology.
Foucault says that war is, in modernity, that is, for instance, for Marxism, 
the very name of being, that war is ontological ground, and that politics is only 
the continuation of war. But if war is ontological ground, then politics cannot 
stop war, since politics could not transcend its own ontological conditions. Is 
the “Communist Manifesto,” as Foucault would seem to indicate, a polemol-
ogy? Is there an identification of war and being in Marxist philosophy? Is there 
one in the Hegelian philosophy from which Marxism derives? If the “Com-
munist Manifesto” posited the identification of war and being, then it would 
have to account for its own claim that communism is an exception to war:
Political power in its true sense is the organised power of one class for 
oppressing another. If the proletariat necessarily unites as a class in its 
cujusdam nigri & scabiosi brasiliani 129
struggle against the bourgeoisie, makes itself into a ruling class through 
revolution, and as a ruling class forcibly transforms the old relations of 
production, then it will transform, along with these relations of produc-
tion, the underlying conditions for class conflict and for classes in general, 
hence its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society 
with its classes and class conflicts there will be an association in which the 
free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.8
“A world to win” implies “the end of class conflict,” and that is the direct con-
sequence of proletariat domination, it is claimed.9 It would be a domination 
that looks for its self- annihilation as such, for the termination of its char-
acter as domination. To bring the class conflict to an end is to accomplish 
the eternity of the ontological exception. If all social history is the history 
of class struggle, then the history that initiates the triumph of the proletar-
iat revolution is the history of an exception— the ontological exception of 
communist peace. But all exception is exceptional and cannot affect the rule 
it interrupts. Is it possible that communism or, now, neocommunism may 
confirm, rather than belie, as an exception to it, the thesis of the ontological 
priority of war?
One could say that this kind of reasoning was rejected by Marx avant la 
lettre a few years before writing the “Manifesto,” that is, in 1845, at the time 
of his study of Feuerbach, when he was trying to establish his own notion of 
materialism against the Hegelian left. I will quote three of the other theses 
on Feuerbach. In the second thesis we read, “The question whether human 
thinking attains objective truth is not a question of theory but a practical 
question. It is in practice that man must prove the truth, the actuality and 
power, the subjective aspect and validity of his thinking. Argument about 
the actuality or non- actuality of thinking, where thinking is taken in iso-
lation from practice, is a purely scholastic question.” In the eighth thesis: 
“All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory in the 
direction of mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in 
the comprehension of this practice.” And in the tenth: “The standpoint of 
the old materialism is bourgeois society; the standpoint of the new is human 
society or social humanity.”10
They are fighting words, and they break with the philosophical tradi-
tion, not just with its Hegelian avatar. The young Marx wants to change 
the world, because only practice is a measure of truth. There is nothing 
beyond practice; there is no truth but practical truth when one abandons the 
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bourgeois position and embraces the perspective of general human society 
or social humanity, which is, as the sixth thesis reminds us, the perspective 
of the essence of man himself, not dependent upon “isolated individuals” 
but rather upon “the ensemble of social relations.”11 The abandonment of 
the bourgeois position and the adoption of a new materialism, a material-
ism not of matter but of practice, is the inversion of Hegelian philosophy, 
the affirmation of a new metaphysical or postmetaphysical perspective, in 
philosophy and against philosophy. It may also be the site from where it 
becomes possible to say “all history up to now . . .” In other words, there is a 
before and an after. “Up to now” does not mean always up to now; that is, it 
is not up to now for us. Rather, Marx and Engels want to indicate the time 
of writing, which is the now of the political performativity of the “Mani-
festo.” The “Manifesto,” upon being published, had to open a “from now 
on” where history would no longer be measured by theoretical mysticisms. 
The hour of practice was upon us.
The contradiction referred to above— how is it possible to affirm the on-
tological priority of war, the condition of reality of war, and at the same 
time affirm the suspension of war in the time to come, as if the time to 
come could only be understood through the figure of the exception, of in-
terruption, of an absolute novum?— could therefore be kept apart from the 
theses on the new practical materialism. If only practice is a condition of 
truth, then there is no ontological priority of war: there is only the historical 
knowledge that there has always been war up to now, and the imaginary 
projection of a new structure of the human, where the point of view of 
totality would impose a permanent end of the conflict. No more war, once 
the proletariat triumphs as the universal class; or the biopolitical multitude; 
or Alain Badiou’s philosophical Idea, since for Badiou “communism is the 
only Idea worthy of a philosopher.”12
The “Manifesto” includes a formulation that would be almost literally 
repeated in the preface to “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Econ-
omy,” which gives it somehow a special status. The “Manifesto” says, “At 
a certain level of development of these means of production and trade, the 
relations in which feudal society produced and exchanged, the feudal organi-
zation of agriculture and small- scale manufacture, in a word feudal property 
relations, no longer corresponded to the forces of production already devel-
oped. They impeded production instead of advancing it. They became just 
so many fetters. They had to be sprung open, and they were sprung open”; 
and the “Contribution,” “At a certain level of their development the material 
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productive forces of society come into contradiction with the already exist-
ing relations of production, or in what is merely a legal expression for this, 
with the property relations within which they had previously functioned. 
From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into 
their fetters. Then an epoch of social revolution commences.”13
No doubt these paragraphs are at the basis of contemporary neocommu-
nist theorizations, from Negri and Hardt to Slavoj Žižek and Badiou.14 They 
initiate a possible alternative to the postulation of the ontological priority 
of war. They do not say “there is war, and within it there is production” but 
rather “there is production, and therefore there is war.” War is a product of 
the development of productive forces at a point when the old relations of 
production have become fetters. There is war not because there can be war 
but because there must be war— because practice imposes a movement, and 
that movement imposes the revolutionary transformation of society and per-
manent change in the class structure. Marx repeatedly affirms the priority 
of production (see the Grundrisse, and of course Capital), but we have not 
yet properly understood the relation between production and war. Is class 
struggle a mere historical derivation from production and the relations of 
production? Or is it the case, as Foucault would seem to propose, that pro-
duction is already the image and manifestation of war?
The preface to “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” 
continues with another famous passage:
Humanity only sets itself such problems as it can solve, for on careful con-
sideration one always finds that the problems themselves only arise where 
the material conditions of their solution are known to be on hand or at 
least in the process of development. In broad outline Asiatic, ancient, 
feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated 
as progressive epochs in the economic development of society. Bourgeois 
relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process 
of production, antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism, 
rather of an antagonism growing out of the conditions of life in society 
for individuals, but at the same time the productive forces developing 
in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the 
resolution of this antagonism. With that social formation the pre- history 
of human society draws to a close.15
Social antagonism, says Marx in 1859 but in a way that I would consider 
consistent with his position in 1848, belongs to the prehistory of that so-
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cial humanity that constitutes the very essence of man according to “On 
Feuerbach.” But if war belongs to prehistory, then there is no ontological 
priority of war. The social antagonism that pervades the known history of 
the modes of production is not foundational. It rather belongs to the avatars 
of production itself, and it constitutes in the last instance something like a 
ruse of practical reason. From the perspective of the inversion of Hegelian 
philosophy, of the new materialism, of the new practice, it is possible to 
affirm that the dictatorship of the proletariat, insofar as it would make it 
impossible that “labor can . . . be turned into capital, money, rent, in short, 
into a monopolizable power in society, i.e. from the moment that personal 
property can no longer be turned into bourgeois property,” would accom-
plish the suppression of “power to subjugate the labour of others.”16 The 
history of production, in other words, will impose a political development 
whose final result will be the end of politics as war. If communism begins 
the history of social humanity or human society properly so called, that is 
so precisely to the extent that communism operates a break with society up 
to now in its character as class conflict, war. Communism is an exception to 
war, but not an exception that maintains the rule of war; rather an exception 
that liquidates its character as grounding and opens another history: “his-
tory.” For communism, war is no longer part of history, but production is. 
And it is also production that has always already organized the war economy 
in communist prehistory.
What then about Foucault’s thesis regarding the modern substitution 
of an ontology of war for the politico- juridical dispositif of sovereignty? Is 
Foucault simply wrong? Or does it remain possible to read Hegelian- Marxist 
dialectics in the light of an ontology of war after all? We can invoke a passage 
from a very late seminar (1973) taught by Martin Heidegger in Zähringen. 
Heidegger tells a few students that Marxian thought is part and parcel of the 
technological Ge- Stell precisely because it never leaves the horizon of produc-
tion, or because it accepts production as the very horizon of the human. The 
transcribed notes say,
Heidegger opens the volume of Marx’s Early Writings and reads the fol-
lowing sentence, taken from the “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right”: “To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. 
But for man man is the root himself.” Marxism as a whole rests upon 
this thesis, Heidegger explains. Indeed, Marxism thinks on the basis of 
production: social production of society (society produces itself ) and 
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the self- production of the human being as a social being. Thinking in 
this manner, Marxism is indeed the thought of today, where the self- 
production of man and society plainly prevails.17
Heidegger contra Foucault perhaps, regarding Marx and Marxism.
Foucault says: war. And Heidegger says: production. The self- production 
of the multitude is of course the only prevailing idea in the Negri- Hardt 
trilogy— a trilogy set against Heidegger, who obsessively appears as the real 
theoretical enemy or as the common denominator of all real theoretical ene-
mies. This is perhaps so. In any case, Negri and Hardt, from the immanent 
productionism and self- productionism of the biopolitical forces of real and 
total subsumption, never stop making war, not so much on the empire, but 
certainly on Heidegger and the Heideggerian left. From the latter perspec-
tive, can self- productionism exist? Is production not essentially heteropro-
duction? This is the question I would like to rehearse by focusing on Jacques 
Rancière’s meditation on the work of Jacques Derrida. It is a question about 
the ground of political practice today. The two main answers we seem to 
have are: yes, politics is the celebration and administration of the forces of 
production, and everything depends on understanding production in the 
right way and anticipating its future; or, politics is precisely always already 
an interruption of production, a refusal to recognize the priority of produc-
tion, and a restitution of the priority of conflict. It would seem that there is 
a choice to be made, although the choice may well be to undo the alternative.
The Demotic Principle
Rancière understands very well that the problem of total or absolute democ-
racy is far from being a matter of allowing the forces of total or absolute 
democracy to triumph. For him politics is always a polemical field, without 
stability, where every accomplishment can be reversed and every defeat is 
temporal. Politics is always at the mercy of the police, although the police 
can indeed suffer political defeat.
In his essay “Should Democracy Come? Ethics and Politics in Derrida,” 
Rancière points out that the very concept of democracy lives in radical insta-
bility, not because those who govern are scoundrels, although that too, but 
rather because there is a difference inherent to democracy itself that makes 
it constitutively incapable of self- accomplishment as a form of government. 
So, insofar as democracy must be understood as “an excess with respect 
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to any form of government,” the postulation of democracy as absolute, as 
imperium absolutum in the Spinozian formulation, would make no sense.18 
But such nonsense of democracy should not take us toward its abandonment 
in the name of any kind of ethical purity. The ethicization of democracy is 
Rancière’s old warhorse, and the source of almost every one of his theoretical 
critiques. For Rancière democracy, as a political term, must come under a 
strictly political rationality, even if such a rationality is far from being simple. 
Giving up democratic politicality in the name of ethical reason, of any ethi-
cal reason, is not just philosophically objectionable but, more importantly, 
it is politically objectionable. And such a problem is what seems to be at 
stake, for Rancière himself, in his confrontation with the thought of Jacques 
Derrida. The fundamental question Rancière asks is whether deconstruction 
can define a political thought, understood as “a thinking of the specificity 
of politics.”19
For Rancière, the very possibility of democracy implies giving up any 
principle of legitimation, that is, any form of arche. The citizen in an ostensi-
bly democratic regime, to the extent that she can indifferently participate in 
governing or in being governed, cancels beforehand any governmental arche. 
Demos is fundamentally and primarily the a- principial principle of indifferen-
tiation— an an- archic principle that dis- joints, that is, joins disjunctively, the 
notions of power and demos.20 There is no political community without such 
a disjunction: there can be politics only if there is indifferentiation in the 
principle of power, which means that the only qualification to exercise power 
is not to have any qualification. And it goes without saying then that only 
democratic politics is politics as opposed to principial domination. The part 
of those who have no part, to use the famous formulation of Disagreements, 
is not the subaltern remainder, it is not the oppressed or the victim, and it is 
not, primarily, any identitarian position whatsoever, but it is rather the very 
indifferentiation regarding any principle of calculation or count. The prob-
lem is that, in virtue of its indifferentiation regarding calculation, the part 
of no part always tends to be left outside the count, to be discounted. The 
discounting agent is of course what Rancière calls the police. Against the 
police, in every case, there is the indifferentiating affirmation, the negation 
of police negation— and such an affirmation in double negation is politics 
itself in its constituent character. It is always a source of dissensus, and it 
always therefore breaks apart and rends asunder the calculus of the police. 
Hence its always productively aesthetic character: it opens new sensoriums 
and it establishes new regimes of the visible.
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For Rancière, however, there would be nothing in Derrida that might 
allow us to suppose he thinks of politics as power of the demos, as the power 
of the an- archic principle of indifferentiation. Rancière says, “[Derrida’s] de-
mocracy is a democracy without demos. What is absent in his perspective on 
politics is the idea of the political subject, of political capacity.”21 Rancière 
thinks that, if democracy in Derrida is a democracy minus the demos, it is 
because Derrida refuses or is incapable of thematizing the idea of a subject of 
the political. That there is no full subject of the political means that no one 
can, according to Rancière on Derrida, take the demotic role upon herself 
and say, “I speak and act as if I, qualified by my unqualifications, were the 
very name of the people, the very name of the constitutive principle of demo-
cratic action.” This hinders the process of counterhegemonic convergence.
There is no subject of politics in Derrida, Rancière says, because there is 
a fundamental ethicization of the political in their work according to which 
the sovereign is always the other, the host that, upon unconditionally impos-
ing the law of otherness, excludes the demand of reciprocity from the realm 
of the possible, the demand of substitutability, and thus destroys the per-
spective of indifferentiation that is essential to a democratic politics. Derrida 
would substitute aporia for dissensus, where “aporia means that there can 
be no possibility of agreement in the practice of disagreement . . . that there 
can be no substitution of the whole by the part, that no subject can perform 
the equivalency between sameness and otherness.”22 Finally, for Rancière, 
it is not just that Derrida has no concept of the specificity of the political: 
it is rather that he is guilty of evacuating the very possibility of a political 
practice in democracy. Derrida may very well sustain the notion of a radical 
priority of war over production in politics, as Rancière himself does. But, for 
Rancière, Derrida would have made it impossible to win any political war 
on the side of democracy: the forces of democracy mire themselves, or are 
mired by deconstruction, in aporia, while the work of the police continues 
unperturbed.
Such is the heart of Rancière’s argument against Derrida. From there 
he extracts consequences that I believe are contaminated by a basic misun-
derstanding regarding deconstruction— and one from which Derrida tried 
to take some distance every time he spoke about the thought of Emman-
uel Levinas.23 But the ghost of Levinas persistently haunts Derrida’s work 
for Rancière, for Badiou, for Žižek, and for all contemporary neo- or post- 
Althusserianism. It does not allow Derrida’s work to speak in its own name. 
It is peculiar that for a certain segment of the contemporary theoretical left, 
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which accuses Derrida of opposing demotic or communist substitutability, 
Levinas and Derrida are perfectly substitutable. But there is a certain in-
tention in this misunderstanding. Before going into it I will attempt to tell 
another story that will prepare a bridge between the two main parts of this 
essay. Spinoza’s dream, as we shall see, tells a story of production and war 
that might mediate a thought of political democracy beyond Rancière’s cri-
tique of Derrida, through the presentation of heteroproduction as the basis 
of political practice.
The Black and Scabby Brazilian
In a letter dated July 20, 1664, Baruch Spinoza replies to his friend Peter 
Balling— a man traumatized by the recent death of his young son. Spinoza 
lives in Rhynsburg at the time, and Balling is one of his contacts with the 
quasi- communist community of mutual friends in Amsterdam. Balling has 
apparently told Spinoza in some previous letter or conversation that he heard 
or thought he heard strange lamentations and wailing before the death of 
his son, coming from nowhere visible, and that they seemed to portend the 
death of his son, which occurred shortly thereafter. Spinoza tries to offer 
some consolation, but he does it in an awkward and apparently illogical 
manner. Spinoza says that it is perfectly possible that some dreams caused 
by the imagination can be portents of some proximate event, particularly 
if there is some previous intimate relation between the two subjects of the 
dream, in this case father and son. They were of course close, since “the soul 
of the father must . . . participate in the ideal essence of his son, and in its 
affections and in what it follows therefrom.”24 Spinoza also tells Balling, and 
this is what might be a little grating vis- à- vis the rest, that he himself had 
a disturbing dream where a “black and scabby Brazilian whom I had never 
seen before” showed up. Spinoza says that such a dream might have had 
purely physical causes, but that it represented just a kind of unconsequential 
delirium, with no foretelling power: “Your case was an omen while mine 
was not.” Spinoza’s was merely caused by his indisposition: “We find by 
experience that . . . those whose blood is thick imagine nothing but quar-
rels, troubles, murders and things of that sort.”25 But there is no prediction 
there— only, we understand Spinoza to say, although he does not say it, more 
of the same; I am that way, always dealing with those things.
Spinoza does not interpret his own dream; he merely tells of it. He gives 
it to his friend, to my mind carried away by the generous desire to com-
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fort, to compensate with his own acknowledgment of private trauma for his 
friend’s trauma. In 1957 Lewis Feuer published an interesting essay where he 
attempted to psychoanalyze Spinoza’s dream. For Feuer, I summarize, the 
“black and scabby Brazilian” was no other than Henrique Diaz, a slave of 
the Dutch in Pernambuco who successfully led an insurrection of the Por-
tuguese and Brazilian population of the colony that ended in the departure 
of the Dutch in 1654. One of those forced to leave Pernambuco was Rabbi 
Isaac de Fonseca Aboab, who would soon become rabbi in the Amsterdam 
synagogue and who, as such, would have direct responsibility for the process 
and then the decree of excommunication against the young Spinoza issued 
on July 25, 1656. For Feuer we should not fool ourselves: in spite of Spi-
noza’s lifelong dissimulation, the event of excommunication was traumatic 
and provoked a long- lasting political passion having to do with hatred and 
resentment, perhaps involuntary but nevertheless no less real. One of the 
examples Feuer quotes: Johannes Colerus, Spinoza’s early biographer, re-
counts how Spinoza took pleasure in drawing portraits, and among them, 
insistently, the portrait of the anti- Spanish Neapolitan revolutionary leader 
Massaniello. But Colerus adds that, in the drawing, Massaniello’s face was 
really Spinoza’s. Spinoza fantasized through his portraits about becoming 
the leader of a popular insurrection, about being the courageous avenger.
In my opinion Feuer destroys his own fascinating story when he finally 
interprets the presence of the black and scabby Brazilian in the following 
manner: “The figure of the Negro terrorist, the spectre which Rabbi Aboab 
had described to the Amsterdam Jews, came to menace Spinoza in his dream. 
He was the symbol of all the hostile forces that await a Jew in the external 
world, all the forces of hatred, and Spinoza, excommunicate, would have 
to deal with them alone. The Negro Terrorist was the embodiment of all 
the curses of the world’s powers which Rabbi Aboab had summoned up 
against him.”26 In my opinion— there is some personal experience here as 
well— if Henrique Diaz was truly the historical figure conjured up by Spi-
noza’s oneiric delirium, it was not because Diaz embodied the evils of the 
world. Rather, Diaz came up because he could have been the exterminator 
of Aboab, the excommunicating and sovereign rabbi— sovereign because 
excommunicating— that harmed Spinoza’s life. That black and scabby fellow, 
a Brazilian, came through as an exterminating angel, alas only potential, an 
explosion of desire, not the devil that frightens.
Hence Spinoza’s letter, in its short phenomenology of trauma, tells a story 
of production and war. His friend Balling’s trauma was a trauma of produc-
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tion, compensated or symptomatized by the productive effort of an imagi-
nation that was captured by the love of a father for his son, as a father always 
already involved in the essence of his son, in helping him continue on his 
conatus essendi, all too prematurely interrupted. But Spinoza’s own trauma 
is an improductive trauma, a trauma involving “quarrels, troubles, murder,” 
which is the retrospective expression of a proleptic desire for revenge and 
extermination that must have a lot to do with the death of the sovereign, 
with the destruction of the figure of the sovereign, thus with the separation 
of the sovereign from the subordinate. Both are plausible traumas; both are 
figures of the human. The political problem has to do with the arbitrary, 
perhaps always already hypocritical denial of the massive facticity of the sec-
ond. If Spinoza’s thought and personality are fully oriented toward gaining 
the right to joy, it is because they fight a previous melancholy injury, not a 
natural one, but rather one caused by an act of war between men. From this 
perspective, Spinoza’s philosophy is not self- production, but fundamentally 
heteroproduction. Not even the subject of the conatus self- constitutes— 
perseverance is always compensatory and retrospective.
This is why Negri and Hardt are much mistaken when, in the same pages 
of Commonwealth quoted earlier, they bring up Spinoza’s Brazilian as a mon-
ster of modern racism, a Caliban that can in his representational inversion 
be offered as the emblem of the joyful body of a liberated humanity— fully 
nondialectical, fully productive. But if Spinoza’s Brazilian is a true mon-
ster of imagination, his liberating benevolence is at the service of Spinoza’s 
posttraumatic hatred, and in no way can it be read in the pious key that 
Negri and Hardt systematically privilege throughout their book. Spinoza’s 
Brazilian is not a Caliban whose ugliness must be tolerated in virtue of the 
many benefits he procures for his master, and still less the figure of a self- 
liberating exodus: it is simply the embodiment of the desired promise of a 
will to take revenge, hence the heteroproductive dimension of political prac-
tice as a struggle for freedom. But revenge will bring no resolution: nothing 
political will have been gained at the end of it.
Radical Atheism
In the last instance that is what is at stake, in my opinion, in the post- 
Althusserian or neocommunist conspiracy against Derrida. Derrida destroys 
the pious key for a reading of history, not from the side of ethics; rather from 
a radical atheism, in Martin Hägglund’s expression, that will allow for no 
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resolution. But that does not amount to a negation of politics. It is rather the 
denial of the negation of politics that occurs through the pretension that, 
once the subject of democracy— whether demotic or despotic, democratic 
or communist, subaltern or hegemonic— speaks or performs her Idea, her 
word is good once and for all and must be unconditionally respected, as if 
the new regime of the visible, the new aesthetic sensorium were written in 
stone as a net gain and an uncontrovertible improvement for all future. It 
is not like that. One could say that it never is, but then one can’t be certain. 
The demotic subject irrupts, and she can be good or not, for a time or for no 
time, but not eternally. Keeping that knowledge in permanent reserve is the 
atheist and undecidable force (atheist because undecidable, against all false 
fidelities and hypocritical infinities) that destabilizes the very possibility of 
a permanent state of democratic redemption and forces democracy to sub-
sist and to insist always at the mercy of its heteroaffection. If the object of 
demotic irruption is always unstable, even suspect, certainly unreliable for 
Derrida, politics is therefore not foreclosed: that is where politics effectively 
begins, pace Rancière, for whom self- production is still the primary enabler 
of class war.
They misunderstand the meaning of unconditional hospitality, and they 
misunderstand the notion that the other or otherness must arrive and can-
not not arrive. If there is unconditional hospitality it is because it cannot be 
helped, given our mortal opening to time and the world, which impose their 
own laws. The otherness of the other is not received through unconditional 
hospitality with open arms; rather it is received with fear and trembling, 
with doubt and reticence, if also with curiosity and anticipation. The oth-
erness of the other very much includes the possibility that the other may be 
a scoundrel— but we can’t close ourselves off beforehand to that danger and 
that risk any more than we can afford to ignore it. Indeed, that the other 
is a scoundrel is the very condition of political action as well as of political 
counteraction.
That hospitality is unconditional reflects that double difficulty, which is 
also an awareness of unpredictability, hence a call to political prudence. We 
cannot but be unconditionally open to the word or the presence of the other, 
because it is a condition of life even though it is also a condition of death. 
In other words, there is no truth of the political, there is nothing assured 
beforehand, there is only a decision in every case, and that decision is al-
ways necessarily a partially passive decision.27 Its conditions of possibility— 
temporality, mortal desire, affect— are of course also conditions of impos-
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sibility, because if the decision seeks justice, the guarantees that justice can 
happen are merely aleatory, always uncertain, and are not given beforehand, 
or even after the fact, since posteriority is endless. Nobody ever knows any-
thing (except perhaps for the neocommunists). But, on the other hand, the 
decision may seek justice, even though it can be mistaken in and through its 
very will to justice. Some decisions in the name of uncertain justice open up 
the space of politics. Their ground is an excess regarding any form of gov-
ernment, as Rancière suggests, and that excess, also for Derrida, is, not the 
name, rather the effective confirmation that there is a power of anyone, an 
option for an- archic irruption, groundless and without guarantees, which is 
the very heart of democracy.
That is why democracy is always to come: because it can never be cap-
tured into presence. The subject, or whatever may represent it, is not respon-
sible out of itself, does not self- produce, which of course does not exempt 
it from responsibility, and the other, or otherness, does not come from any 
responsible position (it is not itself exempted from responsibility, but saying 
so is ethics not politics). Any visitation can always turn into an undesirable 
one: any visit can be a bad visit— hence Spinoza not knowing what to do 
with his Brazilian exterminating angel and preferring to distract him away 
from his delirium. And this is also why it is absurd to posit a political hori-
zon beyond conflict if not war, as if the total subsumption of life into pro-
duction, that is, the identification of life and productive capacity, could itself 
liberate us from the unconditional: this is an anthropotechnic dream. In self- 
production, the human produces the finally human like a carpenter produces 
a table, liberating it from its unproductive imperfections. But that idea is 
pure productionism— in the beginning was production, says Marx, and that 
perhaps authorizes us to think that production is also at the end. Positing 
that production, radicalized into a self- constituting self- production, with-
out heteronomic residue, saves and liberates is messianic theology, not de-
mocracy. Granted, it is not Rancière who does that: for him production is 
simply another life context, and it opens, here and there, and given certain 
conditions, a new sensorial regime, and it widens the quality of the visible.
Why, then, does Rancière accuse Derrida of proposing a messianic the-
ology? He ends his essay with a rhetorical question: “Would it thus not be 
the case that Derrida, in order to oppose an alleged dependency of politics 
on theology, has to make it dependent on another theology?”28 The analysis 
that precedes the question has tried to show that, for Derrida, democracy 
“cannot be presented, even in the dissensual figure of the demos,” because the 
cujusdam nigri & scabiosi brasiliani 141
supplement to democracy that Derrida calls for condemns it to a heteronomy 
without relief or respite.29 Justice in Derrida would be purely heteronomous. 
As in Levinas. It is here that Rancière establishes a differentiation between 
a first “ethical turn” that would be proper to Levinas and the later Jean- 
François Lyotard, whose essential gesture would be, according to Rancière, 
to subordinate democracy to divinity and thus destroy it, and a “second turn 
in the conceptualization of otherness,” the properly Derridean one, derived 
from a Levinasian tropology but able to resend the thought of God to a het-
erogeneous whatever, and to go from the otherness of God to the otherness 
of whatever other.30
Rancière’s question about Derrida’s theology must be answered nega-
tively. No, Derrida does not make politics dependent on theology any more 
than he makes politics dependent on any law of mortal otherness. The fun-
damental problem of deconstruction is the impossibility of setting stable 
horizons for the grounding of life, beyond all ethics and beyond all politics. 
But deconstruction does not create such a problem: it only sees that it exists, 
and thinks from it. Politics is generated, in its constitutive specificity, in 
the conflict between a hospitality of invitation and a hospitality of visita-
tion, which Derrida discusses in several texts.31 The visitor, the friend or the 
stranger, does not impose his law, only his presence, but one never knows 
where trouble will appear. The guest, stranger or friend, simply enters. With-
out an invitation or a visit nothing would ever happen— there would be no 
contact among human monads. Because there is contact there is conflict and 
there is the inevitability of conflict. Unconditional hospitality is what Häg-
glund calls the “nonethical opening of ethics,” and I would like to call the 
indifferentiated condition of political conflict, that is, of politics, of demo-
cratic politics, not only demotic irruption, as in Rancière, but rather also 
the conflictive and conflicting reception of demotic irruption.32 There is no 
prescriptive normativity to know how to deal with bad visits, or with good 
ones. For Hägglund, “the law of unconditional hospitality does not provide 
a rule or a norm for how one should act in relation to the other, but requires 
one to make precarious decisions from time to time.”33
No doubt Rancière’s conception of the political is not limited to under-
standing demotic irruption. The demotic subject that wants to be counted 
can also be understood as a good or a bad visit, in the same way that the po-
lice may always come into the home, for good and for evil. When suddenly 
the uncounted one counts, a new guest, or when one declares, since it is the 
time, that one will come to visit, it is then that we must decide, and when 
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others decide for us without permission, like Spinoza did with his uncanny 
guest, cujusdam nigri atque brasiliani, to erase him or us from the visible or 
to demand or offer shelter in negotiation. That is the class struggle, even 
today, and the mortal opening of politics. We can understand it ethically or 
religiously if we so choose; we can call it biopolitics or communism; we can 
relate in any of those manners with the passive need for action, but it is not 
necessary. The decision to do it is itself an ethical or merely opportunistic 
decision, and even so it carries certain risks, but not to do it carries risks as 
well. Nothing is necessary except for the facticity of a situation that equalizes 
every one and by so doing makes democracy precarious but inevitable. At 
the end Rancière is not as distant from Derrida as he would ostensibly want 
to be.
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Writing “on June 15, 1975”— “an election day,” he observes— Pier Paolo Pa-
solini composed a terse text of three or four pages, “Repudiation [Abiura],” 
to preface an edition of the film scripts of his Trilogy of Life. Trilogy of Life is 
what Pasolini called his films Decameron (1971), Canterbury Tales (1972), and 
Arabian Nights (1974), and the films are discussed, by others and most of all 
by Pasolini himself, as sensuous presentations of the vitality of the poor.1 In 
“Repudiation” Pasolini claims to abjure his erstwhile goals of celebrating the 
innocence of the body and the political potential of  “the youths and boys of 
the Roman subproletariat.”2 Further, he asserts that the potential must never 
have existed as he imagined it (xviii), or else the youth would never have 
been able to participate so fully, as he thinks they do, in the degraded condi-
tion of Italian society: “If those who were then thus and so, have been able 
to become now thus and so, it means that they were potentially such already 
then; therefore, also their way of being then is devalued by the present. . . . 
The collapse of the present implies the collapse of the past” (xviii – xix). In 
light of the lives of the youth, Pasolini decides that he can no longer believe 
in the political and moral benefits of what was called in the 1970s “sexual 
liberalization” (xix). Although Pasolini’s motives and concepts are necessar-
ily unclear in a text so short, what he is negating in existential terms, as we’ll 
see, includes both parliamentary politics (election day) and the early 1970s 
social movements that cast themselves as alternatives to it. And he does not 
fail to ask the obvious next question: “Where will the repudiation of the 
Trilogy lead me?”
Pasolini negates his personal and public projects simultaneously, assum-
ing their psychological inextricability.3 He ceases to believe in people he 
knows— the “beloved faces of yesterday” (xx), “private sexual lives” (xviii)— 
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and also in the potential of a class, a belief on which his work and activities 
had thoroughly depended. What interests me initially in Pasolini’s account 
is its separation of particularities that count as lost, and which he must bury 
and mourn, from a political life that he considers nonexistent and not pos-
sibly existent, and which he refuses to treat with a similar respect. It would 
confer too much tangibility on political Italy to treat it as extinct. Yet the 
period in which Pasolini lives extinguishes many forms of social being, and 
a tenuousness about one’s very sense of existence is a common problem. The 
difference between these things must somehow be registered, his essay sug-
gests. In what follows, I would like to ask what function Pasolini’s insistence 
on existential terms— what he and others were, their way of being or not— 
may have, and how it is related to what he calls “acceptance,” or confronting 
how one would continue without hoping for a real political Italy.
One feature of Pasolini’s perspective in “Abiura” is the scale of it: the 
condition he describes is without horizon, an agoraphobic leveling of the 
present and past that leaves him without reference points for a future. He 
grapples with the nonexistence of a world. We might recall Hannah Arendt’s 
conviction that the “world” is an artifact of work that is not an inevitable 
condition or outcome of human life, or Giorgio Agamben’s thought of a 
state of exception that “coincides with reality itself.” 4 Without endorsing 
Agamben’s entire theorization of exception, we can admire his resonant evo-
cation of the phenomenology of the totality he imagines, in which walking 
down the street or any everyday action may either transgress or carry out 
the messianic law that has superseded ordinary law: “The law, inasmuch 
as it simply coincides with reality, is absolutely unobservable.”5 Agamben’s 
description is useful for thinking about a range of ways of life in which the 
apparent absence of the political appears as a characteristic of  “reality itself.”
Pasolini answers his own question, “Where will the repudiation of the 
Trilogy lead me?,” in this way: “I am adapting myself to the degradation and 
I am accepting the unacceptable. I am maneuvering to rearrange my life 
[Dunque io mi sto adattando alla degradazione e sto accettando l’ inaccet-
tabile. Manovro per risistemare la mia vita]” (xx). This answer is even more 
enigmatic than the question. What counts as “accepting the unacceptable,” 
and what would be the point of it? How should we understand a mental 
state whose obscurity, even impossibility, is indicated by the linguistic con-
tradiction with which Pasolini names it? The strangeness of the text’s “accep-
tance” signals the profound unfamiliarity of its psychic territory. For all that 
we condescend to disavowal and melancholy as aberrant states of mind— 
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assuming that they are failures to recognize and accept recognizable and 
acceptable conditions— it is their absence here that startles the reader. Five 
minutes of acceptance from Pasolini and we are stopped in our tracks; we 
no longer know what it means. Further, acceptance by Pasolini in particular 
carries special weight, since he had no general disposition to value positivity. 
Pasolini once wrote the sentence, “I cannot accept anything of the world in 
which I live”; he was so vocal in his protests that he was harassed with petty 
prosecutions (mostly for obscenity) all of his life, “roughly 365” times.6 We 
might guess, then, that his standard for acceptability would be fairly high. 
“Repudiation” doesn’t explain what makes the unacceptable acceptable; 
rather, it gives clues, mostly by specifying what is unacceptable. In reading 
Pasolini, then, I consider the question “What is the value of accepting the 
unacceptable?” as a philosophical question, as well as its pertinence to his 
object, the nonexistence of Italian politics (and perhaps even the historical 
formation of European politics per se).
Although others have addressed similar issues in Pasolini’s generation 
and in our own, Pasolini’s attempt is distinct in its suggestion that even 
the potential for the political does not and has never existed: to say this is 
to suggest that the conditions for modern political life have been wholly 
misconstrued. By following Pasolini’s associations, I hope to indicate some 
ways in which that may be the case. First, however, I’d like to look closely 
at Pasolini’s text for suggestions about what acceptance of the unacceptable 
is for him in 1975.
Repudiation
“Repudiation” and an article often known as “The Disappearance of the 
Fireflies,” which appeared in February 1975, address the periodization of 
modernity as a matter of finality that can be verified as a coroner might 
verify a death. Both essays use vitalist and anthropological figures, and Pa-
solini’s thought is more or less ethnically essentialist and troubling in that 
regard. But the vitalist figures do the work of allowing one to wrap one’s 
mind around what Pasolini wants to call “extinction.” For him, extinction 
pertains to particularities and attachments that can be killed and mourned; 
registering extinction is part of the exercise of sorting the dead from the 
nonexistent.
“Repudiation” is written mostly in very short paragraphs of a few sen-
tences each. In the middle of the text some paragraphs are clustered into 
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sections sequenced (a), (b), and (c). Pasolini calls parts (a), (b), and (c) “delay-
ing elements [elementi ritardanti]” of his discussion (xviii). The unmarked 
segment of the essay that precedes (a) ends:
Private sexual lives (such as mine) have undergone the trauma of false 
tolerance and physical degradation, and that which in sexual fantasies 
was pain and joy, has become suicidal disappointment, shapeless sloth.
However, those who, annoyed or scornful, criticized the Trilogy of Life, 
should not think that my repudiation leads to their “duties [doveri].”
My repudiation leads to something else. I am terrified of saying it; 
before saying it, as is my real “duty,” I search for delaying elements. (xviii)
Sections (a), (b), and (c) follow, which correspond to circles of expanding 
circumference and to reflections on the past, present, and future. They re-
flect on the disappointing objects of Pasolini’s affection, his critics and the 
condition of contemporary society, and the demise of politicized “people[s] 
[populi]” outside Italy: “Outside of Italy, in the ‘developed’ countries— 
especially in France— the die has long been cast; long ago, the people have 
ceased to exist anthropologically” (xix).
Pasolini confides that his repudiation leads him to something he is afraid 
to name, and he has still not named it as long as he remains in part (c), the 
last delaying passage. Now, these delaying sections render a world that is 
dead interpersonally, sexually, and anthropologically. Deadness, of course, 
is a trope of vitalism that projects the organic nature of such things as lan-
guages and peoples, and Pasolini’s analysis never departs from this uncom-
fortably vitalist assumption. In the closing paragraphs of “Repudiation,” 
Pasolini returns still more explicitly to the figure of the dead body of Italy: “I 
know that, even if— as is very probable— there will be a victory of the left [in 
the 1976 election], the nominal value of the vote will be one thing, the real 
value something else. The first will demonstrate the unification of modern-
ized Italy, in a positive sense; the second will demonstrate that Italy— except, 
naturally, for the traditional communists— is by now, as a whole, a depo-
liticized country, a dead body whose reflexes are purely mechanical” (xx).7 
Tracking the social form of Italian unification, the contemporary world is 
most of all a depopulated one. Although he complains that ethnicizing the 
problems of political groups misses the point, he makes an even stronger 
ontological claim, that the extinction of Italy is an anthropological issue. 
This claim references Pasolini’s lasting concern for the disappearance of his-
torical cultural forms that cannot be maintained, replaced in kind, or revived 
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artificially. The function of this anthropological move is to close off any 
idea of cultural revival.8 Thus Pasolini attributes to his critics the hope that 
the various difficulties are “an unpleasant circumstance that will certainly 
resolve itself,” and replies, “as if an anthropological change were reversible” 
(xix). At just the moment when the point of entropy is reached in his descrip-
tion of the contemporary scene— when “both the intellectuals on the right 
and the intellectuals on the left think, in exactly the same way”— the essay’s 
own delaying also comes to an end. The intellectual discourse in Italy comes 
to be identified with a delaying tactic; it is itself a delaying tactic. Pasolini 
both participates in it and works through his participation in it by absorbing 
anthropological extinction.
Now, Pasolini implies that the extinction of the people and hence the im-
possibility of politics, the perception of which is being evaded, is easy to miss 
because it is just the same thing as the consolidation of the nation- state that 
supposedly makes the modern political process possible. In other words, Pa-
solini is suggesting that abstract citizenship is a contradiction in terms. “The 
Disappearance of the Fireflies” associates industrialization with the fading of 
fireflies from the Italian evening and uses the phases of this disappearance as 
a principle of periodization: before, during, and after the disappearance of 
the fireflies. Here Pasolini asserts that early 1960s industrialization
involved the first true unification of our country. In other countries this 
unification was superimposed logically over monarchic or bourgeois and 
industrial revolution- imposed unifications. Perhaps the only precedent to 
the Italian trauma produced by the clash between pluralist archaism and 
industrial equalization was pre- Hitler Germany. In that country also, the 
values of different specific cultures were destroyed by the violent recog-
nition process of industrialization, with the consequence of producing 
those gigantic hordes who had neither the ancient peasant or artisan roots 
or not even a modern bourgeois background, and who made up the sav-
age, abnormal and unpredictable bodies of Nazi troops.9
The unification that, according to Pasolini, Italian regions had long ignored 
is here achieved suddenly through the dispositif of modernization. Like 
Foucault, or for that matter Weber, Pasolini assumes that radical changes 
to culture may occur in stealth forms when they can be mistaken for “a 
simple modernization of techniques.”10 Pasolini recurs to the vitalist figure 
of extinction, this time that of the firefly, to render the irrevocability of the 
processes he describes. Although the strong periodization he proposes here 
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may seem to contradict his claim in “Repudiation” that the potential for 
politics never existed, attending to modernization in Pasolini’s thinking 
helps to show in what sense that could be. The people, the political category 
of the universalizing modern nation- state, cannot exist because before the 
technologies of that state are introduced, there are only specific, plural peo-
ples; after, the same technologies that call forth the abstract category of the 
people systematically eliminate the peoples whose differences would lend 
value to the European political system construed as a working through of 
differences. The people could exist only if peoples with actual distinctions 
worth debating still survived; but the peoples were destroyed so that the 
abstract universalized citizenry, the people, could take their place. Most 
modern political theory would instead see the construction of the people 
as the always shifting work in progress of specific peoples to create a com-
mon space. Alternatively, this space itself may be seen as a transcendental 
form unattached to any specific substance. Pasolini sees the dissolution of 
the specific peoples instead as the aporetic precondition of modern political 
life, which ensures the nonexistence of what it claims to bring into being. 
Modernizing homogenization offers a discursive and representational sys-
tem in exchange for the handing over of anything one might have talked 
about or represented; the concept of the people is created by what makes its 
fulfillment impossible. The disappearance of peoples and the nonexistence 
of the political thus develop along with the nineteenth- century nation- state. 
Roberto Esposito writes of Hannah Arendt’s awareness of this phenome-
non: the aporetic inability of representation to represent multiplicity rather 
than unity; I return to this later on.11
To actively repudiate these categories would be to realize that they never 
were nor could be what they were supposed to be. Recently, Georges Didi- 
Huberman has used Pasolini’s “Fireflies” essay to typify a despair of resis-
tance that he finds continued in Agamben. Attentive to the resonance that 
the idea of organic light must have had to Pasolini as a filmmaker (and to 
himself as an art historian), he argues that images continue to offer openings 
for resistance.12 Didi- Huberman’s is the position I would call late modern— 
one that wants to say that the fireflies are potentially alive and the political a 
possibility to be recovered. This point of view and the historical framework 
of the political whose possibility it continues to assume, however, causes 
certain acts to appear as mere resistance (and indeed as mere existentialized 
survival), as in the title of Didi- Huberman’s book, The Survival of the Fire-
flies. Pasolini’s rejection of political possibility, on the other hand, rejects an 
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entire order of thinking in which the political is preserved as a remnant or 
potential as compared to the given of capitalism, whose existence is never 
presented as similarly attenuated. For Pasolini, the cost of relying on the 
idea that political life is preserved as an unactualized, resistant potentiality 
is the reinforcement of capitalist givens as setting the terms for presentness 
and actuality.
Pasolini refers to people in the two distinct senses above: local peoples 
with particular cultures and languages and to the people who would be the 
pan- Italian citizenry. Although Pasolini’s shift from poetry in Friulian to 
Roman writing and cinema is often read as a shift from regional to class- 
based thought, and late in his career Pasolini states in the most definitive 
way that dialects are moribund, “Repudiation” still assumes the significance 
of the very disappearance of ethnographic diversity.13 Linguistic diversity 
is now connected to the political through their existential distinction— 
languages are dying out like the firefly while Italian political existence is a 
contradiction in terms.14 The dead need to be sorted from the nonexistent, 
but the actual things that have been killed have been killed in the service of 
nonexistent entities that should not be grieved.
We can see such a line of distinction being drawn in one of the keynotes 
of Pasolini’s late work, the song “Sul Ponti di Perati”: “On the Perati Bridge, 
a black flag is flying.” It is sung by the whole company in Salò, where it is 
taken by the characters to pertain to present as well as past circumstances. 
A World War I song, anthologized by Pasolini in his collection of Italian 
poetry, “Sul Ponti di Perati” was repurposed for World War II to commem-
orate the doomed Alpine division Julia, which suffered massive casualties 
in Albania. In Salò it is sung by torturers and victims together, and so also 
seems to describe the pointless doom of the youth in the film. “Che son 
partiti, non son tornati [those who left have not come back],” it goes; “La 
meglio gioventù va soto tera [the best of youth goes underground].”15 The 
notion of resistance does not capture the tonality of this song, which is sung 
while a victim is being raped in the background. It is sung with feeling by 
the fascists. Although people could be singing simultaneously for opposite 
reasons, the possibility is nonetheless suggested that even from within fas-
cism one can recognize the loss within the song. In this way fascism is given 
a background from which it emerges and which it has not even entirely left 
behind, in which it is fascism and yet still partly something else. In this case, 
fascism can be understood as a violent and distorted response to something 
even more violent that is referenced by the song. This is how Pasolini reads 
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the bodies of the Nazi troops in “Fireflies,” as well— they’re monstrous and 
abnormal, but at the same time are reflections of the violence of moderniza-
tion. Pasolini’s camera dwells on the face of one of the youths as he seems 
to decide to join in the song. The expression and affirmative decision of this 
youth suggests that the song is a space in which the sources of violence can 
be acknowledged and lamented. What goes on in the finding of this space 
is not resistance; it’s the registration of an ongoing catastrophe. The scene 
is not about saying yes or saying no to the matrix of violence, but rather as-
serting one’s presence before it: “Yes, this disaster is my disaster: I exist now 
within this disaster, even as it is trying to extinguish my existence.”
It is just when the illusion of the political, whose existence is predicated 
on the ability of public thoughts to be different, disappears from “Repudi-
ation” that Pasolini writes, “It is time to confront the problem: where will 
the repudiation of the Trilogy lead me? It leads me to adaptation” (xx). If we 
had not been tipped off earlier, this would come as a surprise: the nonexis-
tence of the political in Italy is not the problem? But it’s true: that is not the 
problem of  “Repudiation,” but the premise of it. Even Pasolini’s rejection 
of his former goals is not the problem of the essay, but another premise of 
it; the problem, the question to be answered now according to Pasolini, is 
where it leads. Pasolini answers first by reflecting on where it does not lead. 
The critics of the Trilogy of Life, he writes, “should not think that my repu-
diation leads to their ‘duties.’ ” He explains that the duties prescribed to him 
“[concern] the fight for progress, improvement, liberalization, tolerance, 
collectivism, etc., etc.” (xix). These prescriptions have undergone a collapse 
similar to that of his love objects covered in part (a). They have participated 
in, provided the terms for, the production of what Pasolini sees as a “degen-
eration [that] occurred precisely through a falsification of their values” (xix). 
Rather, saying that he is led to acceptance and adaptation is Pasolini’s “real 
‘duty’ [reale ‘dovere’]” (xviii), and this “real ‘duty’ ” is something different 
from working with a corpse and, further, different from merely saying that 
the political does not exist in Italy (which has been the burden of the “de-
laying elements”). Pasolini is discriminating between the difficult things he 
can say and do, that indeed he is in the habit of saying and doing and getting 
arrested for, and the terrifying thing he can’t at first name, terrifying be-
cause it lies outside their orbit. In other words, it’s relatively unremarkable, 
in Pasolini’s view, for him to say that Italy, along with the other developed 
countries, is a dead body. What is terrifying to say is that his realization 
of this worst- case scenario leads him to adaptation and acceptance. It’s the 
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acceptance and not the deadness that is terrifying— an acceptance that still 
remains undefined.
In the last phrases of the essay, Pasolini replaces “duties” (“ ‘doveri,’ ” al-
ways in quotation marks) with “commitment” (“impegno”; no quotation 
marks): “I am maneuvering to rearrange my life. I am forgetting how things 
were before. The beloved faces of yesterday are beginning to yellow. Before 
me— little by little, slowly, without further alternatives— looms the present. 
I readjust my commitment to a greater legibility (Salò?) [Riadatto il mio 
impegno ad una maggiore leggibilità (Salò?)]” (xx). Acceptance is now ap-
proached through tentative figures of perception in which a featureless pres-
ent looms into view through the reluctant fading of memories and alterna-
tives. The figure is the cinematic one of focus, film development, or even film 
direction in the sense captured by the French word for direction, realisation. 
The introduction of  “legibility [leggibilità]” shifts subtly from what Pasolini 
himself sees to what Pasolini may give to be seen— from remembering or 
looking at a represented image (on yellowing paper), to a different kind of 
perception of what is hard to see because it is present, and finally to a visual-
ity that may be read like language (in keeping with Pasolini’s ideas as a film 
semiotician). In the context of filmmaking, legibility hints at a recalibrated 
neorealism that may, this time, succeed in bringing into view a present that 
has been singularly repellent to the eye. At the end, in the form of a ques-
tion, Pasolini offers Salò, one of the more upsetting films ever made, as the 
fruit of acceptance and legibility. It’s no contradiction, however, that Salò is 
both Pasolini’s example of acceptance and a nearly unwatchable film— maybe 
the single film, until very recently, that viewers are most likely to refuse to 
watch.16 Whatever acceptance of the unacceptable was to Pasolini, if he had 
lived longer he would have been arrested for it, too. For he describes an ac-
ceptance that looks like protest, a giving up that we experience as a demand, 
an adaptation that appears as a provocation.
From the Trilogy of Life to Salò
To understand the subtlety of the psychic process he is demonstrating, it’s 
worth understanding how “Repudiation” emerges from a line of cinematic 
thought that was under way before the texts of 1975 were written. Through 
a kind of latency, Pasolini’s awareness of the nonexistence of the political 
actually precedes his passage from Trilogy of Life to Salò. “Repudiation” 
marks, not the absolutely new emergence of that hypothesis, but Pasolini’s 
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loss of his former proposed solution to it— the creation of an invigorating 
sexual culture— and hence a heightening of its urgency as a problem. Paso-
lini promises to “readjust” his commitment to the legible, to focus on the 
nothing that is there instead of the something that ought to be. Not a first 
but a second response to a perception of political nonexistence at the present 
time and place, repudiation is an active mode of realization, a going beyond 
of the perception that the political does not exist to realize that it could and 
should not. Recognizing the development of the repudiation of the political 
in Pasolini involves reading tensions within the Trilogy of Life itself; for the 
Trilogy— which confines itself to historically or geographically distant times 
and places— is in practice as much about the nonexistence of a political Italy 
(which never appears) as it is an imagination of how people might live differ-
ently.17 As Pasolini later realizes, the potential, the otherwise, the elsewhere 
that he depicts both assumes and evades contact with the nonexistence of 
the political now.
Such a reading especially suits the last film in the Trilogy of Life, Arabian 
Nights (Il fiore delle Mille et una notte, 1974), in which mostly Italian actors, 
speaking Italian while playing Arabian characters, try to suggest how one 
might live as a slave and still possess sexual pleasure and personal integrity. 
One of the protagonists is a young female slave, Zummurud, whose last 
owner has given her the ability to choose her next owner. She uses this op-
portunity to select a barely adolescent boy whom she educates into the sexual 
arts. Their subsequent separation is resolved at the end of the film when Zum-
murud, who has been living as a boy king as the result of a misrecognition— 
enjoying her word become command, even taking the opportunity to cru-
cify one of her former abusers— happily sheds her mask of sovereignty and 
exclaims, “Don’t you recognize me? I am your slave!” With this the lovers 
fall back into one another’s arms, having won from each other all the recog-
nition they need for their fulfillment. Arabian Nights’ contempt for power 
takes for granted a world in which the property relation of human beings 
excludes most of the population from any form of political expression, and 
asks how one would then strategize a life. Gender, economics, social status, 
and theology all contribute to the enslavement of the protagonists, while 
their response is to prefer eroticized and personalized slavery to false sov-
ereignty. Although Arabian Nights is an unusually florid exoticist fantasy— 
outlandishly so— the thought experiment that it conducts remains a com-
mon scenario for transnational art films today. In more palatable guises, they 
often concur that the phenomenology of societies in the aftermath of global 
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capitalism consists in a constant exposure to violence, interrupted by idylls 
that allow one to recuperate temporarily.18 In this light, “Repudiation” in-
vites us to a new phase of Pasolini’s already low political expectations in The 
Trilogy of Life. In the new phase, the interpersonal and sexual opportunities 
are no longer seen as modeling a future or a past.
It is as part of this project, then, that Pasolini comes to consider the Re-
public of Salò (Italian Social Republic), a puppet or remnant state that pos-
sessed no constitution and no economic funding independent of Germany. 
Salò’s opening scenes of administrative establishment stress that the events 
are supported by a substantively false governmental structure. But rather 
Screen shots from Arabian Nights (Pier Paolo Pasolini, 1974), the last film  
in the Trilogy of  Life.
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than “shed[ding] light on the historical phenomenon of fascism,”19 Pasolini 
explains fascism as a still ongoing process that uses the illusion of a political 
Italy. Salò is a meditation on the various historical repetitions of this nullity 
that compose the history of modern Europe.20 Through its reference to the 
revolutionary- era text by Sade which it repeats,21 Salò places the possibility 
of history as farce as far back as revolutionary Europe— in other words, at 
the same time as the inception of liberalization and supposedly universalized 
political representation. A history that is already farce for Marx in The Eigh-
teenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte becomes pornography for Pasolini. Once 
as tragedy; twice as farce; again and again as pornography.
Sexual liberation is only one of the possibilities Salò rules out, although 
the spectacular quality of its inclusion can make that hard to see.22 In fact, 
the film shows almost no dissident sexuality whatsoever: almost all of the 
sexuality in the film is official and normative according to the laws we hear 
read out. What counts as anomaly is created by official code.23 The pro-
fessional madams responsible for introducing and contextualizing the or-
chestrated sex acts of each day maintain a carefully matter- of- course tone 
(along the way, they reveal that they have been coercively educated into 
their current tastes and opinions— circumstances that they divulge with the 
same coolness, as though they were also part of the inevitable course of the 
world). What is not tolerated is any autonomous organization of one’s sexual 
life. Thus Salò becomes in part a pedagogical film for straight citizens; by 
identifying with the victims, they can see what it would be like to try to sur-
vive in a sexually prescriptive world— a world in which you could be tortured 
to death ostensibly for refusing to perform one kind of act rather than an-
other.24 If what counts is subjugation to code, there are only two acts of sex-
ual dissidence in the film: an affair between two female inmates and another 
between a maid and a guard who are promptly executed. In an aggression 
against the Trilogy of Life, Pasolini goes out of his way to refute the idea that 
these private arrangements could suggest a way of inhabiting slavery: the 
executed maid is played by Ines Pellegrini, who plays Zummurud in Arabian 
Nights; Franco Merli, her lover Aziz in Arabian Nights, plays another victim 
whose tongue is removed.
In “Fireflies” Pasolini sketches several phases of fascism that parallel the 
years before, during, and after the extinction of the fireflies: these are fas-
cist fascism, postwar Christian Democratic fascism, and late Christian- 
Democratic fascism. “Before the extinction of the fireflies” (i.e., around 1965), 
“Christian- Democrat fascism is a total and absolute extension of fascist fas-
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cism”; after, “fascist” values (family, church, order, etc.) are “falsified” and 
playacted, while others are actually substituted; and by 1975, Pasolini writes, 
there has been a further “decisive mutation compar[able] to that in Germany 
fifty years ago” that begins “a new era in human history” and exposes a “dra-
matic power void.” Pasolini declines to refer contemporary fascism back to 
Italian wartime fascism because in Italy, according to him, “The fascist mod-
els were only masks that were donned and removed in turn [We might think 
here of Zumurrud’s mask of sovereignty— RT]. When the fascist fascism 
movement fell, everything returned to its previous order.” The previous or-
der, fascist fascism, and postwar Christian- Democrat fascism fall in line, for 
better and for worse. All former phases, however, differ from the 1975 version 
of Christian- Democratic fascism, in which “all these things [the language 
and gestures of contemporary officials, their ostensibly fascist values] actually 
are masks” (my emphasis). Pasolini’s oxymoron, “actually are masks,” conveys 
that only now are things— not merely pretenses— empty in actuality, so ad-
vanced is the modernizing process of homogenization that calls the people 
into being as a void. He reserves apocalyptic language for this actualized 
power void. For “in history the void cannot remain in existence” as void, he 
argues, but will give way to positive disaster. The Eighteenth Brumaire echoes 
in this passage as well, but in reverse: the collapse of available positions does 
not prepare a place for the people but contributes to the violence- attracting 
void the extinction of regional peoples has created. The disaster, finally, will 
connect contemporary Italy to German Nazi fascism in a way that dwarfs 
its heretofore indirect connection through Italian wartime fascism. In other 
words, Pasolini distances himself from the notion of continuity between 
Italian wartime fascism and the “Christian- Democrat fascism” of 1975 only 
because continuity underestimates how fascistic the present is: fascistic not 
because it continues a past fascism, but because the conditions have been 
prepared for an even more robust fascism. These conditions are the processes 
of unification and neutralization that, according to Pasolini, weren’t strong 
enough to produce “nationalized and therefore falsified” values in Italy in 
the 1940s. If, for Pasolini, the culprit is the nation- state, that is not because 
of the particularism of the idea of ethnicized nation, but just the opposite, 
because the universalization of modernist abstraction makes it impossible for 
groups to maintain their political differences.
What should provoke us further is that the villa in Salò recalls the classical 
prototype of the nation- state: the distinctly bounded polis in which think-
ers like Arendt and Schmitt still believe earlier in the twentieth century. 
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The city- state of Salò is Pasolini’s riposte to Rossellini’s Paisa— the title of 
which is Neapolitan for “little town” while also containing the idea of pais, 
state. In Porcile (1969) Pasolini portrays such a medieval city- state and the 
outlaws who wander and terrorize the desert beyond it: we travel with the 
beautiful criminals, from which position we can understand the thinness of 
the city’s legality. In Salò, we enter the villa and never leave it. The opening 
scene that introduces its plenipotentiaries also depicts its geographical loca-
tion, its distinction from other cities, and the codification and distribution 
of its written laws: for example, anyone who mentions God in any way is 
condemned to die. When the torturers explain the laws to the victims, they 
emphasize, as camp administrators are reported to have done, that no one 
knows what happens there and that there are no longer any other possible 
modes of existence. The inmates are “beyond the reach of any legality,” they 
proclaim, before going on, “Here are the laws.” Reflecting the operation of 
late Christian- Democratic fascism, people(s) disappear within the walls and 
are never seen again.
The officials’ proclamation is at once tendentious and true: in a way, the 
question of legitimacy is more prominent the less a realm, or a law, interacts 
with an outside (either external or internal to itself ). Deleuze points out 
that while Pasolini’s Teorema (1968) works out a problem introduced into a 
society from an agent (Terence Stamp) outside it, “in Salò, on the contrary, 
there is no longer a problem because there is no outside: Pasolini presents, 
not even fascism in vivo, but fascism at bay, shut away in the little town, 
reduced to a pure interiority, coinciding with the conditions of closure in 
which Sade’s demonstrations took place.”25 For Deleuze, the nullity of ev-
erything portrayed is its most important characteristic. In Salò even fascism 
and perversion are being playacted— with real weapons and bodies— as much 
as sovereignty and normativity are. Pasolini’s “fireflies article” and other 
writings put an ominous spin on what such emptiness is and means. In these 
writings the nullity brought by unification and the destructive liveness of 
“fascism in vivo” are related causally and a hair’s breadth apart. Pasolini’s per-
ception in “Fireflies”— that at the time of production, playacting goes all the 
way down, so that underneath is not even “a heap of bones and ashes. There 
would be nothing, just emptiness”— imagines a paradoxical “nothing” in 
vivo that is the support of living fascism. In the terms of the regnant neutral-
ization of 1975, more and more of the denizens of Italy are gathered inside.
Deleuze describes the difficulty that Salò explores in formal terms, not-
ing that Pasolini’s visual style in Teorema and Salò shifts from an emphasis 
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on cuts, and thus the creative consciousness of montage, to a kind of  “se-
quence” (c2 174) to which Pasolini earlier professed an aversion and whose 
projected consciousness dovetails with the position of the camera.26 In an 
unrelated passage of Cinema 1, Deleuze calls this position “the anonymous 
viewpoint of someone unidentified amongst the characters” (c1 72).27 The 
position corresponding to that of the camera is that of the narrator in the list 
of possible social roles Pasolini specifies in the credits of Salò: “Gentlemen 
[Signori],” “Narrators,” “Victims,” “Servants,” and “Guards.”28 Celeste Lan-
gan has connected neutralization to “mediatization” in the context of Euro-
pean political theory, pointing out that the term “mediatization” is invented 
around 1800 as part of the pursuit of  “a permanent neutrality, beyond or in 
the middle of the war of all against all.” Schmitt objects to the neutralization 
of  “politics” through media in “The Age of Neutralization and Depoliticiza-
tions” (1929), Langan reminds us.29 “Media” in the contemporary sense, in 
other words, came to prominence along with rationalization’s attention to 
neutral and exchangeable spaces. Further, mediatization is itself built upon a 
more general notion of mediation invented at around the same time. Hegel’s 
articulation of mediation in the Napoleonic and post- Napoleonic period 
furnishes the dominant philosophical vocabulary for the unification of the 
nation- state whose neutralization Pasolini specifically deplores.30 In Salò, if 
the neutral perspective is that of a camera that makes much of its own passiv-
ity, it is literally ever present because we’re watching the film that the camera 
has made possible by preselecting what counts as there. Pasolini’s Salò is an 
image of totality and an image of the false, a totality that is fraudulent to the 
same degree that it produces what counts as everywhere.
Deleuze remarks (in 1985) that the great political cinema of the twenti-
eth century “know[s] how to show how the people are what is missing”: 
the Spanish people in Resnais’s La Guerre est finie, “the German people 
in the Straubs’ Unreconciled” (c2 215 – 16). Instead of “addressing a people, 
which is presupposed already there,” Deleuze continues (c2 217), filmmakers 
may bring “the consciousness that there were no people, but always several 
peoples, an infinity of peoples, who remained to be united, or should not 
be united, in order for the problem to change” (c2 220). These nonunited 
people— for Deleuze as for Pasolini, paradigmatically ethnic or linguistic 
minorities within their milieu— begin with “communication of the world 
and the I in a fragmented world and in a fragmented I which are constantly 
being exchanged” (c2 221). But Deleuze argues that filmmakers call a new 
people to come into being by filing these missing- peoples reports: that is 
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exactly not what Salò is arguing against. Embedding the nonexistence of 
the political in the history of modern Europe since Sade, it neither assumes 
that the people should exist, nor assimilates the given reality in the hope of 
getting through mediation to a better or at least necessary world. Rather, 
Pasolini asks us to look at nullity in order to see modern political citizens as 
contradictions in terms.
Pasolini and the Political Horizon
What we might call the science fiction features of  “Repudiation”— its fig-
ures of degeneration, ruin, and anthropological extinction— insist on the 
contradiction: the unthinkable is the case, and we are thinking it. The post- 
Auschwitz tropes of survivre and “damaged life,” more recent psychoanalytic 
trauma theory, modern and postmodern “end of history” figures, and Ag-
amben’s development of messianic time and limbo are related ways of deal-
ing with related paradoxes.31 Pasolini’s version raises the possibility that the 
nonexistence of the political has been considered unthinkable in the same 
way that trauma is thought to be unthinkable. This apparent unthinkability 
in turn, however, can be understood as an illusion of modernity.
Roberto Esposito’s Concepts of the Impolitical (1988) is the most sustained 
and philosophically ambitious work that responds to the Italian parliamen-
tary crises of the 1970s. Esposito takes another tack in describing a constitu-
tive aporia, considering historical examples that have imagined the limits of 
the political— chief among them works of Arendt, Hermann Broch, Canetti, 
Weil, and Bataille— in order to argue that the impolitical is not opposed to 
the political but “is the political considered from outside.”32 In Arendt, the 
impolitical is the aporetic inability of representation to represent multiplicity 
rather than unity; in Broch, it is an inexpressible “alterity . . . presupposed 
outside the (idea of ) the political”; and in Canetti, it is the dominance of a 
drive to unity in which life itself participates. The privileged point of refer-
ence for Esposito’s argument is the ruin of Weimar, the same context that 
gives rise to Schmitt’s Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy and Concept of the 
Political. Esposito replies to Schmitt by giving the impolitical a formative 
and yet self- dividing function within the political:
The identification between freedom and slavery, autonomy and control, 
which marks contemporary politics (but is latent [présent en germe] in all 
politics) marks the “zero point” (Nullpunkt), the “negative pole,” “which 
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our epoch has reached.” Adopting a positive anthropology once again 
means not taking into account “that the desire of an absolute and un-
restrained liberty for play . . . presses ceaselessly toward the control of 
one’s neighbor”: this occurs “thanks to the infernal interchangeability 
of masochism and sadism; a mechanism with which the slave himself is 
familiar”; like all political regimes, the democratic regime includes it, for 
all that it is preferable to the other regimes, when it can only break control 
into a chain of local micro- servitudes; it even— here the great Arendtian 
impolitical theme returns— penetrates to the dynamic of revolutions, as 
we will see further on.33
The “zero point” of the impolitical is the “identification between freedom 
and slavery” (the identification that Pasolini explores in Arabian Nights). 
Adorno calls this “unfreedom”— the internal ability to mistake slavery for 
freedom and vice versa. For Esposito, the impolitical is a transhistorical, 
logical necessity that all politics must reckon with. He therefore insists that 
there can be nothing apolitical or antipolitical about the impolitical, since 
the impolitical is the blind spot within the political.
The concept of the impolitical may function as a way to cope with the 
loss of horizon, encrypting that loss by rendering it structural and internal 
to a politics that continues to be taken for granted as another structural 
necessity. Pasolini rather suggests that what has happened is not a structural 
problem but a deception. Instead of following subtle traces of the proto- and 
postpolitical (e.g., underlining the nonhegemonic quality of power in Salò), 
Pasolini stresses that the fact that conditions are never hegemonic does not 
mean that politics is by definition not nonexistent, that the political is ei-
ther immortal or undead and, either way, transhistorical. Similarly, a strict 
construction of the worst, like Derrida’s in “No Apocalypse, Not Now,” 
prevents a hegemonic model (of, for instance, totalitarianism) from being 
asserted, but the counterdanger of the strict construction is that it stores “the 
worst” permanently in the future and uses the possibility that something 
can always be worse to deflect past and present catastrophes that may be 
utter even if they are not absolute.34
When I mentioned that the loss of a political horizon is often treated as 
trauma, I meant that it is handled as though it could never register in expe-
rience. A correct Kantian understanding of the impossibility of experiencing 
the zero degree of anything is mobilized to conserve the value of whatever 
there is at the time, because it is by definition not nothing. However small 
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that value is acknowledged to be, because it’s never nothing it is also maxi-
mal, like the difference between life and death (hence the prevalence of the 
organic figure in the texts I have been reading). The premise of biopower, 
the irreducible value of life, is a subset of the conflation of value and fact, 
the conserving of value in whatever existence is available. According to Pa-
solini, such an attitude encourages faithfulness to politics although “it is by 
now, as a whole . . . depoliticized . . . a dead body whose reflexes are purely 
mechanical” (“Repudiation,” xx).
The impulse to credit the smallest twitch of the proto- or postpolitical is 
well and deeply grounded in the post- structuralist critique of presence and 
hegemony, and in rightful suspicion about where the ability would come 
from to say when a potential is defunct. No one occupies a vantage from 
which to pronounce the end of history. The temporal logics of surviving 
and remaining complicate the picture by allowing that the present may be a 
continuation of a past catastrophe. In these logics, the questionable nature 
of the power to say when the worst has occurred is balanced by the equally 
questionable nature of the power to say when the worst has stopped occur-
ring. This second logic, as mobilized, for instance, by Lanzmann’s Shoah, 
implies that there is no after in the sense that the boundary of the catastro-
phe cannot be fixed; rather, there is open- ended catastrophe to which nei-
ther presentness nor pastness can be denied. Thus Didi- Huberman criticizes 
Lanzmann from a historicist perspective for acting as though Auschwitz is 
not over.35 I’ve rehearsed Pasolini’s rather elaborate argument for why he is 
not doing the same thing. To see his project as identical with those is to set 
aside his emphasis on arriving at acceptance and adaptation (to which we 
have still attributed no content), the results to which his recognition, he 
writes, leads him.36
Pasolini, similarly, writes in “Repudiation” that Italy “is by now, as a 
whole, a depoliticized country” (xx). As we’ve seen, Pasolini is indeed point-
ing out that it is “as a whole,” as the false unity into which it has been made, 
that a country has no political dimension. This does not mean that there is 
no struggle; Pasolini writes, and dies, toward the beginning of the so- called 
Years of Lead, and in the “fireflies” article guesses at some of the turmoil 
ahead. So by what right does Pasolini eliminate the possibility of other, per-
haps as yet unseen ways to channel political energies? Autonomian writings 
published around the time of Pasolini’s death also understand their society 
as postpolitical. They claim that this very understanding, however, enables 
their activities to be political in an expanded sense: “if ‘the end of politics’ 
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means the search for new dimensions of antagonism on levels other than the 
one defined by concrete needs (wage struggles, the ‘attack on income’ as a 
refusal of poverty, etc.) then with the Italian movement the ‘end of politics’ 
has a different meaning, not at all psychologistic, literary or philosophic. For 
there the ‘end of politics’ involves a search for new political areas of strug-
gle.”37 For Pasolini this struggle is best thought of as something other than 
the political, rather than a rejuvenation of the political energies in a nonrep-
resentational form. For him, those nonrepresentational forms have died with 
the fireflies, and didn’t the very notion of what it means to be political in 
modernity arise along with those forms, from which it may be inseparable?
If Marazzi and Lotringer envision a corrigible society that needs to refind 
the political in new areas, isn’t that possibility of renewing the political the 
danger that haunts their writings and threatens to return it to the inside of 
Italy? My point is not that social and cultural phenomena contain no poten-
tial to create justice, nor that nothing could replace parliamentary politics, 
but that Pasolini’s insistence that the political is nonexistent and not about 
to be remade applies to social movements as well as to formal politics, to the 
potential for Italian politics as well as its current state. In this way it may be 
further toward conceptualizing something different for the very reason that 
it abjures political possibility.
“Acceptance”
After delaying, acceptance. Pasolini’s acceptance is strange because it fur-
nishes an account of something of which there could seem to be no account— 
acceptance of the unacceptable. To get at the function of Pasolini’s repu-
diation of his former strategies— the outcomes it carries of acceptance and 
adaptation— I’d like to make one final comparison between Pasolini’s “Repu-
diation” and a culturally adjacent text that is its mirror image in nihilistic ac-
ceptance: Primo Levi’s essay “Stereotypes,” from The Drowned and the Saved, 
which was published in the same year as Esposito’s Concepts of the Impoliti-
cal, 1988.38 This is where Levi criticizes the “schematic image of prison and 
escape” that “bears little resemblance to the situation in the concentration 
camps” but is part of an idealized before, during, and after that appears only 
in retrospect.39 Levi makes this criticism as he answers a question from the 
floor, so to speak, about why so many European Jews (and other persecuted 
segments of the population) did not more actively flee their elimination. His 
most radical point comes in the sentences restricted to those who, indeed, 
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chose not to flee, since obviously many others did emigrate, and many could 
not, as Levi also makes clear. Levi nonetheless suggests that the phenome-
non, in any crisis, of there being many people who choose to stay must be 
accepted— that it cannot be expected to be otherwise. Levi’s considerable 
acknowledgment of all the people who were not in denial would seem to 
indicate that things could have been different. Yet finally his argument for 
acceptance is not historically or culturally contingent: “Many Europeans of 
that time— and not only Europeans, and not only of that time . . . [were] 
denying the existence of things that ought not to exist.” 40 He ends the essay 
by comparing the state of mind of those who stayed behind with that of 
Europeans vulnerable to destruction by the Cold War powers, and invokes 
the threat that nuclear warfare poses “to the entire human species, indeed to 
all life on earth, with the exception perhaps of the insects”:
The threat is different from that of the 1930s: less close but vaster; linked, 
in the opinion of some, to a demonism of history, new, still undecipher-
able, but not linked (until now) to human demonism. It is aimed at ev-
eryone, and therefore especially “useless.”
So then? Are today’s fears more or less founded than the fears of that 
time? When it comes to the future, we are just as blind as our fathers. . . . 
There are Polynesia, New Zealand, Tierra del Fuego, the Antarctic: per-
haps they will remain unharmed. Obtaining a passport and entry visa 
is much easier than it was then, so why aren’t we going? Why aren’t we 
leaving our country? Why aren’t we fleeing “before”?41
Levi’s question is largely rhetorical: its unanswerability is turned toward the 
reader in order to suggest that the question is wrong. The quotation marks 
around the word “before” indicate what Levi argues elsewhere, that “before” 
is an illusion created by history. The conclusion that there is no “before” 
in which to flee is central to Levi’s project of doing what he can to tear 
the public imagination of Auschwitz from hindsight fantasies; its refusal 
of pathos distinguishes Levi from many contemporaries.42 Nonetheless, as 
Levi accepts that many will persist in storing catastrophe in the future, Levi 
himself assumes that the time of catastrophe is the future when he writes, 
“When it comes to the future, we are just as blind as our fathers.” Levi’s 
critique of the idea of  “before” deflects criticism of the tendency to be blind 
to the present, a tendency Pasolini attacks when he includes a long list of the 
ongoing degradations his critics “don’t notice” in 1975 (“Repudiation,” xix).
Like Levi, who points out that “we” do not seem to be going anywhere, 
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Pasolini does not exempt himself from historical pressure. Rather, it is no-
ticing this pressure upon himself— in the terms above, “the damage”— that 
opens his eyes, as he would have it, to the distinction of the present moment:
Everyone has adapted either by refusing to notice anything or by inertly 
rendering the news less dramatic.
But I have to admit that also having noticed, or having dramatized, 
does not protect at all from adaptation or acceptance.
Therefore I am adapting myself to the degradation and I am accepting 
the unacceptable. I am maneuvering to rearrange my life. (xx)
Reading with Levi suggests another way to interpret the ending of  “Repu-
diation” in an unimaginable acceptance. One thing that Pasolini is doing 
is noticing what he is already doing; his assertion of adaptation and accep-
tance is as descriptive as it is prescriptive. It’s almost a syllogism: no one is 
protected from degradation; therefore Pasolini is not protected, and must 
be found among the people who are adapting to and accepting it. This ac-
ceptance is no more or less extreme than Levi’s observation that it may well 
not be possible to protect most of the people on earth.
Yet Pasolini is able to do what Levi implies is not to be expected, and 
gives up on his object— the people, the political of Italy— in the present, in 
fact concludes that he has already done so, even though that nonexistent ob-
ject had supported his identity, his work, and his idea both of the state and 
of its alternatives. With other late work by Pasolini, “Repudiation” shows 
how one does— how sometimes people do— act before, although it means 
turning away from everything that has previously been thought meaningful 
and instituting an unknown self.43 We might adapt Derrida’s thesis that 
forgiveness is paradigmatically of the unforgivable and suggest that accep-
tance is paradigmatically of the unacceptable. Levi adduces the poem by 
Christian Morgenstern in which the good German citizen (of 1910, before 
both wars) cannot fathom that he has been hit by a car because it happens 
on “a street where traffic is forbidden.” 44 Pasolini’s introduction of paradox-
ical language— acceptance of the unacceptable— points out that thinking the 
unthinkable can become caught in a similar categorial cul- de- sac: it can be 
seen to have occurred only at the end of time, and this is not the end of time: 
therefore, it could be worse; therefore, it’s not yet necessary to change. For 
things to be different, the unthinkable must already have happened, “with-
out further alternatives” (“Abiura,” xx). To act before, it must be understood 
to be too late— in this case, too late to begin with.
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That’s why for Pasolini it’s not just a matter of noticing the political nul-
lity of Italy, but of including the idea of political possibility within it, leaving 
only acceptance and adaptation— but an acceptance and adaptation that are 
hostile to the given— as conceptual spaces in which to start filming Salò. 
The poetic analogue to the late prose texts is Pasolini’s meticulous negation 
of his first book of poetry, Poesie a Casarsa, in his last, Le nuova gioventù 
(1975; called after the phrase in “Sul Ponte di Perati,” as I mentioned). Re-
pudiation here takes the form of the strikethrough. For example, Pasolini 
rewrites “Fountain of water in my country. / There is no fresher water than 
in my country. / Fountain of rustic love” as “Fountain of water in a country 
not mine. / There is no staler water than in this village. / Fountain of love 
for nobody.” 45 Both poems are in dialect, although by the time of the latter 
Pasolini has declared categorically that “dialect and the world that expressed 
it no longer exist.” 46 No longer conceivably nostalgic, Pasolini now writes 
dialect poetry that places neither nostalgia nor hope in dialect.
Similarly, the acceptance and adaptation of “Repudiation” build a lan-
guage for alternatives to the present that does not assume that the political 
will be born from its impossibility. In an interview on the day before he 
died, Pasolini is asked whether he would do it if, with “magic thought,” he 
could make disappear all that he detests, even though this would include 
the industries, institutions, and audiences that support his own work. When 
Pasolini replies that that is what he is trying to do, the interviewer, Furio 
Colombo, asks, “If you remove all this . . . what’s left?” Pasolini responds, 
“Everything. I am what is left, being alive, being in the world, a place to see, 
work and understand.” 47 The title Pasolini gives to this last interview is “We 
Are All in Danger.” There is no basis on which he can deliver this message if 
he is still invested in potential.
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Reopening the Plato Question
Adam Sitze
1
Contemporary philosophy, Alain Badiou has argued, is considerably more 
unified than its polemically opposed factions would lead us to believe. De-
spite the many and great differences between its constitutive schools— on the 
one side, continental thought stemming from Heideggerian hermeneutics, 
on the other, the analytic tradition growing out of Wittgensteinian logical 
positivism1— the strife that divides these camps is underwritten by a consen-
sus that is all the more binding for remaining almost completely unstated. 
Both schools of contemporary philosophy, Badiou observes, define them-
selves in “violent opposition to the Platonic foundation to metaphysics.”2 
Whereas Platonism remains loyal to the operations required by the category 
of  Truth, contemporary philosophy suspends direct reference to the cate-
gory of  Truth. Whereas Platonism accepts the priority of the Idea in excess of 
any and all of its presentations, contemporary philosophy assumes language 
as the ultimate horizon of thought, converting philosophy into little more 
than the study of meaning (whether through the interpretation of texts or 
through the analysis of utterances). Above all, whereas Platonism holds that 
philosophy itself is at once possible, desirable, and necessary, contemporary 
philosophy puts itself on trial, subjecting itself to melancholic self- accusations 
regarding philosophy’s impossibility, its complicity with evil, its interminable 
internal crisis, and the philosophic need for an end to philosophy.3
In Badiou’s view, the task of philosophy today is to emancipate philoso-
phy from the anti- Platonic consensus that silently unites its otherwise bit-
terly opposed schools. In place of the death sentence that anti- Platonism 
seems to require contemporary philosophers to pass upon contemporary 
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philosophy, Badiou proposes a new and different task: to “reopen the Plato 
question,” which is to say, to return to Plato’s texts so as to seize there a 
new and different beginning for philosophy, and in so doing to revivify 
the desire, even the “imperative,” to philosophize.4 Commentary on Badiou 
certainly is not lacking in names for the position Badiou generates through 
this return (which, often following Badiou himself, has been called every-
thing from “neo- Platonism,” “ultra- Platonism,” and “citra- Platonism,” to a 
“modern Platonism,” a “Platonism of the multiple,” a “renaissance of the 
use of Plato,” and a “materialist Platonism”5). Oddly, however, despite Ba-
diou’s own call for a return to Plato, few of his many recent commentators 
have heeded that call and followed him in that return.6 Emerging from his 
seminars of 1989 – 90, which focused on Plato’s Republic and Laws, Badiou’s 
reading of Plato rests upon a very precise claim about the inner structure of 
the Platonic corpus.7 For Badiou, Plato’s writings assume the form of a grad-
ual but decisive reversal. Whereas Plato’s first work, The Apology of Socrates, 
seems to affirm Socrates’s reckless, fearless, and subversive relation to the 
Athenian polis, his final work, the Laws, seems to imply the exact opposite: 
the justice and even necessity of the counts on which the Athenian polis 
sentenced Socrates to death.8 On Badiou’s reading, subsequent philosophic 
institutions even would seem to have internalized, under the very mask to 
which they assign the name “Plato,” the criminal laws that express the an-
tiphilosophic voice and gaze par excellence. If it should seem that philosophy 
today is incapable of proceeding in any other mode except melancholic self- 
accusation, permitting itself to philosophize only after first putting itself on 
trial for impiety toward this or that declension of the polis, this is perhaps 
because philosophy has not fully thought through what we might call the 
juridical forms that govern its relation to its own history. Philosophy today 
would seem to judge its own voice and gaze with reference to a conscience 
(or, in psychoanalytic terms, an introjected superego) whose injunctions are 
harshly, even mercilessly, antiphilosophic. Philosophy, it would seem, has 
not yet become fully self- conscious about the mode in which it becomes 
self- conscious of its own relation to politics.
2
That so few commentators have sought to question Badiou’s reading of the 
Laws is all the more curious for the fact that it is with respect to this read-
ing that Badiou’s return to Plato is perhaps most discernible from another 
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twentieth- century return to Plato, one whose relation to emancipatory 
politics is diametrically opposed to Badiou’s, yet whose philosophic aims 
nevertheless remain remarkably close to, even symmetrical with, his own.9 
Beginning as early as 1924, Leo Strauss initiated a rereading of Plato that 
also may be summarized, without excessive injustice, as a “re- opening of 
the Plato Question.” Strauss’s rereading of Plato emerged from a desire 
to break with the “radical historicism” (Heideggerian and otherwise) and 
neo- Kantianism that dominated the political philosophy of his day.10 To 
give shape and form to this desire, Strauss retraced the steps of Nietzsche’s 
incomplete overturning of Platonism, fixing on what Strauss understood 
to be the clearest virtue of that overturning (“probity”).11 Along the way, 
Strauss rediscovered a politicized form of address internal to philosophic 
rhetoric (“esoteric writing”) that he redeployed as a hermeneutic guide for 
a rereading of the entire history of political philosophy.12 The keystone of 
that rereading was a long account of Plato’s Republic, in which Strauss subtly 
but methodically demonstrated that Plato’s text anticipates and refutes in 
advance all of the ostensibly anti- Platonic concepts symptomatically adopted 
by modern political philosophers.13 Perhaps above all, Strauss sought to un-
derline the ironic horizon within which Plato thought the philosopher- king, 
in order to reintroduce moderation into the visionary excesses born of the 
modern philosophic supposition, running from Kant to Nietzsche, that the 
philosopher can and should double as a legislator who seeks to realize truth 
in the polis.14
No attentive reader of Badiou would deny the proximity, even excessive 
proximity, between this return to Plato and his own. Badiou too, after all, 
seeks to find in Plato a counterpoint both to Heideggerian historicism and 
to neo- Kantian ethics.15 Badiou too is a careful student of Nietzsche’s over-
turning of Platonism, redeploying Heidegger’s argument about the incom-
pleteness of that overturning as the silent point of reference for his polemic 
against Gilles Deleuze.16 Badiou too has affirmed a manifestly political ap-
proach to the problem of address within philosophic rhetoric, emphasizing 
a sharp distinction, if not between esoteric and exoteric writing, then at least 
between the disciple and the public.17 Badiou too, as we’ve noted, appreci-
ates the sense in which the foreclosure of Platonism is a symptom that seizes 
and holds together otherwise opposed schools of modern political philos-
ophy (especially that of the last century).18 And, perhaps most importantly, 
Badiou too has counseled caution toward the figure of the philosopher- king, 
emphasizing restraint, reserve, and moderation as the antidote to the temp-
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tation, internal to philosophy, for philosophy to realize its truths through 
lawgiving.19
On this point, however, the resemblance would seem to end. In his cri-
tique of Plato’s Laws, Badiou fixes on book 10 as the site where Plato suc-
cumbs to the temptation to realize truth through law: here where Plato 
uses the tyrannical prescriptions of criminal law to ban the Sophist from 
the polis, Badiou argues, Plato abandons philosophy itself, converting its 
aporetic rigor into a force of terror.20 Strauss, by contrast, will consider this 
same book as the very inauguration of the inquiries that define classical po-
litical philosophy (and by extension, given Strauss’s approach to the quarrel 
of the ancients and the moderns, political philosophy as such).21 Because it 
is only in book 10 of the Laws that Plato “directly faces” the problem of the 
gods, Strauss argues, book 10 must be considered “the most philosophic, the 
only philosophic part of the Laws.”22 For Badiou, the Stranger who appears 
in the Laws in place of Socrates represents the absolute betrayal of Socrates: 
the Stranger, Badiou writes, is “the generic representative of the Polis, who 
once again pronounces against Socrates and in favor of the implacable fixity 
of criminal laws.”23 For Strauss, on the other hand, the Stranger marks the 
recapitulation and confirmation of Socrates’s highest teachings: the fact 
that someone other than Socrates could teach political philosophy outside 
of Athens, the birthplace of political philosophy, is proof positive that the 
teachings of political philosophy can survive Socrates and are transferable 
across traditions (or what today we would call cultures).24 And for Strauss, 
of course, the law against impiety the Stranger devises in the Laws does not 
betray Socrates; it defines impiety in a way that would have been more favor-
able to Socrates than was Athens’s own law against impiety.25
No reading of  Plato, it would seem, could have less in common with 
Badiou’s. But to the precise extent that Badiou’s reading of book 10 of Pla-
to’s Laws is on the mark, we will be off the mark to separate his reading 
of Plato from Strauss’s, and above all from Strauss’s reading of book 10 of 
the Laws— in all of its theologico- political piety, its hermeneutic attention 
to silence and speech, and its neoconservatism. Fidelity to Badiou’s teaching 
about philosophy’s relation to its own immanent disaster, in fact, requires 
the very opposite: a recognition that Strauss’s Stranger, this Stranger with 
whom Badiou’s Stranger is least at home, belongs essentially and irreducibly 
to the same Platonism Badiou wishes to reopen, as the exemplary figure of 
the disaster in and through which philosophy estranges itself from its essence, 
perhaps even as the mask that philosophy wears when it insists that disaster is 
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no disaster at all. Strauss’s “zetetic” Platonism, his emphasis on the essentially 
questioning character of Platonism, is not then simply the polar opposite 
of Badiou’s “re- opening of the Plato question” (although, especially on the 
point of the syntagma “political philosophy,” it is precisely this, with Strauss 
affirming the possibility of what Badiou rejects).26 It is also its uninvited rhyme 
and uncanny double. Much more than Deleuze or Jacques Rancière, who after 
all provide Badiou with the consoling figures of a clear- cut and deeply held 
opposition to Platonism, and against whom Badiou has not failed to en-
gage in open polemics, it is perhaps Strauss’s affirmation of Platonism, about 
which Badiou and his disciples have kept noticeably silent, that provides 
Badiou’s return to Plato with its most intimate and volatile koinè.
3
To put a name to this koinè, it will not suffice to traffic in the horse- trading 
of a compare- and- contrast analysis, or work like a detective in the archives 
of intellectual history.27 We instead need to return to the text of the Laws, 
so as to outline in that text the operation of a philosophical apparatus that 
remains active but unthought in each thinker’s renewal of Platonism. To be-
gin comprehending the relations and nonrelations that join and disjoin these 
respective Platonisms, it will be necessary to consider a deceptively simple 
question: how precisely does the Laws pose law as a problem for philosophy? 
As our point of departure into this inquiry, we shall take the curious pas-
sage that appears in the mathematically exact middle of book 4 of the Laws. 
Here the Athenian Stranger distinguishes true polities from cities (such as 
aristocracies or democracies) that have achieved victory over themselves, and 
where it is consequently necessary for a despot to administer the enslaved, 
defeated faction. To truly name any given city, the Stranger continues, “One 
must use the name of the god who truly rules as despot over those who pos-
sess intellect.”28 When pressed by his interlocutors to explain this surprising 
assertion, the Stranger asks permission to respond by telling a myth about 
“the time of Cronos,” when there existed “a most prosperous government 
and settlement [οἴκησις], which is imitated by the best of the arrangements 
now existing.”29 Permission granted, the Stranger continues:
Tradition tells us how blissful was the life of men in that age, furnished 
with everything in abundance, and of spontaneous growth. And the 
cause thereof is said to have been this: Cronos understood that, as we 
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have explained, human nature is not at all capable of regulating the hu-
man things, when it possesses autocratic authority over everything, with-
out becoming filled with hubris and injustice. So, thinking about these 
things, he then appointed as kings and rulers for our cities, not human 
beings, but beings of a race that was nobler and more divine, namely, 
daemons. He acted just as we now do in the case of sheep and herds of 
tame animals: we do not set oxen as rulers over oxen, or goats over goats; 
instead, we exercise despotic dominion over them, because our species is 
better than theirs. In like manner the god, out of friendship for humanity, 
set over us at that time the nobler race of daemons, who supervised us in 
a way that provided much ease both for them and for us. They provided 
peace and awe and good laws and justice without stint. Thus they made 
it so that the races of men were without civil strife and happy.
What this present argument is saying, making use of the truth, is that 
there can be no rest from evils and toils for those cities in which some 
mortal rules rather than a god. The argument thinks that we should 
imitate by every advice the way of life that is said to have existed un-
der Cronos; in public life and in private life— in the arrangement of our 
households and our cities— we should obey whatever within us partakes 
of immortality, giving the name “law” to the distribution ordained by in-
telligence [tēn toû noû dianomēn eponomazontas nomon]. But if an individ-
ual man or an oligarchy or a democracy, possessed of a soul which strives 
after pleasures and lusts and seeks to surfeit itself therewith, having no 
continence and being the victim of a plague that is endless and insatiate 
of evil— if such an one shall rule over a State or an individual by trampling 
on the laws, then there is (as I said just now) no means of salvation.30
That these passages contain Plato’s definition of law seems clear— or so we 
are told, at least, by historians of jurisprudence, who routinely cite these 
lines in the course of their commentaries on Plato, as well as by Strauss, 
who interprets these passages as nothing less than Plato’s definitive response 
to the question of the best regime.31 Upon closer examination, however, 
the confidence of these commentators seems misplaced. Even Strauss’s 
“theologico- political” reading of these passages, so much more careful than 
those historians whose haste he strove continually to chasten, passes over a 
fundamental “perplexity” that stirs within them.32 When the Stranger says 
that law (nomos) should be understood as a name for the dispensation (dia-
nomēn) of thought (noû),33 he engages in what the translator R. G. Bury 
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would call a “double word- play: νοῦς [nous] = νόμος [nomos], and διανομάς 
[dianomas] = δαίμονας [daimonas]. Laws, being the ‘dispensations of reason,’ 
take the place of the ‘daemons’ of the age of Cronos: the divine element in 
man (το δαιμόνιαν [to daimonian]), which claims obedience, is reason (νοῦς 
[nous]).”34 As with other translations associated with the Greek term nomos, 
this wordplay (others have called it a “pun” and even an “anagram”) has 
been obscured and abstracted by its translation into Latin.35 After 1484, 
when Marsilius Ficinus rendered the Greek dianomēn with the Latin dispen-
sationem, many English translators began translating dianomēn as “dispen-
sation,” resulting in a rendering of the Laws that seemed to allow law to be 
defined as “the dispensation of intellect.”36 This translation, which Strauss 
accepts and deploys, certainly avoids the defects of some of the more brutal 
alternatives for dianomēn (such as edict).37 It also has qualities of its own: by 
rendering dianomēn with one of the two Latin equivalents of the Greek oi-
konomia, Ficinus remains faithful to the way that Plato’s Laws seems to think 
the polis on the model of the oikos.38 Even so, the Ficinian rendering ends up 
obscuring a key dynamic in the untranslatable term it seeks to illuminate. 
Dianomēn, in Plato’s wordplay, touches not only nomos (its root, nemein, 
designates precisely the distribution, division, apportionment, or allocation 
that both Schmitt and Heidegger would connect, in their postwar writings, 
with nomos39), but also the dianoia to which Plato attached so much impor-
tance in the Republic (and which is the essence of philosophical thought as 
distinct from the prephilosophical convention, the age of Cronos, which is 
not necessarily the same as a religious age40). And although in the Laws, as 
in the Republic, dianoia must be understood in relation to nous,41 the Laws 
gives both terms a very unusual declension. As Heidegger has observed, 
nous in the Laws, in contrast to the rest of Plato’s corpus, is thought within 
the horizon of poesis (production), and thence too (given Heidegger’s un-
derstanding of poesis) to techne.42 What holds for nous holds as well for 
the terms to which it is contiguous in Plato’s wordplay. “To use Plato’s own 
terms and wordplay more precisely,” as Jean- François Pradeau emphasizes 
in his commentary on this passage, is to draw out precisely this technic-
ity: “the law (nomos),” Pradeau therefore translates, “is the instrument of 
the intellect (nous).” 43 There would thus seem to be a subtle shade to the 
Stranger’s wordplay that is left in silence when dianomēn is rendered with 
dispensation. The Stranger manages to stretch dianomēn so that it allows 
for a harmonious ensemble to be made out of a series of otherwise ranked 
and opposed concepts. In the Stranger’s mouth, dianomēn touches pre-
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philosophical as well as philosophical governance (where governance is fig-
ured, in each case, on the model of the management of the household by 
a despotes). It pertains as much to human as to animal populations (where 
both sorts of population are figured as livestock to be shepherded by nobler 
races). Perhaps above all, it is thought in a mode that deploys rather than 
bans the power of poesis (where poesis signifies as production, and thus too 
as techne and enframing). Given the variety of otherwise opposed concepts 
that are in play in the Stranger’s utterance— prephilosophy and philoso-
phy, prelaw and law, knowledge and power, population and governance, 
thought and instrument— it might not be far off the mark to hypertranslate 
his coupling of nous and nomos into unapologetically contemporary terms, 
as an unavowed precursor for one of the most basic and contested concepts 
of contemporary thought: dispositif.44 On this read, it would be as errant to 
reduce (as does Badiou) the concept of law in the Laws to “criminal prescrip-
tions,” “tyrannical commandments,” or a “law of death” as it would be to 
suppose a relation of simple “natural inferiority” (as does Strauss) between 
nous and nomos.45 Law, in the Laws, instead would be a name for a philo-
sophic apparatus, a machine that conjoins nous and nomos, a device that, 
in a manner we have yet to fully comprehend, makes one “see and speak.” 46
4
Understood as a discourse on a dispositif, the Stranger’s words on law give 
rise to a new and different perplexity. The apparatus of which he speaks 
would seem to be defined by a precise if unusual operation. Dianomēn is 
a place in the Stranger’s utterance about law where each one of the other 
names in his formulation shades into and joins with each of the others, in 
one and the same movement by which philosophic thought disjoins itself 
from the prephilosophic thought it at once imitates, rearranges, and dis-
places. Interpreted strictly within the hermeneutic horizon proper to the 
Laws, this wordplay is not at all an anomaly. As Johann Huizinga showed 
in his 1944 work Homo Ludens, and as Michel Foucault noted in his 1982 – 83 
lectures on Plato, the discourse on serious play saturates Plato’s Laws.47 The 
Laws, as Huizinga points out, is a dialogue that speaks of education ( paideia) 
as the guidance of children ( paides) through play ( paidia).48 It considers edu-
cation and play (and not, contra Schmitt, external war [ polemos]) to be the 
“supremely serious” problem for lawgiving thought (which sort of thought 
the Laws, in turn, repeatedly calls “the sober play [ paidia] of old men”).49 
reopening the plato question 181
It famously construes man (anthropon) as the “plaything” (paignion) of the 
gods.50 The Stranger’s wordplay on nous, dianomēn, and nomos is not then 
a deviation from the otherwise serious thought that takes place in the Laws; 
to the contrary, by putting a name to the play that allows nous to partici-
pate in the very nomos it also orders, this wordplay in fact provides the 
very paradigm according to which the Laws thinks law.51 In book 7 of the 
Laws, the Stranger pauses to reflect upon the dialogue in which he and his 
interlocutors have been participating since dawn. Their own dialogue, the 
Stranger acknowledges, is not only itself akin to a form of tragic poetry; 
it is also, he asserts, the very “paradigm” ( paradeigma) for the sort of dis-
course that ought to govern the guardians’ education of the young instead 
of tragic poetry.52 This self- reference, which precedes the Stranger’s refer-
ence to himself and his fellow lawmakers as “makers of a tragedy,” provides 
the interpretive key that alone can allow for a precise understanding of the 
form of the Stranger’s words on the relation of nous and nomos. Read as 
a part of a paradigm for the “true law” (nomos alēthēs) the Stranger later 
would claim to produce, the very permutation of letters that appears there 
on the page— where nous, dianomēn, and nomos at once depart from the 
very root, nem- , they also share— now comes to light as an exemplification 
of the very harmony that the interlocutors of the Laws elsewhere, in their 
discussions of law, seem merely to approximate.53 In their close concordance 
with one another, the very communication between the words nous, no-
mos, and dianomēn reveals itself there— in the letters that appear visibly on 
the surface of the page itself— as the sensible expression of the Idea, other-
wise only purely intelligible, that thought, law, and space could coexist in 
agreement with one another in an undivided political community where 
human laws imitate divine laws.54 Recalling that the Greek word for truth 
(alēthēia) is formed from privative prefix a- (un- or dis- ) and the root lēthē 
(forgetting), the Stranger’s wordplay even would appear to function as a 
sort of pedagogical reminder to the reader of the Laws, a mnemonic device 
that causes the reader to remember that the name nomos points less to the 
divisive music of tragic poetry than to the silent harmonics of nous, to “the 
play [le jeu] of a thought that permits itself to found the law on an infinitely 
superior Good.”55 But this would be a most paradoxical sort of recollection, 
for it would startle the reader into remembering a Oneness that was never 
forgotten in the first place, that appears for the first time only in Platonic 
reminiscence. If, as the Stranger argues, nomos may be understood as a 
name for the dianomēn of nous, it would then be because the name nomos 
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is itself already a distribution (a dianomēn) of the name nous, because the 
name nous itself already participates in the name nomos— because, in short, 
to write the name nomos is also, at least in part, to write the name nous. 
Understood in this way, nomos alēthēs would be a name for that nomos 
which arrives at its truth in a daring and surprising way— in a manner au-
thorized neither by prephilosophic convention nor by etymology, but simply 
and only by measuring itself with reference to the Idea of the indivisible, to 
the unprecedented One as such.
There is, in this serious play, no hint of an internal thought that can 
take effect only insofar as it inscribes its blueprints upon the passive blank 
slate of external space. The relation between nous and nomos in Plato’s Laws 
cannot then be interpreted, in modern terms, as a relation between mind 
and matter, much less between the two discrete substances of res cogitans 
and res extensa. In fact, in the place where dianomēn joins nous to nomos 
there would appear to be no relation at all. We seem to find nothing more, 
and nothing less, than a peculiar sort of community (or koinonia), a subtle 
but nevertheless definite participation of thought within a law that is al-
ready itself constitutively spatial, an intimate proximity of names that, in 
its approximation of the paradigm of indivisibility rendered visible by the 
Good, itself exemplifies the sort of intimate proximity that would exist in 
the best possible political community. On this read, the Stranger’s word-
play would communicate a most serious teaching indeed: the indivisibility 
it exemplifies— which extends to include not only nous, dianomēn, and no-
mos, but also nemein, the concrete distribution of lots and land— would be 
so thorough and so complete that the cobelonging that defines its very form 
would already imperceptibly begin making or producing (in the mode of a 
poesis) a novel form of community. It would allow us to see and speak, for 
the first time, of the politeia, this peculiar new unity that comes into being 
when and where philosophy discovers in itself an apparatus that enables it, 
in turn, to immunize the human community against the contagious disease 
of civil strife, of stasis, of unending internal division and divisiveness.56
5
However poetic it may be, the philosophic apparatus of law in the Laws 
cannot be comprehended with recourse to the poem alone. So identical is 
mathematics to lawgiving in the Laws that, as Pradeau will put it in his com-
mentary on the Laws, “to legislate is to count.”57 To read the Laws on its own 
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terms is consequently to trace its mathematical reasoning; but the more one 
traces the mathematical reasoning of the Laws, the more one realizes that 
its philosophic apparatus depends for its intelligibility upon operations that 
allow for mathematics but that are not themselves mathematical in character. 
There are, after all, constitutive limits upon the sorts of problems that can 
become intelligible in and for the mode of thought Plato calls dianoia.58 The 
apparatus of the law the Stranger sets up in the Laws depends for its intelli-
gibility upon one operation in particular: an ungeometrical use of space, a 
use of space that is specifically political or, more to the point, a use of a very 
specific political space, the colony (apoikia).59 At the end of book 3, Klinias 
suddenly reveals that he has been commissioned to settle a new colony and 
to draw up laws for that colony.60 This premise will remain the occasion of 
the Laws throughout the rest of the dialogue; it will silently shape the order 
of all of the questions and responses that subsequently will take place in the 
text. As such, the space of the colony will have an indispensable function 
within the philosophic apparatus of law set forth in the Laws. It will give the 
gathered interlocutors the opportunity and indeed the duty to formulate 
only those laws which philosophy asks of them, as distinct from those laws 
which the necessities of an existing oikos would demand of them. The prem-
ise of the colony, in other words, will allow the interlocutors’ philosophizing 
no longer to be governed by an existing arrangement of the sensible (with its 
prephilosophical and therefore unphilosophical distribution of labor, agri-
culture, reproduction, education, and so forth), but now to govern that ar-
rangement. Only in a new apoikia— as distinct from an existing oikos— will 
it be possible for the order of the intelligible to come to govern and arrange 
the order of the sensible. The interlocutors of the Laws understand this: they 
grasp that the very possibility of their philosophic discourse is predicated on 
a divine accident, and for the chance to write the nomoi of an apoikia— for 
their emancipation, in other words, from the need to rewrite the nomoi of 
an existing oikos, with the stasis that rewriting would inevitably entail— they 
thank and praise God.
What this praise conceals is a perplexity that is neither theological nor 
mathematical in character. Without the clearing produced by coloniza-
tion, the Stranger would not have been able to reconcile the arithmetic and 
geometrical orders in his account of the best possible number of lots. He 
would have been forced to begin counting in medias res, which inevitably 
would have entailed the recollection of past wrongs, a trace of stasis.61 In 
the Laws, the apparatus of law depends upon a truly philosophical count— a 
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distribution of land, lots, and life that not only begins but also ends with 
One. But where exactly is it— in the midst of what already existing nomos 
or oikos— that one can begin counting from one? If every already existing 
political and legal order already entails a prephilosophical count, such that 
any introduction of a philosophical count necessarily will entail a divisive 
recounting (not only in the mode of nomos, in the form of lots, debts, etc., 
but also in the mode of nous, in the form of bad memories, grief and griev-
ances related to stasis, etc.), how exactly is it that a philosophical count will 
be able to come into being at all? But for the possibility of a perfectly empty 
clearing— an equivalent, we might say, for the zero that Greek mathematics 
famously lacked— how else could the apparatus of law set itself up in confor-
mity with the requirements of a truly philosophic nous?62 It’s precisely this 
perplexity— this paradoxical lack of nothing, of a count that could begin 
with emptiness— that demands or requires the operation of colonization as 
the prior condition for the philosophic apparatus of law in the Laws. It is this 
same problem that colonization solves more dianoetically than does numeri-
cally based amnesty: although both amnesty and the colony do indeed clear 
the way for the emergence of a philosophic apparatus of law, the colony per-
forms this function more completely than does amnesty. The clearing of the 
colony provides an empty space that is much more radical, much more fully 
emptied of division, than is the enforced oblivion produced by amnesty’s 
internally divided oath, its “promise to remember to forget.”63
The space of the colony is, accordingly, not merely one among prob-
lems for the Laws. It’s the implicit spatiality that lets Plato’s Laws count, 
and that as such enables law to become thinkable in and for the philosophic 
apparatus the Laws sets up. At once the innermost limit of the arithmetic 
and geometric orders, the topos noetos that ordains the most dianoetic po-
lis, and the condition for the best possible join between the arithmetic and 
geometric orders, the space of the colony is the indispensable condition for 
the philosophic apparatus of law that emerges in the Laws. It is the reason the 
lawgivers begin legislating at all (in the strict sense that the purpose of the 
last seven books of the Laws is to provide legislation for the new colony) and 
it is the empty space on which alone the lawgivers’ harmonious common 
can become intelligible at all. But if the colony is therefore the paradigmatic 
nomos for the mode of thought inaugurated in the Laws, it is equally that 
clearing operation that nous requires for itself if the order of the intelligible 
is to give order, shape, and form to the order of the sensible, rather than the 
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other way around. Colonization is indispensable for nous, that is to say, if 
nous is to be able to produce a nomos without also becoming nonidentical 
with itself in the process (for a nous that was produced by a nomos would be, 
for Plato, no nous at all), and if nomos is to remain self- identical with itself 
in this apparatus as well (for colonization alone allows the philosopher to 
produce an apparatus of law free from the fear that his prescriptions will pro-
duce recounting within the community and thus too the very stasis against 
which law is supposed to immunize the community).
In The Apology, Plato’s first work, Socrates speaks almost as though he 
were a stranger to Athens.64 In the Laws, Plato’s last work, a Stranger speaks 
in a setting outside Athens almost as though he were Socrates. From the 
only Platonic dialogue in which Socrates does not appear, the Laws would 
seem to offer a teaching that is perfectly befitting of the Stranger who here 
seems to appear in Socrates’s place: philosophy can solve the war within the 
home only by presupposing a home away from home (which is literally what 
a colony, or ap- oikia, is in the Laws). Between the nous of philosophy and 
the nomos of the colony there would appear to be, in short, a relation not 
simply of hierarchy but also of cobelonging: the colony will have been that 
nomos that allows thinking itself— nous— to set itself up as a self- founding 
force, and that, for this reason, is inscribed essentially, if silently, each and 
every time nous appears in its selfsame autonomy.
Nothing here, of course, should imply that colonization allows the phi-
losopher to escape from grounded practical matters into the clouds of the-
ory. Colonization in the Laws is an operation that is at once much more intri-
cate and much less Aristophanean than that. The introduction of the colony 
into philosophy enables the interlocutors to establish a proper rank— a philo-
sophical rank— between the necessities of household management and the 
wisdom of philosophic lawgiving. Prior to the harmonious One, prior to 
the serious play that operates to immunize the community against division 
and stasis, colonization is that operation internal to the Laws’ philosophic 
apparatus which produces the empty space in the absence of which, in turn, 
that apparatus would not be able to come into its own as philosophy— as a 
mode of autonomous thought that is capable of governing and arranging, 
distributing and disposing, the sensible world from the standpoint of the 
intelligible world. Even, especially, when it is not named as such, the clearing 
of the colony remains the definitive horizon for the specific mode of nous 
the Laws inaugurates.
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Contemporary philosophers sometimes seem to presuppose that to be self- 
conscious of law’s effects in and on philosophical thought is to be self- conscious 
of a very specific juridical form: the mandatory command or tyrannical pre-
scription. But with this presupposition, philosophy demonstrates that it has 
not yet become fully self- conscious about the mode in which it becomes 
self- conscious of its own relation to law. From the Laws we learn something 
unexpected about the sort of dispositif that law is. If I should find that I am 
unable to think politics without first seeing and speaking of an empty space, 
a clearing or void in which the perfect polity stands a chance of coming into 
being, then already my voice and gaze dwell within a horizon opened for me 
by law’s philosophic apparatus. The dispositif of the law, at least in Plato’s 
Laws, is not then limited to the form of the tyrannical command, the in-
junction or imperative backed by threats. To seek out the clearing, this space 
defined by the potential for a home away from home, as though thought’s 
estrangement in an empty space were the prior condition for any thought 
that truly is thought, is not at all to render inoperative the dispositif of the 
law. To the contrary, it is already to think in the innermost inside of the law, 
in the space that philosophy prepares in order for the law to be law, and in 
the space that law prepares so that philosophy may become philosophy.
The operation of this dispositif is apparent in each of the two reopenings 
of the Plato question we’ve outlined. To sharpen the point, it will be useful 
to recapitulate the teachings on law these respective Platonisms propose to 
transmit. For Badiou, reopening the Plato question holds out a very definite 
promise: it is an occasion for philosophy to think anew its relation to the One 
and thus too to the law, to discover in Plato’s aporetic dialogues a way for 
philosophy to think law without also at the same time participating either 
in the One or in lawgiving. For Badiou, as we have seen, philosophy ceases 
to be philosophy as soon as it begins to rely upon criminal prescriptions to 
enforce its truths upon nonphilosophers. Philosophy can remain philosophy, 
can avoid its innermost and most intimate disaster, only if it suspends its 
temptation to use despotic injunctions to declare a permanent end to soph-
istry. This understanding of philosophy does not, as some commentators 
seem to have concluded from Badiou’s writings on Saint Paul, commit Ba-
diou to simple antinomianism, to a crude antithesis between philosophy and 
law. It commits him to nothing more, but also nothing less, than a newly 
aporetic understanding of the relation of philosophy and law. To the extent 
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that philosophy is able to maintain a philosophic relation to its own temp-
tation to issue criminal prescriptions, its own desire to remain self- identical 
with itself will give rise to an imperative: that philosophers must regard 
as “illégal” (Badiou’s quotation marks) any use of law to substantialize or 
realize Truth.65 Only by remaining loyal to this paradoxical imperative, this 
philosophic law against philosophic lawgiving, will philosophy be able to 
relate to law not as an inner temptation to disaster, but as a proper aporia— 
in a mode, that is to say, that is not nonphilosophical but now, for the first 
time, properly philosophical.66 For Badiou, it would seem, reopening the 
Plato question would allow us to comprehend the relation between law and 
philosophy in rigorously philosophical terms: as a nonrelation.67
Strauss’s return to Plato would seem to circle around an equally intricate 
set of reflections on law and philosophy. In his well- known writings on the 
problem of  “persecution and the art of writing” that emerge out of his ear-
lier, lesser- known studies of Platonism, Strauss explains why writers who 
hold heterodox views must communicate their thought “exclusively between 
the lines.”68 If thinkers did not take care to inscribe their thoughts between 
the lines, Strauss suggests, they would run the risk that those thoughts 
would be censored or destroyed, and that philosophic teachings would cease 
to be transmitted to those few who are capable of them (or, in Strauss’s 
words, those “young men who might become philosophers”). Structuring 
this hermeneutics, this serious play of speech and silence, is a clear under-
standing of an irreconcilable gap between philosophy and law.69 Because 
law cannot be philosophical— because the nonphilosophical multitude can-
not govern itself by thought alone, and stands in need of law’s tyrannical 
commands and threats of force if it is to govern its passions and appetites 
at all— philosophy cannot fully obey law without also subordinating itself, 
in the process, to its opposite: nonphilosophy. Between law and philosophy 
there is not, however, a simple antinomy; there is instead an unstable equi-
librium, an opaque force field, in relation to which both law and philoso-
phy each remain constitutively open to the risk of becoming nonidentical 
with themselves. Just as philosophy that abides by law risks devolving into 
nonphilosophy, so too law that aspires to philosophy risks throwing into 
question the tyrannical commands and threats of force that alone allow it to 
govern nonphilosophers; law that gives full voice to its own self- stultifying 
aporias is no law at all. For Strauss, albeit in a much different way than for 
Badiou, the relation between law and philosophy also should be understood 
as an irreducible nonrelation: as an unbridgeable distance between philos-
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ophy’s open question (“what is?”) and law’s definitive declaration (“what 
is”), and by extension, between Athens and Jerusalem, between reason and 
revelation.70 The subtle relations of speech and silence that structure the sur-
faces of exoteric texts are thus anything but empty forms. There is a content 
to their form: they are signs of a nonrelation that is no less irreducible and 
aporetic than is Badiou’s philosophic imperative.
7
If we may speak of a koinè that joins Strauss to Badiou, it is not, however, 
because each thinker finds in Plato the resources to hold open a nonrelation 
between law and philosophy. It is because each thinker leaves unthought 
the space that at once enables that nonrelation and collapses it from within. 
Strauss and Badiou alike underestimate the extent to which the apparatus of 
law in Plato is not simply a tyrannical command, but also, even primarily, 
a nomos— a political space.71 And not just any political space, but a very 
distinct political space, one whose specifically political character derives, 
paradoxically, from the absence within it of any polis whatsoever. In short: 
an impolitical space. The empty space of the colony is not a res extensa, an ex-
terior space upon which the philosopher inscribes his interior blueprints. It 
is that clearing that alone allows philosophic thought to separate itself from 
the order of the sensible and to set itself up in the atopia (or, better, atopicité) 
that, in turn, is the only place where autonomous thinking is really at home 
with itself; it is that place alone that allows thought to produce laws out of its 
own autonomy.72 The blank slate or tabula rasa exemplified by the colony is 
not then exterior to lawgiving thought; it is the innermost interior and indis-
pensable condition of lawgiving thought. It is the very horizon of thought 
that allows thought to render itself intelligible to itself as lawgiving thought.
This holds even, especially, where thought cannot name or think the 
clearing that allows it to see and speak of law; it holds even and especially 
when thought misrecognizes this clearing as a space exterior to law, a space 
of nonlaw that would seem to promise to thought an ability to relate to law 
in the mode of a nonrelation. In Straussian hermeneutics, this misrecogni-
tion will take place in a most symptomatic way, through Strauss’s excessively 
literal naming of the blank slate or tabula rasa that appears between the lines 
in exoteric texts. The space of the colony will provide the horizon and lexi-
con within which Strauss explains what it means to read writing between the 
lines. At the opening of his famous 1941 text, Strauss outlines his hermeneu-
reopening the plato question 189
tic project, his desire to interpret the blank slate— the surface of the empty 
page— that is there between the lines, with catachrestic reference to coloni-
zation: “This expression [writing between the lines] is clearly metaphoric. 
Any attempt to express its meaning in unmetaphoric language would lead 
to the discovery of a terra incognita, a field whose very dimensions are as 
yet unexplored and which offers ample scope for highly intriguing and even 
important investigations. One may say without fear of being presently con-
victed of grave exaggeration that almost the only preparatory work to guide 
the explorer in this field is buried in the writings of the rhetoricians of antiq-
uity.”73 Strauss’s unmetaphoric use of metaphor here may at first appear to be 
nothing more than play, but read to the letter it has an effect that is far from 
unserious: a claim that opens with logical paradox— what might it mean 
to read writing in a space where there is none?— is closed down by rhetori-
cal commonplace (namely, that knowing the unknown is akin to exploring 
an unexplored land). It is, of course, no accident that Strauss will treat the 
empty surface of the page as though it could be rendered intelligible as a 
colonial space (an unknown land that is there to be discovered by a reader 
who is, in effect, an explorer, a founder of a colony). Quite the opposite: this 
swerve will have been prescribed for Strauss in advance by the very text in 
which he claimed to find the best regime in the first place. In Plato’s Laws, 
the empty space of the colony is that topos noetos in which alone the best 
regime may be found each and every time it is possible to find it, up to and 
including when that empty space is the empty space between the lines of an 
exoteric text. Strauss’s self- conscious metaphorization of the limit to meta-
phor is, in this sense, the unself- conscious mark within Strauss’s thought 
of a dispositif that Strauss, who thought the relation of law and thought in 
Plato as dispensation, could not think on its own terms. For Strauss, the 
poetics of colonization would seem to provide the best, clearest, or per-
haps just the most obvious device for seeing and speaking about a mode 
of thought, philosophy, that seeks to escape the persecutions of law by in-
scribing its lessons in the empty spaces that appear on the blank page. Loyal 
Straussians certainly might want to downplay Strauss’s playful reference to 
colonization, as if it were merely an unserious aside. But Strauss’s loyalty was 
not to Strauss but to Plato, and it was a loyalty that was far more excessive 
then either Strauss or his disciples perhaps are able to admit. In particular, 
Strauss is excessively loyal, more loyal than he knows or can even manage 
to know, to that part of the Laws that requires the clearing of the colony be-
fore thought can be thought as thought. But this same clearing undermines 
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the very hermeneutics it seems to enable, for it collapses from within the 
nonrelation upon which Straussian hermeneutics at root depends. From the 
Laws, we learn that the clearing in which alone thought is at home is not at 
all exterior to law, but is to the contrary law’s most indispensable condition. 
The colony, in other words, is not law’s antipode; it is the only place where 
law has a chance to achieve perfection. Strauss deploys the poetics of colonial 
space in order to name the interpretive horizon inside of which the thought-
ful writer may transmit his thought of the best regime in nonrelation with 
the thoughtless censor who, in turn, seeks to persecute that writer— or, in 
Platonic terms, where nous may express itself with being ordered by nomos. 
But precisely this deployment is the best sign that Strauss cannot think the 
juridicality of the very horizon on which he depends for his interpretations. 
The empty space that Strauss supposes is exterior to law is itself already a 
space internal to law, is already the innermost interior and indispensable 
condition of lawgiving thought. Strauss’s return to Plato would thus seem 
to reopen the Plato question in a manner that exceeds, from within, not only 
Strauss’s own reading of Plato, which circles around a nonrelation between 
law and philosophy, but also the hermeneutics he proposes to have retrieved 
from Platonism, which brings that same nonrelation to the surface of the 
written page now as a problem for reading.
What is true of Strauss’s thought in the mode of the poem is true for 
Badiou’s thought in the mode of the matheme. For Badiou, Plato’s aporetic 
thinking can be sustained only insofar as it remains atopic thinking: phi-
losophy’s act is nothing more, but also nothing less, than to open an “active 
void within thought.”74 The “empty gap” that results from this operation 
allows for the appearance of truths, but only so long as philosophy manages 
to maintain those truths in nonidentity with the void that provides them 
with their background.75 The “ethics of philosophy,” as Badiou calls it, is 
to avoid the temptation to transform this empty gap into a spacing where 
Truth appears not as a void, but as being.76 To the extent philosophy caves 
in to this temptation, it succumbs to its own internal inverse: terror. Philos-
ophy becomes a force of terror when it no longer limits itself to the work of 
poking a hole in sense or declaring the void inside of the domain of what 
is, but instead gives truth a presence in a specific place and assigns a specific 
sacred name, in the process annihilating the void itself and destroying the 
very possibility of declaring what is not.77
On this point, it must be said, there is between Strauss and Badiou no 
koinè whatsoever. There is only diagnosis. Badiou’s ethics of philosophy 
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explains, with great clarity, what precisely is terrible in Strauss’s localization 
of philosophy and law, reason and revelation, in Athens and Jerusalem. This 
localization of  Truth has produced a sacralization of the West, the terror 
and dogmatism of which require no additional elaboration here.78 Especially 
because Strauss privileges a close and sustained reading of Plato’s Laws, the 
very text in opposition to which Badiou develops the ethics of philosophy 
in the first place, Strauss’s Platonism is the very paradigm of disaster in the 
Badiouian sense of the word; it is, in other words, the very best example of 
philosophy at its worst.79
That same exemplarity, however, also points to something else: the sense 
in which Badiou’s own ethics disjoins itself in its most intimate and essential 
region. The paradox of Badiou’s operational void, which strives to maintain 
the empty place of  Truth and so to guard against any disaster, is not that it 
is disloyal to Plato; it is that it is also excessively loyal to Plato, above all to 
the Platonic text in which Badiou locates the disaster of Platonism itself.80 
On the terms of Plato’s Laws, the clearing of an empty space in sense, and 
the setting up of thought in the operational void that results, is not at all a 
renunciation of lawgiving thought; it is, to the contrary, the paradigmatic 
form of lawgiving thought. In the Laws, the empty space is not a step back 
from the ecstasy of place; it is the ecstatic place par excellence. The apoikia 
of the Laws, in fact, is nothing so much as a place of ek- stasis, a place that 
immunizes politics against stasis by placing itself outside of stasis.
To be sure, Badiou’s recourse to the “exceptionally severe” laws of mathe-
matics certainly does allow him to displace the unmathematical use of the 
One that Jacob Klein found at the core of Platonic politics.81 It is certainly 
therefore possible to generate a reading of Badiou as the thinker who can-
cels out the apoikia, thinking it through to completion: by thinking the 
void that Plato could not think, and by opposing the One that Plato did 
think, Badiou puts himself in a position to rethink the place and function of 
the colony in the philosophic apparatus Plato establishes in the Laws.82 But 
even this reading would need to confront the possibility, immanent to the 
very procedures of Badiou’s ethics of philosophy, that Badiou does not so 
much cancel out the apoikia as sublate it, iterating its empty space now in 
a higher form, indeed as the very hallmark of philosophic thought itself.83 
Understood purely from the perspective of its deployment, after all, Badiou’s 
operational void produces the same philosophic autonomy that the colony 
produces in Plato’s Laws: the operational void, like the empty space of the 
colony, allows philosophy to separate the intelligible from the sensible, and 
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to establish the rank of the intelligible over the sensible. It is perhaps no 
surprise, then, that the space of the colony should reappear so consistently 
in Badiou’s descriptions of philosophy itself. “The philosopher is always a 
stranger,” Badiou argues; the philosopher’s thought constitutively exceeds 
any “home for truth,” which is defined by nothing so much as its emptiness, 
its exteriority to any home, such that thinking can only “take place abroad,” 
in a “foreign” country, such that the hallmark of any true philosophic com-
mitment is its “internal foreignness.”84 It’s as though the ethics of philoso-
phy were reducible to a most familiar imperative: that philosophy will have 
been philosophy only if it first dwells in the topos noetos of the ap- oikia, this 
empty space, this home away from home.
The ethics of philosophy too, the ethics of philosophy above all, would 
thus seem to circle around an aporia. This aporia, however, consists not of 
a nonrelation between law and philosophy, but of a relation of excessive 
identity, a relation in which philosophy is so completely interior to the empty 
space of the ap- oikia, and consequently too so completely in thrall to its own 
autonomy, that the very notion of empty space has become for it, precisely, 
an imperative. “The event is in excess of all law”— this philosopheme, so cen-
tral to Badiou’s oeuvre, would appear to be capable of thinking everything 
except the event of law itself, everything except the genesis of law in and 
from an empty space that reappears, in Badiou’s thought, as the imperative 
of all imperatives, the nonlaw governing any and all philosophic relations to 
law, as the dead center of the very thinking of thinking undertaken by the 
thinker of the event. The truth of the void, on the terms of Plato’s Laws, is 
that the void is not a void. It is an impolitical space that lawgiving thought 
must occupy if thought is at all to become able to issue laws in and from 
its own autonomy. The open void in which Badiou finds the possibility of 
restraining philosophy from caving in to disaster is, in other words, precisely 
that space that alone enables the criminal prescriptions that are, for Badiou, 
the hallmark of disaster itself. Badiou’s thought, it would seem, must there-
fore expose itself to disaster in the very same place, and by virtue of the very 
same ethical imperative, that allows it the possibility of restraining itself 
from disaster. In principle, of course, a void that is inconsistent with itself 
should not be inconsistent with Badiou’s Platonism, which emphasizes the 
necessity of inconsistency in the void.85 But the inconsistency internal to the 
colony of the Laws— to this atopic space that is the paradigm not only for 
lawgiving thought but also for the complete absence of lawgiving thought— 
points to a very different problem: a disjunctive synthesis of law and thought 
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that is as central to Badiou’s Platonism as it is unthinkable on the terms of 
that Platonism.
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chapter 7
The Royal Remains:
The People’s Two Bodies and 
the Endgames of Sovereignty
Eric L. Santner
1
In what is perhaps his most dreamlike prose text, “A Country Doctor,” 
Franz Kafka describes in graphic detail the wound on the side of a young 
boy, the patient a district physician has been called to attend to in the middle 
of a snowy night:
On his right side, near the hip, there is an open wound the size of a 
palmprint. Many shades of pink, dark in its depths and growing lighter 
at the edges, tender and grainy, with unevenly pooling blood, open at the 
surface like a mine. Thus from a distance. Close up, further complications 
are apparent. Who can look at that without giving a low whistle? Worms, 
as thick and as long as my little finger, rose- pink themselves and also 
blood- spattered, firmly attached to the inside of the wound, with little 
white heads, with many little legs, writhe up toward the light.1
The text is unusual for Kafka in its proximity to the sort of expressionist 
prose he was known to dislike, but it still very much bears the distinctive 
signature of the author. Here, as in so many other texts, the main character, 
the provincial doctor named in the title, is faced by a call he cannot fully re-
spond to, a mandate or summons to work— call it a “charge” or “ex- citation” 
(from excitare, to call out or summon)— that turns out to be impossible to 
discharge. Kafka indicates in the text that there might be large, historical 
reasons for this impossibility, among them the preponderance of a false 
conception of medical knowledge and capacities in a secular world. The 
problem seems to be in part that in such a world spiritual needs now register 
largely as bodily, somatic disturbances: “Always asking the doctor to do the 
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impossible. They have lost their old faith; the pastor sits at home, plucking 
his vestments into shreds, one after the other; but the doctor is supposed 
to accomplish everything with his tender, surgical hands.”2 Here a sacerdo-
tal investiture crisis— the priest literally shreds his vestments— resonates as 
bodily symptom that induces, in its turn, an excess of demand with respect 
to the medical arts, one that generates its own investiture crisis: the doctor’s 
inability to fulfill, to satisfy the normative pressures, of his office.3 The 
immediate proximity of these remarks to the characterization of the boy as 
being “blinded by the life in his wound” (my emphasis) suggests that one can 
only begin to grasp the meaning of this palpitating life substance and the 
crisis it materializes against the background of this collapse of the spiritual 
into the corporeal, of transcendence into an immanence that can no longer 
be mastered by the available sciences of immanence.
As Slavoj Žižek has noted, just such a correlation of a surplus of flesh 
with a crisis of investiture had already been staged by Richard Wagner in his 
opera Parsifal. There Amfortas’s inability to administer his office as Grail 
King— Titurel, the king’s father, harasses his son with the admonishing 
question, “Mein Sohn Amfortas, bist du am Amt?”— takes on the carnal 
form of an endlessly bleeding wound afflicting the king.4 Hans Jürgen Sy-
berberg’s great dramaturgical innovation in his film adaptation of the opera 
was to separate the wound from the king’s body, to present it as an auton-
omous bit of surplus flesh unable to find its proper bodily container. To 
put it in the form of a wordplay that works only in German (and, perhaps, 
especially in Swiss German), we might say, Was in der (Eid- )Genossenschaft 
genossen wird, geht darüber hinaus, was in einer Körperschaft verfasst werden 
kann. It is, I would suggest, just such an excess of jouissance or Geniessen that 
keeps Kafka’s characters in a kind of perpetual motion that in another short 
fragment he characterized as the uncannily animated or undead dimension 
of an oath or Eid, the mysterious validity of which survives the death of the 
figure that had previously embodied the Verfasstheit, the constitution and 
composure of the body politic: “They were given the choice to become kings 
or messengers. Just like children they all chose to be messengers. For this 
reason there are only messengers; they race through the world and, because 
there are no kings, they call out to one another proclamations that have 
become meaningless. They would happily put an end to their miserable life 
but because of their oath of office they don’t dare.”5
the royal remains 203
2
In this context, one will recall that the dream that Freud himself saw as 
the inaugural dream of psychoanalysis— the dream in which the paradoxical 
stuff or raw material of the symptom makes a dramatic appearance— is itself 
a kind of parable of a country doctor overwhelmed by the demands of his 
office. Much as in the case of Kafka’s provincial physician, the famous dream 
of Irma’s injection stages the insufficiency of the sciences of immanence— 
including, first and foremost, medicine— for the treatment of hysterical 
symptoms. It thus marks for Freud the very birth of psychoanalysis, its emer-
gence, precisely, as the science that is called on the scene by the hysteric’s 
body, one that manifests a strange excess of life that both belongs and does 
not belong to the body in question. At one point in this dream that for the 
most part circulates around Freud’s concern that he might have missed some 
sort of purely physiological cause of Irma’s suffering— and so that he himself 
failed to be a proper man of science, failed to satisfy the normative pressures 
of his office— Freud looks into his patient’s mouth; what he encounters there 
places Irma in a kind of kinship relation with the boy in Kafka’s story as well 
as with Wagner’s Grail King: “She then opened her mouth properly and on 
the right I found a big white patch; at another place I saw extensive whit-
ish grey scabs upon some remarkable curly structures which were evidently 
modeled on the turbinal bones of the nose.”6 In the dream Freud essentially 
places himself in an impossible situation, one in which he can only lose. If 
Irma is physically sick, then he has failed as a physician; if it is, rather, her 
hysterical symptoms that persist in spite of Freud’s treatment, then he has 
failed as the inventor of a new science and therapy of psychopathology. The 
key to the dream will ultimately lie in Freud’s discovery— indeed, we might 
call this the inaugural, self- reflexive finding of psychoanalysis— of the ways 
in which his own mind has gotten (dis)organized around the fantasy of 
being found, of being judged to be wanting in the face of the normative 
pressures of an office or symbolic mandate.
Some ten years later, Freud would encounter the case of yet another fig-
ure whose life came to be informed by the threat of being rendered formless, 
informe, under the pressures of a crisis of investiture precisely as a judge. I 
am referring, of course, to the case of Daniel Paul Schreber, whose psy-
chotic breakdown was precipitated by his nomination as Senatspräsident of 
the Sachsen Supreme Court. Schreber seems to have experienced this crisis 
as the meltdown of his official, institutional identity into the rotting flesh 
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of a strange new creature, a delusional metamorphosis that led to his eight- 
year- long institutionalization. Freud based his case study of Schreber on 
the latter’s efforts to account for the meaning behind the madness of his 
metamorphosis in his now famous Memoirs of My Nervous Illness. Schreber 
felt himself called by divine forces to become a Luder and to cultivate a new 
sort of religious practice we might characterize as Ludertum. (In German, 
the word Luder can mean wretch, in the sense of a lost and pathetic creature, 
but can also signify a cunning swindler or scoundrel; a whore, tart, or slut; 
and finally, the dead, rotting flesh of an animal, especially in the sense of 
carrion used as bait in hunting. The French translation of Schreber’s Memoirs 
renders this word as Charogne, which was also, of course, the title of one of 
Baudelaire’s most famous poems from the Fleurs du mal.) Schreber’s inability 
to fulfill the office of his secular Beruf engendered a remainder of flesh that 
formed the kernel of his messianic Berufung to restore order to a world in 
which a state of exception had become the norm, at least in his “own private 
Germany.”7
To return to Freud’s Irma dream: in his own rather apocalyptic commen-
tary on this primal scene of psychoanalysis— and indeed, citing the dream 
visions and interpretations of the Book of Daniel— Jacques Lacan, who the 
following year would dedicate an entire seminar to Daniel Paul Schreber’s 
metamorphosis into a Luder, writes the following:
There’s a horrendous discovery here, that of the flesh one never sees, the 
foundation of things, the other side of the head, of the face, the secretory 
glands par excellence, the flesh from which everything exudes, at the very 
heart of the mystery, the flesh in as much as it is suffering, is formless, in 
as much as its form in itself is something which provokes anxiety. Spectre 
of anxiety, identification of anxiety, the final revelation of you are this— 
You are this, which is so far from you, this which is the ultimate formlessness. 
Freud comes upon a revelation of the type, Mene, Tekel, Peres at the height 
of his need to see, to know, which was until then expressed in the dia-
logue of the ego with the object.8
Lacan returns to the prophetic writing on the wall when he comments on 
the conclusion of the Irma dream. First Freud: “Not long before, when she 
was feeling unwell, my friend Otto had given her an injection of a prepa-
ration of propyl, propyls . . . propionic acid . . . trimethylamin (and I saw 
before me the formula for this printed in heavy type). . . . Injections of 
that sort ought not to be made so thoughtlessly. . . . And probably the sy-
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ringe had not been clean.” Although this is perhaps going a bit too far, I do 
quite like the detail that the formula for trimethylamin is printed in “heavy 
type”— is, as Freud puts it, fettgedruckt— in which I can’t help but hear a 
slight emphasis on Fett qua surplus of flesh. In his own interpretation of the 
dream, Freud himself notes that trimethylamin was a substance— curiously, 
in the dream he refers to it as a body or Körper, though not explicitly as a fat 
one— with a possible link to the chemistry of sexual processes: “Thus this 
substance [dieser Körper] led me to sexuality, the factor to which I attributed 
the greatest importance in the origin of the nervous disorders which it was 
my aim to cure.”9 But as we know, this would be a cure that would intervene 
into the peculiar chemistry of the libido not by way of injections but rather 
by way of speech (after having experimented with hypnotism and even the 
laying on of hands). The language of the religions of revelation— religions 
based on the word and its transmission, a transmission that necessarily 
exceeds comprehension, or to use the famous formulation that Gershom 
Scholem coined to characterize the nature of revelation in Kafka’s universe: 
a transmission that remains valid in excess of a graspable meaning— all this 
allows Lacan to locate the symptom and its cure in the field of the signifier, 
in the discourse of the Other:
The dream, which culminated a first time, when the ego was there, with 
the horrific image I mentioned, culminates a second time at the end with 
a formula, with its Mene, Tekel, Upharsin aspect, on the wall, beyond what 
we cannot but identify as speech, universal rumor. . . . Like my oracle, the 
formula gives no reply whatsoever to anything. But the very manner in 
which it is spelt out, its enigmatic, hermetic nature, is in fact the answer 
to the question of the meaning of the dream. One can model it closely 
on the Islamic formula— There is no other God but God. There is no other 
word, no other solution to your problem, than the word.10
The point Lacan is making here is that we are libidinal beings, that we de-
sire in a human rather than animal sense, because our enjoyment is entwined 
with the signifier, with titles and entitlements, with the various offices with 
which we come to be invested in the world, offices we are, in turn, called to 
occupy— zu besetzen. The strange surplus flesh that Freud came to call the 
libido and that constitutes the stuff of our erotic investments in the world 
is born from the fact that our being is compelled to unfold within a matrix 
of signifying representations, a field never quite made to the measure of the 
animal that we also are. It is this very lack of measure, this lack of fit, that 
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opens the wound correlative to our passions and that accounts for the pecu-
liar stuff of which dreams— and nightmares— are made. What accounts for 
our capacities to experience sublimity and abjection— and the peculiar os-
cillation between the two extremes— is that we are always contending with 
a bit of surplus flesh that can never be fully figured out. Some part of the 
discourse of the Other into which we are inscribed is always, we might say, 
fettgedruckt.
3
I would like to propose that the urgency of the engagement with the dimen-
sion of the flesh that calls psychoanalysis into being, that converted Freud 
from being a man of medicine into what Merleau- Ponty characterized as 
the only true philosopher of the flesh, has a precise historical index and one 
located not so much in the history of the natural sciences but rather in the 
history of what Foucault referred to as governmentality. (Indeed, I propose 
that we hear this word as a complex wordplay: a shift in mentality, in the way 
embodied subjects are minded, must be correlated with a shift in the nature 
of governance and Herrschaft, of the elaboration of potestas and auctoritas in 
the space of political life.) My argument is, basically, that this visceral yet 
somehow virtual dimension of the flesh that begins to haunt everyday life 
in modernity needs to be grasped as what I refer to as the royal remains, the 
residues of the substance of the king’s sublime body that has, in the age of 
popular sovereignty, entered into the life of the people without ever fully 
being able to find its proper locus or fully binding Verfassung.
It was precisely in response to the pressures generated by this new dispen-
sation that Michel Foucault felt compelled to reject the classical concepts of 
political theory— above all that of sovereignty— in favor of a new ensemble 
of concepts and modes of inquiry that would be more responsive, more 
attuned to the locations and dynamics of political power and authority in 
modernity. As he put it in a very concise passage in Discipline and Punish: 
“The body of the king, with its strange material and physical presence, with 
the force that he himself deploys or transmits to some few others, is at the 
opposite extreme of this new physics of power . . . : a physics of a relational 
and multiple power, which has its maximum intensity not in the person of the 
king, but in the bodies that can be individualized by these relations.”11 To take 
the example of Daniel Paul Schreber, we can certainly say that his body was 
individualized, rendered into a case, indeed into a kind of paradigmatic case, 
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by this new physics of power. I would, however, insist that insofar as the 
agents of the new physics of power— and here one should include not only 
Schreber’s famous father but also his psychiatrists— imagined themselves to 
be addressing the care and discipline of living bodies and the biological life 
and health of populations rather than ministering to the strange materiality 
of the flesh in its now horizontally dispersed locations, they did not and 
could not fully grasp the nature of their tasks. Given the messianic place 
he saw himself as occupying, Schreber might have said about these agents 
of the new biopolitics: they know not what they do. But this is also true, 
I think, for the great theorist of biopolitics; Foucault himself did not fully 
grasp that his new theory of power was responding to the metamorphosis 
of what Ernst Kantorowicz had so richly elaborated as the political theology 
of the king’s two bodies in medieval and early modern Europe, a metamor-
phosis that would compel the people to have to figure out what to do with 
the carnal dimension— with the flesh— of their sovereignty, with the stuff 
of a second, sublime body. The task was, we might say, to figure out how 
to figure these royal remains that now intruded so forcefully into the life of 
the people.
Against this background it makes sense that in the same seminar in which 
he comments on the inaugural dream of psychoanalysis, Lacan will have 
further recourse to the uncanny materiality of flesh and the crisis of its figu-
ration. The context of these reflections is a commentary not on the Schreber 
case— that will come, as I have noted, the following year for Lacan— but 
rather on Edgar Allan Poe’s story “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar.” 
The first- person narrator tells of his recent preoccupation with mesmerism 
and his curiosity about the fact that no one had ever seemed to have investi-
gated the boundary between life and death by means of this technique, that 
“no person had as yet been mesmerized in articulo mortis.”12 The narrator 
proposes to a terminally ill acquaintance, a certain M. Ernest Valdemar, 
to allow him to attempt the experiment with him. The prospects appeared 
good, for Valdemar had already shown himself to be susceptible to mes-
merism. His advanced state of tubercular dissolution— it is referred to in 
the story as phthisis, meaning literally to waste away— furthermore made it 
possible to predict the time of his demise. When the time of death finally ar-
rives, the narrator is called on the scene and brings Valdemar into a mesmeric 
trance that miraculously preserves a kind of animation beyond the point of 
death. The story reaches a climax at the moment when Valdemar answers the 
narrator’s question whether he was asleep with the following words: “ ‘Yes;— 
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no— I have been sleeping— and now— now— I am dead’ ” (281). The narrator’s 
attempt to describe the voice uttering these words— he refers to the utterance 
as a distinct “syllabification”— is worth quoting at length:
There was no longer the faintest sign of vitality in M. Valdemar; and 
concluding him to be dead, we were consigning him to the charge of the 
nurses, when a strong vibratory motion was observable in the tongue. 
This continued for perhaps a minute. At the expiration of this period, 
there issued from the distended and motionless jaws a voice— such as it 
would be madness in me to attempt describing. There are, indeed, two 
or three epithets which might be considered as applicable to it in part; I 
might say, for example, that the sound was harsh, and broken and hol-
low. But the hideous whole is indescribable, for the simple reason that no 
similar sounds have ever jarred upon the ear of humanity. There were two 
particulars, nevertheless, which I thought then, and still think, might 
fairly be stated as characteristic of the intonation— as well adapted to 
convey some idea of its unearthly peculiarity. In the first place, the voice 
seemed to reach our ears— at least mine— from a vast distance, or from 
some deep cavern within the earth. In the second place, it impressed me 
(I fear, indeed, that it will be impossible to make myself comprehended) 
as gelatinous or glutinous matters impress the sense of touch. (280 – 81)
The narrator then relates that Valdemar had remained in this state of what we 
might call mesmeric undeadness for a period of seven months. At that point 
he and the attending physicians decide that they will attempt to break the 
trance, to free Valdemar from his somatic purgatory, in a word, to awaken 
him to his own death. As for what follows, the narrator writes, “it is quite 
impossible that any human being could have been prepared”: “As I rapidly 
made the mesmeric passes, amid ejaculations of ‘dead! dead!’ absolutely 
bursting from the tongue and not from the lips of the sufferer, his whole 
frame at once— within the space of a single minute, or even less, shrunk— 
crumbled— absolutely rotted away beneath my hands. Upon the bed, before 
that whole company, there lay a nearly liquid mass of loathsome— of detest-
able putridity” (283).
It is worth underlining that Lacan offers this commentary in conjunction 
with remarks on kingship and its demise, that he links the case of Valdemar 
to the decline of Oedipus Rex, that is, to Oedipus at Colonus, the tragedy 
of the entsetzlich dissolution of the once- great king who now finds himself 
reduced, as Lacan puts it, to “the scum of the earth, the refuse, the residue, 
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a thing empty of any plausible appearance.”13 What we are faced with here 
is, I am arguing, not the body in its utter vulnerability, not the precarious 
biological life we share with the animal and vegetable kingdoms, but rather 
the enigmatic substance of sovereignty at the historical moment at which it 
is uncoupled from its primary locus, the body of the king, and, so to speak, 
takes on a life of its own within the life of the people. We might say that 
the capacity to be eingesetzt and to be entsetzt belongs to every body, distin-
guishes the Leibhaftigkeit of every citizen- subject.
4
The French Revolution is, of course, universally seen to mark the period of 
transition from kings to people as the bearer of the principle of sovereignty. 
It makes sense, then, to begin a discussion of the modern reorganization of 
the physiology of the body politic and its impact on the arts— and my focus 
now turns to the visual arts, in particular— with a discussion of one of the 
most famous paintings to emerge out of the crucible of that historical turn-
ing point, and indeed one that itself appears to be dedicated to this very proj-
ect of a reconfiguration of the flesh in the wake of the king’s— or better: the 
King’s— demise. My guide in this discussion will be T. J. Clark, who himself 
begins his critical history of visual modernism with a seemingly exorbitant 
claim about the status of the painting in question, Jacques- Louis David’s 
Death of Marat, in the history of modern art (I hope that it will become clear 
in the course of these reflections why and how this painting can serve as a 
kind of allegory for my project as a whole). In his Farewell to an Idea: Episodes 
from a History of Modernism, Clark writes the following: “My candidate for 
the beginning of modernism— which at least has the merit of being obvi-
ously far- fetched— is 25 Vendémiaire Year 2 (16 October 1793, as it came to 
be known). That was the day a hastily completed painting by Jacques- Louis 
David, of Marat, the martyred hero of the revolution— Marat á son dernier 
soupir, David called it early on— was released into the public realm.”14
Rather than trying to rehearse the full complexity of Clark’s stunning 
argument, I focus on what for me provides the real key to his claim about 
the singular status of the Death of Marat in his broadly conceived history of 
modernism. Concerning David’s own uncertain grasp of the stakes of his 
painting and the staging of its initial viewing, Clark writes that David at the 
very least “knew that picturing Marat was a political matter, part of a process 
of making [the Revolution] a Jacobin property. . . . He believed that a new 
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world was under construction. No doubt he saw in the cult of Marat the 
first forms of a liturgy and ritual in which the truths of the revolution itself 
would be made flesh— People, Nation, Virtue, Reason, Liberty” (29).15 The 
problem, however, was that such conversions, still possible within the con-
text of the political theology of kingship (and the forms of picture making 
it sponsored), did not and perhaps could not succeed under revolutionary 
and postrevolutionary conditions. “Marat could not be made to embody 
the revolution because no one agreed about what the revolution was, least 
of all about whether Marat was its Jesus or its Lucifer. David’s picture— this 
is what makes it inaugural of modernism— tries to ingest this disagreement, 
and make it part of a new cult object” (38). But this answer too is insufficient. 
For it is not simply a matter of a provisional disagreement as to the meaning 
of events, but rather of an impasse affecting the possibility of converting 
events— and these events in particular— into representative images and bod-
ies that would convincingly incarnate their truths. The problem is that the 
events in question put under pressure the entire apparatus of representation 
in all its complex and intersecting meanings. And it is this impasse that, as 
Clark puts it, forms the gate through which contingency comes to invade 
painting.
What, as Clark puts it, “changed the circumstances of picturing for good” 
(46) was, precisely, the entrance of the people onto the stage of power for-
merly occupied by the monarch: “That is to say, [the revolution] tried to put 
one kind of sovereign body in place of another. And the body had somehow 
to be represented without its either congealing into a new monarch or split-
ting into an array of vital functions, with only instrumental reason to bind 
them together” (47). Contingency, Clark concludes, “is just a way of describ-
ing the fact that putting the People in place of the King cannot ultimately 
be done. The forms of the social outrun their various incarnations” (47). 
This means that there is a great deal more at stake here than a provisional 
disagreement as to the meaning of events. It is rather a question of a fun-
damental impasse affecting the concept and procedures of representation. 
The task was to put forth a body that would, as it were, incarnate the now 
empty place of the king, the figure that had traditionally been charged with 
corporeally representing the subject for all other subjects of the realm. The 
task would be, in a word, to incarnate in some ostensibly new way the excar-
nated principle of sovereignty: “Marat . . . had to be made to stand for the 
People. By now the enormity of the task should be clear: not just that Marat 
was such a disputed object, pulled to and fro by the play of factions (though 
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this indeed is part of the problem), but that at a deeper level any body was 
inadequate to what had now to be done. Or any technique of representation. 
That representation was henceforth a technique was exactly the truth that 
had not to be recognized” (47).
The real tour de force of Clark’s reading of the Death of Marat consists 
in his account of the ways in which David’s painting ends up succeeding at 
bringing this fundamental impasse to a commanding painterly presence, 
one that evokes, precisely, what I have characterized as the spectral yet vis-
ceral dimension of the flesh no longer figured and contained by means of the 
royal physiology— by the king’s two bodies. For Clark, the locus of the flesh 
is not exactly where we might assume it to be, that is, in Marat’s wounded 
body, but rather in the large, empty upper half of David’s canvas or, at the 
very least, where the one seems to extend or metamorphose into the other. 
As Clark puts it, David’s treatment of the body “seems to make Marat much 
the same substance— the same abstract material— as the empty space above 
him. The wound is as abstract as the flesh” (36, emphasis added). The flesh 
that can no longer be figured in the body of the king becomes, in a word, 
the abstract material out of which the painting is largely made. The empty 
upper half of the painting stands in for a missing and, indeed, impossible 
representation of the people: “It embodies the concept’s absence, so to speak. 
It happens upon representation as technique. It sets its seal on Marat’s un-
suitability for the work of incarnation” (47). The scumbled surface forming 
the upper half of the painting thus no longer functions as a simple absence 
but rather as a positive, even oppressive presence, “something abstract and 
unmotivated, which occupies a different conceptual space from the bodies 
below it. This produces, I think, a kind of representational deadlock, which 
is the true source of the Marat ’s continuing hold on us” (48). This is, Clark 
continues, the “endless, meaningless objectivity produced by paint not quite 
finding its object, symbolic or otherwise, and therefore making do with its 
own procedures” (48).
Clark goes on to link this apparent failure to a kind of shame that will 
forever haunt modernism; we might even say that the abstract material out 
of which the upper half of the painting is made is just the ectoplasmic sub-
stance of this haunting: “In a sense . . . I too am saying that the upper half 
is a display of technique. But display is too neutral a word: for the point I 
am making, ultimately, is that technique in modernism is a kind of shame: 
something that asserts itself as the truth of picturing, but always against pic-
turing’s best and most desperate efforts” (48). In David, this shame emerges 
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precisely at the point and in the space where “ ‘People’ ought to appear, as 
a kind of aura or halo” (48). What appears at the missing place of the new 
sovereign body is rather a kind of dream work made painterly flesh in the 
pure activity of painting; the empty upper half of the image forms not so 
much a vacancy as the site of an excess of pressure, a signifying stress that 
opens onto a vision of painting as pure drive: “And yet the single most ex-
traordinary feature of the picture . . . is its whole upper half being empty. Or 
rather (here is what is unprecedented), not being empty, exactly, not being 
a satisfactory representation of nothing or nothing much— of an absence in 
which whatever the subject is has become present— but something more like 
a representation of painting, of painting as pure activity. Painting as mate-
rial, therefore. Aimless. In the end detached from any one representational 
task. Bodily. Generating (monotonous) orders out of itself, or maybe out 
of ingrained habit. A kind of automatic writing” (45). My own sense is that 
the shame at issue here pertains not simply or even foremost to painting’s 
failure to reach its object, to what Clark here characterizes as a distinctively 
modernist stuckness in technique, artifice, mediation, self- reflexivity, and 
so on— a shame, ultimately, of painting’s nominalism, its moving within a 
frictionless universe untethered from lived life and the things that make it 
matter; it pertains, rather, to an almost defiling contact with the flesh that 
one had torn free from the king’s sublime physiology and claimed for the 
people. Among other things, David’s painting shows us just how difficult it 
would be to redeem, to make good on this claim. To put it in the form of a 
paradox, we might also say that the history of European art from this point 
on will in some sense be dedicated to the task of figuring out abstraction, 
this eventful opening onto the nonfigurative understood as the abstract ma-
teriality of once representative figures and bodies. Put somewhat differently, 
the normative pressures proper to painting— the pressures pushing toward 
what would be recognizable as excellence in painting— was mutating in re-
sponse to a radical transformation of the political and social form of the 
normative pressures informing lives more generally.
5
In this context, I’d like to recall the two moments of extreme intensity 
achieved in Freud’s famous dream of Irma’s injection, both of which Lacan 
characterized as a kind of prophetic (and perhaps, in some sense, automatic) 
writing on the wall. The first was reached in the image of the inflamed tis-
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sues of Irma’s throat, the second in the letters of a formula that Freud sees in 
the dream, one he associates with the chemistry of human sexuality. These 
two elements are, in a way, also present in David’s painting: the first in the 
form of Marat’s wounds (and sickly, puffy skin more generally), the second 
in the pieces of paper filled with writing that stand in a kind of visual sym-
metry with respect to Marat’s martyred, Christlike body. Clark, for his part, 
places considerable emphasis on these bits of writing, seeing them as more 
than a means for the idealization of Marat as exemplary friend of the people. 
For Clark, these bits of writing are the place where, to use a Lacanian locu-
tion, the signifier falls into the pictorial space whose meanings it is meant to 
authorize and becomes an object among other objects, one that juts forward 
beyond the picture plane and toward the spectator with a peculiar insistence. 
Rather than sealing the meaning of the image, these discursive bits function 
instead as a thing- like surplus of script that, as it were, objects to any claim 
as to the legibility of the historical situation. Apropos of the words just out 
of sight in Marat’s letter and presumed to be “de la patrie,” Clark asks, “But 
is there a final phrase at all? Of course there looks to be something; but it is 
so scrappy and vestigial, an extra few words where there really is no room 
left for anything, that the reader continually double- takes, as if reluctant 
to accept that writing, of all things, can decline to this state of utter visual 
elusiveness. Surely if I look again— and look hard enough— the truth will 
out. For spatially, this is the picture’s starting point. It is closeness incarnate” 
(40, emphasis added). Clark adds that these bits of painted writing “become 
the figure of the picture’s whole imagining of the world and the new shape 
it is taking. . . . The boundaries between the discursive and the visual are 
giving way, under some pressure the painter cannot quite put his finger on, 
though he gets close” (42).16 (We should recall here, once again, that the 
bit of writing in Freud’s Irma dream was fettgedruckt, thereby linking it to 
what Freud first spotted in Irma’s throat as a stain of inflamed flesh that has 
no business being there.)
But as Clark has so persuasively argued, it is in the swirling, vertiginous 
void that fills the picture’s upper half that this pressure finds its proper 
place— its nonresting place— in the visual field. The spectral materiality of 
the flesh that forms at the impossible jointure of body and letter, soma and 
signifier, enjoyment and entitlement— a dimension that can neither be fully 
imagined nor, finally, be spelled out in a formula— finds its inaugural mod-
ern figuration in that dense, agitated, painterly writing on the wall. Clark 
is right, then, to see in the painting the opening onto a new aesthetic di-
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mension and one that has a very precise historical index. What makes mod-
ernism is that its basic materials are compelled to engage with and, as it 
were, model the dimension of the flesh that is exacerbated to an unbearable 
degree by the representational deadlock situated at the transition from royal 
to popular sovereignty. What, in historical experience, can no longer be ele-
vated, sublimated, by way of codified practices of picture making to the 
dignity of moral allegory, introduced into a realm of institutionally— and, 
ultimately, transcendentally— authorized meanings, now achieves its sub-
limity in a purely immanent fashion, that is, in the various ways in which 
the vicissitudes of this abstract yet inflamed materiality itself becomes the 
subject matter of the arts.
I would like to emphasize here the difference between the flesh qua par-
tial object, on the one hand, and parts of the body functioning (or not func-
tioning) in harmony within a discrete organism, on the other. To put it in 
rather oversimplified art historical terms, what Clark describes apropos of 
the Death of Marat demonstrates that the dissolution of the image of Levia-
than that forms the famous frontispiece of Hobbes’s book on sovereignty— 
and of the form of sovereignty represented by that image— does not simply 
yield a multitude, a swarming, unruly mass of body parts (in this case, in-
dividuals) adrift and uncoupled from any form or organization. The mass 
that is unleashed by way of the excarnation of the sovereign, the dissolution 
of his sublime body, is one that now, so to speak, metastasizes within each 
individual, one that can indeed crowd out the self from within. To put it 
another way, what Freud discovered was that individual psychology and the 
theory of the libido are always, at a profound level, a theory of masses in the 
multiple meanings of that word.
6
The editors of a volume of essays on the “republican body” have put the 
problem I have been elaborating here quite succinctly: “With democracy the 
concept of the nation replaced the monarch and sovereignty was dispersed 
from the king’s body to all bodies. Suddenly every body bore political weight. . . . 
With the old sartorial and behavioral codes gone, bodies were less legible, 
and a person’s place in the nation was unclear.”17 My own argument has, of 
course, been less about the transformation of social codes than about the 
agitations of the flesh brought about by this shift, the nature of the matter 
that accounts for the new political weight of every citizen. I have argued that 
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biopolitics, psychoanalysis, and a variety of modern and modernist aesthetic 
practices have all struggled with this dimension, with the materiality of this 
uncanny mass or matter each in different fashion, each with its own degree 
of comprehension and incomprehension as to the issue at issue in what now 
issues forth from the bodies of its creaturely citizens.
The ambiguity and ambivalence that attaches to this issue is, perhaps, 
best captured by the German word that Freud favored when he spoke of the 
excitations or stimuli that circulate in the social and psychic spheres: Reiz. 
One thinks, for example, of Freud’s notion of the Reizschütz that, in his view, 
functions as a kind of callus on the ego- skin and that protects the mind from 
becoming overwhelmed by stimulus, by Reizüberflutung. The danger, we 
might say, is that the spaces of modern life have become too reizvoll, too full 
of something that threatens psychic life with an overproximity that turns 
what is charming into the stuff of anxiety and repulsion. And in his Three 
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud characterizes the drive as “the psychi-
cal representation of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimu-
lation, as contrasted with a ‘stimulus,’ which is set up by single excitations 
coming from without.”18 In my reading, one would have to replace the term 
innersomatisch or “endosomatic” with a formulation that would capture the 
fact that the soma at issue is at some level extraindividual, that the excitations 
at issue belong to the larger normative framework of the bodies that come to 
matter within them. So the next time someone characterizes you or some-
thing you have achieved as reizvoll, you now know that this is not entirely a 
compliment: it might ultimately mean that your flesh is showing or, perhaps 
better, some bit of flesh is showing on and through you as something that 
sticks out, that doesn’t quite fit into or fully belong to your body no matter 
how much you might try to get it to fit or into shape.
Epilogue
Because the project from which these remarks have been taken was at some 
level really an attempt to lay the groundwork for a reading of Rainier Maria 
Rilke’s great novel The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (the last quarter of 
the book is an extended reading of the novel), I’d like to end my essay by, as 
it were, giving Rilke the last word.
Rilke’s novel— one of the first great urban novels in German— tells the 
story of a now- impoverished twenty- eight- year- old Danish aristocrat who is 
struggling to become a writer; he does so in large part by exposing himself 
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to the Reizüberflutung of the streets of Paris. What can’t fail to strike the 
reader of this novel, which is composed of seventy- one discrete notebook 
entries of varying length and complexity, is the proliferation of passages 
describing bodies that seem unable to contain their insides, somatic pres-
sures and protuberances that push against the boundaries of veins, organs, 
and skin, internal masses that expand and crowd out the self from within 
just as the urban masses crowd in upon Rilke’s protagonist from without. 
The bodies at issue in these passages— and die Masse that issues forth from 
them— are taken from various thematic complexes in the novel: bodies en-
countered on the streets of Paris; bodies recalled from Malte’s childhood in 
various Danish manor houses or Herrenhäusern (including his own body); 
bodies recalled from literature and history, among them those of a series of 
late medieval and early modern sovereigns. When asked by his Polish trans-
lator about the links between some of these thematic complexes, especially 
those between these suffering sovereigns, Malte’s childhood memories, and 
his contemporary experiences in Paris, Rilke responded that in the novel, 
“there can be no question of specifying and detaching [zu präzisieren und 
zu verselbstständigen] the manifold evocations. The reader should not be in 
communication with their historical or imaginary reality, but through them 
with Malte’s experience: who is himself involved with them only as, on the 
street, one might let a passer- by, might let a neighbor, say, impress one. 
The connection,” Rilke continues, “lies in the circumstance that the par-
ticular characters conjured up register the same vibration- rate of vital intensity 
[Schwing ungszahl der Lebensintensität] that vibrates in Malte’s own nature.”19
Among these evocations one finds, for example, the description of the 
tormented body of King Charles VI of France who suffered some forty bouts 
of madness; the state of this royal flesh recalls Kafka’s description of the 
wound on the side of the young patient in “The Country Doctor”:
It was in those days when strangers with blackened faces would from 
time to time attack him in his bed in order to tear from him the shirt 
which had rotted into his ulcers, and which for a long time now he had 
considered part of himself. It was dark in the room, and they ripped off 
the foul rags from under his rigid arms. One of them brought a light, and 
only then did they discover the purulent sore on his chest where the iron 
amulet had sunk in, because every night he pressed it to him with all the 
strength of his ardor; now it lay deep in his flesh, horribly precious, in a 
pearly border of pus, like some miracle- working bone in the hollow of a 
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reliquary. Hardened men had been chosen for the job, but they weren’t 
immune from nausea when the worms, disturbed, stood up and reached 
toward them from the Flemish fustian and, falling out of the folds, began 
to creep up their sleeves.20
It is crucial that Malte introduces the figure of the mad king while consider-
ing his own descent— his own deposition or Ent- Setzen— to the place of die 
Fortgeworfenen, the figures he encounters on the streets of Paris whose only 
distinction is to lack every distinction or status, whose only entitlement is that 
of enjoying their bare life, a life often described with reference to their exces-
sive and agitated flesh. The Lebensintensität that is vibrating along the same 
frequencies in the suffering sovereigns evoked in the novel, in Malte’s own 
body, and in those of the outcasts of Paris, is one located not in the biological 
body but rather in the virtual yet uncannily carnal dimension of sovereignty, 
in the flesh that has migrated from the body of the king into the life of the 
people and whose sublimity or greatness— whose Grösse— now pushes against 
the skin of every citizen. It thus makes sense that at the very moment that 
Malte seeks a cure for the pressures— the internal and external Reizüberflu-
tung that is beginning to drive him mad— among the psychiatrists of the 
Salpêtrière, he is forced to recall an earlier encounter with this dimension, one 
that clearly surpasses the capacities of the country doctor from his childhood, 
one in which the figure of the sovereign master or Herr was already caught up 
in a kind of chronic state of exception or perhaps better, Entsetzen:
And then, as I listened to the warm, flaccid babbling on the other side of 
the door: then, for the first time in many, many years, it was there again. 
What had filled me with my first, deep horror, when I was a child and 
lay in bed with fever: the Big Thing. That’s what I had always called it, 
when they all stood around my bed and felt my pulse and asked me what 
had frightened me: the Big Thing. And when they sent for the doctor 
and he came and tried to comfort me, I would just beg him to make the 
Big Thing go away. . . . But he was like all the others. He couldn’t take it 
away, though I was so small then and it would have been so easy to help 
me. And now it was there again. (61)
Malte goes on to describe in detail the return of this somatic sublime di-
mension of embodiment:
Now it was there. Now it was growing out of me like a tumor, like a 
second head, and was a part of me, although it certainly couldn’t belong 
218 eric l. santner 
to me, because it was so big. It was there like a large dead animal which, 
while it was alive, used to be my hand or my arm. And my blood flowed 
through me and through it, as through one and the same body. And my 
heart had to beat harder to pump blood into the Big Thing: there was 
barely enough blood. And the blood entered the Big Thing unwillingly 
and came back sick and tainted. But the Big Thing swelled and grew over 
my face like a warm bluish boil, and grew over my mouth, and already 
my last eye was hidden by its shadow. (61 – 62)
The question with which Rilke leaves us is whether we are up to the chal-
lenges posed by this dimension, diese neue Grösse, that presents a surplus of 
immanence that cannot be mastered by the available sciences of immanence, 
a surplus that seems to call less for new and better science or medicine than 
for new concepts of politics, community, citizenship, and subjectivity.
Notes
This chapter brings together various parts of my book The Royal Remains: The 
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Thinking Cohabitation and  
the Dispersion of Sovereignty
Judith Butler
I would like to consider Hannah Arendt’s reflection on thinking and re-
sponsibility, but I want to suggest that one place to start is not her essays 
on these topics— although I refer to them later— but her controversial pub-
lication in 1963 of Eichmann in Jerusalem, originally a series that she wrote 
for the New Yorker magazine. Although an accomplished philosopher, she 
decided to go to Jerusalem to report on the trial of the recently captured 
Adolph Eichmann, who was responsible for formulating and implement-
ing the final solution in Nazi Germany. So Arendt is writing as a reporter, 
one who interviewed several people involved with the trial. Her report was 
controversial since she was not pleased with the proceedings of the Israeli 
court, calling it a public spectacle rather than the exercise of the rule of law. 
At the same time, in this text, Arendt begins to formulate many of the most 
important philosophical questions that preoccupied her in the subsequent 
years: what is thinking, what is judgment, and even what is action? But even 
more fundamentally, perhaps, who am I, and who are we?
Although Arendt agreed with the final verdict of the trial, namely, that 
Eichmann should be condemned to death for his crimes, she quarreled with 
the reasoning put forward at the trial. She thought the trial needed to focus 
on the acts that he committed, acts that included the making of a geno-
cidal policy. She did not think that the history of anti- Semitism or even 
the specificity of anti- Semitism in Germany could be tried. She objected to 
Eichmann’s treatment as a scapegoat; she criticized some of the ways that 
Israel used the trial to establish and legitimate its own legal authority and 
national aspirations. She thought the trials failed to understand the man and 
his deeds. The man was either made to stand for all of Nazism and for every 
Nazi, or he was considered the ultimately pathological individual. It seemed 
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not to matter to the prosecutors that these two interpretations were basi-
cally in conflict. She thought that the trial necessitated a critique of the idea 
of collective guilt, but also a broader reflection on the historically specific 
challenges of moral responsibility under dictatorship. Indeed, that for which 
she faulted Eichmann was his failure to be critical of positive law, that is, a 
failure to take distance from the requirements that Nazi law and policy im-
posed upon him; in other words, she faults him for his obedience, his lack of 
critical distance, or his failure to think. But more than this, she faults him for 
failing to realize that thinking implicates the subject in a sociality or plural-
ity that cannot be divided or destroyed through genocidal aims. In her view, 
no thinking being can plot or commit genocide. Of course, they can have 
such thoughts, and formulate and implement genocidal policy, as Eichmann 
clearly did, but such calculations cannot rightly be called thinking, in her 
view. How, we might ask, does thinking implicate each thinking I as part of 
a we such that to destroy some part of the plurality of human life is to destroy 
not only one’s self, understood as linked essentially to that plurality, but to 
destroy the very conditions of thinking itself? Many questions abound: is 
thinking to be understood as a psychological process or, indeed, something 
that can be properly described, or is thinking in Arendt’s sense always an ex-
ercise of judgment of some kind, and so implicated in a normative practice? 
If the I who thinks is part of a we and if the I who thinks is committed to 
sustaining that we, how do we understand the relation between I and we and 
what specific implications does thinking imply for the norms that govern 
politics and, especially, the critical relation to positive law?
It is a book of uneven tone, and sometimes she seems to break out into 
quarrel with the man himself. For the most part, she reports on the trial and 
the man in the third person, but there are moments in which she addresses 
him directly, or engages in irate free indirect discourse. One such moment 
occurred when Eichmann claimed that in implementing the final solution, 
he was acting from obedience, and that he had derived this particular moral 
precept from his reading of Kant.
We can imagine how doubly scandalous such a moment was for Arendt. 
It was surely bad enough that he formulated and executed orders for the final 
solution, but to say, as he did, that his whole life was lived according to Kan-
tian precepts, including his obedience to Nazi authority, was too much. He 
invoked duty in an effort to explain his own version of Kantianism. Arendt 
writes, “This was outrageous, on the face of it, and also incomprehensible, 
since Kant’s moral philosophy is so closely bound up with man’s faculty of 
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judgment, which rules out blind obedience.”1 Eichmann contradicts himself 
as he explains his Kantian commitments. On the one hand, he clarifies, “I 
meant by my remark about Kant that the principle of my will must always 
be such that it can become the principle of general laws” (121). And yet he 
also acknowledges that once he was charged with the task of carrying out the 
final solution, he ceased to live by Kantian principles. Arendt relays his self- 
description: “He no longer ‘was master of his own deeds,’ and . . . he ‘was 
unable to change anything’ ” (136). When in the midst of his muddled ex-
planation, Eichmann reformulates the categorical imperative such that one 
ought to act in such a way that the Führer would approve, or would himself 
so act, Arendt offers a swift rejoinder, as if she were delivering a direct vocal 
challenge to him: “Kant, to be sure, had never intended to say anything of 
the sort; on the contrary, to him every man was a legislator the moment he 
started to act; by using his ‘practical reason’ man found the principles that 
could and should be the principles of law” (121).
Arendt made this distinction between practical reason and obedience in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1963 and seven years later she began her influential 
set of lectures on Kant’s political philosophy at the New School for Social 
Research in New York City. In a way, we can understand much of Arendt’s 
later work, including her work on willing, judgment, and responsibility, as 
an extended debate with Eichmann on the proper reading of Kant, an avid 
effort to reclaim Kant from his Nazi interpretation and to mobilize the re-
sources of his text precisely against the conceptions of obedience that uncrit-
ically supported a criminal legal code and fascist regime.
In the end, she has three main complaints against the decision: “the prob-
lem of impaired justice in the court of the victors; a valid definition of a 
crime against humanity; and a clear recognition of the new criminal who 
commits this crime” (274). I’d like to suggest that it is interesting, maybe 
even odd, that Arendt thinks that the court failed to understand the person, 
the criminal, since she is everywhere reminding us that deeds are criminals, 
not persons, and not peoples. But this last becomes important when she 
considers the legal convention that the doer of the misdeed must have a clear 
intention to conduct the misdeed. Can it be said that Eichmann had inten-
tions? If he had no conception of a misdeed, can he be said to have intention-
ally committed one? It seems one cannot seek recourse to his intention or, 
indeed, to any psychological feature of this person, not only because the in-
tentional fallacy is right, but because now there are persons who implement 
mass death without explicit intentions. In other words, it is now possible 
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that some persons have become, historically, instruments of implementation 
and that they have lost the capacity for what she calls thinking. In a way, 
the problem is for her both historical and philosophical: how did it come to 
be that persons are now formed in such a way that thinking, understood as 
the normative exercise of judgment, is no longer possible for or by them? She 
rejects the psychological explanation: he is neither perverted nor sadistic, in 
her view, but simply acted according to a brutal law that had become normal 
and normalized. What was his crime, finally, according to Arendt? He failed 
to think; he failed to judge; indeed, he failed to make use of practical reason 
in the precise sense that Kant described and prescribed. In effect, Eichmann 
failed to be Kantian, even as he claimed he was.
Toward the end of this highly charged text, there is a curious set of pas-
sages in which Arendt addresses Eichmann in the second person and gives 
voice to a final verdict that the judges in Jerusalem would have done, had 
they agreed to make visible or manifest “the justice done in Jerusalem.” She 
writes, “You . . . said your role in the Final Solution was an accident and that 
almost anybody could have taken your place, so that potentially almost all 
Germans are equally guilty. What you meant to say was that where all, or 
almost all, are guilty, nobody is.” Then she makes her rejoinder, making use 
of the plural we to wage the counterargument: “This is indeed a common 
conclusion, but one we are not willing to grant you.” Later, she adds, “Even 
if eighty million Germans had done as you did, this would not have been an 
excuse for you” (255).
She begins the paragraph right before the voicing of the verdict by mak-
ing the point that where it is not possible to establish intentions, it still must 
be possible to understand that a crime has been done. She refuses the option 
of vengeance, maintaining, “We refuse, and consider as barbaric, the propo-
sitions ‘that a great crime offends nature, so that the very earth cries out for 
vengeance; that evil violates a natural harmony which only retribution can 
restore; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty to the moral order to punish 
the criminal’ ” (254).2
What seems clear, then, is that when the established conventions regard-
ing intention cannot be used, and when vengeance is barbaric and inad-
missible, on what grounds does one then sentence Eichmann? One expects 
perhaps that the verdict that she herself will voice will be the one she would 
have liked to see, but that conclusion is not unequivocally supported by what 
comes next. She makes the claim that “these long forgotten propositions” 
that belong to vengeance, retribution, and natural moral orders were, in fact, 
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both the reason he was brought to trial and the “supreme justification for 
the death penalty.” It would seem that these are precisely the justifications 
she rejects, although she adds “and yet” these were the reasons, and then 
adds her own sentence: “Because he had been implicated and had played a 
central role in an enterprise whose open purpose was to eliminate certain 
‘races’ from the surface of the earth, he had to be eliminated” (277). She then 
continues, citing the age- old jurisprudential maxim that “justice must not 
only be done, but must be seen to be done,” faults the Jerusalem courts for 
failing to make apparent (and to bring into the domain of appearance) the 
justice of their actions. At this point, it seems clear that she thought their 
actions, including the meting out of the death penalty, were just, but that 
they had failed to give good public reasons for that conclusion. Right before 
launching into her own voicing of the verdict, she writes that the “justice” of 
their actions “would have emerged to be seen by all if the judges had dared 
to address their defendant in something like the following terms” (254). The 
direct address that follows is obviously one intended as courageous, com-
pensating for the nondaring of the Jerusalem judges. But is she actually 
disagreeing with them? Or is she supplying a rationale that they should have 
used? It is difficult to understand, since she could simply be presenting their 
rationale in a more courageous way and disagreeing with that rationale (after 
all, it is the long- forgotten propositions of vengeance that led them, in her 
view, to their final verdict). But this voicing may be a way to participate in 
that final judgment and to accept the contemporary form that such long- 
forgotten propositions now take. It would be odd, if not impossible, for 
Arendt to champion barbarism, and she has explicitly rejected it. And yet if 
she is voicing what the judges should have said, and referring also to the jus-
tice of their decision, perhaps she is also simply making apparent a rationale 
with which she disagrees. What seems more likely is that she starts off trying 
to reenact what they did mean only to begin voicing what they should have 
meant. She does end this direct address with “you must hang”— an archaic 
formulation of the death penalty, to be sure, and one that some might con-
sider barbaric indeed. So let us follow this passage and see what can possibly 
be meant by this outbreak into direct address when Arendt sentences Eich-
mann to death again.
She makes her final judgment: “There still remains the fact that you have 
carried out, and therefore actively supported, a policy of mass murder” (279). 
Eichmann’s final crime, though, the one for which he must hang, has to do 
with the fact that he, addressed as “you and your superiors,” took as their 
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own right the decision with whom to share the earth. He thought, and he 
represented those who thought, that they could determine that they did not 
need to “share the earth” with the Jewish people, and insofar as they decided 
that they did not need to share the earth with any specific population, no 
one, no member of the human race, as she puts it, “[could] be expected to 
share the earth with you.” And it was for this crime, the crime of not shar-
ing, that she concludes, “This is the reason, and the only reason, you must 
hang” (279).
A voice is conjectured by Arendt that is not her own (and so partially dis-
owned), but so also are there identifiable features of her own voice, and that 
doubling is there for us to see. So where is Arendt in this voice? Does the 
voice still carry something of Arendt’s view, or is this a voicing of the view 
with which she disagrees? Is she giving voice to the rationale she opposes, 
or has she begun, perhaps in spite of herself, to elaborate the rationale she 
supports? It is surely consistent with her view to claim that nothing more 
than misfortune made him into a criminal. The reference to him as a “will-
ing instrument in the organization of mass murder” is one way of claiming, 
as Arendt has, that obedience to the law is tantamount to a support of the 
genocidal aim of the Nazi law, and this establishes his guilt. Although the 
conjectured voice explains why people want him dead, Arendt has made a 
less emotive argument elsewhere: genocide is unacceptable because it con-
stitutes an attack on the plurality of humanity itself. Perhaps giving voice to 
what the more courageous judges would have said is actually giving voice to 
what a more emotional Hannah Arendt would have loved to say.
The voice actually interrupts itself at one point, suggesting that both 
views emanate from this voiced figure of the judge. The language of wanting 
seems to decide the penultimate line. In the final accusation the conjectured 
judge underscores Eichmann’s wanting not to share the earth “with the Jew-
ish people and the people of a number of other nations,” and concludes that 
the members of the human race do not want to share the earth with him. But 
then a certain principle emerges within dashes, suggesting that the decision 
is based not on desire alone, but a principle, even a norm, that ought to be 
invoked in order to decide cases of genocide: “— as though you and your 
superiors had any right to determine who should and should not inhabit the 
world— ” (255 – 56).
The philosophical and political point of her voiced rejoinder to Eichmann 
(and to the judges) is that one must make clear that there is no right to 
choose with whom to cohabit the earth or world. Cohabitation with others 
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we never choose is, in effect, an abiding characteristic of the human condi-
tion. To exercise a right to decide with whom to cohabit on this earth is to 
engage a genocidal policy, and it is on the basis of this implementation of 
genocide that the death penalty is apparently justified. We do not receive 
in these pages a justification for why that penalty is appropriate rather than 
some others, although we do know that the appropriateness of the death 
penalty was debated at the time. Perhaps we are being asked to remember 
that murder is not the same as genocide, and that the death penalty is not 
the same as murder. If that is the case, and if Arendt had fully displayed the 
principles of her reasoning, it may be that implicitly at work in the decision 
to sentence Eichmann to death is a moral typology of modes of death deal-
ing that would justify the death penalty (state- induced killing under certain 
legal conditions) and would reject any death dealing that is genocidal.3 But 
this justification we do not receive. It is implicit, if it is anywhere, and the 
voice that makes visible the version of justice that took place in Jerusalem 
seems to lag at this very moment.
Interestingly, this conjectured voice of the judge speaks in the we. Since 
she is the one who apparently knows what the judges should have said, 
she speaks in her own voice; and yet, in speaking as a plural subject, a we, she 
also seems to disappear as a singular author. Can we finally separate these 
two strands, or are they in some ways implicated in one another, suggesting 
that judgment is not simply an individual act, but an implicit or explicit 
recognition of plurality itself?
One might reasonably expect the judge to be a figure of sovereignty, and 
though Arendt clearly enacts the sovereign voice, she does so only against a 
background of an irreducible vacillation: is she an I or is she a we? Indeed, 
this vacillation seems to function as a condition of judgment, one that im-
poses a certain limit on the sovereignty effect of the utterance itself. If it is 
in the name of plurality that she speaks, are we to presume that the voice 
in which she speaks is, in fact, a plural one? We know from Arendt’s writ-
ings on federalism and on Palestine (which are internally linked discussions, 
given her support for a federal authority in that region) that her version of 
democratic politics favors plurality over sovereignty. What seems to be en-
acted rhetorically within these pages is a splitting up of sovereignty itself, 
the exposure of the vacillation that is its condition, and the federating of its 
constituent parts.
When Arendt tries to explain the plurality in whose name (and voice) she 
speaks, she provides something other than principles to unify this plurality; 
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she clearly objects to any effort to divide this plurality, although it is, by 
definition, internally divided. It is one thing to seek to repudiate some part 
of this plurality, to bar admission of some part into the plurality of the hu-
man. And it is another to consolidate or abstract from this internally divided 
plurality in the name of a single and defining principle. Arendt wants it both 
ways. Moreover, another conundrum appears since there are, for instance, at 
least two forms of plurality that she invokes. One belongs to what she calls 
the self, and another belongs to a broader sociality, one that she associates 
with the political sphere.4
This conundrum is bound up with another since she herself established 
the domain of thinking as distinct from the domain of plurality. Indeed, 
thinking, like other solitary and even private activities (distinct from ac-
tions), takes place between me and myself or in dialogue with one other. 
This poses a problem, of course, because not only was Eichmann described 
as unable to think, as “stupid” (letter to Jaspers), but that failure to think 
was an essential precondition and part of his crime.5 If he were thinking, 
he would not have committed such a crime, since something in thinking, 
understood normatively, would have precluded the commission of genocide. 
If, indeed, Arendt argues that thinking commits us in advance to the preser-
vation of plurality, then there has to be a connection between thinking and 
plurality. So how do we negotiate this apparent paradox?
To speak of the plurality of the self may at first seem like a misnomer, 
since it may appear that the self may have a single relation to itself, and so be 
redoubled or dual in some way, but in what way is the self also plural, if it 
is? Arendt defines responsibility as the act of thinking, and further defines 
thinking as an exercise of a plural self. Thinking, she tells us, is the process 
through which we maintain company with ourselves. Thinking is a silent 
intercourse with ourselves or, rather, with each person and himself or herself 
(if binary gender holds). We are, in her view, necessarily internally divided, 
and must remain so, if we are to think at all. She writes, for instance, in 
“Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” that “even in the singularity or du-
ality of thinking processes, plurality is somehow present in a germinal form 
insofar as I can think only by splitting up into two, although I am one.”6 
Does she mean to suggest that the plurality in germinal form exceeds the 
dyad? Somewhere it seems a crowd of others is lurking behind or beneath 
this relation I have to myself. For the most part, she continues to refer to 
the self who thinks as necessarily redoubled and dyadic; it seems like a so-
cial relation and even carries the echo of those relations: “This two- in- one, 
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looked upon from the standpoint of human plurality, is like the last trace 
of company— even when being one by oneself, I am or can become two— 
which becomes so very important only because we discover plurality where 
we would least expect it” (106). If the “two- in- one” is like the trace of com-
pany, a simile is devised to explain a certain resemblance between duality 
and the plurality that belongs to a greater sociality. If it were the last trace 
of company, then there would have been company before, and this present 
dyad is in some way the outcrop of that prior terrain. “Like the last trace of 
company” suggests perhaps that departed company actually leaves no trace 
or that there never really was some prior company. But perhaps the “like” is 
also the trace of this disappearing sociality, one that we no longer know how 
or whether to name. It would appear that I am populated precisely when I 
feel myself most deserted, and that my capacity to hold conversations with 
myself in some way recalls, or calls upon, those conversations with others 
that precede my reflexive address.
Arendt seeks to redescribe conscience as a relation of oneself to oneself. 
“Conflicts of conscience,” she writes, “are actually nothing but deliberations 
between me and myself; they are not resolved through feeling but through 
thinking. . . . Conscience means no more than this being at peace with my-
self which is the sine qua non of thinking” (108). In a way, her views on these 
matters follow from the Kantian proposition that the I has the capacity to 
assert its equivalence to itself, the famous equation of the first critique that 
asserts self- identity as a precondition of thought: “I am I.” Curiously, this 
principle of identity cannot be asserted without redoubling the self at issue, 
as Hegel pointed out quite clearly in his Logic. For Hegel, the I that would 
assert itself as identical must first differentiate itself from itself, thus calling 
into question the simple identity. What at first appears to be a tautology 
emerges as a movement of thought. For Arendt, this internal division has 
to be actively constituted, which means that it is also always at risk of being 
deconstituted. In her essay “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” also in 
the volume Responsibility and Judgment, Arendt explains a kind of internal 
division that is different from living as a being in the midst of other beings, 
a plurality that would be proper to our sociality and political life. She writes, 
“This curious thing that I am needs no plurality in order to establish differ-
ence; it carries the difference within itself when it says, ‘I am I.’ So long as I 
am conscious, that is, conscious of myself, I am inevitably two- in- one” (184).
Here it would seem that the I has the capacity to constitute its own differ-
ence from itself, and must constitute that difference, if it is to assume respon-
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sibility. It needs no plurality, which means that its self- constituting activity 
seems to be unconditioned by any preceding sociality. This self- sufficiency 
will prove important for Arendt’s theory of responsibility and, indeed, for 
her account of judgment. But for now, let us note that a certain equivocation 
arises here about whether plurality is germinal in thinking (which could be 
true even as plurality is not necessary for thinking), and a notion of thinking 
that commits us in advance to social and political plurality.
For Arendt, this capacity for self- division in the self is the very precondi-
tion of responsibility. It is a split, but not a splitting off— and the difference 
is crucial. I would suggest that one way to understand Arendt’s point here is 
that the split is the sign of conscience, but the splitting off is the end of con-
science. If the dialogic relation to the self is broken, that constitutes the fail-
ure of responsibility. If we ask according to what norms or what criteria we 
decide whether or not a specific act is right, the answer, according to Arendt, 
has to do with whether or not we can continue to live with ourselves, to keep 
company with ourselves, after having committed such an act. Of course, this 
remark can be read as trying to offer a phenomenological description of a 
psychological condition. Indeed, we can perform acts that make us want to 
cut ties with ourselves, to break up with ourselves, to disown and banish the 
self who committed such a deed. Indeed, we quit speaking to the one who 
used to be our self and we no longer recognize that one as having anything 
to do with us. This breakup with the self banishes oneself or, rather, some 
part- self, to a location to which all lines of communication are stopped. 
That self receives no more money or tuition, no more care, no place in the 
will, and whatever we might mean by “the remaining self ” disavows and 
repudiates that self whose apparent misdeed was the cause of this rather 
stark divorce. Note that this form of disavowal or disownment is not the 
same as self- recrimination or superegoic self- beratement. In those latter in-
stances, a dialogue is still happening, even though one self judges the other, 
and the other does not have much to say for itself. Although this scenario is 
described as an internal dialogue or, indeed, an internal exile, it takes on all 
the features of a social relation and, in Arendt’s description, it is very clearly a 
question of linguistic address. So is the phenomenological description of the 
psychological condition sufficient for understanding the reconceptualization 
of conscience at work? Or are we being asked to see conscience as an implic-
itly social relation? We seem not to be able to move quickly to such a conclu-
sion, since Arendt distinguishes this solitary and silent dialogue— as well as 
the rupture in the dialogue— as happening for and within the domain of the 
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self alone. And yet it seems we must ask, is this solitary self as contained and 
as self- sufficient as her theorization at this moment would imply?
Could there be a distinction between the plurality proper to the self 
and the plurality proper to sociality? For the moment, let us remember the 
context in which she is pursuing this question: those who refused to obey 
the Nazi laws thought that only through disobedience could they continue 
to live with themselves. They maintained this plurality of the self, whereas 
those who ceased to think, who followed the rules and became unreflec-
tively obedient, could do so only by severing ties with themselves and so 
forfeiting the act of thinking itself.7
But is this right? Did Eichmann lose the dyadic structure of thinking, or 
did he never have it? Did his acts make him disown himself, or was there a 
prevalent cultural disposition to disowning the self that made his acts pos-
sible? Was self- disowning in some sense obligatory under these conditions? 
The question is probably unanswerable, since it presumes that we know what 
it might be to own a self and that such self- possession is even possible. Nei-
ther can we adjudicate the issue psychologically, and Arendt has already told 
us that she is not interested in a psychological interpretation of his condition. 
Instead, she offers a certain philosophical anthropology to explain him, one 
that presumes that personhood requires an inaudible and invisible dialogue 
that happens within the self, and so one that would have no verification of 
the existence of such a dialogue in the realm of appearance (and yet it would 
seem that the realm of audible and visible dialogue leaves its trace precisely 
here in the inner dialogue that is not unlike the last trace of company). To 
have thought would have meant to have been in dialogue with himself and 
so to have maintained his own proper duality. If, however, in having com-
posed genocidal policy, he also failed to think, then thinking must be related 
to this plurality of the human, this differentiated many to which he belongs, 
but which he seeks to destroy. Hence, to maintain a dialogue with himself 
must in some way imply maintaining a dialogic relation to that plurality. 
And thinking must require both, and implicate us in both.
Perhaps part of the conundrum here has to do with remaining restricted 
to a numerical understanding of plurality. Perhaps what is most important 
is the relationship to oneself that is established through a mode of address, 
one that is essentially linked to addressing and being addressed by others.8
In relation to the dialogue with the self, one might be tempted to speak 
as if there are two selves, something tantamount to a distribution of sov-
ereignty. But it is probably more appropriate to consider that the self is re-
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thought as a dialogic relation, constantly splitting up into parts. This means 
that there are not two selves, but rather a redoubling in relationality without 
which there is no thinking and, indeed, no personhood. In fact, I would 
suggest that the dialogue that thinking is has a performative and allocutory 
dimension. To think is not necessarily to think about oneself, but rather, to 
think with oneself (invoking oneself as company, and so using the plural we) 
and to sustain a dialogue with oneself (maintaining a mode of address and 
addressibility). To act as an individual is to enter into concerted action with-
out fully sacrificing one’s singularity and to act in such a way that dialogue 
with oneself can be continued; in other words, the maxim according to 
which I live is that any action I take should support rather than destroy my 
capacity to keep company with myself (should support the receptivity and 
audibility of that internal dialogue). To the extent that thought is dialogic, 
it is a linguistic exercise, and this proves important to my capacity to con-
tinue to make myself as one who can and does keep company with myself. 
Although dialogue would imply being addressed by others (or myself as an 
other) and so require receptivity, in “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” 
Arendt casts the dialogic encounter within the self as an active and perfor-
mative dimension of self- making: “In this process of thought in which I 
actualize the specifically human difference of speech, I explicitly constitute 
myself a person, and I shall remain one to the extent that I am capable of 
such constitution ever again and anew” (95). For Arendt, those who fail to 
relate to themselves, to constitute themselves, as one does in thinking and 
judging, fail to actualize as persons. There is a certain kind of speech that 
is necessary for this actualization of the person to take place; interestingly, 
it is a silent speech, solitary, but not for that reason a soliloquy. Someone is 
addressing someone else, and this structure of address provides the rhetori-
cal and linguistic condition of thinking. According to Arendt’s reading of 
Eichmann, he failed to call upon himself. To be called upon, someone must 
be home. And Arendt concluded that with Eichmann, no one was at home. 
In fact, Arendt in her reflections on evil in relation to Eichmann makes this 
quite stunning remark: “In rootless evil there is no person left whom one 
could ever forgive” (95). Indeed, she had no forgiveness for Eichmann, and 
was willing, within her own discursively manufactured tribunal, to sentence 
him to death. And we have to conclude that this is in part because there was 
no person left there, in her view, that his actions had destroyed the precon-
ditions of his own personhood. Does this mean that to put a nonperson 
to death is nothing more than a kind of redundancy? We might justifiably 
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pause here and wonder about Arendt’s view, whether it is finally acceptable, 
whether she has actually offered sufficient reasons to accept the death pen-
alty at all.
Interestingly, the dialogic preconditions of conscience presume that there 
is a call, and that someone is there to receive the call. But in Arendt’s for-
mulation, I constitute myself, which means that I bring that someone into 
being, which means that my call is, strictly speaking, an illocutionary speech 
act. He failed to call himself up, and so acted irresponsibly, and yet Arendt 
produces the textual occasion when she pays him a call, addressing him di-
rectly, bringing into relief, we might say, the addressability of this subject 
who failed to address himself. If Eichmann is beyond reach, Arendt’s direct 
address is finally without recipient, unless of course we accept that she is 
actually addressing us, “the world” that functions as the de facto jurors in 
the trial.
But does Arendt indirectly constitute Eichmann as a potential interlocu-
tor by addressing him directly? And would this act not be in tension with her 
conclusion that “no one is home”? In effect, she places him within the sphere 
of interlocution and, hence, a person of some kind. At the moment that she 
addresses him, some disposition of language binds them both together; she 
is part of a human plurality with him, indeed, with the likes of him. And 
yet the effect of her address to him is to exclude him from that very domain 
of plurality. The death sentence is one of the paradigmatic instances of the 
perlocutionary performative, a speech act that under certain conditions can 
lead to the result that it bespeaks. In this way, the final sentences of that epi-
logue (sentences in both senses) figure an operation of discourse as action.
Here we can see that a certain equivocation has entered the scene between 
thinking and acting. Arendt thinks, and she theorizes thinking, but in the 
Eichmann book, that thinking takes the form of judgment, and judgment is 
a kind of action. It emerges as the performative action of judging Eichmann 
himself at the end of that text. When she explicitly theorizes thinking, she 
notes that it involves keeping company with oneself, but also notes that it 
involves constituting that self, time and again. And yet Arendt explicitly 
distinguishes between thought and action, suggesting that even as thought 
involves this internal capacity to keep company with oneself, action involves 
keeping company (acting in concert) with others, that generalized plurality 
that Eichmann sought to destroy, a plurality voiced as the we in whose name 
Arendt condemns him to death. Arendt makes this distinction explicitly, but 
it is not one that can be consistently maintained throughout her work. This 
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is how she states the distinction when she tries to make it firm: “The main 
distinction, politically, between Thought and Action lies in that I am only 
with my own self or the self of another when I am thinking, whereas I am in 
the company of the many the moment I start to act.” She continues, “Power 
for human beings who are not omnipotent can only reside in one of the 
many forms of human plurality, whereas every mode of human singularity 
is impotent by definition” (106). If we take this typology seriously, then we 
think by ourselves or in dyadic relations, in actual dialogues between this 
self and another. But only when we are engaged with the many, a plurality 
that exceeds dyadic relations, do we become capable of action, understood 
as the exercise of power. I am wondering whether this is true and whether 
it is, actually, thinkable. After all, the I is said to constitute itself through 
language, and that is already a performative act, and so a version of action. 
Arendt judges Eichmann, and that seems, at least on the surface, to be a 
dyadic relation, indeed no less dyadic for being imaginary and strange. Both 
forms of thinking have assumed linguistic form and, in both instances, the 
language does not merely describe a reality, but brings one into being (self- 
constitution is illocutionary; judging is perlocutionary). In this sense, the 
language is a kind of action, if not a constituting or performative one. And 
hasn’t she already told us that plurality is germinal in thinking? Would that 
not immediately imply that action is germinal in thought? Can we even have 
thought that is not in some way related to action or, put more boldly, already 
incipient action in some mode or another?
Although it sometimes seems that she is separating two different modes 
of plurality, the one that is the self and the one that is the self with others, 
does she succeed? She has already told us that solitary thinking carries the 
trace of social company. There is, I believe, a stronger claim to be made 
here. One becomes capable of having a dialogue with oneself only on the 
condition that one has already been engaged in dialogue with others. More 
specifically, one becomes capable of responding to others only on the con-
dition that one has been first addressed, constituted by others, as one who 
might be prompted to respond to that interpellation with self- reflection or, 
indeed, thinking. One is impinged upon by another’s voice, through pri-
mary interpellations, and this is the beginning of a certain kind of splitting 
up of the self into forms of nonunity— one might even consider this as a kind 
of federating effect of primary interpellations. Only as someone brought 
into language through others do I become someone who can respond to 
their call, and who can interiorize that dialogic encounter as part of my 
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own thinking. Their voice and the voice of my response are not precisely 
separated, since I draw upon that other’s voice to have a voice at all. It is not 
a dialogue between fully discrete beings, but a form of enmeshment that 
becomes the condition of my own individuation. And since there is no single 
other whose address calls me into language, we have to think of the voice by 
which I am interpellated as implicitly, if not explicitly, plural or social. When 
this happens, the dialogue that I am is not finally separable from the plu-
rality that makes me possible. Although the dialogue that I am is not fully 
reducible to that plurality, there is a necessary overlap, or chiasm, between 
the two spheres. Is there not a social formation of thinking in Arendt’s sense, 
even if the normative form that thinking takes is radically solitary? And is 
solitariness not also, in some sense, a social relation?
Eichmann seems to have known neither solitariness nor plurality. So 
when Arendt addresses him, she figures him as one who ought to have be-
come capable of both. Since he is not quite a person in her view, and she 
faults him for this, we can reasonably ask, to whom is Arendt addressing 
herself when, at the end of Eichmann in Jerusalem, she sentences Eichmann 
to death? He is not there to hear her and neither really are the judges. But 
the judges may well read her, become part of her audience, just as we are. 
So though her death sentence is directed to him, it is shown to her readers, 
delivered to us, and that suggests that Arendt, as writer, has moved outside 
the dyadic encounter with Eichmann to an address to the many, the plural 
we whom she defends and to whom she addresses her remarks. In effect, 
she displays her death sentence of Eichmann to us, speaks in our name, but 
does not exactly perform or facilitate the performance of the death sentence. 
If anything, her way of formulating and justifying the death sentence con-
stitutes a critique of the Israeli courts, positing herself as the judge of the 
judges, showing us all, the many, what good judgment might finally look 
like. The voice she delivers at the end articulates good judgment, but also 
shows us that the voice, the manner of address, even the severing of this 
criminal from the domain of the living, is what philosophically grounded 
legal judgment has to be. Of course, Arendt has told us that in bad con-
science, we break up with ourselves, cut off all ties, refuse to keep company 
with ourselves. But does something of this same solitary dialogue take place 
in relation to the judgments of others? Clearly, Arendt is breaking up with 
Eichmann in the sense that she has explicitly said that he no longer belongs 
among the living, that he has given up his claim to personhood, and that 
his efforts to eliminate the Jewish people constitute an effort to destroy the 
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plurality that constitutes a differentiated humankind. As a result, he deserves 
to be destroyed instead.
So this is a curious conclusion, since to accept Arendt’s death sentence 
for Eichmann, we would have to know whether she is entitled to break up 
with him in this way. Is she right to circumscribe that human plurality that 
deserves to live and to say who it is who deserves to die? Is it the case that 
because he sought to deny and destroy the plurality of the human through 
his genocidal policies that he has disqualified himself from continuing to 
live in that plurality?
Let us backtrack for a moment: if there is a relation between breaking up 
with oneself and breaking off all relations with another, is that not because 
the soundless internal dialogue is already linked with the social dialogue 
that takes place within appearance? Arendt speaks to Eichmann in her text, 
figures him as not only listening to her words but also dying as a result of her 
words. The act of banishment, even the death sentence, is still an address, 
which suggests that the one to whom such words are uttered qualifies as a 
recipient of speech. The fact that he is not there, in the text, suggests that 
maybe he is no longer part of the human dialogue that constitutes human 
plurality. But maybe we have to consider that the judgment of oneself (in 
bad conscience) is inextricably linked to the address of another and to an-
other. She herself crosses the I and the we through this unattributed voice, 
the voicing of plurality itself. And this suggests, once again, that we may 
not be able to sustain a rigid distinction between the plurality of the self 
and the plurality of the sociopolitical domain. She performs the crossing of 
the two, and it may be that without that performance, she cannot make the 
judgments she considers responsible.
Perhaps Arendt demonstrates to us this important crossing between the I 
and the we in matters of judgment. Every human has already to be a we, a plu-
rality, a thinking being, in order to be part of the we who makes and remakes 
the world. The one is not simply a precondition of the other; but the two 
pluralities cross when thinking becomes action, which it does in language, 
and when it asserts its rights, even when there is no legal basis for doing so, 
even when that assertion threatens to destroy the legal code that exists. Of 
course, this conclusion leaves some critics nervous, since it would seem that 
Arendt appeals finally neither to existing law nor to abstract principle, but 
to judgment itself. And that seems to presuppose the sovereignty of the one 
who judges, independent of law and independent of precedent. She wanted 
Eichmann to have judged in that way, to have transcended his historical 
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circumstances and called them wrong; and she found herself making such 
an independent judgment as well.
It seems to me that Arendt does something interesting and disturbing by 
invoking the voice of the judge to condemn Eichmann to death after he has 
already been so condemned. On the one hand, she summons and produces 
a figure of sovereign authority outside of all law; on the other hand, she 
performatively introduces a norm that might distinguish just from unjust 
law on radically egalitarian grounds. It may well be, for the reasons that 
both she and Benjamin in “A Critique of Violence” suggest, that we must 
oppose law, act against it, even engage in provisional anarchism when law 
becomes unjust. But there is no reason to think that the only way to oppose 
or suspend law is through recourse to an extralegal sovereignty. That brings 
Arendt closer to Schmitt than I would like, and it goes against the radical 
egalitarian consequences of her theory of social plurality.
What would happen if, instead of turning to the sovereign voice as the 
way to oppose legal violence, she were to have rethought the social, that field 
of plurality, not only as a site of belonging, but as a site of struggle? In other 
words, does the chiasmic relation between the I and the we also expose a 
fault at the heart of sovereignty, a noncoincidence that makes the voice vacil-
late between modes, that keeps the ground more slippery than sovereignty? 
This apparent recourse to sovereignty at the heart of judgment seems to be 
in tension with the social ontology she has laid out for us. Indeed, it may be 
that plurality disrupts sovereignty time and again, federating its remains, 
dispersing sovereignty into federal forms. If to think or, at least, to think 
well involves thinking in such a way that we seek to preserve the heterogene-
ity of human life, then when we are thinking, we are thinking heterogeneity. 
But here we are compelled to note that this heterogeneity is only thought 
within an anthropocentric horizon. After all, the life that is worth preserv-
ing, even when considered exclusively human, is connected to nonhuman 
life in essential ways; this follows from the idea of the human animal. Thus, 
if we are thinking well, and our thinking commits us to the preservation of 
life in some form, then the life to be preserved has bodily form. In turn, this 
means that the life of the body— its hunger, its need for shelter and protec-
tion from violence— would become a major issue of politics.
This produces a problem for the Arendt of  The Human Condition who 
consequentially and mistakenly separated the sphere of the public from the 
sphere of the private. In the sphere of the private we find the question of 
needs, the reproduction of the material conditions of life, the problem of 
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transience, of reproduction and death alike— everything that pertains to pre-
carious life. The possibility of whole populations being annihilated either 
through genocidal policies or systemic negligence follows not only from the 
fact that there are those who believe they can decide among whom they will 
inhabit the earth, but because such thinking presupposes a disavowal of an 
irreducible fact of politics: the vulnerability to destruction by others follows 
from all modes of political and social interdependency, and constitutes a 
demand on all political forms.
A different social ontology would have to start from this shared condition 
of precarity in order to refute those normative operations, pervasively racist, 
that decide in advance who counts as human and who does not. The point 
is not to rehabilitate humanism, but to accept not only human animality 
but shared precarity. Perhaps this feature of our lives can become the basis 
for the rights to protection against genocide, whether deliberate or neg-
ligent. After all, even though our interdependency constitutes us as more 
than thinking beings, indeed as social and embodied, vulnerable and pas-
sionate, our thinking gets nowhere without the presupposition of that very 
interdependency. Indeed, our thinking relies on a bodily life that can never 
fully be sequestered in any private sphere— indeed, for thinking to become 
political, there must be a body that, even in Arendt’s own term, “appears.” 
Arendt clearly thought that thinking might bind us to others, and so give us 
a way to think the social bond to which we are committed when we think. 
My sense is that our commitments emerge as well by virtue of other kinds 
of proximities, living up against the neighbor, with others we never knew, 
and never chose.
Notes
 1 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 120 – 21. Subsequent references to this edition 
appear in the text.
 2 Here Arendt quotes Rogat, The Eichmann Trial and the Rule of Law.
 3 See Talal Asad’s notion of  “death dealing” in On Suicide Bombing.
 4 The social in her view designates a sphere of conformity and nondifferentiation, 
but sociality, as I use it here, affirms precisely a heterogeneous conception of 
social interrelations. See Arendt, The Human Condition; and Arendt, Origins 
of  Totalitarianism.
 5 See Avital Ronell on Eichmann’s “stupidity” in Stupidity.
 6 Arendt, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” in Responsibility and Judgment, 
106. Subsequent references to this edition appear in the text.
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 7 Arendt links thinking with being able to give an account, even with remember-
ing, and then remarks, once again referencing Eichmann, “The greatest evil-
doers are those who don’t remember because they have never given thought 
to the matter, and, without remembrance, nothing can hold them back” (com-
pare Benjamin’s “Conversations with Brecht” for a dispute over the value of 
remembrance).
 8 Note Arendt’s similarity to Bakhtin on the notion of addressability.
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Beyond the State of Exception:
Hegel on Freedom, Law, and Decision
Andrew Norris
In this essay I argue that the central issues raised by recent discussions of 
the state of exception are best explored in the context of Hegelian dialectics. 
The essay proceeds in three stages. In the first, I argue that there is a deep 
ambiguity in the idea of the state of exception regarding the kind of category 
or concept that is in question. Specifically, it is unclear whether the idea of 
the state of exception is a practical or a logical one. Is it simply a historical 
fact that every (known, or politically or philosophically significant) system 
of rules relies upon or generates exceptions that cannot be captured by those 
rules? Or is this an a priori truth about rules as such? I argue that the major-
ity of the extensive work being done in this area by philosophers and literary 
critics is incompatible with the former, as almost no one working in this 
area has anything to say about the relative success of actual institutions and 
practices that might avoid gaps in law and legitimation; instead, they devote 
their energies to the consideration of conceptual conflict. In a discussion 
of two examples of this tendency, William Rasch and Giorgio Agamben, I 
argue that there are good reasons to be skeptical that the Ausnahmezustand 
and the sovereignty with which it is associated are best understood as prob-
lems in logic that happen to express themselves in politics. I then turn to 
the consideration of Hegel, who clearly influences Agamben’s analysis, but 
whose own understanding of the logical issues surrounding the exception 
is quite different from his. The consideration of Hegel’s work in this context 
is complicated by the fact that, on many readings, there is simply no place 
in it for the logical problem of the exception to emerge. I argue that these 
readings are mistaken, and that Hegel offers us one of the best accounts of 
why the exception appears to be the problem that it does, and what the true 
significance of that problem might be. In the third and final section I discuss 
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Hegel’s own treatment of sovereignty and argue that, initial appearances 
notwithstanding, it is significantly different from and superior to that pro-
pounded by Schmitt or Agamben.
That idea of the state of exception as an essentially ambiguous one is al-
ready apparent in Carl Schmitt’s 1922 Political Theology, the text with which 
this concept is most closely associated. Schmitt famously provides a recip-
rocal definition of sovereignty and the Ausnahmezustand in which each is 
a Grenzbegriff or “borderline concept.”1 For Schmitt, the state of exception 
is not a concept defined by preexisting, stable criteria— it is not recognized 
by the sovereign, but rather produced, in a performative fashion, by the 
sovereign’s decision.2 The decision concerns nothing but the exception, and 
the exception is nothing but the object of the decision.3 The liminal quality 
of each is most obvious in the sense that the exception marks the limit of 
the legal order, a limit that is neither within nor without that order. No law 
or rule can justify, interpret, or apply itself, and when a community can 
no longer agree on a natural mode of interpretation and application of the 
law, the highest political authority must dictate one. “What characterizes an 
exception is principally unlimited authority, which means the suspension of 
the entire existing order. In such a situation it is clear that the state remains, 
whereas law recedes. Because the exception is different from anarchy and 
chaos [Chaos], order in the juristic sense still prevails even if it is not a legal 
kind.” 4 The need for exceptions and decisions on them is a hard truth that 
Schmitt argues liberalism has consistently denied and avoided. But it cannot 
be avoided forever.5 Why this is so is not entirely clear, however. Is it simply a 
historical fact that no given community’s sense of what is legitimate and ap-
propriate can be sustained forever, given the economic, military, and social 
instabilities and developments each must confront over time? Or is this an a 
priori truth about rules as such? Is every rule derived from and based upon 
the exception such that the explicit emergence of the exception is not just the 
inevitable unraveling of the rule but an integral part of its very functioning?6 
Posing these questions reveals a second, deeper ambiguity in the idea of the 
state of exception that undergirds its explicitly liminal nature, an ambiguity 
concerning the kind of category that the exception is. Is it an essentially 
practical one, or a logical one?
If the state of exception is a practical matter, sovereign decisions of the 
sort celebrated by Schmitt might well be required only very infrequently, 
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and only under extreme circumstances that are in principle identifiable and 
largely avoidable (plague, civil war, natural disasters, constitutional crises, 
and so on).7 The central question on this account would not be that of in-
vestigating the abstract relation between rule and exception, but that of 
determining the conditions that most readily lend themselves to avoiding 
such crises. Here it is striking that Western capitalist liberal republics have 
a relatively good track record in this area. Whatever their deficiencies— and 
there is no denying that they have a great deal— they do offer at least a large 
percentage of their citizenry a relatively stable legal and political order (if 
a tumultuous economic one). And they do so without, as Schmitt argues 
they must, resorting to a nondiscursive, supreme centralized sovereign au-
thority.8 Though they have encouraged a huge set of extralegal adminis-
trative bodies in which largely unregulated decisions are made, even in the 
aggregate these bodies and these decisions hardly amount to a Schmittian 
sovereign. If the rule of law does not extend to the disposed and those who 
are the objects of the society’s most virulent discrimination, this is less the 
result of a failing in the law as such than it is a failing either in those who 
administer it or in the policies to which they commit themselves (such as, in 
the American case, empire).
However, if law in Schmitt’s discussion is taken to mean any rule at all, 
the state of exception becomes an essentially logical problem, one that in-
evitably emerges as rules are applied and interpreted over time.9 Here the 
problem has nothing to do with historical change and the specific difficulties 
of holding together a political community’s understanding of the legitimate 
and the normal, but rather the internal reliance of the rule upon the decision 
and the exception. The structure of the decision of a private agent is the same 
as that of a sovereign. Of course, one might put these two positions together 
and argue that the internal, logical limitations of rules as such are put under 
greater pressure when the rules are political laws subject to the vicissitudes 
of history and internal and external conflict. But the two positions remain 
nonetheless distinct. One way to bring this out is to observe that those who 
embrace what I have referred to as the logical reading of the Schmittian 
exception are committed to the strict inevitability of the emergence of the 
Ausnahmezustand, and, for this reason, are in a rather weak position from 
which to criticize the excesses of either the Bush- Cheney administration or 
the current administration.
Whatever Schmitt’s own views on this matter, it is safe to say that the 
majority of people working on the state of exception today are not inclined to 
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adopt the former, practical approach to it. Instead, they tend to see the state 
of exception as a philosophical, logical matter. This is reflected in the fact that 
most people working in this area focus less on the relative success of actual 
institutions and practices that might avoid gaps in law and legitimation and 
more on the analysis of conceptual conflict.10 A good example of this would 
be William Rasch, who, in his volume Sovereignty and Its Discontents, defends 
a conception of  “the political” as “the ineliminable antagonism [that] serves 
as the condition of possibility for the limited and channeled struggles of both 
domestic and international politics.”11 On Rasch’s account, such struggle de-
mands and revolves around sovereign decisions regarding who is and is not 
a member of a given group and what commitments define that membership. 
And the attempt to suppress and eliminate this conflict and this decision can 
only result in the return of the repressed: “When one excludes the political, 
one has to guard the borders vigilantly against those willful intruders who 
deviate from God’s will” and the order of peace, a defense that inevitably 
assumes a violent form.12 No doubt, at points Rasch argues that the asser-
tion of  “the primacy of the political . . . merely registers a pragmatic insight, 
namely, that assuming incommensurable conflict as an ineradicable feature 
of social life leads to more benign human institutions than the impossible 
attempt to instantiate the shimmering City of God.”13 But this is belied by 
his claims concerning the inevitability of the return of the repressed. It is not 
surprising, then, that the emphasis of the analysis in Rasch— as in similar 
studies of the political— is placed heavily upon the logical claim.
Rasch defends and explicitly embraces the logical necessity of Schmitt’s 
sovereign decision in appealing to Bertrand Russell’s well- known paradox of 
the village barber who shaves all and only those men in the village who do 
not shave themselves. The paradox here is that if the barber does not shave 
himself, he does not fulfill the first condition, that of shaving all of the men 
in the village; while if he does shave himself, he does not fulfill the second, 
that of shaving all those men in the village who do not shave themselves. 
Rasch argues that this exemplifies the logical limitations of the rational per-
ception of order, as it shows that “for the law of the excluded middle to 
operate, it must be the excluded middle, neither true nor false.” The decision 
for logic is itself a logically ungrounded decision and hence, correctly under-
stood, supports the decisionist critique of logic.14 As Rasch puts it,
In a word, the barber is sovereign, for the paradox [that Russell iden-
tifies] is the neat trick of sovereign self- exemption, which makes a neat 
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asymmetry out of an impossible symmetry. The sudden emergence of 
this figure— the figure of the sovereign— at first seems arbitrary and mys-
terious. When personified as an individual, an institution, or a general 
will, sovereignty appears as if it precedes the law, giving the law its force. 
Yet, the sovereign is simply the name given to a logical effect. Rather than 
prior or opposed to the law, the sovereign is the law’s shadow, its included 
and excluded double. In the set we call “Sicilian village,” law is universal. 
All are equal before the law. Whoever applies the law is also subject to the 
law. But the law itself is not subject to the law.15
This looks compelling on first blush. But on reflection it becomes evident 
that, in his eagerness to provide a logical basis for Schmitt’s model of sover-
eignty, Rasch has overlooked the empirical assumptions built into his ana-
lysis. For the barber’s paradox assumes that there is a barber who shaves all 
and only the villagers who do not shave themselves. But, as logicians after 
Russell have noted, there may be no such barber, and if there is, it may be 
a woman.16
A somewhat different tack is taken by Giorgio Agamben, without a doubt 
the central figure in the current debate concerning the state of exception.17 
In the first volume of his Homo Sacer, Agamben makes explicit his commit-
ment to the logical reading of the exception in his discussion of the relation 
between exceptions, examples, and rules. Agamben argues that “exception 
and example are correlative concepts that are ultimately indistinguishable.”18 
As the one is an inclusive ex- clusion— eine Aus- nahme— so is the other “an 
exclusive inclusion.” “The example,” he writes, “is truly a paradigm in the 
etymological sense: it is what is ‘shown beside,’ and a class can contain every-
thing except its own paradigm. . . . What the example shows is its belonging 
to a class, but for this very reason the example steps out of its class in the very 
moment in which it exhibits and delimits it. . . . If one now asks how the rule 
applies to the example, the answer is not easy, since the rule applies to the 
example only as a normal case and obviously not as an example.”19 Agamben 
has described the logic in question here as an “analogical logic” that cannot 
be separated from its context and the objects that bear it.20 This analogical 
logic, however, retains the necessity and universality of the logic it replaces. 
Every example and every exception as such “suspend” and at the same time 
“expose their belonging” to the class they exemplify or from which they 
are ex- cepted.21 The problem of the exception is, on this account, hardly a 
political or legal matter; for the problem appears every time one claims that 
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something is presented as being an example of a rule— or an exception to 
a rule. The exceptional status of the example (as something taken outside 
the class in order to demonstrate that class) is a necessary feature of classes 
as such, be they classes of the product of artistic genius or classes of rules. 
As Agamben puts it, “In every logical system, just as in every social system, 
the relation between outside and inside, strangeness and intimacy, is this 
complicated.” In every case, “belonging to a class can be shown only by an 
example.”22 Examples precede classes just as, for Schmitt, decisions precede 
norms. This has problematic implications for Agamben’s own analysis, in 
particular his central claim that “today it is not the city but rather the camp 
that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West.”23 For the clear 
implication of this analysis is that in claiming a paradigmatic or exemplary 
status for the camps, Agamben is and can only be making an unregulated 
decision that cannot be justified to his readers in a nonauthoritarian manner. 
Since the example precedes and defines the rule, Agamben cannot appeal 
to an independent rule or standard to justify his claim that the camps are 
exemplary of anything. The determination that the camp is representative 
of the rule is one that is made and not in any substantive sense recognized.
Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that Agamben’s own justifications 
for the logical reading of the state of exception are neither extensive nor 
terribly convincing. To argue, as Agamben does, that “the rule applies to 
the example only as a normal case and obviously not as an example” es-
sentializes the categories of the normal case and the example or exception. 
If we take a group of things that are subsumed under the same rule— say, 
three species of a particular bird genus— have we really treated one of these 
species as an example and (for this reason) not as a normal case when we 
present it as an example of the genus, or as an exception to the standards of 
the genus?24 Some may object that such a taxonomical example is too trivial 
to be useful here or is otherwise inappropriate. But recall that Agamben 
claims that there is an isomorphism between the exception and the example 
or paradigm and that “in every logical system, just as in every social system, 
the relation between outside and inside, strangeness and intimacy, is this 
complicated.” Moreover, problems remain even if one sets aside questions 
of species and genus and takes up what surely is Agamben’s real interest, the 
question of paradigmatic language.25 In the chapter “What Is a Paradigm” 
of his book The Signature of All Things, Agamben repeats almost word for 
word the claim cited above concerning the difficulty of applying the rule 
to the example. Immediately before doing so, he writes, “What is essential 
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here is the suspension of reference and normal use. If, in order to explain the 
rule that defines the class of performatives, the linguist utters the example ‘I 
swear,’ it is clear that this syntagma is not to be understood as the uttering 
of a real oath. To be capable of acting as an example, the syntagma must be 
suspended from its normal function, and nevertheless it is precisely by virtue 
of this nonfunctioning and suspension that it can show how the syntagma 
works and can allow the rule to be stated.”26
To evaluate this argument, let us consider a pair of philosophers attending 
the criminal trial of one of their colleagues. When the first witness is sworn 
in, the first turns to the second and says quietly, “You were asking what 
J. L. Austin meant by ‘performative.’ Well, that oath there is an example of 
it: the fellow swearing to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth doesn’t report on or describe a performance or act; it is the performance.” 
Now, I imagine that Agamben might reply that citing even an immediately 
present performance like this is not “normal use.” Normal use would then 
be the actual use of the phrase— “the uttering of a real oath,” as Agamben 
puts it— and not a quoting of it or comment upon it. But if Agamben were 
to take this line, he would be effectively equating not just examples and 
exceptions but examples, exceptions, and a whole slew of criticisms, praises, 
and queries. Statements such as the following are completely unremarkable: 
“Did you really say, ‘I swear he did it’?” or, “How dare you say to her, ‘You’re 
an old fool’?” or, “I wouldn’t exactly call what he’s doing ‘self- assertion’— it 
looks more like a cry for help.” In none of these cases is the speaker taking 
the word or phrase she cites as an example of or an exception to a rule, and 
each of them is perfectly normal.
Agamben’s general position might be more compelling if we took exam-
ples the identification of which requires a large degree of judgment. Think, 
for instance, of excellent student essays. Here there is a rule that determines 
the class, but it is a rule that not all observers or participants will agree upon, 
as it requires training and sensitivity to apply.27 Hence students regularly 
complain that grading in humanities courses is subjective and for that reason 
unfair. The philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend embraced this skepticism 
when he gave all of his students at Berkeley the same grade— first, I believe, a 
C, and then, after the Berkeley administration complained, an A. But even if 
one shares our students’ skepticism regarding the rules used in the grading 
of their papers, it seems misleading at best to say that anything like this is 
true of rules as such. To claim otherwise would effectively mean denying any 
distinction between cases involving the rote application of rules and cases 
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involving discretion or fine judgment. This is not to deny that rule applica-
tion may require judgment, only to insist that these broad categories are not 
completely meaningless.28
If Rasch’s and Agamben’s approaches to the exception are as problematic as 
I have argued, it hardly follows that we are any better off turning to Hegel. 
Hegel’s claim to speak from the perspective of Absolute Spirit— a culmina-
tion of intellectual and moral life in which there are supposedly no more 
mysteries left and our duties are plain to see— is not one that appears open 
to anything like a decision on the exception. Nonetheless, I shall argue that 
the passage through rather than around the decision is one that Hegel feels 
we moderns must make, for both political and philosophical reasons. I shall 
further argue that Hegel’s position on this matter provides a helpful contrast 
to the currently fashionable views of Schmitt. Where Hegel anticipates the 
critique of romanticism laid out in Schmitt’s Political Romanticism, he is clear 
that the moment of the “sovereign decision” is a moment in a larger process, 
and not, as Schmitt would have it, an ever- present abysmal ground of politi-
cal life that might, by virtue of its status as ground, legitimately if not legally 
swallow all it supports. What for Schmitt remains a decision, albeit one that 
ought to be made by the sovereign of a hierarchically organized political 
unity, is in Hegel a moment of the free will. Hegel thus promises both to 
allow us to integrate irony into a meaningful, coherent life, and to address 
the dangers of Schmitt’s decisionism without ignoring Schmitt’s insight that 
no system of rules can apply or ground itself.
As Schmitt notes, what he describes as occasionalism is termed irony by 
Hegel: the conception of freedom and subjectivity that allows for and even 
demands the emergence of the exception is one that celebrates the ironic 
detachment of the free individual.29 Hegel’s depiction of this is, on the face 
of it, unremittingly negative. Irony is an evil radicalization of the modern, 
Kantian conception of the free will. As such it seems an unlikely suspect 
to play a central role in the articulation of any modern political life worth 
affirming.30 But, on Hegel’s account, such a role is just what it does and 
must play in the Philosophy of Right ’s account of the limitations of the criti-
cal philosophy of Kant and Fichte, and hence the necessity of Hegel’s own 
contributions to political thought. This is clearest in Hegel’s discussion of 
irony and evil in §§138 – 41 of the Philosophy of Right. These sections are the 
central hinge of the book in that they depict both the transition from Mo-
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ralität to Sittlichkeit and the transition from the historical unfolding of the 
free will in the previous half of the book to the outline of the structure of a 
rational modern society in the second. Hegel argues that morality as Kant 
and Fichte conceive of it is too subjective, and fails to accord sufficient ethical 
significance to the community and the roles it assigns us or makes available 
to us. Ultimately, Hegel’s predecessors are painted as being too Cartesian, 
too willing to jettison tradition and the wider culture in the hope that the 
isolated individual can alone develop an adequate morality. But unlike the 
more conservative of today’s communitarians, Hegel’s presentation of his 
alternative conception of Sittlichkeit or ethical life is meant to be a further 
development of Kantian morality, one that that morality itself calls forth in 
a process of immanent critique. Hegel makes no appeal to external authority, 
or contingent, given norms; instead, he claims to present the autonomous, 
internally driven unfolding of the will, from its initial objectivization of 
itself in private property to its adequate realization in a complex, articulated 
modern state that incorporates nuclear families, promulgated legal codes, 
a capitalistic economy, corporate mediations between the individual and 
the state, and a constitutional monarchy with a version of the traditional 
branches of government as conceived since Cicero. This process is one of 
immanent critique in the sense that it is driven by negation, a fact that comes 
more prominently into view in the later stages of the process, and in par-
ticular in the transitions from one stage to another. Each stage reveals its 
limitations in the form of internal contradictions that can only be resolved 
by rising to a higher and more fully articulated form of the free will.
The crucial juncture in this internally driven unfolding of the will is the 
transition from Kantian morality to Hegelian ethical life. Irony plays a cen-
tral role in this transition, just as crime does in the transition from Abstrakte 
Recht to Moralität, as a negation of a negation. Crime makes morality pos-
sible in that the criminal who violates the contractual conditions of abstract 
right can only be judged from a perspective that respects but nonetheless 
transcends that right— in Schmitt’s terms, one that has a “juristic element” 
but nonetheless defies “general codification” in the system of right. The judge 
who merely takes an eye for an eye (and thus engages in a “fair exchange”) 
is no judge at all.31 To punish rationally, and hence preserve the principle of 
abstract right, requires a mode of judgment that is not yet developed in that 
sphere, and that comes into its own only in the next section on morality. 
Essentially the same is and must be the case with irony, which is the truth of 
morality as crime is the truth of right, and which signals the need for ethical 
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life as crime signals the need for morality. This means that ethical life can 
be understood only as the sublation or Aufhebung of irony, which is to say, 
its negation and fulfillment. On Hegelian grounds, then, it is impossible 
to simply dismiss irony as childish or self- indulgent or evil. But at the same 
time, it is difficult to see how irony might play the large and productive 
role Hegel assigns to it. Hegel presents irony as dissolving everything it 
touches into the arbitrary whim of the subject. All rules lose their validity, 
and each judgment becomes a manifestation of the individual’s sovereign 
power to decide on the exception. Once this is done, how could anything 
as substantial and systematically articulated as ethical life ever emerge? The 
challenge here is much greater than in the case of crime, which operates in a 
normative world that still lacks, as it were, the depth of a third dimension, a 
depth supplied by moral judgment. This is not the case with irony, as Hegel 
himself signals: with the discussion of irony, the development of the free will 
charted by the first half of  The Philosophy of Right ends, and the depiction of 
the social world adequate to that will begins. The dialectical unfolding of 
the free will ends, then, with the mystery of an exception avant le lettre.32
In order to engage with these issues in a helpful way, one needs to appre-
ciate the extent to which Hegel is profoundly concerned with our subjective 
embrace of the objective truth of modern political life. The Philosophy of Right 
is, among the canonical works of modern political thought, rivaled only by 
those of Rousseau in the centrality of its concern with alienation and recon-
ciliation. Hegel writes for a world that supposes the spiritual universe to be 
“god- forsaken. . . . According to this atheism of the ethical world, truth lies 
outside it, and at the same time, since reason is nevertheless also supposed to 
be present in it, truth is nothing but a problem.” While Hegel presents this 
as a philosophical radicalization of Kant’s excessive caution, it also expresses 
an alienation found more widely in the general culture.33 As he puts it in the 
Encyclopedia, “The sickness of our time, which has arrived at the point of 
despair, is the assumption that our cognition is only subjective.”34 In both 
critical philosophy and the modern age more generally, the fact that truth is 
simultaneously included and excluded from the world produces a demand 
that “every thinker . . . take his own initiative, though not in search of the 
philosopher’s stone,” which all assume they already have, albeit in a disfig-
ured form (el §22; pr, 14). Rather, a sincere decision and assertion of self is 
demanded: the “self- styled philosophy” of the romanticism that pervades 
the modern world “has expressly stated that truth itself cannot be known, 
but that truth consists in what wells up from each individual’s heart” (pr, 
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15). This produces a world in which “the arbitrary will of the subject” deter-
mines what will count as right and true (pr §140r). Modernity, in short, 
experiences itself as being more or less, as Schmitt’s teacher Weber describes 
it a hundred years later in “Science as a Vocation,” a “godless” ( gottfremden) 
time in which life “knows only of an unceasing struggle of . . . gods” ( jener 
Götter), a struggle that ends only with a manly decision to commit oneself 
to one’s personal demon (Dämon) and that demon’s values.35
The paradox in Weber’s formulation is matched in Hegel, where his read-
ers are pictured as being alienated from reality in an essentially unreal way. 
Their experience of alienation, that is, is a false experience of the world, one 
Hegel intends to correct. But since the world from which they are alienated 
is the world of their social and spiritual activity, this alienation is objective 
as well as subjective. Social alienation can be dismissed as nonactual, as the 
“superficial outer rind” or “brightly colored covering in which consciousness 
first resides” only insofar as it does not inhibit the will’s realization in the 
forms of social life outlined in the Philosophy of Right (el §6; pr, 21). But to the 
extent that alienation does hold us back from finding ourselves in the family, 
in civil society, and in the state, that alienation is, if not actual, then some-
thing like a rupture within actuality. This way of putting the matter will 
strike some as being far too paradoxical to be true to Hegel’s insistence that 
the rational is actual and the actual rational (pr, 20). In his study of Hegel’s 
“project of reconciliation,” Michael Hardimon, for instance, presents what 
I think most would see as a claim more in keeping with Hegel’s intentions: 
according to Hardimon, Hegel, unlike Marx, does not see the problem of 
alienation as an objective one, a feature of reality that must be contested and 
overthrown. Citizens “are subjectively alienated because they feel estranged 
from its arrangements. . . . But their subjective alienation is pure (unaccom-
panied by objective alienation) because, contrary to appearances, the world 
they inhabit is in fact a home.”36 But a page after writing this, Hardimon 
notes, “People who are subjectively alienated are not at home in the social 
world; for . . . being at home in the social world includes an essentially 
subjective element, and not being at home in the world is to be alienated.”37 
We are not at home at home, then. As Hardimon does not acknowledge the 
contradiction here, he does not see that Hegel, like Nietzsche or Pindar, is 
engaged in the uncanny task of helping us to become what we are.
“The state,” Hegel argues, “is the actuality of concrete freedom. But con-
crete freedom requires that personal individuality [Einzelheit] and its particu-
lar interests . . . should, on the one hand, pass over of their own accord into 
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the interest of the universal, and on the other, knowingly and willingly ac-
knowledge this universal interest even as their substantial spirit, and actively 
pursue it as their ultimate end. The effect of this is that the universal does 
not attain validity or fulfillment without the interest, knowledge, and voli-
tion of the particular [and its] conscious awareness” (pr §260). If Sittlichkeit 
is a matter of the community’s customs or Sitten, these are not followed 
simply because an external authority says they must be, but because the 
subject affirms them. The importance of the “conscious awareness” of this 
subjective affirmation is indicated by the fact that Hegel makes the cure of 
alienation one of his central tasks. In contrast, he quite pointedly does not 
find it necessary to address every existent but unreal failing. In English, 
to realize something is both to make it real and to understand it. Both of 
these are required by Hegel’s notion of actualization. As Hegel puts it in the 
preface, “The truth concerning right, ethics, and the state is at any rate as 
old as its exposition and promulgation in public laws and in public morality 
and religion. . . . What it needs is to be comprehended as well.” The rational 
matter needs to be given an appropriately rational form; the Begriff must be 
grasped, begreifen. It is this comprehension that makes possible “reconciliation 
with actuality” (pr, 22). The other side of the unreality of our alienation 
from the world is the world’s failure to be what it really is, rational. Failing 
to see what we are, we fail to be what we are. The Philosophy of Right and the 
logic that stands behind and gains political expression in it will correct this. 
It is not, I think, misleading to describe this work as therapeutic.38
There is a variety of ways in which we might be alienated from the mod-
ern world. We might be repelled by the conflict and selfishness characteristic 
of the— for Hegel— relatively new forms of civil society. More specifically, 
we might conclude that the prevalence of poverty— and Hegel’s inability to 
recommend a solution to it— is evidence that civil society is irrational and 
destructive. More specifically still, we might take the existence of the rabble 
or Pöbel that on Hegel’s own account characterizes the marginalized, super-
fluous poor who see the social world as making promises of rights and digni-
ties that it systematically denies as evidence that that world is dehumanizing, 
and hence no proper home for humans. But the main danger Hegel sees is 
that we will reject modern political society because we do not recognize it 
as a place in which we can be free. “The fetter of some abstraction” forged 
by Hobbes, Kant, or Fichte might lead us to believe that our freedom is 
opposed to the duties and commitments of that society, and that true free-
dom is found in the abstract decisions of the isolated subject. The result is 
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nihilism, be it Jacobi’s or Weber’s, according to which the denatured self is 
fulfilled only in the act of decision itself. The logical extreme to which mod-
ern moral consciousness is drawn is evil in the form of irony: the “last and 
most abstruse form of evil, whereby evil is perverted into good and good 
into evil and the consciousness, knowing it has the power to accomplish this 
reversal, consequently knows itself as absolute, is the greatest extreme of 
subjectivity from the point of view of morality. It is the form to which evil 
has advanced in our time— thanks to philosophy” (pr §140r). Pure choice 
takes the form of irony, as only irony displays the simultaneous emptiness 
and quasi- divine power of the decision. A just decision, say, would reveal me 
as just, but, as such, as bound by the tenets of justice. Only an empty, ironic 
choice allows for the assertion of the ultimate mastery of the self, unbound 
by any commitment or any defining characteristic. As Hegel puts it, for the 
ironist, “It is not the thing which is excellent, it is I who am excellent and 
master of both thing and law” (pr §140r).
In Hegel’s discussion in both the Lectures on Aesthetics and the Philosophy 
of Right it is clear enough that Friedrich Schlegel’s romanticism epitomizes 
for Hegel the sickness he seeks to ward off and correct.39 Schlegel is the ful-
fillment of a process begun in Fichte’s philosophy of subjectivity, whereby 
the abstract, simple, and formal I becomes the absolute principle and foun-
dation of all knowledge and all philosophy. Subjectivity is the absolute self- 
certainty (Gewißheit) that Hegel identifies with conscience (Gewissen) (pr 
§136), the “abstract self- determination and pure certainty of oneself alone” 
that is the “judging power” (pr §138). In Fichte this subjectivity takes center 
stage, and the I or ego (Ich) becomes
lord and master of everything, and in no sphere of morals, laws, things 
human and divine, profane or sacred, is there anything that would not 
have to first have been laid down by the ego, and that therefore could not 
equally well be destroyed by it. Consequently everything genuinely and 
independently real becomes only a show [Schein], not true and genuine on 
its own account or through itself, but a mere appearance due to the ego in 
whose power and caprice and at whose free disposal it remains. To admit 
or cancel it depends wholly on the pleasure of the ego, already absolute in 
itself simply as ego.40
Because the subject of Fichte’s philosophy decides not just what is the case 
but by what means and according to what standards such judgments are to 
be made, everything is what it is by virtue of its decisions.41
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Fichte himself, however, only systematizes a conception of abstract sub-
jectivity that is uncovered well before him; and in the Philosophy of Right 
Hegel identifies such subjectivity with a far less easily vilified figure than the 
Schlegel Fichte makes possible: Socrates. Immediately before beginning his 
discussion of evil in pr §139, Hegel discusses the “subjectivity, as abstract 
self- determination and pure certainty of self alone [that] evaporates into it-
self all determinate aspects of right, duty, and existence, inasmuch as it is the 
power of judgment which determines solely from within itself what is good” 
(pr §138). This is obviously the basis upon which evil is, as Hegel claims in 
§139, “necessary.” Hence it is confusing when Hegel refers to Socrates in 
both the Remark and the Addition to §138. This is made all the more confus-
ing as Socrates is presented as doing something that may be appropriate for 
others as well. Where Fichte’s (and, before him, Kant’s) formalism is simply a 
limitation of an incomplete idealism, one with disastrous consequences that 
Fichte himself did not anticipate, Socrates is presented as a potential model 
for us. That is, Fichte was a step on a road we have taken. Socrates looks like 
a potential way forward.
The self- consciousness which has managed to attain this absolute re-
flection into itself knows itself . . . as a consciousness which cannot and 
should not be compromised by any present and given determination. In 
the shapes which it more commonly assumes in history (as the case of 
Socrates, the Stoics, etc.), the tendency to look inwards into the self to 
know and determine from within the self what is right and good appears 
in epochs when what is recognized as right and good in actuality and cus-
tom is unable to satisfy the better will. . . . This will no longer finds itself 
in the duties recognized in this world and must seek to recover in ideal 
inwardness alone that harmony which it has lost in actuality. (pr §138r)
It is tempting to assume that the hypothetical nature of this remark elimi-
nates any problem. We do not live in dark times, but in a world that is ac-
tually rational— at least if we see it as such. Socrates however did not share 
our moral luck. But this only exacerbates the difficulty: how does Socrates 
avoid becoming (as evil as) Schlegel if his world is even more impoverished 
than Schlegel’s?42 It is tempting to answer that Socrates is simply a better 
person than Schlegel. But making any such appeal to contingent (zufällig) 
differences between the two men would mean accepting that Hegel’s argu-
ment is not about the logic of a particular conception of freedom as it arises 
in the realization of the idea of right. And this in turn would make hash of 
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the central claim of the Philosophy of Right to be an immanent development 
of the free will: if evil does not follow from the abstract self- certainty of the 
moral consciousness as crime follows from the assertion of abstract right, 
the Philosophy of Right runs out of gas just as it approaches the gates of the 
Hegelian state, leaving us stranded more or less where we started. Hence 
we must find another ground upon which Hegel might distinguish Socra-
tes from Schlegel, while at the same time noting as he does their essential 
similarity.
In an essay on this topic, Robert Williams provides some help here. Wil-
liams notes that a great deal hinges on the correct interpretation of Socratic 
irony. With Schlegel we begin the turn away from Xenophon to Plato as the 
privileged source of our understanding of Socrates; and the reason for this 
is Xenophon’s inability to understand Socrates’s irony— in Schlegel’s view, 
“the only involuntary and yet completely deliberate dissimulation.” In this 
paradoxical mix of the voluntary and the involuntary “everything should 
be playful and serious, guilelessly open and deeply hidden. . . . It origi-
nates in the union of savoir vivre and scientific spirit, in the conjunction of 
a perfectly instinctive and a perfectly conscious philosophy. It contains and 
arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the 
relative, between the impossibility and the necessity of complete commu-
nication.” 43 Schlegel argues that his own irony and Socrates’s are the same. 
As we have seen, this is a claim that Hegel must contest. Williams sees him 
doing so by distinguishing between destructive and constructive irony. This 
is right— the question is, how does Socrates manage to make this distinc-
tion? The central line of Williams’s discussion is that he does so by virtue of 
his commitment to “substantial interests.” 44 Pace Schlegel and Kierkegaard, 
Socrates’s irony is more or less as Gregory Vlastos has described it: a mask 
that in announcing itself to be a mask reveals the positive commitments it 
playfully conceals, such as Socrates’s care for his friends and interlocutors, 
and his pursuit of the good, which Williams argues is only comprehensible 
given some knowledge of the good.45 All of this is in stark contrast to Schle-
gel’s destructive and unsubstantial irony, which “results in a substanceless 
subject” and “can dissolve any substantive content and regard it as null and 
void. . . . Hegel believes irony is directed at everything, including substantive 
interests.” 46
There is, no doubt, some evidence for this. Immediately after the passage 
cited above from the Lectures on Aesthetics, for instance, Hegel proclaims that 
“genuine earnestness enters only by means of substantial interest, something 
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of intrinsic worth [in sich selbst gehaltvolle] like truth, ethical life, etc.” 47 But 
Hegel’s commitment to the intrinsic, substantial content of ethical life is not 
a commitment to the substantial as opposed to the subjective; indeed, as we 
have already seen, “the universal [ethical life] does not attain validity or ful-
fillment without the interest, knowledge, and volition of the particular [and 
its] conscious awareness.” The same is also true in Hegel’s aesthetics and 
his logic.48 Hence the contrast cannot be drawn quite as starkly as Williams 
suggests. Indeed, Hegel suggests that the contrasting terms themselves are 
the product of the subject’s mediation— not its limitation. As he puts it in 
pr §138, “The subjectivity, as abstract self- determination and pure certainty 
of itself alone evaporates into itself all determinate aspects of right, duty, and 
existence, inasmuch as it is the power of judgment which determines solely 
from within itself what is good in relation to a given content, and at the same 
time the power to which the good, which is at first only an Idea [vorgestellt] 
and an obligation, owes its actuality.” And in the Addition he emphasizes 
that “everything which we recognize as right and duty can be shown by 
thought to be null and void,” and says of Socrates, “He evaporated the ex-
isting world.” This implies both that Socrates practices something like de-
structive irony, and that his relation to “substantive interest” is much more 
ambivalent than Williams makes it out to be. Williams’s interpretation leaves 
unexplained how it was that Socrates was able to develop and maintain his 
commitment to the substantive interests that supposedly distinguish him 
from the Sophists. Williams is quite right to say that Hegel sees Socrates’s 
conception of the good as overly abstract.49 But the question remains, how 
did Socrates manage to develop even an abstract conception of the good, 
given that his was an evaporating subjectivity in which the Greek world and 
its substantive interests dissolved?
The answer lies in Socrates’s relation to the Sophists. Williams comes 
close to articulating this, particularly when he writes that Socratic irony 
“is a determinate negation directed against the Sophists.”50 But this is not 
quite right: Socratic irony is not “a determinate negation directed against 
the Sophists”; it is “a determinate negation of the Sophists.” The difference 
is hardly trivial. As the determinate negation of the Sophists, Socrates was 
the negation of the negation, not the reassertion of what was initially ne-
gated. What does this mean? Williams writes that “the sophistic view is that 
knowledge is impossible” while “Socrates assumes that once the debris of 
confused and misleading ideas (such as sophism) is cleared away, knowledge 
and virtue will be attainable in principle.” And he confidently asserts that 
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Socrates was no Sophist.51 But as the determinate negation of the Sophists 
Socrates was very much a Sophist. Indeed, as Plato already hints, he was 
nothing else.52 His truth is the truth of sophistry, which, pace Williams, 
is hardly “debris” for Hegel. Williams refers to the Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy, but only to the section on Socrates. Hence his recollection is 
perhaps rusty of Hegel’s glowing description of the Sophists as the students 
of Anaxagoras, the agents of the Idea who brought Bildung to Greece, and 
who in dissolving (Auflösung) the false, nonspeculative ideas of common 
sense introduced philosophy to the Greeks.53
Socrates is not a defender of the status quo in opposition to the Sophists. 
As Hegel puts it in the Encyclopedia Logic, “Socrates fought the Sophists on 
all fronts; but he did not do so by setting authority and tradition against 
their abstract argumentation, but rather by exhibiting the untenability of 
grounds dialectically, and by vindicating . . . the concept of willing” (el 
§121a). Rather than a vague or abstract version of maligned substantive in-
terests, we have the undoing of sophistry via sophistry. The two are simply 
two moments in the progress of the Idea, and that progress is always a neg-
ative one— one might say, a skeptical one. “Socrates directed his dialectic 
first against ordinary consciousness in general, and then, more particularly, 
against the Sophists” (el §81a). Against ordinary consciousness first, be-
cause that was the step taken by Anaxagoras and the Sophists, the step that 
made Socrates possible. Hegel identifies the essence of sophistry as “making 
one sided and abstract determinations valid in their isolation . . . in accord 
with the individual’s interest of the moment and his particular situation”; 
“the decision as to what grounds are to count as valid falls to the subject”— a 
nihilism that obviously anticipates that which Hegel attributes to Schlegel 
(el §§81a, 121a). Hegel associates this with a particular reading of Protago-
ras’s dictum, man is the measure: “in this . . . as in all their [maxims] lurks 
an ambiguity, since the term ‘Man’ may denote Spirit in all its depth and 
truth, or in the aspect of mere caprice and private interest.”54 Williams says 
repeatedly that Socrates opposes the principle that man is the measure.55 
But Hegel says that he opposes only the false interpretation of the principle: 
“Protagoras’ assertion is in its real meaning a great truth. . . . The same 
statement is brought forward in Socrates and Plato, but with the further 
modification that here man, in that he is thinking and gives himself a uni-
versal content, is the measure. Thus here the great proposition is enunciated 
on which, from this time forward, everything turns.”56 The correct interpre-
tation is in fact Hegel’s own doctrine, as laid out in the Encyclopedia and the 
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Philosophy of Right. The state is the actualization of the will, the concept by 
which we have seen Socrates “vindicated”; and “the will is a particular way 
of thinking” (pr §4a).
It is the collapse of the false interpretation of Protagoras’s dictum that 
demonstrates the necessity of the true interpretation. This collapse trans-
pired in both a political and philosophical setting. In his discussion of the 
Sophists in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel writes, “The end 
of the state is the universal [Allgemeine],” and a half page later he writes, 
“Thought seeks universal [allgemeine] principles.”57 The polis as a discursive 
community realized itself in the teaching of the Sophists; but that teaching 
undermined the common world even as it realized it. As Thucydides shows, 
as the Peloponnesian war progressed, the false reading of Protagoras’s dictum 
took hold of the city, and “private ambition and private profit led to policies 
which were bad both for the Athenians and their allies.”58 It is in this corrupt 
city, and in conversation with the Sophist Gorgias, that Socrates claims that 
he is “one of the very few among the Athenians, not to say the only one, en-
gaged in the true political art.”59 This art looks forward to an assertion of self 
as public or universality. As Hegel puts it in the 1817 – 18 Lectures on Natural 
Right and Political Science, “My genuine conscience is universal conscience.”60 
Universality is the truth of the abstraction of the subjectivity of the Sophists, 
and of Schlegel. Socrates does not reprimand his interlocutors for pursuing 
their own interest; instead he teaches them that they do not know what that 
is— nor, in the end, who they really are. It is the desire to assert themselves as 
the measure that drives them on. Instead of clearing away sophistic debris, 
Socrates radicalizes this sophistic project and transforms it into its other.
But what would it mean to will the self as universal or general as opposed 
to abstract? To put the question somewhat differently, if the autonomous 
self is one that passes through the moment of abstraction, how can it ever 
become concrete again? Hegel’s answer is found in his account of the will. 
Hegel describes the will as “particularity reflected back into itself and so 
brought back to universality, i.e., it is individuality” (pr §7). Such formu-
lations are dense and extremely abstract, and they open themselves up to 
a number of interpretations. One way of approaching this problem is to 
focus on Hegel’s later discussion of the way one can purify one’s impulses, 
give them the form of reason, and make them one’s own (pr §19). This is 
a process in which I become what I am by making myself at home in the 
world— making my world my world, making it one in which I can recognize 
myself. I do this by taking up (some of ) the impulses and relationships that 
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characterize that world as contingent facts and making them things that I 
choose. This requires me to step back from the things themselves and to ask 
if I really want them, if they really satisfactorily express who I am. In doing 
this I apply universal categories to the particular impulses and relationships 
my history has left me with— categories that are not simply my own inven-
tion, but social products.61 Instead of simply feeling what I do for, say, the 
people with whom I have close relations, I reflect upon those people and 
relations in general terms. In realizing that what I feel is best characterized 
under the general rubric of love, for example, that feeling is deepened— it 
becomes self- conscious, itself an object of my esteem (as opposed to the 
person for whom I feel this love). This in turn adds worth and stability to 
my relationship. When times are hard, and my feelings of love appear to 
have been replaced by ones of, say, anger and impatience, I do not lose track 
of the general truth of our relationship as a loving one. I am no longer a 
prey to my passing feelings— here anger and impatience. But none of this 
means that I am not an individual who feels specific, individual feelings for 
another individual. Quite the opposite: I can be such an individual, rather 
than a Humean bundle of impulses and sensations, only by virtue of pass-
ing through these three moments of the will and making some feelings or 
impulses structural features of my world, or who I am.
This is a dangerous transition, as it may easily happen that I choose to 
remain abstracted from all concrete relations, and to make this abstraction 
itself a way of life. This is Hegel’s diagnosis of the Terror of the French 
Revolution: “Only in destroying something does this negative will possess 
the feeling of itself as existent. Of course it imagines that it is willing some 
positive state of affairs, such as universal equality or universal religious life, 
but in fact it does not will that this shall be positively actualized, and for 
this reason: such actuality leads at once to some sort of order, to a particu-
larization of organizations and individuals alike, while it is precisely out of 
the annihilation of particularity and objective characterization that the self- 
consciousness of this negative freedom proceeds” (pr §5r).62 The difficulty 
of the transition through and out of this moment of  “negative will” has led 
some to infer that Hegel himself does not in the end think it possible. Slavoj 
Žižek, for instance, argues in the second and central chapter of  The Ticklish 
Subject: The Absent Center of Political Ontology that the only alternative to this 
“fury of destruction” is the return to particularity as such. On this account, 
Schmitt as decisionist is the true heir of Hegel, rather than those who claim 
to be following Hegel in asserting the satisfactory resolution of this dilemma 
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in the ultimate recognition of a concrete universal that somehow magically 
unifies the demands of universality (I am nothing) and individuality (as this 
nothing I recognize that I am these things, that I now choose and hence 
willingly embrace).63 And no doubt it is true that if all that were going on 
was the turning off and on of one’s feelings and commitments, it is difficult 
to see why one should choose to turn back on the particular feelings and 
commitments with which one began. One might well choose any set of rela-
tions rather than remain in the psychotic loneliness of utter nonrelation; but 
one’s reasonable horror of such a state would not lend any special advantage 
to the particular set of relations that had initially been set aside.
An analysis such as Žižek’s, however, takes the moment of abstraction 
profoundly out of context, and leaves unexplained why one abstracts one-
self from one’s relations to begin with. One simply refuses particularity and 
then accepts it again— or not. On Hegel’s account, in contrast, one initially 
refuses pure particularity on Rousseauian grounds: the utter contingency of 
particularity as experienced in contingent impulses is not a sphere in which 
one can affirm oneself as a free individual.64 Hence one seeks a mediated 
mode of universality that will allow one to affirm oneself as willing the 
particular (these people, these relations) at least in part on conceptual or 
universal grounds. In these relations the subject is able to experience ca-
maraderie in the form of friendship, or desire in the form of love. Precisely 
such a mode of abstraction and commitment is enacted in the Philosophy of 
Right itself, which asks the reader to set aside her immediate political com-
mitments in favor of a commitment to the universal free will, a commitment 
that shall ultimately take as its object the manifold institutions and modes of 
life that both characterize modernity and make possible the (concrete) free 
will. As Hegel puts it, “The free will . . . wills the free will” (pr §27); but this is, 
of necessity, a mediated willing in which the free will wills the institutions 
that make it possible and sustain it.65
If Socrates fails to make such a commitment, and tarries in ironic ab-
straction, it is not because he, like Schlegel, finds freedom in abstraction as 
opposed to the passage through universality to individuality, but because 
there is as yet no such set of institutions and forms of life adequate to his 
will that he might affirm. As is well known, in his discussion of the Greek 
political work of art in The Philosophy of History lectures, Hegel relates the 
Socratic moment of moral reflection to the rise and collapse of democracy 
in Athens, and argues that the appearance of subjective freedom with the 
Sophists and Socrates “plunged the Greek world into ruin, for the polity 
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[Verfassung] which that world embodied was not calculated for this side of 
humanity— did not recognize this phase; since it had not made its appear-
ance when that polity began to exist. Of the Greeks in the first and most 
genuine [wahrhaften] form of their Freedom, we may assert that they had 
no conscience.”66 This is often taken as suggesting that the Greeks somehow 
lacked the interiority of moderns— that they did not and (for some bizarre 
and wholly unexplained reason) could not question their customs, and ask 
themselves what was really right and wrong. Hegel’s fondness for Sopho-
cles’s Antigone alone should be enough to indicate that this is not his view. 
Hegel’s point is rather that they could not do this in any but a “destructive” 
fashion, as their polity was not yet equal to such questioning.67 The Greeks 
had no conscience because their political constitution or Verfassung was not 
adequate to the demands of subjectivity, and hence did not allow for the 
mediation of subjective reflection.
Irony hence works quite differently in the modern world than it did in the 
ancient. For moderns, irony, if not properly disciplined, becomes a rejection 
of a world that one might well make one’s own. Ironists like Schlegel or Jean- 
Luc Nancy see their irony as a way to ensure their freedom.68 Hegel is often 
taken as reacting to this with reactionary fury, as if to say, “Don’t think so 
much about yourself, you petty egoist, think about something important, 
think about the state!” While his language of  “evil” no doubt encourages 
such an interpretation, it is nonetheless profoundly wrong to attribute this 
response to Hegel. Hegel’s point is that this sort of irony is a failure on its 
own terms. Hegel’s consideration of irony in the context of the questions 
of freedom and self- assertion is meant to draw out the way that irony is an 
attempt to assert the self as free. But the self that is thus asserted is too closely 
bound up with the event of its self- assertion to allow the ironist to recognize 
himself in his deed. Hence even the boldest self- assertion will only leave the 
ironist unsatisfied, like someone flipping through the channels on tv late at 
night. Hegel doesn’t deny that this can seem to promise real satisfaction— 
one need only think of the lord in the dialectic of lordship and bondage to 
see that one might well choose a form of life that fails to satisfy one’s own 
will and its need to recognize itself in its worldly deeds. Nor does Hegel at-
tempt to get the ironist to pull back to the realm of  “substantial values”; he 
urges him instead to recognize that he has already embraced nihilism, and 
that the only way forward is to radicalize the self- assertion this involves, to 
tread “the path of despair [Verzweiflung]”— or, as Hegel also says, the “path 
of doubt [Zweifel].”69
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These lines are of course from the Phenomenology, where Hegel lays out 
the approach of that book. He continues, “For what happens on [this path] 
is not what is ordinarily understood when the word ‘doubt’ is used: shilly- 
shallying about this or that presumed truth, followed by a return to the 
truth again, after the doubt has been appropriately dispelled— so that at the 
end of the process the matter is taken to be what it was in the first place.” 
Instead, the “thoroughgoing skepticism” he calls for is one in which one has 
“the resolve, in Science, not to give oneself over to the thoughts of others, 
upon mere authority, but to examine everything for oneself and to follow 
only one’s own conviction, or better still, to produce everything oneself, and 
to accept only as one’s own deed what is true.”70 If political autonomy is to 
be justified scientifically, it will require a science that is our own; anything 
else could only end in an appeal to authority that denies the very auton-
omy it attempts to justify. In the terms of contemporary politics, this means 
that, if authoritarianism thrives on the ironic detachment of the populace, 
the proper response is not to bemoan that irony, but to take it seriously, 
and to push it into its other. If people seek freedom in fleeing from politics 
while at the same time embracing it, it is the desire for freedom that must 
be embraced and encouraged. This is profoundly counterintuitive, as the 
modernity in which everything solid melts into air seems best opposed by 
clinging to substantive moral commitments, such as the moral values many 
claim to defend. But these values are, from the Hegelian perspective, archaic. 
For moderns, morality is not so much a matter of substance but of form: the 
form of autonomous willing. Subjective reflection is an absolutely essential 
moment in this willing, but as part of a process. Evil is the result not of the 
turn to the subject, but of forgetting that subjectivity seeks a concrete home 
in which it might recognize itself, rather than a set of objects it can affirm 
and discard according to its whims and fancies. That the return to the world 
adequate to the will is not a mere return to archaic substance is revealed in 
the fact that these institutions are not valued for their alleged inherent value, 
but because they make possible the realization of our autonomy. Irony, and 
the subjective decision it celebrates, is the central and most difficult stum-
bling block on the way to that realization in both in the Philosophy of Right 
and contemporary America. But it is necessary, and passable, for all that.
On the level of the state as a whole this conclusion may not be immediately 
obvious, as Hegel at times seems to embrace positions that sound much 
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closer to those of Schmitt in the 1920s than one would expect after working 
though his account of evil and subjective reflection. This is particularly true 
in Hegel’s discussion of Die Souveränität gegen außen (pr §§321 – 29), where 
the monarch is linked to the necessity of war and to the ability of a soldier 
who gives his life on the battlefield to attain the status of the universal class 
that otherwise is limited to the members of the enlightened bureaucracy.71 
The main difficulty here concerns Hegel’s treatment of sovereignty. In gen-
eral, Hegel describes sovereignty as being made up of three moments: the 
monarch, the legislature, and the executive. Sovereignty is constituted by 
ideality (pr §278, §278r), and Hegel refers us to pr §7’s discussion of the “ab-
stract concept of the will” as “self- relating negativity” (as addressed above) to 
understand this relation between part and whole. But in “a situation of exi-
gency,” which Hegel contrasts with one of peace, “the organism [the state] 
of which these particular spheres are members fuses into a single concept of 
sovereignty, and the monarch as it were becomes the sovereign of which it 
is usually only a moment” (pr §278r). Hence the monarch is the sovereign 
to which Hegel refers when he argues that, at such times, “the sovereign is 
entrusted with the salvation of the state at the sacrifice of those particular 
authorities whose powers are valid at other times, and it is then that that 
ideality [of the sovereign] comes into its proper actuality [Wirklichkeit]” (pr 
§278r, §323). Using language that plainly evokes his earlier discussion of 
subjectivity, irony, and evil, Hegel argues that the crown is “the moment of 
ultimate decision as self- determination” (pr §275), “the moment of individu-
ality” (Einzelheit), and the I that results from the internal dialectic between 
the universal and the particular, as opposed to a natural identity that is simply 
contrasted to a negating alternative located in an external realm (pr §275a). 
Sovereignty as found in the monarch is “the will’s abstract and to that extent 
ungrounded self- determination in which finality of decision is rooted” (pr 
§279); and in alternate versions of the lecture notes that make up the main 
body of the Philosophy of Right, this same monarch is described in terms later 
used by George W. Bush: “It is a turning in the history of the world, that 
man locate infinity in themselves; that is done especially by the Christian 
religion, according to which human and divine nature is the same. In the 
state the monarch is such a maker of decisions.”72
All of this sounds terribly like the Schmitt of Political Theology and The 
Concept of the Political. But Hegel’s arguments in favor of the monarch’s ex-
clusive right to assume sovereign power à la Schmitt are hardly consistent 
with the main tenets of his political and legal theory. If, as in Plato, there 
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is an isomorphism between the individuality of the person and the individ-
uality of the state, this in itself does not legitimate the former standing in 
for the latter. The only grounds upon which this might be validated is the 
ideality of the state; and this is one in which “each of these powers is itself the 
totality of the constitution” (pr §272, emphasis added). If Hegel nonetheless 
claims a special privilege for the monarch here, this can only be, as above, 
on the grounds that in a “moment of exigency” the “ideality [of the sover-
eign] comes into its proper actuality,” an actuality that somehow favors the 
monarch over the other two moments of the constitution. But the Philosophy 
of Right as a whole is devoted to the explication of the actuality of the state. 
(Recall Hegel’s remark in the preface: “Nothing is actual except the Idea.”) 
It is absurd to suggest that the state becomes somehow more actual in a state 
of emergency. If the monarch, as the supposed concrete moment of individu-
ality (as opposed to the moments of particularity and universality) has a pri-
ority over the legislature and the executive, it enjoys this in peace as well as 
war.73 And Hegel is quite plain that this is not the case. This has led some to 
claim that the older Hegel opportunistically altered his political- philosophic 
position in order to ingratiate himself with the Prussian authorities. Most 
influentially, K. H. Ilting has advanced this interpretation and argued that 
Hegel’s turn to the monarch represents a “betrayal” of Hegel’s own princi-
ples.74 Schnädelbach, too, argues that a comparison between the Philosophy 
of Right and the notes to these lectures that were delivered before the 1819 
Karlsbad decrees shows that Hegel made substantive changes that invite the 
charge of political opportunism in his teaching regarding the monarch.75 
Given that Hegel already held similar views about the privileged position 
of the hereditary monarch in his Jena Realphilosophie, this may not be quite 
fair. Nonetheless, it is clear that Hegel’s strong claims for the priority of the 
monarch are not justified by his claims about the ideality of the state.76 Once 
one acknowledges this, it is no surprise to find Hegel regularly writing dis-
paragingly of the talents of the average sovereign monarch (e.g., pr §281a), 
and in pr §280a taking back many of his bolder claims. Defending the in-
stitution of monarchy from the suggestion that it makes the welfare of the 
state overly reliant upon chance— the good fortune to have a monarch who 
is worthy of his or her position— Hegel says that such fears exaggerate the 
role of the monarch’s particular character: “In a completely organized state, 
it is only a question of the culminating point of formal decision, and one 
needs for a monarch only someone who can say ‘yes’ and dot the ‘i.’ . . . In a 
well- organized monarchy, the objective aspect belongs to the law alone, and 
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the monarch’s part is merely to set to the law the subjective ‘I will.’ ”77 Hence 
though Hegel grants that “there may be circumstances in which it is [the 
monarch’s] private character alone which has prominence,” he insists that “in 
that event the state is either not fully developed, or it is badly constructed” 
(pr §280a).78 Though the monarch may (be said to) be the abstract self of the 
will and the “subjective certainty” of itself that makes the state a real unit (ein 
wirkliches Eins), its “empty, last deciding” is sharply distinguished from the 
“objective decision” for which the ministers or counselors are responsible. 
“In this way the element of the capricious is limited.”79 In short, when Hegel 
criticizes Hobbes in the lectures of the history of philosophy for granting 
the sovereign a godlike authority in which the sovereign’s will replaces law, 
he might well have been speaking of Schmitt.80
This is borne out by Hegel’s suggestion in pr §279r that in ancient times 
“oracles, the entrails of sacrificial animals, and the flight of birds” fulfilled 
the role that is today played by the monarch’s sovereign decision. What is 
significant here is the manner in which divination worked. In the second 
book of the Odyssey, for instance, when Telemachos is trying to get rid of 
his mother’s suitors, Zeus sends two eagles who fly along together then 
turn on one another and tear at each other before finally flying away. This 
is accurately read as a portent of coming disaster by Halitherses, who is said 
to be far beyond the men of his generation in understanding the meaning 
of birds and reading their portents, and falsely denied by one of the suitors. 
It is important to note here that the portent does not itself make a decision, 
but signals that a decisive act is coming: the purging of the suitors. If this is 
analogous to the monarch’s “final decision,” one has to conclude that Hegel 
misspoke when he described it as such, as the comparison suggests that the 
monarch only encourages the acceptance of the decisions of the counsel by 
giving them his stamp of approval. When we consider that in the ancient 
world when people did reach a decision in defiance of portents it led to di-
saster, Hegel is best read as signaling an anxiety that the sovereign remain 
passive and ceremonial. In this light, it is significant that Hegel in pr §279r 
compares ancient oracles to Socrates’s Dämon: as Socrates reports in the 
Apology, his Dämon (unlike that of Weber) never says “yes,” only “no.”81 If 
the monarch is sovereign, he does not, as such, decide.
On neither the level of the subject nor that of the state does Hegel suggest 
that norms will somehow apply themselves. If we are to follow Schmitt so 
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far as to acknowledge that “real life” inevitably “breaks through the crust 
of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition,” this life will be ad-
dressed not by an “absolute,” “self- supporting” decision, but by a will that, 
as “active thought,” moves through particularity, through universality, 
to individuality.82 To move through particularity entails a confrontation 
with the exception, but makes that confrontation part of a larger process 
in which what is sought for is a set of universal concepts that will allow us 
to become the individuals that we are. As in Schmitt, universality is not 
affirmed in its own light, but only once we have stepped outside it. But that 
step is not a step back to mere particularity— the decision of the sovereign 
leader— but a step forward, into an individuality that retains the mark of 
the universal. Rather than a choice between rule and exception, we have a 
dialectic of assertion, abstraction, and realization. No doubt, this logic is 
not one that produces deductive arguments in favor of a specific form of 
individuality in any case. But there will be a range of criteria (as laid out 
in the Philosophy of Right but not, say, Political Theology) that allows for the 
elimination of some possibilities and the reasonable evaluation of others. 
Hegel is under no illusion that we shall necessarily appreciate the validity 
of the ethical, political, and legal relations he lays out in the Philosophy of 
Right. Indeed, he writes the book precisely because most of us, most of 
the time, fail to do so. And the account he lays out is not a deduction (in 
the sense of the “Understanding”) from indubitable premises, but one that 
requires our interpretation and affirmation. Hegel’s text does not compel 
us in this sense. But perhaps the greatest failure of the decisionist view lies 
in the assumption that the only alternative to discretion is compulsion. The 
Hegelian account of autonomy, and hence of the will, is meant to point us 
toward another alternative. No doubt, Hegel himself does not go far be-
yond this. The fact that his own discussion of the necessary role of Socratic, 
skeptical subjectivity in the dialectic of modern politics is as cryptic as it 
is— the fact that it requires the level of interpretive work we have given it 
here— itself demonstrates that Hegel himself does not, in the end, provide 
all of the resources we need to understand it. He does, however, provide the 
framework within which we might begin to do so.83
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Notes
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as “Willing and Deciding: Hegel on 
Irony, Evil, and the Sovereign Exception,” Diacritics 37, nos. 2 – 3 (2007): 135 – 56.
 1 When the sovereign decides on the exception, he “decides whether there is an 
extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it. Although he 
stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, 
for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended 
in its entirety.” Schmitt, Political Theology, 5, 7; I silently modify the transla-
tion throughout when accuracy demands. German references are from Politische 
Theologie.
 2 The Schmittian sovereign is he who decides on the exception; this decision must 
be made by a single person because there is no common sense among members 
of the community as to when the constitution needs to be suspended in its 
entirety. Hence Schmitt does not write, “We are sovereign when we agree to 
decide upon the exception.”
 3 “It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that 
is, the whole question of sovereignty.” Schmitt, Political Theology, 6.
 4 Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 12: “Besteht im juristischen Sinne immer noch eine 
Ordnung, wenn auch keine Rechtsordnung.”
 5 Schmitt does not just argue that the political in the form of the sovereign de-
cision must reemerge, but that it should do so. Politics in the sense of the in-
dividual’s existential commitment to a hierarchical ordering of the community 
in which the voice of the political Einheit has the authority to dispose of the 
individual’s life is, for Schmitt, a positive good that forestalls a nihilistic collapse 
of meaning. Or so I argue in Norris, “Carl Schmitt on Friends, Enemies and the 
Political.”
 6 As Schmitt puts it, “The sovereign decision is the absolute beginning, and the 
beginning . . . is nothing else than a sovereign decision.” Schmitt, Über die 
drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens, 23 – 24. Or, in Agamben’s terms, 
“The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspend-
ing itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the 
exception, first constitutes itself as a rule. . . . The sovereign decision on the 
exception is the originary juridico- political structure on the basis of which what 
is included in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquire their 
meaning.” Agamben, Homo Sacer, 18, 19.
 7 By “largely avoidable” I do not mean to suggest that we might yet live on a 
candy mountain in which such things cease altogether to plague us, but simply 
that, for us, today, they are exceptional events in the sense that they are unusual, 
and not day- to- day events such as adultery, theft, and trucking and bartering.
 8 It will be pointed out that the Bush- Cheney administration hardly fit this rosy 
scenario. I assume here that one reason the actions of this administration were 
as reprehensible as they were is that they were not necessary. If one feels that 
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Guantánamo, secret prisons, forced extradition, the violent compromises of the 
U.S. Constitution and so on were necessary, it is hard to see what grounds one 
would have for complaint. I press this point in Norris, “Sovereignty, Exception, 
and Norm.” The same would obviously apply to the Obama administration’s 
deeply unfortunate embrace of many of its predecessor’s antiterrorist measures.
 9 Schmitt may point to this conception of the exception when he rigorously dis-
tinguishes the exception from a mere “construct applied to any emergency de-
cree or every state of siege.” Schmitt, Political Theology, 5.
 10 A clear contrast here would be Bruce Ackerman’s excellent book, Before the Next 
Attack, which attacks Schmitt’s Political Theology as “melodramatic” and takes 
care to give criteria of what is and is not an “existential threat” to the nation. 
Ackerman argues that states of emergency need to be addressed by an executive 
branch that is much more responsive to and limited by the other branches of 
government than the executive branch in the United States currently is. He 
proposes that the executive be given the ability to declare a state of emergency, 
but that this declaration must be ratified by the Congress at regular intervals, 
and each time by a supermajority with an increasing percentage of the vote. 
Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, 56, 21, and 171.
 11 Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents, 6.
 12 Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents, 15.
 13 Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents, 17.
 14 Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents, 92.
 15 Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents, 90. Given this appeal to the logical, it is 
somewhat ironic that Rasch is fiercely critical of Agamben for making “struc-
tural” arguments that, appearances notwithstanding, are “historical only in the 
most apocalyptic sense,” relying as they do on the hope that “the logical paradox 
of sovereignty [can] be overcome by the installation of a new ontology” (95, 93).
 16 See, e.g., Read, Thinking about Logic, 149.
 17 My discussion of Agamben here follows that in Norris, “The Exemplary Excep-
tion”; I discuss the echoes of Hegel in Agamben’s account of the paradigm and 
the example at 276 and 282.
 18 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 21, emphasis added.
 19 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 22.
 20 Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 18 and 7. On page 19 of the same book, 
however, Agamben argues that what he is discussing “is not logic but analogy.”
 21 Compare Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 31.
 22 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 22.
 23 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 181.
 24 Or consider an even more straightforward example. I could be an example of 
a political philosopher interested in both “analytic” and “continental” modes 
of philosophy. As an example, am I somehow distinguished from other such 
professors? Or do they, in the comparison, likewise become examples?
 25 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 21.
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 26 Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 24.
 27 Compare Agamben’s discussion of the members of an order following the ex-
ample of their founder in Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 21 – 22. In such 
cases it seems perfectly fair to speak of  “a form of knowledge that is neither in-
ductive nor deductive but analogical. It moves from singularity to singularity.” 
Agamben, The Signature of All Things, 31.
 28 Denying this is a mistake I myself once made. Norris, “Introduction,” 9.
 29 Schmitt cites Hegel in his own attack upon romantic irony as a flight from the 
decision. Schmitt, Political Romanticism, 70 – 72.
 30 Throughout this essay I use the term modern rather loosely. Hegel is concerned 
with modern Europeans, and there is no reason to believe that he would see his 
argument as applying to, say, Amazonian tribes or the miserable inhabitants of 
“failed states” such as Afghanistan.
 31 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §§101 – 2. All citations from the Philosophy of Right 
come from Elements of the Philosophy of Right, edited by Allen Wood and trans-
lated by H. B. Nisbet and from the Suhrkamp Werke. Subsequent references to 
this edition appear in the text as pr.
 32 No wonder then that, as Herbert Schnädelbach observes, “Dieser übergang ist 
immer wieder als einer der schwächsten und unplausibelsten der ganzen [Philos-
ophy of Right] kritisiert worden.” Schnädelbach, Hegels praktische Philosophie, 244.
 33 In the Logic Hegel describes Kant’s appeal to a distinction between what can be 
thought and what can be known as a solution to the antinomies as being “like 
attributing to someone a correct perception, with the rider that nevertheless he 
is incapable of perceiving what is true but only what is false.” Hegel, Introduc-
tion to Science of Logic, 46; cited in Forster, Hegel and Skepticism, 177.
 34 Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, §22. That Hegel seeks to confront this “sickness 
of his time” as such is signaled in the fact that he lectures on these matters re-
peatedly for huge numbers of students, most of whom would not themselves 
become professional philosophers. See Pinkard, Hegel, 456. Subsequent refer-
ences to the Encyclopedia appear in the text as el.
 35 Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” 153, 152, and 156; Weber, “Wissenschaft als Be-
ruf,” 610, 608, 613. On Schmitt’s exposure and response to Weber, see William 
Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception, 251n7.
 36 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 133.
 37 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, 134.
 38 It is not only that, of course. As Terry Pinkard emphasizes in his recent biogra-
phy, Hegel was a reformist liberal with a long- standing interest in the French 
Revolution and the Napoleonic reforms. And the Philosophy of Right of course 
outlines institutions that were not found in the Prussia of Hegel’s own day. 
But the emphasis of the Philosophy of Right is not on proposing changes, but on 
reconciling us to what is (actual), and thereby making it— our lives, us— what it 
really is. For a related account of the role of the therapeutic in Hegel, see Pippin, 
“The Absence of Aesthetics in Hegel’s Aesthetics.”
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 39 Many will protest that Hegel’s characterization of Schlegel is hardly fair or ac-
curate. This need not concern us here, as the issue here is the status of irony and 
the subjective decision in Hegel, and not Schlegel’s own views.
 40 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, 64 – 65.
 41 This is somewhat misleading. Fichte does argue that what kind of philosopher 
one is is itself the expression of an existentialist decision that cannot be guided 
by reason; but he sees this decision as itself the expression of one’s true charac-
ter. See Fichte, “[First] Introduction,” 18. But, as with Schlegel, the point here 
is not the accuracy of Hegel’s reading of Fichte, but his own position.
 42 See Hegel’s contrast between ancient Athens and modern Europe in his Lectures 
on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, 365. On the deficiencies of this text, to which 
one working on this topic must nonetheless refer, see Beiser’s introduction to 
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, xxxi – xxxii.
 43 Schlegel, “Critical Fragment 108,” 13.
 44 Williams, “Hegel on Socrates and Irony,” 70, 74, 76, 79, 80.
 45 See Vlastos, “Socratic Irony,” in Socrates. For an excellent critique of Vlastos’s 
reading, see chapter 3 of Nehamas, The Art of Living. The central text on the 
subject is of course Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony. Considering the depth of 
Kierkegaard’s antipathy to Hegel, this early work is extraordinarily Hegelian in 
tone and content.
 46 Williams, “Hegel on Socrates and Irony,” 73, 72.
 47 Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, 65; Hegel, Werke, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik I, 94.
 48 In the Aesthetics Hegel argues that the experience of the beautiful art object is 
one in which the demands of the object and of the subject are brought into har-
mony with one another. The distorted perspective of  “unfree” or “finite intelli-
gence” presents us with a false dilemma in which we must choose between the 
freedom of the subject and that of the object. From this perspective, that of the 
Understanding, the cognitive freedom of the subject is hopelessly compromised 
by the given quality of the apparently independent object; the subject’s freedom 
is found only in the imposition of its will upon the object, and hence the denial 
of the object’s freedom in its reduction to an object of use. But for Hegel, “in 
both these relations, both sides are finite and one- sided, and their freedom is a 
purely supposititious freedom.” In contrast, in aesthetic experience the object 
is considered in its “subjective unity and life” as “an end in itself,” while the 
subject in his “liberal contemplation” of the object escapes both the cognitive 
subordination to the given and the practical reduction to unrealized intention. 
“His relation to the fulfillment of his subjective intentions is no longer the finite 
one of the mere ‘ought’; he has gone beyond it and what now confronts him is 
the perfectly realized Concept and end.” Hegel, Lectures on Aesthetics, 112 – 14. For 
an excellent and clear account of the necessary role of the subject in the presup-
positionless science of Hegel’s logic, see Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic.
 49 Williams, “Hegel on Socrates and Irony,” 79.
 50 Williams, “Hegel on Socrates and Irony,” 80.
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 51 Williams, “Hegel on Socrates and Irony,” 77, 78.
 52  At Plato, The Sophist, 268a – d, the Stranger describes what is plainly meant to 
be Socrates as “the real and genuine Sophist.”
 53 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 354.
 54 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 269.
 55 Williams, “Hegel on Socrates and Irony,” 68, 82.
 56 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 373 – 74.
 57 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 356.
 58 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 163.
 59 Plato, Gorgias, 521d. The claim here is much stronger than that found in Xe-
nophon, where Socrates suggests that he knows how to rule (as opposed to 
actually ruling) and that he prepares others for politics. Compare Xenophon, 
Conversations of Socrates, 162, 98.
 60 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science, §66. Compare Hegel, Vor-
lesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 405. And compare Pierre Hadot on 
the force of Socratic dialectic: “Caring for ourselves and questioning ourselves 
occur only when our individuality is transcended and we rise to the level of uni-
versality, which is represented by what the two interlocutors have in common.” 
Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, 28 – 29. Hadot does not recognize that Hegel 
shares his estimation of Socratic dialectic and attributes the standard view laid 
out by Williams to Hegel at 37.
 61 Robert Pippin rightly argues that a central strand of this process involves the 
recognition of our sociality, the nature of which we distort if we “see social 
practices, conventions, and the like as results of simultaneously held individ-
ual commitments, as if the content of such commitments could be understood 
apart from, independently of, the expectations, possible reactions, oppositions, 
and so forth within a community of subjects.” Pippin, “Responses to Conway, 
Mooney, and Rorty,” 360 – 61 and passim. This is not exactly a turn from the self 
to society, but a recognition that the self is a social self.
 62 This critique does not support the liberal alternative, as it also undercuts the 
sort of negative conceptions of liberty championed by liberals like Isaiah Berlin 
and by (quite different) liberals like Friedrich Hayek.
 63 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 113, 114.
 64 As Rousseau puts it in The Social Contract, “man acquires with civil society, 
moral freedom, which alone makes man the master of himself; for to be gov-
erned by appetite alone is slavery, while obedience to a law one prescribes to 
oneself is freedom” (65).
 65 Alan Patten correctly argues that, for Hegel, freedom is “recursive: the determi-
nations that give content to freedom turn out to be the ones the agents must 
pursue if they are to be in a position to deliberate and pursue the ends and 
determinations that give content to freedom.” Patten, Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, 
100. For further critique of Žižek’s reading of Hegel, see Dews, “The Tremor of 
Reflection: Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian Dialectics,” in The Limits of Disenchantment.
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 66 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 253.
 67 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 252.
 68 I discuss the role of irony in Nancy’s political thought in Norris, “Jean- Luc 
Nancy and the Myth of the Common.” I discuss his ironist reading of Hegel in 
Nancy, Hegel, in Norris, “Beyond the Fury of Destruction.” The celebration of 
irony is, of course, a central theme in contemporary modern society. Contem-
porary political culture requires a level of sophistication that often appears as 
the ability to ironically if not cynically engage and disengage with one’s fiercely 
held commitments: on one day the commitment to return integrity to politics 
in general or the White House in particular is everything, on the next a demand 
for consistency and an attack on public hypocrisy is dismissed as petty, legalis-
tic, and naive. Our political culture is a part of our more general culture— and 
by “our culture” I mean American culture, the culture of Hollywood mov-
ies, television, pop music, and so on that is obviously hegemonic in more and 
more parts of the world. Here in its home in the States at least this culture is a 
profoundly ironic one, and ironic in a sense that fits well with Hegel’s claims: 
our endless regurgitation of the past— Happy Days, Planet of the Apes, Charlie’s 
Angels, Starsky and Hutch— demonstrates our culture’s collective embrace of the 
truth of that past and its meaning for us, while the smirking irony in which it 
increasingly comes clothed demonstrates our recognition of its essential falsity, 
its utter lack of meaning. Politically this finds a good match in the fact that 
in our time, “homeland” is a site of pervasive homelessness and compromised 
citizenship.
 69 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 49; Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 72.
 70 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 49 – 50.
 71 Compare the discussion of sacrifice and sovereignty in pr 324r and Hegel, Nat-
ural Law, 93: “the individual proves his unity with the people unmistakably 
through the danger of death alone.”
 72 Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts, 272 – 73. As Bush put it in a defense of his em-
battled secretary of defense, “I’m the decider, and I decide what’s best.” George 
W. Bush, quoted in “Bush Names New Budget Chief; More Changes Coming 
but Rumsfeld Will Stay in Job, President Says,” Washington Post, April 19, 2006.
 73 Hegel sometimes writes as if this is indeed the case. At pr §273, for instance, 
Hegel argues, “We begin with the power of the crown, i.e. with the moment of 
individuality, since this includes the state’s three moments as a totality in itself ” 
(emphasis added). The legislature is the moment of universality, the executive is 
the moment of particularity, and the crown is the moment of individuality (pr 
§275). Of these three, individuality is privileged, as it alone contains the other 
moments: “Universality [and] particularity . . . are only abstractions; what is 
concrete and true is the universality which has the particular as its opposite, 
but the particular which by its reflection into itself has been equalized with 
the universal. This unity is individuality” (pr, 7r). Compare el I, §163: “Jedes 
Moment des Begriffs ist selbst der ganze Begriff (§160), aber die Einzelheit, 
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das Subjekt, ist der als Totalität gesetzte Begriff.” This obviously contradicts 
the claim, quoted above, that each moment contains the other two. Moreover, 
imagine if a state had only the “concrete” moment of the monarch, and lacked 
the supposed “abstractions” that surround it in the Philosophy of Right. In this 
light Peter Steinberger is quite right to argue that Hegel’s language of the domi-
nance of one moment is not in keeping with his own thinking: “For Hegel, the 
state is in some sense an entity of sovereignty; but as the state is, so to speak, 
a monad, only it in its entirety can be sovereign. Of course, sovereignty may 
actively manifest itself in one or another of its members; hence, we can say that 
decisions come directly from this or that institution. But to say that the mon-
arch or the majority is sovereign over against the rest of the state is to ignore the 
state’s fundamental unity.” Steinberger, Logic and Politics, 214.
 74 Ilting, “The Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” 105 – 6. For a history of 
this approach to the text, see Riedel’s introduction to Materialien zu Hegels 
Rechtsphilosophie; for critical evaluations, see Siep, “Vernuftrecht und Rechts-
geschichte”; and Pinkard, Hegel, 457, and chapters 10 – 12.
 75 Schnädelbach, Hegels praktische Philosophie, 170 – 71. On the Karlsbad decrees and 
the censorship and political climate in which Hegel finished the Philosophy of 
Right, see Pinkard, Hegel, chapter 10.
 76 Axel Honneth argues that Hegel’s commitment to the hereditary monarch in 
the Realphilosophie represents a retreat from a political to a metaphysical under-
standing of the state. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 60.
 77 From this Shlomo Avineri concludes that the sovereign is “a mere symbol of 
the unity of the state” and that it is “both essential— without him the ‘i’s go 
undotted— but also ultimately trivial.” Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of  the Modern State, 
188. Likewise, Allen Wood rightly concludes from pr §280a and §279a and other 
student lecture notes that “the state’s policies are not at the mercy of the individual 
judgment of the sovereign prince.” Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 282n5.
 78 Hegel argues in pr §279a that the monarch is “bound by the concrete decisions 
of his ministers” and that he “may” not act capriciously. This “may” is repeated 
in pr §280a, and in each case one wonders how Hegel’s dürfen improves upon 
the Kantian sollen he consistently castigates. (In pr §280a Hegel also writes that 
“the throne must be such that the significant thing in his holder is not his partic-
ular makeup.”) Hegel repeats tirelessly that it is not the job of a philosopher to 
offer empty ideals or “oughts.” Is a state that is not “completely organized” one 
that is not fully real? Here it is helpful to recall pr §214r: “Reason itself requires 
us to recognize that contingency, contradiction, and show have a sphere and 
right of their own, restricted though it be, and it is irrational to strive to resolve 
and rectify contradictions within that sphere.”
 79 Hegel, Die Philosophie des Rechts, 274, 164. Compare pr §278a, where Hegel 
clearly distinguishes sovereignty as he understands it from a despotic state 
where a particular will, be it that of the monarch or the people, “counts as 
law or rather takes the place of law.” This is consistent with Hegel’s discussion 
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of the limits of legal norms in his discussion “Right as Law” (pr §§211 – 14), 
where he acknowledges that no law can apply itself to a particular case: “In this 
sphere, the concept merely lays down a general limit, within which vacillation 
is allowed. This vacillation must be terminated, however, in the interest of get-
ting something done, and for this reason there is a place within that limit for 
contingent and arbitrary decisions [willkürliche Entscheidung]” (pr §214). Hegel 
hardly sees this as leading to a suspension of law as such, à la Schmitt. In pr 
§214r he admits, “Reason cannot determine, nor can the concept provide a 
principle whose application could decide whether justice requires for an offense 
(i) a corporal punishment of forty lashes or thirty- nine. . . . And yet an offense 
is done if there is one lash too many.” The implication that justice is present 
but indeterminable does not cause Hegel the worry that it does Schmitt and 
Hobbes, that someone must make it present by declaring it to be correct, and 
that it is only present in being so determined. The borders are vague but real, 
and the judge’s decision, which “pertains to abstract subjectivity, to formal self- 
certainty [ formellen Gewißheit],” must stay “within a certain limit.”
 80 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 226.
 81 Hegel is likely following Xenophon here; Xenophon, “Socrates’ Defense,” de-
picts Socrates himself making this comparison, to his own advantage. Xeno-
phon, Conversations of Socrates, 43 – 44; compare Hegel, The Phenomenology of 
Spirit, 431.
 82 Schmitt, Political Theology, 12; Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 19.
 83 While space does not permit an adequate discussion of the matter, I would 
suggest that we turn to figures such as Stanley Cavell, who give a more detailed 
account of the role of individual subjectivity in the therapeutic “road of doubt” 
that allows modern citizens the opportunity to become what they are in a world 
that, despite its often hopeless appearance, offers them that possibility in a way 
that previous societies did not. If the pairing of Cavell and Hegel seems odd, 
one might recall (1) Cavell’s remark that one of the sources for the phrase “the 
truth of skepticism” (a phrase that names the central teaching of  The Claim of 
Reason) is “Hegel’s use of ‘the truth of x’ where x is a concept he has just sub-
lated, denied at one level but preserved at another,” and (2) his comment that he 
can find no better term than Aufhebung for Wittgenstein’s mode of criticism, his 
“most original contribution [to] philosophy.” Cavell, “Reply to Four Chapters,” 
289; and Cavell, “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” 85.
chapter 10
Humans and (Other) Animals 
in a Biopolitical Frame
Cary Wolfe
Michel Foucault argues in The History of Sexuality that “for millennia, man 
remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional 
capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics 
places his existence as a living being in question.”1 Moreover, as Foucault 
famously defines biopolitics, it “is the power to make live. Sovereignty took 
life and let live. And now we have the emergence of a power that I would call 
the power of regularization, and it, in contrast, consists in making live and 
letting die.”2 Foucault develops this line of investigation later in his career. 
In the lectures collected in “Society Must Be Defended,” for example, he argues 
that a “new mechanism of power” arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, one that had “very specific procedures” and “new instruments.” 
This new type of power, he argues, is “absolutely incompatible with relations 
of sovereignty,” and it is based on “a closely meshed grid of material coer-
cions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign.”3 Foucault thus allows 
us to see, as Roberto Esposito points out, that for biopolitics the fundamen-
tal mechanism concerns not sovereignty and law but rather “something that 
precedes it because it pertains to its ‘primary material.’ ” 4
Even more importantly for our purposes, Foucault argues that this shift 
from sovereignty to biopower involves a new concept of the subject, one 
who is endowed with fundamental interests that cannot be limited to or 
contained by the simple legal category of the person. But a trade- off is in-
volved here. If the subject addressed by biopolitics constitutes a new political 
resource, it also requires a new sort of political technology if it is to be fully 
controlled and exploited. The biosubject, you might say, is far more multi-
dimensional and robust than the thin subject of laws and rights; that is both 
its promise and its challenge as a new object of political power.
274 cary wolfe 
As Foucault characterizes it, the subject theorized during this period by 
English empiricist philosophy is something new, defined not so much by 
freedom or the struggle of soul versus body, but rather as a subject “of in-
dividual choices which are both irreducible and non- transferable.”5 Those 
choices and the ability to make them derive, he argues, not from reason 
but from the capacity to feel (and the desire to avoid) pain, which is “in 
itself a reason for the choice beyond which you cannot go.” It is a reason 
beyond reason, you might say, “a sort of irreducible that does not refer to 
any judgment, reasoning, or calculation.”6 And this means, he argues, that 
“the subject of right and the subject of interest are not governed by the same 
logic.”7 In opposition to what Foucault calls homo juridicus (or homo legalis)— 
the subject of law, rights, and sovereignty— we find in this new subject, homo 
oeconomicus, “an essentially and unconditionally irreducible element against 
any possible government,” a “zone that is definitively inaccessible to any 
government action,” “an atom of freedom.”8 The subject of interest thus 
“overflows” the subject of right, “surrounds” him and, indeed, is the “per-
manent condition” of his possibility.9
This “displacement,” as Maurizio Lazzarato characterizes it, of the prob-
lem of sovereignty doesn’t neglect it but merely points out that “the ground-
ing force will not be found on the side of power, since power is ‘blind and 
weak’ ” (as Foucault puts it)— hence, its growing need, in an increasingly 
complex and differentiated field of operation, for the various techniques of 
management, surveillance, and so on that it deploys.10 What we are deal-
ing with here is not a withdrawal of sovereignty and the law, but rather, as 
Esposito writes, how the pivot of real political power gradually shifts from 
the domain of legal codes and sanctions to “the immanent level of rules and 
norms that are addressed instead to bodies.”11 Politics, law, and economics 
now function primarily not in a top- down but in a bottom- up fashion, and 
become operators for the effective management of the health, well- being, 
and increase of the population, conceived now as an object of biological 
intervention. Norms are thus addressed neither to individual rights holders 
nor, in Esposito’s words, to “their confluence in a people defined as the 
collective subject of a nation, but rather to the living being in the specificity 
of its constitution.”12 But that very “specificity,” precisely because of its own 
complexity, which increases all the more as new regimes of knowledge are 
brought to bear upon it, contains new challenges, new aleatory elements that 
must be managed and directed.
As Lazzarato argues, three important points follow from this: first, “bio-
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politics is the form of government taken by a new dynamic of forces that, in 
conjunction, express power relations that the classical world could not have 
known”; second, “the fundamental political problem of modernity is not 
that of a single source of sovereign power, but that of a multitude of forces. . . . 
If power, in keeping with this description, is constituted from below, then 
we need an ascending analysis of the constitution of power dispositifs”; and 
third, “Biopower coordinates and targets a power that does not properly 
belong to it, that comes from the ‘outside.’ Biopower is always born of something 
other than itself.”13
Here, then— with Foucault’s emphasis on bodies before the law— we find 
a potentially creative, aleatory element that inheres in the very gambit of 
biopower, one not wholly subject to the thanatological drift of a biopoli-
tics subordinated to the paradigm of sovereignty. Quite the contrary, those 
bodies are enfolded via biopower in struggle and resistance, and because 
those forces of resistance are thereby produced in specifically articulated 
forms, through particular dispositifs, there is a chance— and this marks in 
no small part Foucault’s debt to Nietzsche (as both Esposito and Deleuze 
point out)— for life to burst through power’s systematic operation in ways 
that are more and more difficult to anticipate.14 Power/knowledge complexi-
fies the political resource called the body, the better to control it at ever more 
micrological levels, but complexity increases risk. Thus, as Lazzarato notes, 
Foucault actually “interprets the introduction of ‘life into history’ construc-
tively because it presents the opportunity to propose a new ontology, one 
that begins with the body and its potential, over and against the prevailing 
Western tradition of understanding the political subject as above all a subject 
of law.”15 Indeed, Lazzarato argues, one of Foucault’s key insights is that 
without factoring “freedom” and the “resistance of forces” into the equation 
as constitutive, “the dispositifs of modern power remain incomprehensible.”16
But as Esposito rightly observes, all of this leaves us with “a decisive ques-
tion: if life is stronger than the power that besieges it, if its resistance doesn’t 
allow it to bow to the pressure of power, then how do we account for the 
outcome obtained in modernity of the mass production of death?” In short, 
“Why does biopolitics continually threaten to be reversed into thanatopoli-
tics?”17 For Esposito, Foucault leaves hanging “the question of the relation of 
modernity with its ‘pre,’ but also that of the relation with its ‘post.’ What was 
twentieth- century totalitarianism with respect to the society that preceded 
it? Was it a limit, a tear, a surplus in which the mechanism of biopower broke 
free . . . or, on the contrary, was it society’s sole and natural outcome?”18 
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Are the Nazi death camps, to use Agamben’s words, not “a historical fact 
and an anomaly belonging to the past,” but rather “the hidden matrix and 
nomos of the political space in which we are still living”?19 If the latter, then 
Foucault would be forced to join Agamben in seeing genocide as the under-
lying paradigm and constitutive tendency of modernity.20 But such a posi-
tion, as Esposito points out, is at odds not only with Foucault’s strong sense 
of historical distinctions and disjunctions, but also with the sense of life’s 
inevitable expression of itself through resistance that Lazzarato’s reading 
underscores. And so, for Esposito, Foucault’s analysis of biopower ends at 
an impasse, caught between an essentially affirmative view of the biopolitical 
and a thanatological one.
For Esposito, it is this impasse that the paradigm of immunization (one 
also explored by Jacques Derrida, Donna Haraway, and Niklas Luhmann, 
among others) helps us to avoid. In his view, Foucault is unable to develop 
the full implications of his insight in the lectures of 1976 that “the very fact 
that you let more die will allow you to live more”; he is unable to see that 
the affirmative and thanatological dimensions of biopolitics— either “a poli-
tics of life or a politics over life,” as Esposito puts it— are joined in a single 
mechanism.21 “This is where Foucault seeks out the black box of biopolitics,” 
Esposito writes; “in the liminal space where death is not solely the archaic 
figure against which life defines itself . . . but rather one of its inner folds, a 
mode— or tonality— of its own preservation.”22 Like Derrida’s pharmakon, it 
is “a gentle power that draws death into contact with life and exposes life to 
the test of death.”23 The immunitary mechanism thus “saves, insures, and 
preserves the organism, either individual or collective, to which it pertains, 
but it does not do so directly, immediately, or frontally.”24
For Esposito, articulating the immunological mechanism with greater 
precision also allows us to make headway on the question of the specifically 
modern character of biopolitics. It is certainly the case that the exercise of 
biopower may be traced to the ancient world— in the availability of slave 
bodies to their masters, or in the politics of health and hygiene in ancient 
Rome. But what distinguishes these from modern biopolitics is that such 
practices were oriented toward a “collective, public, communal” objective.25 
“Tracing it back to its etymological roots,” Esposito writes, “immunitas is 
revealed as the negative or lacking [ privata] form of communitas. If com-
munitas is that relation, which in binding its members to an obligation of 
reciprocal donation, jeopardizes individual identity, immunitas is the con-
dition of dispensation from such an obligation and therefore the defense 
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against the expropriating features of communitas.”26 Such a paradigm can 
be traced to Hobbes, he argues, in light of whose concept of sovereignty 
the actual underlying function of what we call “the individual” becomes 
clear.27 In reality, it is “the immunitary ideologeme through which mod-
ern sovereignty implements the protection of life”— not of the individual, 
not even of the body, but of life itself.28 Ideologically speaking, the dis-
course of the person or the individual doesn’t undo the split between the 
bodily, the animal or corporeal, on the one hand, and the rational element 
on the other, but rather serves as a means for the latter to subjugate the 
former.29 Here, at the nexus of the person or the individual and the im-
munitary mechanism, the biopolitical takes a specifically modern turn, as 
the person becomes the access point, as it were, to life’s management and 
protection.
Here, however, in the face of the massive thanatological drift of modern 
biopolitics associated above all with Agamben’s work, we need to complicate 
considerably this relationship between immunitary protection, the body, the 
animal, and the person, and we need to remember the fundamental ambiva-
lence of Foucault’s notion of biopower, an ambivalence underscored, as we 
saw earlier, by Lazzarato. For at the very historical moment when the scale 
and efficiency of factory farming have never been more nightmarish— it has 
been compared, by Derrida and by others, to the genocide of the Jews by 
the Nazis (a term whose biopolitical resonance is clear enough in light of 
Agamben’s work)— some animals are receiving unprecedented levels of care, 
so much so that the pet care industry in the United States grew in total 
expenditures from $17 billion in 1994 to nearly $36 billion in 2005 to $45.5 
billion in 2009.30 The late 1990s saw the birth of the famous Missyplicity 
Project, dedicated to cloning companion animals for those who can afford 
it, and short of that (as any owner of a companion animal will testify) the 
range and quality of veterinary care available today, much of it highly spe-
cialized and expensive (dental cleaning requiring general anesthesia, ultra-
sounds, cat scans, ekgs, chemotherapy for veterinary oncology, and much 
else besides— the capacity to “make live,” in Foucault’s words), far outstrips 
what was either available or marketable even a generation ago.31 And this has 
led in turn to another growth industry unheard of until relatively recently: 
pet health care insurance, estimated in 2010 to be a $271 million business and 
on track to balloon to $500 million by 2012.32
What all this adds up to, of course, is a historically remarkable shrinkage 
in the gap between human beings and their animal companions regarding 
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quality of life in areas such as food quality, health care, and other goods 
and services.33 Clearly, then, many animals flourish not in spite of the fact 
that they are animals but because they are animals— or even more precisely, 
perhaps, because they are felt to be members of our families and our commu-
nities, regardless of their species. And yet, at the very same moment, billions 
of animals in factory farms, many of whom are very near to or indeed exceed 
cats and dogs and other companion animals in the capacities we take to be 
relevant to standing (the ability to experience pain and suffering, anticipatory 
dread, emotional bonds and complex social interactions, and so on), have as 
horrible a life as one could imagine, also because they are animals. Clearly, 
then, the question here is not simply of the animal as the abjected other of the 
human tout court, but rather something like a distinction between bios and zoe 
that obtains within the domain of domesticated animals itself.
We find here an additional insight that thickens Derrida’s well- known 
observation that the designation “the animal” is therefore an “asininity” be-
cause it effaces the vast diversity of nonhuman life under a single definite 
article. Indeed, we might say, paraphrasing Esposito, that “the Animal” is 
an “ideologeme” that masks what Rosi Braidotti, following Deleuze, calls 
the “transversal” relations in which animals, and our relations with them, 
are caught under biopolitical life.34 From this vantage, it makes little or no 
sense to lump together in the same category the chimpanzee who endures 
biomedical research, the dog who lives in your home and receives chemo-
therapy twice a week, and the pig who languishes in the factory farm. Nor 
does it even make sense to assume that such groupings proceed along species 
lines, strictly speaking. As Braidotti puts it, “In the universe that I inhabit 
as a post- industrial subject of so- called advanced capitalism, there is more 
familiarity, i.e. more to share in the way of embodied and embedded loca-
tions, between female humans and the cloned sheep Dolly, or oncomouse 
and other genetically engineered members of the former animal kingdom, 
than with humanistic ideals of the uniqueness of my species.”35
This new differentiation of the biopolitical field is what Esposito is after 
at the end of Bios, where he insists that a turn away from the thanatological 
and autoimmunitary logic of biopolitics can only take place if life as such— 
not just human (versus animal) life, not just Aryan (versus Jewish) life, not 
just Christian (versus Islamic) life— becomes the subject of immunitary 
protection. Esposito writes, “We can say that the subject, be it a subject of 
knowledge, will, or action as modern philosophy commonly understands 
it, is never separated from the living roots from which it originates in the 
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form of a splitting between the somatic and psychic levels in which the first 
is never decided [risolve] in favor of the second. . . . This means that between 
man and animal— but also, in a sense, between the animal and the vegetal 
and between the vegetal and the natural object— the transition is rather more 
fluid than was imagined.”36 And what this means, in turn, is that “there is 
a modality of bios than cannot be inscribed within the borders of the con-
scious subject, and therefore is not attributable to the form of the individual 
or of the person.”37
To put it another way, if Agamben’s contribution is to articulate power-
fully how the “anthropological machine” cannot function without produc-
ing this remainder called “animal,” which is at the same time the retroac-
tively posited origin that must be excluded by the political project of  “man,” 
then Esposito’s advance is to recognize that the animal is not something 
that need be always already abjected. But if one of the great contributions 
of biopolitical thought is to show how it is impossible to talk about race 
without talking about species— this fact, after all, is at the core of the biopo-
litical confrontation with the Nazi camps— what must now be added (and 
what is already at work in Derrida’s critique of the idea of “the animal” in 
the singular) is that race and species must, in turn, give way to their own 
deconstruction in favor of a more highly differentiated thinking of life in 
relation to biopower, if the immunitary is not to turn more or less automati-
cally into the autoimmunitary. Or in Esposito’s words, “The most complete 
normative model is indeed what already prefigures the movement of its own 
deconstruction in favor of another that follows from it.”38
But where Esposito is wrong, I think, is in his insistence on “the princi-
ple of unlimited equivalence for every single form of life.”39 The problem, 
of course (or one of the problems), is that if all forms of life are taken to be 
equal, then it can only be because they, as the living, all equally embody 
and express a positive, substantive principle of Life not contained in any 
one of them. Thus, as Eugene Thacker puts it, “The contradiction is clear: 
Life is that which renders intelligible the living, but which in itself cannot 
be thought, has no existence, is not itself living.” 40 As Thacker points out, 
later philosophers such as Kant “would recast this dilemma in terms of an 
antinomy: every assertion about life as inherently ordered, organized, or 
purposeful is always undermined by the assertion itself and its irrevocable 
object of thought.” 41 But of course, such a Kantian solution is precisely what 
is unavailable to Esposito, given his reliance on Simondon and Deleuze in 
the final pages of Bios and its framing of an affirmative biopolitics.
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To put this slightly otherwise— updating the Kantian position via Der-
rida— what Esposito is unable to articulate is that what “binds him to his 
own biological matrix” is nothing living, but neither is it Life. Rather, as 
Martin Hägglund has argued, it is the trace structure and “spacing” that is 
“the condition for anything that is subject to succession, whether animate 
or inanimate, ideal or material.” 42 Such a structure (or more precisely, sys-
tem) is, strictly speaking, dead; it is a machinalité (to use Derrida’s term).43 
Far from metaphysical, however, such a system is perfectly compatible with 
a materialist and naturalistic account of how life evolves out of nonliving 
matter, how even the most sophisticated forms of intentionality or sensi-
bility arise out of the inorganic sytematicity of repetition and recursivity, 
retention and protention.44 What Henry Staten calls the “strong naturalist 
view” holds that life may emerge from matter organized in particular ways 
but rejects the idea that “life is somehow hidden in matter and just waiting to 
manifest itself.” Life is thus one possible outcome of materiality, but it is cer-
tainly not a normal or expected one— indeed, it is highly improbable, not the 
rule but the exception.45 In this way, the arche- materiality of the structure 
of succession, of what Derrida calls “living- on,” allows, as Hägglund puts it, 
“for a conceptual distinction between life and matter that takes into account 
the Darwinian explanation of how the living evolved out of the non- living, 
while asserting a distinguishing characteristic of life that does not make any 
concessions to vitalism.” 46
I return to the importance of this point for the question of  “biologistic 
continuism” below, but for now I want to note a separate but related prob-
lem in Esposito’s thinking about life: the slippage in and around the term 
species, which appears to be symptomatic of Esposito’s desire to hold this 
problem of vitalism at bay without falling back into the lexicon of the per-
son as the locus of the norm. Esposito argues that the specific place where 
the immunitary logic operates in biopolitics is “at the juncture between the 
spheres of the individual and the species. When Foucault identifies the object 
of biopower as the population . . . he is referring to the only element that 
groups all individuals together into the same species: namely, the fact that 
they have a body. Biopolitics addresses itself to this body— an individual one 
because it belongs to each person, and at the same time a general one because 
it relates to an entire genus.” 47 But if the entire point of an affirmative bio-
politics for Esposito is to realize the force of  “life, singular and impersonal,” 
that “cannot but resist whatever power, or knowledge, is arranged to divide 
it,” that thus produces “new knowledge and new power as a function of its 
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own quantitative and qualitative expansion,” then it is not clear how the call 
of an affirmative biopolitics can be “for a new alliance between the life of 
the individual and the life of the species,” since such “life” forces clearly don’t 
stop at the water’s edge of species and are instead operative at— and in fact, 
beneath— the level of  “flesh.” 48 To put it another way, species here cannot do 
any heavy lifting for Esposito, for the very same reasons that “the body” 
cannot be cordoned off from the “flesh”— indeed, life, if anything, radical-
izes the logic of the flesh, the being in common of embodied beings that 
cannot be limited to Homo sapiens, either philosophically or pragmatically. 
To put it another way, Esposito may be right that the body is the immunitary 
site upon which biopolitics seizes control over life, but the cordoning off of 
the body within the domain of species simply reinstates the very autoim-
munitary, thanatological movement that his affirmative biopolitics wants to 
resist.49 What is needed here, then, is a third way, one that can think life and 
norm together, without falling back on either the lexicon of the person or, 
at the other extreme, the radically dedifferentiating discourse of life, which 
is unworkable both philosophically and pragmatically.
So the problem is not Esposito’s insistence— quite correct, in my view— 
that “what we call the subject, or person, is nothing but the result, always 
provisory, of a process of individuation, or subjectification, quite irreducible 
to the individual and his masks,” nor is it his core argument that for an af-
firmative biopolitics, “there can be nothing but a clear distancing from the 
hierarchical and exclusionary apparatus of the category of the person, in any 
of its declensions, theological, juridical, or philosophical.”50 It is rather that 
the only alternative that Esposito seems to be able to imagine to this index-
ing of biopolitical norms is simply its other extreme, a sort of neo- vitalism 
that ends up radically dedifferentiating the field of the living into a molecu-
lar wash of singularities that all equally manifest life. And so, as Thacker 
notes, “The concept of life— and whether such a concept is possible— places 
philosophy in a hovering, wavering space between an onto- theology and an 
onto- biology.”51
Be that as it may, Esposito’s position, pragmatically speaking, fares no 
better. First, it replays all of the quandaries around biocentrism brought to 
light during the 1970s and 1980s in North America during the heyday of the 
deep ecology movement— debates that Esposito (or for that matter his fellow 
Italian political philosophers) would have little reason, perhaps, to know 
about. As Tim Luke notes, if all forms of life are given equal value, then we 
face questions such as the following: “Will we allow anthrax or cholera mi-
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crobes to attain self- realization in wiping out sheep herds or human kinder-
gartens? Will we continue to deny salmonella or botulism micro- organisms 
their equal rights when we process the dead carcasses of animals and plants 
that we eat?”52 In the face of such challenges, all that Esposito can offer is ret-
rofitting Spinoza’s concept of natural right to make “the norm the principle 
of unlimited equivalence for every single form of life.”53 As Esposito char-
acterizes it, “the juridical order as a whole is the product of this plurality of 
norms and the provisional result of their mutual equilibrium,” and for this 
reason no “normative criterion upon which exclusionary measures” could 
be based is possible.54 But such a position— and its key markers in the fore-
going quotation are “plurality” and “equilibrium”— is in essence no different 
from deep ecology’s guiding principles of biocentrism (or, in a slightly more 
refined version that Esposito would be forced to reject, biodiversity). There 
are perhaps those who would respond to Luke’s foregoing questions in the 
affirmative— who would argue that, yes, all forms of life should be equally 
allowed to take their course, even if it means a massive die- off of the species 
Homo sapiens. But biopolitically speaking, that hardly solves the problem, of 
course, because when we ask what the demographic distribution of such an 
event would likely be, we realize that the brunt would surely be absorbed 
by largely black and brown poor populations to the south of Europe and 
North America, while those in the “rich North Atlantic democracies” (to use 
Richard Rorty’s no- nonsense phrase) who could afford to protect themselves 
would surely do so.55
A further problem with equating the norm with “the principle of unlim-
ited equivalence” of life pure and simple is underscored by the prominent 
contemporary development of synthetic biology. As one article puts it, “post- 
genomic biology— biology 2.0, if you like— has finally killed the idea of vital-
ism.”56 In fact, the explosion of new developments in the field has depended 
in no small part on two factors: more and more widely accessible computing 
power of considerable magnitude and, more importantly, the rapidly falling 
costs of dna sequencing. For example, the human genome sequenced by the 
International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium took thirteen years 
and cost $3 billion; now, using the latest technology, the same work can be 
done in eight days at a cost of about $10,000— a figure that is sure to be even 
lower as you read these words. And projections were that by 2013 the same 
work would take about fifteen minutes and cost about $1,000.57 When, with 
much media fanfare, Craig Ventner and Hamilton Smith reported on May 
20, 2010, in Science magazine that they had created a living creature with no 
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ancestor from scratch using off- the- shelf laboratory chemicals— a bacterium 
of the family M. genitalium— it seemed perverse to some, and analogies with 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein were ready at hand.58 And it perhaps seemed 
even more perverse when Ventner and his team added some dna designed 
from scratch to watermark the organism with a cipher that contains the url 
of a website and three quotations.59 As many scientists point out, however, 
for all of its pathbreaking possibilities, synthetic biology is quite continuous 
with the enfolding of life and technology that reaches back hundreds, if not 
thousands, of years.60
Precisely here, it seems to me, it is worth remembering the sort of point 
made by Derrida in his discussion of cloning in Rogues. As he observes, those 
who oppose cloning object to it in the name of “the nonrepetitive unicity of 
the human person,” the “incalculable element” of  “a unique, irreplaceable, 
free, and thus nonprogrammable living being.”61 But what is overlooked 
here, he argues, is that
so- called identificatory repetition, the duplication, that one claims to re-
ject with horrified indignation, is already, and fortunately, present and at 
work everywhere it is a question of reproduction and of heritage, in cul-
ture, knowledge, language, education, and so on, whose very conditions, 
whose production and reproduction, are assured by this duplication. . . . 
This is yet another way of ignoring what history, whether individual or 
not, owes to culture, society, education, and the symbolic, to the incalcu-
lable and the aleatory— so many dimensions that are irreducible, even for 
“identical” twins, to this supposedly simple, genetic naturalness. What is 
the consequence of all of this? That, in the end, this so- called ethical or 
humanist axiomatic actually shares with the axiomatic it claims to oppose 
a certain geneticism or biologism, indeed a deep zoologism, a fundamen-
tal but unacknowledged reductionism.62
Derrida’s commentary here— and the example of synthetic biology in gen-
eral— enables us to see how the biopolitical frame makes possible the think-
ing of a more nuanced and differentiated set of ethical and political relations 
with regard to forms of life, but only if we do not succumb to the sort of 
neo- vitalism that, at the end of Bios, seems to leave us with a stark choice: 
either life and an affirmative biocentrism on the one hand, or, on the other, 
the autoimmune disorder that is bound to eventuate if the continuum of 
life is broken.
What begins to dawn on us at this point, then, is the full complexity of 
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the confrontation with “biologistic continuism” as articulated by Derrida, 
which assumes its most challenging and illuminating form in his reading 
of Heidegger.63 Heidegger was right, Derrida argues, to reject the idea of 
“some homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man and what 
he calls the animal,” and he was also right to insist that the fundamental 
questions here are not biological but, if you like, phenomenological if not 
indeed ontological (though Derrida’s caveat of  “what calls itself man” would 
eventually challenge that last characterization).64 And Heidegger was also 
right, as Dominick LaCapra observes, in his “departure from Husserl’s at-
tempt to center philosophy on the intentional consciousness of the meaning- 
generating, radically constructivist ego or subject,” and his increasing em-
phasis on understanding “human being in relation to Being and not vice 
versa,” a project in which “the dignity of the human being is enhanced if 
it is seen within a larger relational network that is not unproblematically 
centered on human freedom or human interests.”65 What Heidegger was 
wrong about, Derrida argues, was his insistence that whatever is at stake 
here— phenomenologically, ontologically, ethically— corresponds to a dif-
ference in kind, an absolute limit, between “the human” and “the animal” 
(which is precisely why Derrida calls it a dogma).66 Derrida’s position, on 
the other hand, consists “not in effacing the limit” between different forms 
of life “but in multiplying its figures, in complicating, thickening, delin-
earizing, folding, and dividing the line precisely by making it increase and 
multiply.”67 And here the problems with the headlong rush toward life that 
we find late in Esposito’s Bios come fully into view: that the vast differences 
between the orangutan, the wasp, and the kudzu plant— Derrida even calls 
them “abysses,” but they are abysses that, unlike Heidegger, apply within 
the animal kingdom— fall out because those differences are all reduced to 
the same kind of difference.68
Not one line, then, but many. But not “no line” either, and a further way 
of delinearizing it is to realize that the material processes— some organic, 
some not— that give rise to different ways of responding to the world for dif-
ferent living beings are radically asynchronous, moving at different speeds, 
from the glacial pace of evolutionary adaptations and mutations to the fast 
dynamics of learning and communication that, through neurophysiologi-
cal plasticity, literally rewire biological wetware. In this light, it is clear, as 
Matthew Calarco puts it, that “the presubjective conditions that give rise 
to human subjectivity” cannot be restricted to humans alone. Instead, the 
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more fundamental issue is the “complex networks of relations, affects, and 
becomings into which both human beings and animals are thrown. As such, 
posthumanism is confronted with the necessity of returning to first phi-
losophy with the task of creating a nonanthropocentric ontology of life- 
death.”69 This does not mean that whoever is the addressee here— human 
or nonhuman— is defined by the transcendence of the biological; the point 
is rather that everything that is relevant here applies in ways that have noth-
ing to do with species designation and, moreover, operates in a way that is 
not wholly reducible to the facticity of biological existence, either human or 
animal. Paradoxically, then, the rejection of biologistic continuism in fact 
makes possible a more robust naturalistic account of the processes that give 
rise to that which cannot be reduced to the biological alone— or even, more 
radically still, to the organic per se. For as Derrida notes in a late interview, 
“Beginning with Of Grammatology, the elaboration of a new concept of the 
trace had to be extended to the entire field of the living, or rather to the life/
death relation,” and it is by virtue of the trace and its technicity that both 
humans and (at least some) animals are “thrown.”70
We are now in a better position to fully grasp the biopolitical point of 
Derrida’s observation in the “Eating Well” interview that “the power to ask 
questions,” which, “in the end, is how Heidegger defines the Dasein,” may be 
seen as anterior— before— the question of the subject, of the who for whom 
and to whom we are responsible, but only to give way to “another possi-
bility,” a more fundamental one that “overwhelms the question itself, re- 
inscribes it in the experience of an ‘affirmation,’ of a ‘yes’ or of an ‘en- gage’ . . . 
that ‘yes, yes’ that answers before even being able to formulate a question, 
that is responsible without autonomy, before and in view of all possible au-
tonomy of the who- subject.”71 “Not only is the obligation not lessened in 
this situation,” Derrida continues, “but, on the contrary, it finds in it its only 
possibility, which is neither subjective nor human. Which doesn’t mean that 
it is inhuman or without subject, but that it is out of this dislocated affirma-
tion . . . that something like the subject, man, or whoever it might be can 
take shape.”72 Whoever it might be. Why “without autonomy”? Because this 
originary “yes,” as Martin Hägglund puts it, “answers to the trace structure 
of time that is the condition for life in general.”73 That is to say, it answers 
to the fact that the other is just as constitutively other to itself as I am to 
myself, just as constitutively prosthetic, brought into being by a technicity 
and spacing that is radically neither self nor other, radically nonliving. This 
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means, in turn, that “every finite other is absolutely other, not because it is 
absolutely in itself,” as Hägglund writes, “but on the contrary because it can 
never be in itself.”74
Of course, there are many, many forms of life— plant life, bacterial life, 
and much else— that fall outside the parameters I have been describing, at 
least as far as we know at the moment: indeed, the overwhelming majority 
of life forms on earth. But my foregrounding of the who here is meant to 
remind us that while it is no doubt worthwhile to continually rethink the 
relations between different forms of life, whatever they may be, and, beyond 
that, to understand as fully as possible the complex ways in which they are 
enmeshed and networked with the inorganic world (as Jane Bennett, Bruno 
Latour, and others have explored), the questions of ethics, law, justice, and 
hospitality pose a specific kind of challenge: namely, that in a “parliament of 
things” (Latour) or a “political ecology of things” (Bennett) some of those 
things are also whos and not just whats— even as any who becomes one only 
by virtue of also being, prosthetically, a what.75 Is there not a qualitative 
difference between the chimpanzee used in biomedical research, the flea on 
her skin, and the cage she lives in— and a difference that matters more (one 
might even say, in Derridean tones, “infinitely” more) to the chimpanzee 
than to the flea or the cage?76 I think there is.
This is not to reinstate what is obviously an untenable opposition be-
tween persons and things; indeed, the prosthetic logic of the who and the 
what that I have been pursuing argues precisely the opposite. But it is to 
put our finger on a specific challenge entailed by thickening and deepening, 
rather than flattening, our description of the worlds and networks we share, 
and their qualitative dimensions— a challenge that returns us, but at a differ-
ent angle of approach, to the question of biocentrism that we discussed ear-
lier. The problem is summed up well by philosopher Levi Bryant, who writes 
that the issue is “asking how the domain of value might be extended beyond 
the human, without humans being at the center, or all questions of value 
pertaining to nonhumans being questions about the relationship of humans 
to nonhumans. In other words, the litmus test . . . revolves around whether 
that domain of value would continue to be a domain of value even if humans 
cease to exist. That seems to be a pretty tall order or very difficult to think.” 
“No case could here be made,” he continues, “that there’s something of in-
trinsic value in nonhumans such as animals or the planets. Rather, we would 
be committed to the thesis that there are only relative values of some sort or 
another. . . . The planet, for example, would only take on value- predicates in 
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relation to humans. Were humans to not exist, the planet would neither be 
valueless or valuable. It would just be.”77
But as I have been arguing, a third possibility exists, which is that ques-
tions of value indeed necessarily depend upon a “to whom it matters,” but 
that “to whom” need not be— indeed, as we have already seen, cannot only 
be— human, either in the sense of excluding by definition nonhuman ani-
mals, or in the sense of a human who is not always already radically other 
to itself, prosthetically constituted by the ahuman and indeed inorganic. 
Bryant is right, in other words, that were there no “to whom,” “the planet 
would neither be valueless or valuable. It would just be.” But he is wrong to 
assume that this hinges on whether humans alone exist.
From this vantage— to put it slightly otherwise— the problem with the 
recourse to life as the ethical sine qua non is that it bespeaks the desire for a 
nonperspectival ethics, ethics imagined fundamentally as a noncontingent 
view from nowhere, a view which— for that very reason— can declare all 
forms of life of equal value. And here, we can bring to light what is particu-
larly problematic about Esposito’s recourse to Spinozan natural right as the 
background against which he seeks to ground norms in a naturalistic basis.78 
As Esposito puts it, we find in the norm “the principle of unlimited equiva-
lence for every single form of life”; and (following Spinoza), “the juridical 
order as a whole is the product of this plurality of norms and provisional re-
sult of their mutual equilibrium.”79 But the question, of course, is this: from 
what vantage would it be judged that the equilibrium invoked by Esposito is 
achieved? Spinoza’s answer, as we know, was God: each particular thing “is 
determined by another particular thing to exist in a certain way, yet the force 
by which each one perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of 
the nature of God.”80 But of course, as Niklas Luhmann would be the first 
to remind us, what God names here is the desire for the impossible, or at the 
very least (to put it a little more charitably), the premodern: an observer who 
can be both self- referential, contingent, socially constructed and historically 
specific, and universal and transhistorical at the same time. In other words, 
what is wanted here is an escape from responsibility for the inescapable fact 
that all norms are exclusionary simply because they are contingent (as Rorty 
would put it), selective and self- referential (Luhmann), or, for Derrida, per-
formative and conditional.
That is to say, there is no “god’s eye view”; there are only “limited points 
of view.” But the fact that any norm is unavoidably perspectival doesn’t 
dictate either relativism, solipsism, or autoimmunitary closure. Quite the 
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contrary— and it would take another entire essay to fully develop this point— 
because of its constitutive self- referential blindness (Luhmann), its consti-
tutively performative and conditional character (Derrida), such a limited 
perspective constitutes the opening to the other and to the outside, to the 
necessity of other observations (Luhmann), and even to futurity or the “to 
come” of justice itself (Derrida). Indeed, for these very reasons, the equi-
librium Esposito invokes is to be not desired but avoided. If there are, as 
Hägglund writes, “potentially an endless number of others to consider, and 
one cannot take any responsibility without excluding some others in favor of 
certain others,” then “what makes it possible to be responsible is thus what at 
the same time makes it impossible for any responsibility to be fully responsi-
ble.”81 And for the very same reasons, an ethics of pure equilibrium without 
decision, without discrimination— without, in short, selection, discrimina-
tion, and perspective— would be, paradoxically, unethical. It’s not that we 
shouldn’t strive to be fully responsible; it’s simply that to do so is necessarily 
to do so selectively and partially, thus conditionally, which in turn will un-
avoidably call forth the need in the future to be more fully responsible than 
we have already been.
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chapter 11
Thing- Politics and Science
Carsten Strathausen
On the Concept of  Things
In 1993, Bruno Latour called for replacing our current “modern Constitu-
tion”— defined by the nature- society distinction and the continuing legacy 
of Cartesian rationalism— with the more egalitarian and less anthropocen-
tric “Parliament of  Things.” “It is time,” Latour concluded, “to speak of de-
mocracy again, but of a democracy extended to things themselves.”1 Latour’s 
call did not go unheeded. Other historians of science— such as Lorraine 
Daston, Peter Galison, and Hans- Jörg Rheinberger— have each made com-
pelling arguments in favor of a relationist and thing- oriented political epis-
temology.2 In the words of Latour’s collaborator Isabelle Stengers, the left 
needs to “decenter political theory from the abstract concept of  ‘humans.’ ”3 
This sentiment is echoed by prominent political and cultural theorists, who 
likewise champion thing- power as the most promising way to conceive of 
a different sociopolitical order beyond the anthropocentric legacy of (neo)
liberalism. John Protevi, for example, recognizes contemporary political the-
ory’s “turn to a new, nonmechanistic materialism”— a new materialism that 
William Connolly names “immanent materialism” and Jane Bennett calls 
“vital materialism.” 4
What unites these new materialisms, according to Diana Coole and Sa-
mantha Frost, the editors of an anthology with that title, is their rejection 
of classical Marxist theory and economic determinism in favor of a more 
complex— and affect- oriented— notion of biopolitics, coupled with a keen 
interest in science studies (notably post- Newtonian physics as well as current 
advances in biotechnology and the life sciences).5 Thing- politics, in short, 
embraces a “materialist theory of politics” that takes “the ‘stuff ’ of politics 
seriously” and acknowledges the “constitutive power” of nonhuman things 
in the political realm.6
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This essay takes thing- politics at its word. I want to look closely at some 
key concepts such as affect, life, individual, and, above all, the concept of 
knowledge itself. My inquiry is guided by the following question: what is 
the price to pay for “the multimodal methodology” of these new (vitalist, 
nonmechanistic, immanent) materialisms that currently inform the post-
humanities? I am particularly interested in the institutional and epistemolog-
ical consequences that ensue from “the multitiered ontologies, the complex 
systems, and the stratified reality” endorsed by thing- politics.7 This multiplic-
ity of different methodological- ontological frameworks, I argue, gives rise 
to disciplinary tensions about conceptual meanings and discursive practices. 
Although these tensions produce new ways of thinking about the present, 
they also exacerbate or cover up the epistemological paradoxes that define 
the limit of meaningful interdisciplinary collaboration across the disciplines. 
Each academic discipline comprises a complex system of discursive practice 
that creates its own dynamics and follows its own laws of structural devel-
opment. For that, precisely, is its academic purpose: each discipline, by its 
very nature, is charged with presenting a substantially different view of how 
things are: “Disciplines seek to be complete worlds unto themselves; they 
aspire to explain everything, albeit in their own way.”8 From this perspective, 
it seems hardly surprising that thing- politics continues to wrestle with the 
epistemological tensions that arise within and in between the concepts it 
employs: because these concepts are rooted in different academic disciplines 
and derive from different methods of inquiry and discursive practices.
My study of thing- politics seeks to acknowledge both the potential collab-
oration between science and the humanities and the actual conflicts that ex-
ist between them. In order to conceptualize this conflictual terrain in terms 
of thing- politics, we must first and foremost recognize concepts as objects 
in their own right. Yet precisely because concepts are objects, their (poten-
tial) interaction is restricted by the (actual) stratification of their historical- 
contextual environment, largely defined by the use of language and other 
human practices. Semantics matter in science no less than in the humanities, 
because concepts not only cooperate but also compete with one another: 
they collide or connect, merge or dissipate, depending on the particular 
circumstances of their encounter. Due in large part to Deleuze’s influence 
in posthumanist discourse, contemporary critics, I argue, tend to disregard 
the semantic ambiguity within concepts and the epistemological conflicts 
that frequently arise between them. The concept of biopolitics provides an 
excellent case in point: “Compressed (and at the same time destabilized) by 
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competing readings and subject to continuous rotations of meaning around 
its own axis, the concept of biopolitics risks losing its identity and becoming 
an enigma.”9 The same problem hampers the ongoing debate about human 
nature in neo- Darwinian theory and evolutionary psychology. Like many 
other historians of the sciences, Evelyn Fox Keller, for example, laments the 
“morass of linguistic and conceptual vegetation” that has grown around 
the nature- nurture debate over centuries past. Keller’s deliberate choice of 
metaphors (“morass,” “vegetation,” “tangle”) renders language itself organic 
and alive. It is precisely this ongoing, quasi- organic evolution of language, 
Keller contends, that causes “the slippage of meaning, or polysemy, of our 
basic vocabulary,” and it is this constant slippage of meaning that continues 
to nourish the terminological and conceptual confusions surrounding the 
gene myth and the nature- nurture debate.10
A similar danger of conceptual incoherence, I believe, threatens contem-
porary thing- politics and its attempt to rethink the relation between vitalism 
and materialism— two concepts that are traditionally considered to be mutu-
ally exclusive. Marxist materialism, for one, has always remained suspicious 
of vitalist philosophy (e.g., Nietzsche, Bergson, Heidegger), which it deemed 
inherently irrational and potentially fascist.11 According to classical Marxist 
theory from Marx to Lenin, vitalism mystifies the (scientific) laws of nature 
and disavows the historical inevitability of revolutionary change. Twentieth- 
century Frankfurt School Marxists (e.g., Adorno, Eagleton, Jameson) like-
wise denounced vitalism because it purportedly projects human qualities 
onto lifeless matter. This anthropomorphization of nature, in their view, 
mystifies the real process of reification at the heart of capitalism. Vitalism 
thus reinforces rather than exposes the commodity fetishism that fuels the 
capitalist mode of production. Adorno’s harsh critique of the “thing- cult” 
of symbolist art and poetry is exemplary in this regard. “The aesthetic weak-
ness of this thing- cult, its obscurantist demeanor and its blending of reli-
gion with arts and crafts, reveals the real power of reification, which can no 
longer be gilded with a lyrical halo and brought back within the sphere of 
meaning.”12
Mindful of this critical history, the new materialists are careful to dis-
tinguish thing- politics from both Marxist materialism and traditional vital-
ism alike. Although Jane Bennett, for example, recognizes some important 
“affinities between Adorno’s nonidentity and thing- power,” she empha-
sizes that Adorno “is quick— too quick from the point of view of the vital 
materialist— to remind the reader that objects are always ‘entwined’ with hu-
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man subjectivity.”13 Yet Bennett also distances herself from “vitalism in the 
traditional sense; I equate affect with materiality, rather than posit a separate 
force that can enter and animate a physical body.”14
At the same time, however, thing- politics, much like contemporary chaos 
and complexity theory, embraces the notion that physical laws of nature are 
necessary but insufficient to predict how things behave or matter evolves 
over long periods of time. In recent decades, numerous philosophers and 
renowned scientists have argued “that the unfolding of the universe is not 
sufficiently describable by natural law.”15 The physicist and Nobel laureate Ilya 
Prigogine agrees: “We need a ‘divine’ point of view to retain the idea of de-
terminism. But no human measurement, no theoretical predictions, can give 
us initial conditions with infinite precision.”16 Prigogine, therefore, stresses 
“the role of human creativity in science,” which is often undervalued by 
practicing scientists and philosophers alike.17 “If the world were formed by 
stable dynamical systems,” Prigogine concludes, “it would be radically dif-
ferent from the one we observe around us. It would be a static, predictable 
world, but we would not be here to make the predictions.”18 More recently, 
Robert E. Ulanowicz has charged that neither Newtonian nor Darwinian 
approaches are “sufficient for explaining how real change— in the form of 
creative advance or emergence— takes place in nature.”19
To be sure, nobody denies that a theory that contradicts the basic laws of 
natural science is demonstrably false. Yet scientific falsifiability (as described 
by Karl Popper, Donald T. Campbell, Gerhard Vollmer, and others) does 
not amount to objective verification and the predictability of events. On 
the contrary: the main characteristic of organic life is the emergence of new 
and unforeseen systemic effects. Although these effects can be explained in 
principle with the help of mathematical models and statistical analyses, their 
occurrence in each individual case is unpredictable, as Manuel DeLanda has 
made clear.20 No theory, not even Darwinian evolution, is able to determine 
in advance what exactly is possible (and what not) within the boundaries 
of natural law. This is precisely why Prigogine, Kauffman, and Ulanowicz 
all emphasize the importance of— and need for— human creativity for the 
production of knowledge. There remains ample room for competing explan-
atory models of human nature in both the humanities and the life sciences 
today.
In order to study the epistemological effects of the new materialisms, we 
need to come to terms with the peculiar nature of those living things called 
humans. In saying this, I do not want to advocate a return to the structur-
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alist Marxism of Louis Althusser, who famously considered the humanist 
ideology of the subject constitutive of all societies, including communism.21 
But I do believe that we cannot conceptualize social politics without at least 
some notion of human agency that distinguishes it from that of other “ac-
tants.”22 My main argument is that thing- politics in its current form renders 
this task difficult, if not impossible. If one of the goals of thing- politics is to 
study the social effects of affect, then we must primarily consider our knowl-
edge and experience of these things and affects. What matters politically is to 
conceptualize the forces that, on the one hand, take shape in human bodies, 
while, on the other hand, they take hold of human bodies. For this reason 
alone, thing- politics entails an irreducible phenomenological dimension.
Another reason why we need to retain some notion of human agency is 
that epistemology itself becomes unthinkable without it. There is no science 
without observation, no knowledge without concepts, and neither politics 
nor history without human beings. Most— if not all— academic disciplines 
are based on this premise, the negation of which will inevitably increase 
the intellectual disconnect between the humanities and the sciences. If 
thing- politics continues to pursue what appears to be an antihuman— as 
opposed to an antihumanist— discourse, it might inhibit rather than foster 
interdisciplinary exchange about how to understand the role of affect in 
contemporary politics. Yet we need more discursive sites of critical engage-
ment, not less. And the most promising site for these engagements, in my 
view, remains the university in general and the empirical sciences in partic-
ular. How better to influence the current discourse on biotechnologies than 
by actively engaging— through institutional collaboration and intellectual 
debate— with colleagues in the social and life sciences?
I do not believe that the humanities’ critical engagement with the life 
sciences will shift the— already unbalanced— institutional power dynamics 
further to the sciences’ advantage. Nor do I share the widespread anxiety 
among humanities scholars about “the colonization of the cultural sphere 
by a scientific mode of thinking.”23 While I do not want to belittle these 
concerns, they seem at least partly based on the failure to appreciate the dis-
ciplinary and methodological diversity both within contemporary biology 
(between molecular and evolutionary biology; between research on plants, 
animals, and humans; between biochemistry, biophysics, bioinformatics, 
biogenetics, bioengineering, etc.) and in between the natural sciences at 
large.24 The history of science demonstrates that there simply is no scientific 
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mode of thinking currently practiced anywhere, because scientific theory 
and practice remains always bound to— territorialized upon— particular spa-
tiotemporal coordinates. The production of scientific knowledge is always 
territorialized: it occurs at a particular place at a particular time, which is 
why science encompasses a multiplicity of diverse and often contradictory 
theories, methodologies, and procedures.
This disciplinary diversity of science provides ample opportunities for the 
humanities to actively engage and influence both academic and popular de-
bates on the science of life. Yet the political left keeps “territorializ[ing] itself 
on the category of resistance,” a resistance that all too often “is little more 
than the denunciation of all possibility of knowledge and truth, as if com-
municative capitalism was not already implicated in fundamental changes 
to the conditions of possibility for credibility,” as Jodi Dean points out.25 In 
my view, the more critical approach to communicative capitalism might be 
a certain affirmation, if you wish, of scientific practice.26 An intellectually 
open engagement with whatever contemporary science has to offer in con-
ceptual terms has nothing to do with “being epistemologically intimidated 
by the sciences.”27 Yet it has everything to do with what the humanities 
have always done best, namely, to explore different forms of knowledge and 
understanding.28
With this premise in mind, the remainder of this essay is structured into 
three more parts. The second section situates thing- politics within the post-
reductionist paradigm of contemporary science. I argue for the concep-
tual irreducibility of humans to things by drawing a distinction between 
Deleuze’s concept of singularity and Foucault’s concept of self. For only the 
latter provides a basis for epistemological research and yields insight into the 
production of knowledge. In the third section, I examine in greater detail 
the conceptual tensions surrounding the current debate of biopolitics. I fo-
cus in particular on Roberto Esposito’s work Bios. Although I support his 
attempt to replace the humanist notion of the individual with the less restric-
tive concept of individuation, I particularly call attention to the inevitability 
of human agency in scientific- discursive practices. For it is precisely these 
practices that enable us humans to recognize and engage the individuation 
of things in the first place. In the last section, I briefly return to Marx in or-
der to suggest that the new materialisms should retain at least one aspect of 
old (Marxist) materialism, namely, its pragmatist understanding of human 
beings as the agents of history.
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Deleuze, Foucault, and Postreductionist Science
There is broad consensus among leftist political philosophers about the need 
for new concepts to help analyze the dynamic structures of global capitalism. 
Carlo Galli, for example, argues that globalization “organizes new spaces for 
itself in a new way,” which requires a new vocabulary able to analyze and 
critique the traditional concept of space and its relation to politics.29 Thing- 
politics responds to this challenge by reconceptualizing the incessantly shift-
ing spatial configurations of contemporary geopolitics. But how can we map 
these emergent political spaces in epistemological terms? One possibility 
would be to return to the Ideenkonstellation (constellation of ideas) by which 
Walter Benjamin sought to conceptualize the Origin of the German Tragic 
Play. Yet Benjamin’s vision of ideas as quasi- planetary objects caught in inter-
stellar constellations presupposes a well- ordered and stable Newtonian space 
whose equilibrium is maintained by the gravitational forces between these 
objects. The emergent epistemological landscape of today’s new material-
ism, by contrast, seems less determined by the absolute laws of mechanical 
physics and more akin to the self- regulatory structures of dynamic systems 
and living organisms.
At the same time, however, I am hesitant to envision this new material-
ist landscape as a rhizome in Deleuze’s sense— in spite of the term’s strong 
biological connotation and Deleuze’s explicit reference to plants, fungi, and 
the brain as rhizomatic structures. Given Deleuze’s distaste for metaphorical 
language, we ought to think of rhizomes as actually living organisms, which 
implies a homeostatic, self- regulatory mechanism at its core and in charge 
of maintaining its overall systemic stability. There is no organism without 
environment, but neither is there an environment without an organism.30 
Deleuze’s nonorganic version of vitalism, unlike that of Canguilhem and 
Foucault, fails to reflect upon this centrist organization of life. In botanical 
terms, a rhizome denotes a mass of roots that distinguishes certain groups 
of plants from others. Like all plants, however, rhizomes are subject to the 
laws of evolution. The concepts evoked by contemporary thing- politics, by 
contrast, are not rhizomatically organized. On the contrary, they were origi-
nally conceived in different sociohistorical contexts and emerged from dif-
ferent disciplinary practices. If anything, one might think of each academic 
discipline as a rhizome and conclude that the (epistemological) transfer of 
specific concepts from one discipline to another is no less challenging than 
the (bioengineered) transfer of specific morphological characteristics from 
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one plant to another. In both cases, the transplanted object needs to take 
root in its new environment; otherwise, it won’t grow. The current med-
ley of concepts in thing- politics is too heterogeneous to effect a rhizomatic 
structure.
It is important to remember that Deleuze primarily thinks of concepts 
as independent singularities that create their own space of extension and 
existence. Although he acknowledges that “every concept has a history” 
that renders it “both absolute and relative,” he nonetheless insists that the 
“concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing.”31 The Deleuzian 
concept, in other words, “is self- referential: it posits itself and its object at 
the same time it is created.”32 Yet its objects are neither material things nor 
“the lived,” but always “the contour, the configuration, the constellation of 
an event to come.”33 In epistemological terms, Deleuzian concepts are as 
autonomous and irreducibly singular as Leibniz’s monads: “The concept 
is obviously knowledge— but knowledge of itself, and what it knows is the 
pure event, which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is 
embodied.”34 Historians of science, by contrast, insist that this “confusion” 
between the “pure event” and the actual “state of affairs” is crucial for the 
production of (scientific) knowledge. Concepts are objects, to be sure, but 
they are not entirely self- referential. Instead, they remain bound to precisely 
those material things and “the lived” state of affairs from which (some of ) 
Deleuze’s philosophy ultimately cuts them off.
Foucault, too, regarded concepts as historically determined objects of 
thought that remain inextricably caught up in the actual limits and con-
straints of the specific discursive practices from which they emerged. His 
perspective reflects the influence of his teachers— Bachelard, Canguilhem, 
Althusser— and their epistemological commitment to the historical study of 
scientific practice.35 This difference between Foucault and Deleuze— between 
a historical epistemology that focuses on the relational being of concepts as 
opposed to a creative ontology that focuses on their singular becoming— 
 is crucial if we want to come to terms with thing- politics, for two reasons.36 
First, the former (Foucauldian) approach enables and requires the kind of 
historical- epistemological questions the latter (Deleuzian) approach renders 
more or less meaningless. Deleuze’s ontology, according to which relations 
are external to their terms, literally spells the end of epistemology. Concepts 
produce knowledge only if conceived in terms of their sociohistorical and po-
litical (inter)relations. Conceived as nonrelational singularities in Deleuze’s 
sense, however, concepts are essentially unknowable and hence nonscientific. 
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In fact, Deleuze distinguishes philosophical from logical concepts precisely 
because the latter reduces concepts to functions and “makes science the con-
cept par excellence.”37 Deleuze is right, of course: epistemology does privi-
lege science in order to understand how knowledge is produced. As histori-
ans of science (from Canguilhem and Bachelard to Hacking, Rheinberger, 
and Daston) have repeatedly pointed out, concepts are productive precisely 
because they shape things in both epistemological and ontological terms. 
They remind us that matter and meaning, thing and thought coemerge as 
intertwined beings in the world. Yet they also emphasize that these beings 
remain site specific and historically determined. Concepts are inherently re-
lational objects, not independent singularities.
This leads us to the second reason why we should distinguish between 
the Foucauldian and the Deleuzian approach toward thing- politics. It con-
cerns the concept of the human, for which Deleuze’s antiphenomenological 
philosophy does not have much use. Since “the enemy is the organism”— 
“organism” understood as the coagulated “organization of the organs” in 
living bodies— Deleuze’s overall goal is to disarticulate this organization, 
not to study it.38 Knowledge, for Deleuze, is not the product of human 
investigation, but results from the incessant movement of “pure thought” 
passively registered by humans in/as sensation: “We must try to imagine 
events of pure thought, radical or transcendental events that determine a 
space of knowledge for any one era,” Deleuze contends.39 “Contemplating 
is creating, the mystery of passive creation, sensation.” 40 Deleuze, in fact, 
never made a secret of the vitalist strand in his philosophy (“Everything 
I’ve written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is”)  and he clearly considered Fou-
cault’s work, too, as partaking of the vitalist tradition, particularly in regard 
to the theme of subjectification, which “amounts essentially to inventing 
new possibilities of life” and new “styles of thought”— “a vitalism rooted in 
aesthetics.” 41
For all his critique of human subjectivity, however, Foucault never went 
quite as far as Deleuze in trying to liberate thought from “the critical ontol-
ogy of ourselves” and “the hermeneutics of the subject.” 42 This is not to claim 
that Foucault, toward the end of his career, endorsed the kind of humanist 
individualism he had previously critiqued.43 For regardless of how one inter-
prets Foucault’s notion of self— be it in the traditional sense of liberal “indi-
viduality,” as Nikolas Rose argues, or more along phenomenological lines, 
as Peter Hallward suggests, or, finally, as a process of  “individuation taking 
place through intensities,” as Deleuze and Nealon insist— what matters most 
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for thing- politics is the fact that Foucault, unlike Deleuze, never abandoned 
the concept of the human subject: “Whereas Deleuze would like to get rid 
of the relational subject altogether,” Hallward concludes, “Foucault wants 
to purge the subject, to eliminate everything that specifies or objectifies the 
subject.” 44 Even in his later lectures, Foucault continued to think through 
the self, whereas Deleuze always thought beyond it.
The significance of this distinction has become increasingly apparent 
during the recent affective turn in the humanities, which has spawned a 
lively debate about whether— or how— to conceptualize the relation be-
tween sensation and sense, matter and meaning.45 Although Brian Massumi 
laments the fact that “there is no cultural- theoretical vocabulary specific to 
affect,” he quickly adds that such a vocabulary must be part of an “asignify-
ing philosophy” in order to respect the “autonomy of affect” that remains 
irreducible to human modes of cognition.46 Regardless of its philosophical 
merits, Massumi’s Deleuzianism— that is, his understanding of affect as a 
virtual, apersonal, and asignifying force of becoming— has clearly contrib-
uted to the increasing disciplinary rift between the humanities and the so-
cial sciences. Lawrence Grossberg is not alone in contesting the “leap from 
a set of ontological concepts to a description of an empirical and affective 
context.” 47 “Affect can let you off the hook,” Grossberg worries, because it 
“appeal[s] back to an ontology that escapes,” meaning that “affect has come 
to serve, now, too often as a ‘magical’ term.” 48
I share Grossberg’s concerns. I, too, believe that unless we recognize af-
fects as “material, physiological things”— things that emerge from neuro-
nal connections, hormonal streams, and changes in blood flow and other 
physiological traits that sustain living organisms and take hold of human 
bodies— it will be difficult, if not impossible, to study “the transmission of 
affect” at the level of everyday life.49 And yet it is precisely this transmission 
that matters politically. Why care about affects at all, unless they are “under-
stood as forces in human affairs that can be . . . transformed”?50 To be sure, 
politics concerns the affective relations among all things, not only humans. 
Politics is not just a matter of (cognitive) comprehension and recognition, 
but also involves (precognitive) apprehension and recognizability, as today’s 
critics rightly point out.51 Yet the laws of affective social transformations 
cannot be conceptualized in isolation from the empirical research that helps 
define these laws. What matters in contemporary politics is neither the vir-
tual dimension of affect nor its stratified actualization, but precisely the dy-
namic thresholds at which affect materializes and seizes (human) bodies. 
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One may agree or disagree with Manuel DeLanda’s claim that these thresh-
olds belong to the “intensive” and thus constitute a third ontological plane 
in Deleuze’s philosophy distinct from both the “virtual” and the “actual.”52 
The crucial point remains that the dynamic laws of intensive transformation 
need to be studied empirically with the help of scientific inquiry as practiced 
in different academic disciplines.
Deleuze’s ontology of pure becoming preempts epistemology, however, 
because the infinite space of the virtual disables the conceptual tension be-
tween the objectivity of science and the subjectivity of human experience 
that constitutes knowledge. Modern science exists only because of this ten-
sion, as Erwin Schrödinger points out: “The material world has only been 
constructed at the price of taking the self, that is, mind, out of it, removing 
it; mind is not part of it.”53 Put differently, the rationalist notion of scien-
tific objectivity presupposes— and can only operate in conjunction with— 
the humanist separation of lifeless things from human subjectivity. “What 
a paradox!” Edmund Husserl exclaimed in his famous lecture on the crisis 
in European sciences in 1932: “Nothing could cripple the peculiar force of 
the rapidly growing and, in their own accomplishments, unassailable exact 
sciences or the belief in their truth. And yet, as soon as one took into account 
that they are the accomplishments of the consciousness of knowing sub-
jects, their self- evidence and clarity were transformed into incomprehensible 
absurdity.”54 The entire discourse of Western philosophy, Boris Groys has 
cogently argued, ultimately comes down to this: “Logos is paradox,” or, in 
Niklas Luhmann’s terms: “The form of rationality itself under modernity is 
paradoxical.”55 Analytical philosophers call this phenomenon norm circu-
larity or the principle of relativity. As Willard van Ornam Quine explains, 
“What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a theory are, absolutely 
speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable or reinterpretable in 
another.”56 Insofar as classical science refuses to acknowledge its constitutive 
relativist nature, it remains a profoundly metaphysical enterprise, as Can-
guilhem, Lyotard, and many others have argued.57 Yet once we acknowledge 
the first- person / third- person distinction as the very foundation of scientific 
knowledge (as in cybernetics, biology, and system theory), the process of 
thinking immediately gets entangled in paradox and logical contradictions, 
as outlined above.
Logical paradox, however, does not spell the end of knowledge, nor does it 
condemn us to complete ignorance about the world we live in. On the con-
trary: paradox enables knowledge; it is the sine qua non of scientific inquiry 
thing-politics and science 303
and epistemological investigation into the paradoxical nature of things. 
Knowledge and meaning emerge precisely through “the de- paradoxification 
of the fundamental and constitutive paradox that underlies all ordered struc-
tures” because “universalization can be achieved only through specification.”58 
Paraphrasing Luhmann and Wolfe, we might say that science, like any other 
complex- dynamic system, works “only because it is such a reduction of com-
plexity.”59 The production of knowledge is predicated on the chiasmic rela-
tion of blindness and insight, between operational closure and environmen-
tal permeability. The claim that the real is a (scientific) construction is true 
only and precisely because (scientific) constructions are themselves deter-
mined by the infinite complexity of the real. This paradox literally informs 
the being of humans and their relation to the material world. “Things,” 
Lorraine Daston clarifies, “knit together matter and meaning.”60 As she ex-
plains elsewhere: “Things are both socially constructed and real. That is, 
they depend crucially on the cultural resources at and in a given context . . . 
and they capture some aspect of the world; they work. But they are neither 
historically inevitable nor metaphysically true. Rather they are contingent to 
a certain place and yet valid for certain purposes.”61 In any given situation, 
humans experience things both exactly as they are in and of themselves and 
as something actively constructed by us and for us. Scientific knowledge— 
originally conceived by Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, Bacon, and so on as the 
objective mathematization of nature— is never just an abstract method of 
representation, but always remains rooted in life and the living. Not only is 
knowledge based on human practice; it is itself a human practice that con-
stitutes “a form of life.”62
Although some tough- minded realists continue to struggle with the 
methodological and epistemic consequences ensuing from the paradoxical 
nature of Western rationality, most scientific disciplines have accepted and 
productively integrated this dilemma into their discursive practices. Daston 
aptly points out that most scientists today “take it for granted that things 
are simultaneously material and meaningful.”63 They hardly have a choice 
in the matter, given the century- old history of philosophical reflection and 
scientific evidence demonstrating the chiasmic intertwinement of epistemo-
logical and ontological questions.64 Ever since Einstein’s and Heisenberg’s 
revolutionary discoveries of relativity and quantum physics some one hun-
dred years ago, post- Newtonian physics was forced to recognize the be-
havioral unpredictability of nonlinear systems. The original conundrum in 
quantum physics was that the scientist’s observation of particles interacts 
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with— and thus changes— the (state of ) things observed. Heisenberg repeat-
edly remarked upon the insufficiency of classical logic to explain quantum 
physics: “The mathematical scheme of quantum theory can be interpreted 
as an extension or modification of classical logic,” in particular the “law 
‘tertium non datur.’ ”65
A key distinction between classical physics and quantum physics thus 
concerns the replacement of absolute laws with statistical laws of probability. 
In Heisenberg’s words, a probability function “does not in itself represent 
a course of events in the course of time. It represents a tendency for events 
and our knowledge of events. The probability function can be connected 
with reality only if one essential condition is fulfilled: a new measurement 
is made to determine a certain property of the system. Only then does the 
probability function allow us to calculate the probable result of the new 
measurement.”66 Anticipating what cybernetics and (general) system theory 
would later formulate in terms of autopoiesis and second- order observation, 
Heisenberg recognized that only a second measurement is able to supple-
ment the limited information obtained by means of the first. Obviously, this 
amounts to an infinite regress of ever more observations— none of which, 
however, is able to reveal what exactly “happens to the system between the 
initial observation and the next measurement.”67
Quantum physics, much like the nonlinear dynamics of complex systems 
explored by mathematicians since the 1970s, required scientists to shift focus 
“from objects to relationships, from quantity to quality, from substance to 
pattern.”68 Post- Newtonian physics, in other words, amounts to a funda-
mental reconceptualization of the natural laws of science. These laws can no 
longer be stated in absolute, determinist terms, but instead are based on sta-
tistical data that predict probabilities rather than certainties. Today’s physics 
analyzes dynamic potentials, not static facts.69 The same holds true for the 
various “knowledges produced by the new biology.” Based on the molecular, 
cellular, and holistic study of individual organisms and whole populations, 
the laws currently developed by the life sciences are “probabilistic rather than 
deterministic” in nature.70
Population genetics provides a case in point. As Evelyn Fox Keller points 
out, genetics can only answer “statistical question[s] about the relative con-
tributions of variations in genetics and in the environment to our differences 
from each other.”71 These statistics, however, are only “of limited use in try-
ing to tease out the influence of genotype on phenotype.”72 In other words, 
geneticists’ statistical information about the distribution of trait differences 
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among a given (i.e., arbitrarily defined) population does not answer the 
question about the power of genes to determine the unique development of 
a single organism. Contrary to popular belief, genes are not, strictly speak-
ing, agents, because they do not act in and of themselves. Rather, genes are 
activated in and through their specific environment, and the result of their 
activation can only be measured statistically in terms of probability, but not 
actually in terms of the specific traits of a unique individual.
Before moving on to the next section, let me briefly emphasize that none 
of the above amounts to some postmodern cult of fashionable nonsense or 
scientific irrationalism.73 Instead, the demise of the traditional concept of 
objectivity is based on developments in numerous scientific fields, includ-
ing mathematics, physics, and the life sciences, all of which acknowledge 
the importance of postreductionist ways of thinking. Neither Heisenberg 
nor Schrödinger, neither Husserl nor Luhmann ever denied the existence of 
material reality, nor did they reduce scientific knowledge to just one among 
many arbitrary constructions of how the world is. To say that matter and 
meaning are inextricably intertwined is not the same as saying that matter 
and meaning are identical and literally amount to the same thing. On the 
contrary, the crucial point is to avoid this unproductive short circuit between 
the epistemological and the ontological realm. If we allow both realms to 
collapse into one and the same thing, we effectively undermine the produc-
tion of new knowledge, because we reify the dynamic interplay between 
matter and meaning on which all scientific inquiry is based. Instead, epis-
temology remains— and ought to remain— in a state “of perpetual crisis,” 
as Hans- Jörg Rheinberger points out.74 The very production of scientific 
knowledge depends upon this crisis, for there is no knowledge indepen-
dent of the problems it encounters: “As long as epistemic objects and their 
concepts remain blurred, they generate a productive tension.”75 The goal is 
precisely not to “confuse ontological questions (about what exists) with epis-
temological questions (about how we know about it),” but to demonstrate 
“why these questions have to be answered together.”76
Defining Life: Individual versus Individuation
This (all too brief ) overview may suffice to demonstrate the scientific cre-
dentials behind the new materialism of thing- politics.77 My goal has been 
to demonstrate that the sciences have, by and large, been able to make sense 
of— and productively engage with— the logical paradoxes that found the hu-
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manist tradition of Western rationalism. On the political side, however, the 
legacy of this tradition has proven disastrous. The “anthropological machine 
of humanism” has given rise to a highly normative— and normalizing— 
understanding of human nature, which in turn has shaped the modern 
history of liberal- democratic philosophy from Locke and Hobbes to John 
Rawls and Jürgen Habermas.78 One of its key concepts is that of the human 
individual, which is meant to capture the physical- organic integrity— the 
holistic gestalt— of a living body. In the liberal tradition, life is therefore 
considered a personal property of the individual, which means that being 
alive is tantamount to (the being of ) individuals. As Judith Butler rightly 
points out, liberal political philosophy “tends to presuppose already consti-
tuted communities, already established subjects” but fails to analyze “how 
these subjects and communities are constituted” and become recognizable 
as such in the first place.79
Yet the countless humanitarian crises of the twentieth and twenty- first 
centuries have exposed— and continue to expose— the political impotence 
of liberal philosophy and its unfaltering belief in the (always already) given 
identity of individuals, communities, and nation- states. It was precisely this 
presumed naturalness of liberalist discourse that fueled much of the post-
modern critique of traditional humanism, which Sartre famously character-
ized as “nothing but an ideology of lies, a perfect justification for pillage.”80 
Sartre’s overall goal, like that of most French intellectuals at the time, was 
not to destroy but rather “to remake humanism.”81 It is therefore hardly 
accidental that Louis Althusser qualified his philosophy as a theoretical anti-
humanism, or that Foucault repeatedly sought to clarify the antihumanist— 
as opposed to antihuman— tenets of his philosophy. Not only leftist progres-
sives (e.g., Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Slavoj Žižek, Gilles Deleuze), 
but also conservative thinkers (e.g., Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss) throughout 
the twentieth century have argued that liberal human rights discourse is 
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.
Hannah Arendt was among the first to make this claim. Although human 
rights are meant to protect refugees, migrants, and those who, for whatever 
reason, are no longer protected by the nation- state, they are, in fact, only ap-
plied to those who continue to enjoy state rights anyhow. Human rights, in 
other words, are the phantasmagorical double— rather than the primordial 
foundation— of citizen rights. Without the legal- administrative power of 
nation- states to implement them, human rights are politically meaningless, 
a concept without a referent. For there is nobody to administer these rights 
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nor anybody to whom these rights are actually being applied. Once reduced 
to the status of bare life, to use Giorgio Agamben’s term, the human being 
falls outside all— that is, both the sacred and the secular— order of things. 
Like the rationalist concept of objectivity, the liberal notion of human rights 
is a metaphysical construct inherited from the Western humanist tradition. 
As Arendt points out again and again, the human does not exist; only hu-
mans do. What humans share, however, “are not attributes of human nature, 
however we may define it, but qualities of a world constructed by humans.”82
Today more than ever, the liberal concept of the human individual and 
its inalienable rights seems out of touch with life as it currently takes shape 
in molecular research and biotechnological procedures. As numerous stud-
ies have pointed out, the increased cooperation among financial investors, 
corporate industry, and the life sciences has led to an enormous produc-
tion (and consumption) of sophisticated products, prostheses, and medical 
procedures that affect and modify the internal regulatory systems of living 
organisms.83 And yet, although contemporary biotechnology is meant to 
serve and protect life— and, above all else, human life— its major effect, para-
doxically, consists in undermining our traditional humanist belief in subjec-
tivity, individuality, and the integrity of the human body. For it has become 
increasingly unclear what exactly constitutes life or human life in the first 
place. As the life sciences and medical examiners penetrate deeper and deeper 
into living organisms, they expose the dynamic complexity of self- regulatory 
mechanisms that question not only the body’s ontological status as a unified 
being— a material thing in the world— but also reveal the precariousness of 
our epistemological concepts that seek to endow this bodily matter with 
cognitive meaning.
This means that the (philosophical, scientific, legal) concepts of life, as 
well as their material referents, are inherently unstable, or, in Butler’s words, 
precarious.84 Life itself, not just human life, requires its own concept— a 
concept less entangled with the rationalist anthropomorphism that char-
acterizes the modern liberal understanding of the human subject as a free 
individual. Nobody has argued this point more convincingly than Roberto 
Esposito. Esposito’s reading of Foucault seeks to unbind today’s biopoli-
tics from the history of modern sovereignty precisely in order to replace the 
static concept of the liberal individual with the more dynamic and process- 
oriented concept of individuation. What renders Esposito’s philosophy im-
portant for us today, I think, is not only his detailed historical account of 
modern biopolitics or his careful negotiation of a middle path in between 
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Agamben’s negative vision of biopolitics (understood as the exploitation of 
bare life) and Hardt and Negri’s affirmative vision (of the multitude as an 
emergent biopolitical power).85 Even more crucial, in my view, is Esposito’s 
recognition that an affirmative vision of biopolitics requires the invention of 
a new conceptual framework that expresses— and protects— the irreducible 
multiplicity of life’s becoming.
According to Esposito, biopolitics— both its concept and its practice— has 
become “not only the instrument but also the object of a bitter philosophical 
and political fight over the configuration and destiny of the current age.”86 
Much of the confusion, Esposito argues, can be traced back to a conceptual 
ambiguity in Foucault’s remarks on biopolitics. In his first volume of  The 
History of Sexuality and his later lecture series from the mid- 1970s to the 
early 1980s, Foucault provides a detailed historical investigation of different 
modes of governmentality in the modern age. He frequently distinguishes 
between disciplinary power and biopower as two different approaches— or 
technologies— for the organization of modern societies. While the first re-
gime seeks to discipline the individual human (body), the second regime 
tries to engineer the development of entire populations: “Both technologies 
are obviously technologies of the body, but one is a technology in which 
the body is individualized as an organism endowed with capacities, while 
the other is a technology in which bodies are replaced by general biological 
processes.”87
According to Esposito, however, Foucault’s distinction between bio-
power and sovereign power “oscillates between a continuist attitude” and 
one “more inclined to mark differential thresholds.”88 For it remains un-
clear whether biopolitics produces subjectivity or death, that is, whether it 
constitutes “a politics of life or a politics over life”: “If biopolitics is born 
with the end of sovereignty . . . , this means that the history of biopolitics 
is largely modern and in a certain sense postmodern. If instead, as Foucault 
suggests on other occasions, biopolitics accompanies the sovereign regime, 
constituting a particular articulation of a specific tonality, then its genesis 
is more ancient, one that ultimately coincides with that of politics itself, 
which has always in one way or another been devoted to life.”89 The crucial 
step in Esposito’s argument is to link this ambiguity to a larger conceptual 
problem at the center of Foucauldian discourse, which concerns “the rela-
tion (not only historical, but conceptual and theoretical) between sover-
eignty and politics.”90 Esposito contends that Foucault essentially conceives 
the history of modern politics in terms of sovereignty, which leads him to 
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regard disciplinary power and biopower as two consecutive regimes under 
the overall category of modern sovereignty. Esposito, by contrast, considers 
biopolitics— not sovereignty— the main concept that informs and structures 
the history of modern politics. In other words, whereas Foucault proceeds on 
the basis of a structural- conceptual link between sovereignty and modernity, 
Esposito replaces this link with that between biopolitics and modernity. For 
him, biopolitics is inherently modern and comprises different historical ver-
sions that range from early social contract theory and disciplinary power all 
the way to Nazi thanatopolitics and today’s concerns about “the preservation 
of life through reproduction.”91 The overarching paradigm that unites the 
historically distinct regimes of modern biopolitics, Esposito argues, is their 
shared reliance upon “immunization [as] a negative [form] of the protection 
of life.”92
Immunity, biopolitics, and modernity are thus coconstitutive in Esposi-
to’s view. Modern biopolitics has always been immunitarian, because mo-
dernity has always sought to discipline the (individual and social) body, first 
through the “juridification of life,” and then, increasingly since the end of the 
nineteenth century, through the “biologization of law.”93 Regardless of the 
specific biopolitical regime, however, the immunitary paradigm operative 
within each has always remained the same, from Hobbes to Hitler: it is the 
inherently paradoxical attempt to protect life by regulating life, that is, to 
“shelter life in the same powers [ potenze] that interdicts its development.”94
This immunitary paradigm at the heart of modern biopolitics finally 
reached its structural limit with the rise of German fascism. Unlike any of 
its precursors, the Nazi regime pushed modern biopolitics over a critical 
threshold by completely (con)fusing body and politics. Nazi thanatopolitics, 
Esposito argues, is “actualized biology,” because it literalizes the hitherto 
largely metaphorical tradition of conceiving modern politics in terms of life. 
“What before had always been a vitalistic metaphor becomes a reality in 
Nazism.”95 Due to this literalization of our modern biopolitical vocabulary, 
Nazism “represents the threshold with respect to the past that makes every 
updating of its lexical apparatus impractical.”96 Esposito especially mentions 
concepts such as sovereignty, law, and democracy as the “modern politi-
cal categories that have been shaken and overturned” by twentieth- century 
biopolitics.97
As long as we continue to use these categories, Esposito concludes, politi-
cal philosophy will remain trapped in the same biopolitical logic from which 
it seeks to escape. Since modern biopolitics neither emerged nor dissipated 
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with the rise and fall of Nazism, it will persist until we develop a different 
political vocabulary that reconceptualizes the relation between life and poli-
tics along the nonnormative creativity of life’s becoming.98 Any affirmative 
vision of biopolitics, in other words, requires not only the rejection of the 
liberal concept of human individuality; it also requires that we leave behind 
the entire philosophical tradition of thinking individual being as such. Un-
less biopolitical discourse stops fixating on the (being of ) individuals, it will 
inevitably remain chained to the self- destructive logic of the modern immu-
nitarian paradigm and its paradoxical effort to protect life by destroying life. 
Instead, we must conceive of life in terms of individuation as opposed to 
the being of individuals, because the immunitarian paradigm holds no do-
minion over the infinite potential of life’s becoming. Affirmative biopolitics 
thus “discovers in life its immanent norm, giving to the norm the potenti-
ality [Potenza] of life’s becoming.”99 In the final pages of his book and with 
explicit reference to Canguilhem and Deleuze, Esposito therefore envisions 
life as a self- regulatory process not only in the biological sense of the term 
(i.e., homeostasis, autopoiesis), but also in its juridical, normative sense: “The 
logic of the living,” Esposito suggests, “is capable of introducing a power-
ful semantic in the juridical norm against the immunitary normalization 
of life.”100
Although I support Esposito’s attempt to reconceptualize modernity’s 
political vocabulary along the lines of individuation, I am not sure— nor 
does Esposito himself specify— how to conceptualize “the multiplicity of 
juridical norms” that are said to emerge from this epistemological shift. In 
my view, this lack of specificity is itself symptomatic: it reminds us, once 
again, that the concept of individuation— like that of the individual or any 
other concept— is an (epistemological) object like any other. As such, indi-
viduation remains bound to specific discursive practices that seek to define 
its historical specificity (and not its singularity in Deleuze’s sense). Here is 
how Gilbert Simondon describes these practices: “We cannot have either 
an immediate or a mediated knowledge of individuation, but only one that 
is in process parallel to the process with which we are already familiar. We 
cannot know individuation in the common sense of the phrase; we can only 
individuate, individuate ourselves and in ourselves.”101 In other words, the 
paradoxical attempt of human beings to obtain knowledge about the pro-
cess of individuation that constitutes (their own) living presence becomes 
meaningful only in and through the (scientific) process itself. Like any other 
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concept, individuation cannot be conceived in isolation from its empirical 
roots in science without losing its epistemological coherence. This is not to 
deny that “individuality is not a term, if by that we mean a limit: it is a term 
in a relation.”102 But this relation, Canguilhem insists again and again, is 
profoundly distorted if conceptualized as an independent entity apart from 
its constitutive terms and the discursive practices that constitute it. Doing 
so signals the end of science and epistemology, because both presuppose and 
require human agency in the pragmatist sense of the term. They are literally 
unthinkable without it.103
Labor
Like the new materialisms today, old (Marxist) materialism rejected the bour-
geois humanist notion of subjectivity in favor of a scientific materialist view 
of nature. According to the early Marx, the fact that mankind continues “to 
create and posit things” provides empirical proof that we ourselves are also 
“posited by things, because that is what [we] essentially are by nature.”104 
Yet humans, for Marx, are nonetheless particular and somewhat privileged 
things. More than any other creature on earth, humans constantly intervene 
and substantially alter the material world surrounding them. Man labors, 
and this labor, in Marx’s view, is “an exclusively human characteristic” that 
remains irreducible to animal behavior.105 The human being, for Marx, is 
a laboring animal that can realize itself as human only in and through the 
deliberate, goal- oriented action called labor. While the later Marx focused 
almost exclusively on the analysis of alienated labor in capitalist society, the 
early Marx ventured to characterize labor in a communist society as “a free 
expression of life, hence enjoying life.” And he added, “My labor would thus 
confirm the particularity of my individuality, of my individual life.”106 How-
ever dialectically intertwined the respective natures of humans and things 
might be, Marx leaves no doubt that, at the end of the day, things themselves 
are neither actants nor agents in sociohistorical terms; only humans are.107
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radical way. In such a formulation, the basic objects of physics are no longer 
trajectories or wave functions; they are probabilities.” Prigogine, The End of 
Certainty, 73ff. Similarly von Bertalanffy, Problems of Life, 172; and Schrödinger, 
What Is Life?, 10.
 70 Rose, The Politics of Life Itself, 51.
 71 Keller, The Mirage, 32.
 72 Keller, The Mirage, 39.
 73 Compare Stove, Scientific Irrationalism; Sokal and Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense.
 74 Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete, 21.
 75 Rheinberger, An Epistemology of the Concrete, 156. In Canguilhem’s view, the 
use of scientific concepts is “at once both inevitable and artificial,” because the 
scientist “strives to grasp a becoming whose meaning is never so clearly revealed 
to our understanding as when it disconcerts it.” Canguilhem, Knowledge of Life, 
22. Rheinberger calls this tension between matter and meaning “contained ex-
cess” (An Epistemology of the Concrete, 156), while Heisenberg referred to it as the 
“deficiency of knowledge” first encountered in quantum physics (Physics and 
Philosophy, 15).
 76 Dennett, Kinds of Minds, 2.
 77 For a more detailed account, see the excellent studies by Manuel DeLanda (In-
tensive Science and Virtual Philosophy) and John Protevi (Political Physics), as well 
as the editors’ introductions in Political Matter (Braun and Whatmore, “The 
Stuff of Politics) and New Materialisms (Coole and Frost, “Introducing the New 
Materialisms”).
 78 Agamben, The Open, 29.
 79 Butler, Frames of War, 31ff.
 80 Sartre, preface to The Wretched of the Earth, 21.
 81 Williams, “Edward Said,” 23. Similarly, Neil Badmington argues that the “anti- 
humanist resistance movement” of the mid- twentieth century was precisely 
that: a critique not of— or directed against— the human per se, but only against 
a humanist tradition that needed to be overcome “if radical change, the think-
ing of difference, is to become a possibility” (Badmington, “Introduction,” 7).
 82 Arendt, Über die Revolution, 36 (my translation).
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 83 Nikolas Rose speaks of “biovalue” and “bioeconomy” as a new economic 
sphere that seeks to extract “biovalue” from “the vital properties of living pro-
cesses” (The Politics of Life Itself, 32); Kaushik Sunder Rajan coins the term 
biocapital to denote “a form of enterprise inextricable from contemporary cap-
italism” and based on the “implosion of the economic and [the] epistemic” 
(Biocapital, 3, 283); Eugene Thacker’s concept of “biomedia” makes the point 
that the “biological and the digital domains are no longer rendered ontologi-
cally distinct, but instead are seen to inhere in each other” (Biomedia, 7).
 84 “It can only be that life, conceived as precarious life, is a generalized condition, 
and that under certain political conditions it becomes radically exacerbated or 
radically disavowed” (Butler, Frames of War, 48).
 85 Compare Timothy Campbell, translator’s introduction to Esposito, Bios, 
xix – xxxi.
 86 Esposito, Bios, 14.
 87 Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended,” 249.
 88 Esposito, Bios, 9.
 89 Esposito, Bios, 32, 52.
 90 Esposito, Bios, 42.
 91 Esposito, Bios, 147.
 92 Esposito, Bios, 46.
 93 Esposito, Bios, 182.
 94 Esposito, Bios, 56.
 95 Esposito, Bios, 112.
 96 Esposito, Bios, 149.
 97 Esposito, Bios, 11.
 98 Esposito, Bios, 146.
 99 Esposito, Bios, 194.
 100 Esposito, Bios, 191. Timothy Campbell’s excellent introduction provides a de-
tailed account of Esposito’s overall philosophy and his focus on individuation. 
According to Campbell, Esposito emphasizes “every living form’s interdepen-
dence with other living forms,” which, in turn, helps to recognize and develop 
a “multiplicity of norms within the sphere of law” (translator’s introduction, 
xxxviii).
 101 Simondon, “The Genesis of the Individual,” 317.
 102 Canguilhem, Knowledge of Life, 49.
 103 As Paul Rabinow points out, it appears that “ethnographic studies of labora-
tory life, like those of Bruno Latour,” seek not merely to “[correct] a positivist 
and idealist understanding of science as a single unified activity . . . , but also 
[try to dismantle] the very idea of science— a position as far from Canguilhem’s 
as one could imagine” (Rabinow, introduction to A Vital Rationalist, 13). Can-
guilhem’s aim, according to Rabinow, “was not to attack science but to show 
it in action in its specificity and plurality” (13).
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 104 Marx, quoted in Fetscher, Der Marxismus, 94 (my translation).
 105 Karl Marx, cited by Stack, The First Darwinian Left, 74.
 106 Marx, quoted in Fetscher, Der Marxismus, 98 (my translation).
 107 For a detailed and informed discussion of Marx’s and Engel’s reception of 
Darwinism and their understanding of “human nature,” see Stack, The First 
Darwinian Left, 64 – 75.
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